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SYNOPSIS 
The thesis is an examination of the philosophy of William 
Temple (1881-1944), concentrating on the personalism which 
especially characterises his entire philosophical outlook, but 
which is particularly apparent in his treatment of value. 
The areas addressed are: 
1. The world-picture which underlies Temple's thought. 
2. The place of value in the universe, the nature of value, and 
the relationship between the self and values. 
3. Temple's non-propositional approach to revelation. 
4. The concept of value in personality, the human person, and 
the person in community and Christian fellowship. 
S. God, the supreme personal will, and Temple's justification 
of his existence. 
6. The ethical consequences of Temple's philosophy: the concept 
of Natural Order and its relationship to situation ethics and 
to the Natural Law tradition. 
In analysing these concepts, particular attention is paid to 
Temple's relationship to both the British Idealist tradition 
and to Process Theology. Detailed consideration is also given 
to traditional philosophical questions which concerned Temple, 
especially the Problem of Evil, the Is/Ought question, and the 
extent to which the moral capacity is innate. Outlines of 
alternative approaches to these questions are given where this 
has appeared necessary. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
••• the Oxford Conference felt called upon to address 
a message to the world. I was on the committee which 
drew it up: I remember the hours we spent, wi th 
William Temple as chairman, in working out drafts, 
none of which satisfied us. Finally we asked Temple 
to do it. His version was widely approved, and 
Professor Clavier rightly described it as 'a charter 
of freedom in service and of service in freedom'. The 
essential sentence, which engraved itself 
unforgettably on our minds, ran: 'The first duty of 
the Church, and its greatest service to the world, is 
that it be in very deed the Church, confessing the 
true faith, committed to the fulfilment of the will 
of Christ, its only Lord, and united in him in a 
fellowship of love and service. 1 
Marc Boegner is here writing about the 1937 Conference on 
Church, Community and State, which was an important development 
in the subsequent formation of the World Council of Churches, 
of which William Temple was to be the first (provisional) 
President, though his early death in 1944 meant that he was not 
to oversee the flowering of that organisation. 
Boegner's comments are revealing, for they demonstrate 
significant strands in Temple's personality, not least his 
ability to harmonise different ideas and viewpoints, an ability 
which rested in part on the training he had received at the 
hands of Edward Caird, one of the greatest British Hegelians. 
It is characteristic of that school of philosophy to believe 
that each view, each statement about reality contains partial 
truth, but that it requires modification by another statement, 
in a system of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, in the quest 
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for absoluteness. The gift of synthesis was clearly Temple's, 
though I shall suggest in subsequent chapters that at times his 
solutions are verbal only. 
Perhaps more significant is the sentence which so impressed 
Boegner. To the casual reader, it might appear that Temple is 
simple uttering a truism of Christian thought. A closer 
reading, based more fully on a knowledge of Temple's work, 
reveals how closely it reflects his mature philosophy. To him, 
'fellowship' is not a slick term, but something which reflects 
a profound personalism which is the constant theme of his work; 
and he is concerned, again and again, to state in practical 
terms what love and service mean within the context of social 
and political life. 
The emphasis on the human person as the measure by which social 
and political life should be judged is one that has been 
stressed by many religious thinkers in the past fifty years, 
perhaps in response to the dehumanising influences, both 
political and technological, of the age. Temple, in an essay, 
says: 'The Christian ••• is very much concerned, precisely as a 
Christian, to insist that economic wealth is a means to human 
well-being, and that any action or policy must be wrong which 
tends to increase the former while diminishing the latter.,2 We 
may compare with this Pope John Paul II in Laborens Exercens: 
'the principle of the priori ty of labour over capi tal is a 
postulate of the order of social morality. ,3 Nor is this 
orientation confined only to religious thinkers and 
philosophers. It may be discerned in fields as diverse as 
psychology (in, for instance, the work of Carl Rogers), 
management theory (it is instructive to compare the outlook of 
Chris Argyris or Victor Vroom with the earlier orthodoxies of 
Taylorism), and much recent sociology. 
How much anyone thinker is responsible for an intellectual 
current, it is impossible accurately to judge. By his authority 
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and his fame, by his work as preacher, writer and broadcaster, 
Temple clearly contributed much. Although, as we shall see, 
such a social concern for individual working men and women had 
been a concern of the Catholic Church overtly since the Leo 
XIII's Rerum Novarum of 1891, and had occupied the thought of 
men like F.D.Maurice, Charles Kingsley and Conrad Noel, and 
indeed, of Archbishop Frederick Temple, and of organisa tions 
such as the Guild of St. Matthew, William Temple, more 
completely than any other, integrated it into the mainstream of 
Anglican thought, and influenced a generation. 
That saddest and most energetic of men, Hilaire Belloc, wrote: 
Now, personality is everything. It was a Personal 
Will that made all things, visible and invisible. Our 
hope of immortali ty resides in this, tha t we are 
persons, and half our frailties proceed from a 
misapprehension of the awful responsibili ties which 
personality involves or a cowardly ignorance of its 
powers of self-government. 4 
There is nothing here with which Temple, who knew Belloc, would 
disagree. Indeed, he holds that it is in personality that 
supreme value resides, most wholly in the full personality of 
God. He judges ethics by the standard of what is best to or for 
a person, and is concerned to demonstrate the personal nature 
of the Christian's relationship with God. 
* * * 
Underlying this thesis, therefore, is a concern with 
personalism. I have attempted to address a number of ultimately 
related questions, while tracing links with other thinkers, and 
looking to consider Temple in relation to the Idealist 
tradition. 
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The areas addressed may be summarised briefly: 
1. The world-picture which underlies Temple's thought. 
2. The place of value in the universe, the nature of value, and 
the relationship between the self and values. 
3. Temple's non-propositional approach to revelation. 
4. The concept of value in personality, the human person, and 
the person in community and Christian fellowship. 
S. God, the supreme personal will, and Temple's jus tifica tion 
of his existence. 
6. The ethical consequences of Temple's philosophy: the concept 
of Natural Order and its relationship to Natural Law tradition. 
* * * 
Anyone wri ting about the work of a philosopher necessarily 
comes to his task from a cuI tural background different from 
that of the man under consideration. This is especially true in 
the present case. Temple was a member of the Church of England, 
in the Protestant tradition. I share neither tradition. His 
philosophical training was within the Idealist school. I was a 
pupil of Czeslaw Lejewski, and the predominant influence on my 
philosophical method was not the linguistic enthusiasms of much 
contemporary English philosophy, but the Reism of Tadeusz 
Kotarbinski and the approach of other Polish philosophers, 
together with the Phenomenology of the Central European type, 
tracing its origins to the thought of Brentano. To this should 
be added an abiding interest in medieval philosophy, gained 
largely from D.P.Henry, and perhaps above all, to the thorough 
training I received, in my earliest years, in Catholic social 
thought, to which my late father gave a lifetime's reflection. 
This difference of approach will be apparent. I hope it is 
fruitful rather than otherwise. I have not hesitated to draw on 
those differences, for it seems that often I have been unable 
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wholly to accept Temple's reasoning on particular points, while 
- often - agreeing with his conclusions, and in parts of this 
thesis I have tried to outline alternative approaches. Nowhere 
is this more evident than in my attempt to suggest an 
alternative basis for natural order, or in my suggestions on 
the problem of evil. But where I am cri tical, it is from 
respect: and it is perhaps tribute to Temple that he stimulates 
thought rather than passive acceptance. It was this quality 
tha t s truck me when firs t I read him, and it is this I find 
still in him. 
* * * 
One preliminary question needs to be addressed. Central to 
Temple's philosophy is a concept of the nature of truth which 
is itself controversial. In Nature, Man and God, he gives a 
specific definition: 
The essential condition for the actualisation of 
Value is the discovery by Mind of itself or its own 
principle in its object ••• 
•.• When Mind makes this discovery in the activity of 
analysis and synthesis, the form of Value actualised 
is Truth. 5 
He adds to this an explanatory note: 
When I say that Mind finds itself or what is itself 
in its object, I mean an experience which has two 
aspects: first, that it finds the counterpart of the 
principle of its own acti vi ties as for example the 
mathematical properties of mechanical combinations of 
forces or of aesthetic proportions; secondly, tha t 
with this discovery goes a feeling of being at home 
with the object, not lost or bewildered in presence 
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of it. The latter aspect is not easily capable of 
definition, but seems to me to be easily 
recognisable and profoundly significant. 6 
It is clear tha t Temple, as he frequently reminds us 7, uses 
'satisfactoriness' as the test that mind has discovered truth. 
Truth is that which resolves tension, and the need for it is 
fundamental to the organism: 
••• desire is a condition of tension. It arises from 
a failure in the environment to satisfy the organism, 
or a realisation that the environment is offering the 
means of satisfying a need till now unsatisfied; and 
so soon as under the impulse of desire the organism 
has found the satisfaction of its need, desire 
ceases; it exists in the tension which it seeks to 
relieve. 8 
There is an immediate problem with Temple's view: what is 
satisfactory to one person is not necessarily so to another. 
One person may say of an explanation that it is sufficient for 
him, and he has no need of any other: another, perhaps a 
scientist, may ask for more, feeling that the given explanation 
itself opens up further questions. The danger here is that one 
feels he has found 'truth', the other not. Any account of the 
differences between the two men will be not a matter of logic 
so much as analysis of two psychologies: different people being 
differently satisfied. In this difference there is further 
peril: the sense of frustration felt by the person satisfied at 
the apparent obtuseness of the person who is not. The 
consequence can be that of an unreasoned defence of an 
orthodoxy against a questioner. Examples abound in intellectual 
his tory. Many thinkers were entirely sa tisfied wi th a geo-
centric vision of the universe, and felt that men like 
Copernicus or Galileo were unnecessarily dissatisfied in their 
search for an alternative. 
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Ultimately, greater knowledge prevailed; and it was the 
dissatisfaction which led to that deeper knowledge. Indeed, 
according to Karl Popper, it is through dissatisfaction with 
existing orthodoxy, through seeking to show falsification, that 
scientific progress is made. There is, between Temple and 
Popper, a great gulf. As we shall see, many writers about 
Temple have drawn attention to his self-confidence: some, 
indeed, have described him as intellectually 'placid', and 
there is, I think, an element of truth in the criticism. When 
arguing for the existence of God, for instance, Temple seeks an 
explanation that raises no further questions, using this to 
justify his acceptance of purposive will. For me, the critical 
stance of Popper is preferable, in that it enriches rather than 
impoverishes a given topic, for it asks us to envisage a 
universe of other possibilities. 
Perhaps we should extend charity to Temple in this. He could 
not have been familiar with the work of Popper, and his writing 
shows no familiarity with the existentialists who, finding no 
intrinsic meaning in the world, require the individual as it 
were by act of will to impose his own meaning on the world for 
the sake of his own authenticity. It is not necessary, nor is 
it part of my purpose, to consider the merits of the 
existentialist case. It is sufficient to point to the need for 
a coherent defence of any philosophy to be able to account for 
the views of others. Any hint of 'well, it satisfies me' is 
signally unpersuasive. I hope to develop something of this in 
the ensuing pages: it seems to me an underlying, even 
temperamental, weakness in Temple as philosopher. But if that 
is a weakness in him, it should not deflect from the central 
task of seeking what is of perennial value in his philosophical 
writing. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BACKGROUND 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
It is rare, but not without parallel, that a man notable as a 
philosopher should reach the very highest ecclesiastical 
office. Two twentieth century cases however stand out. One is 
the elevation of Karol Wojty1a, the phenomenologist and 
Professor of Ethics at Lublin to the papacy as John Paul II. To 
his work reference will be.made in this study in the thought of 
Dr. William Temple (1881-1944), who was to rise to be 
Archbishop of Canterbury (1942-1944). 
The combination of high church office and philosopher is, at 
times, an uneasy one. It is tempting to view the philosopher 
through the office - to consider the philosopher great because 
of the exaltedness of the man. It is equally tempting to view 
the philosophy with some surprise, as a curiosity; and perhaps 
to demean it as somehow irrelevant, more involved with 
apologetics than with true philosophical concern. The 
difficulty here is heightened in the case of William Temple, as 
his philosophical works contain elements of overt theology, in 
greater measure than in those of Wojtyla. Nonetheless, there is 
an illogicali ty in deriding the philosopher because of the 
churchman: it would be as reasonable to deride the philosophy 
of Leibniz because he was a mathematician - or, in another 
field to the music of Charles Ives because he was a 
successful businessman. 
Nevertheless, there are real difficulties in the philosophical 
activities of the man of affairs, and these apply with some 
force in the life and work of William Temple. The point is well 
made by Temple himself, writing of his first major 
philosophical work, Mens Creatrix, published in 1917: 
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This book was planned in the year 1908 when I 
was a junior don engaged in lecturing in Philosophy. 
At that time I had the presumption to believe that I 
was myself destined to be a philosopher. The course 
of events has led to my since being mainly occupied 
with what arefoolishly distinguished as "practical 
affairs"(for what is so powerful in practice as a 
philosophy?), and the completion of this book has 
been the work of odd moments. It was partly written 
at Oxford; partly at Repton, while I was Headmaster 
there; but more than half of it has been dictated in 
spare half hours since I came to London, indeed 
during the first six months of 1916. 1 
There is indeed, as Dorothy Emmet has noted, a tendency to 
disjointedness in some of Temple's philosophical work, and she 
notes also that 'we may feel that ••• argument has not been 
subjected to the constant scrutiny for which we look in a 
writer to whom philosophy has been a primary vocation. ,2 
Indeed, Temple's own description of the years 1908 to 1916 
omits much. In those years, he had published seven other books, 
visited Australia, lectured at the General Theological Seminary 
in New York, edi ted a magazine and Papers for Wartime, was 
President of the Workers Educational Association, laboured for 
the burgeoning ecumenical movement, and had charge of St. 
James', Piccadilly, one of London's busiest churches. Mens 
Creatrix was finished late at night on the eve of his wedding. 3 
Even for a young man of phenomenal energy such labour must have 
some effect. As he rose in the church, Temple's activities 
increased rather than diminished. There is no need to rehearse 
them here. It is sufficient to note that by the time of 
Christus Veritas(1924) he was busy as Bishop of Manchester; and 
he delivered the Gifford Lectures 1932-1934 when Archbishop of 
York. These lectures were published in 1934 as Nature, Man and 
God and constitute Temple's last and perhaps most important 
major contribution to philosophy. 
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There are clearly disadvantages to the philosopher in so wide a 
range of activities. There are, however, certain benefits when 
studying the thought of a man so immersed in public life, a man 
who could say ... what is so powerful in practice as a 
philosophy?' for we have the opportuni ty to consider towards 
the end of this thesis how Temple applied his philosophical 
method and 
including 
ethical 
such 
principles 
matters as 
to a wide range 
Nazi treatment 
of subjects, 
of Jews, 
education,war,history, penal reform, the League of Nations, 
ecumenism,politics, economics, marriage, gambling and venereal 
disease. The practical affairs of life provide a test for any 
philosophy: we shall consider the adequacy of Temple's thought 
in the light of that test, having first analysed his central 
philosophical principles. 
2.BACKGROUND TO TEMPLE'S PHILOSOPHY 
Temple's style in philosophy tends to be vigorous and 
straightforward. His philosophical 'voice' is confident, 
tending towards exposi tion of ideas wi thou t a grea t deal of 
overt analysis of other philosophers. Of his method, Temple 
says in Mens Creatrix: 'The enquiry is tentative; but for the 
sake of clearness and brevity the exposition will be confident. 
Views not accepted will only be mentioned when the ground for 
their rejection seems to be also ground for the acceptance.,4 
His style was not to change.( We may note that this confidence 
of exposition is also characteristic of Wojtyla, a 
characteristic which he shares with much Polish philosophy: but 
modern British writing is generally more discursive. A British 
philosopher will conduct a debate with other philosophers; a 
Polish one - and Temple - prefers to expound directly to the 
reader.) 
This method can create occasional difficulties for the Temple 
scholar. Because Temple mentions few other philosophers, and 
even fewer theologians, there is a temptation to treat his 
1 1 
philosophy as if it were a thing complete of itself. Joseph 
Fletcher 5 in the longest published study of Temple's thought 
falls into this trap, doing little to set Temple in his 
intellectual context, especially in the development of English 
philosophy. More rigorous analysis shows tha t Temple stands 
within the tradition of British Idealism, and most eVidently of 
Personal Idealism; though there is a shift towards the newer 
school of Realism apparent in Nature, Man and God. One critic 
has suggested that 'what Temple has attempted is the 
development of a theistic idealistic metaphysic on the basis of 
a realistic epistemology,6 It seems to me that this is an over-
simplification, for reasons which I hope will be apparent 
later. While the main purpose of this study is not to show the 
philosophical antecedents of Temple, a brief review of his 
background of his background will be hplnful in elucidating and 
contextualising certain points. 
Temple said of himself that the 'master influences,7 were St. 
John, Browning and Plato8 • Plato, he said, was supreme among 
philosophers, because of his ability - as perceived by Temple -
'to grasp the whole as a whole - •.. Imagina t ion as well as 
-Intellect, the artistic as well as the scientific capacity,9. 
This capaci ty to grasp the whole, to synthesise and to unify 
was characteristic of Temple's whole method: in various church 
and poli tical deba tes he was frequently called upon to draft 
consensus statements reconciling the points of view of 
others lO : and his philosophical and other writings are shot 
through with this approach. Nor is this at all surprising. The 
synthesising approach may be true of Plato: it is certainly 
true of Temple's Oxford mentor, Edward Caird 11. Caird 
repeatedly stressed the need for a unifying principle in 
philosophy - 'the source of being to all things that are, and 
of knowing to all beings that know ... an essential principle, 
or rather the ultimate essential principle of our intelligence, 
a principle which must manifest itself in the life of every 
rational creature. ,12 This principle, the ground of thought and 
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being, is God. This view is fundamental to both Caird and 
Temple. Temple made explicit his debt to Edward Caird - 'such 
method in thought as I possess, and especially such grasp of 
the principles of Dialectic as I have acquired, I believe 
myself to owe to my Master at Balliol, Edward Caird,13 - and 
Nature, Man and God is dedicated to his memory. Caird had 
published important studies of Kant14 and Hegel lS , and it is 
not surprising that both the critical approach of the one, and 
the dialectical approach of the other should have had evident 
influence on Temple's own work, especially in Nature, Man and 
God. As a student, Temple was a keen disciple of Kant; indeed, 
his father, Archbishop Frederick Temple, found it necessary to 
advise his son to stop thinking about the nature of things-in-
themsel ves, 'for Time and Space are a part of you and you 
cannot do without them' 16. The influence of the Dialectical 
Method is evident both in the emphasis on synthesisation and in 
the whole intellectual method of Nature, Man and God. 
Caird held that despite the importance of Kant and Hegel and 
the significance of metaphysical idealism as a way of 
interpreting experience, it was an error to import into a 
foreign country any philosophical system - what satisfied a 
past generation in another country was not necessarily suited 
to the intellectual needs of today17. (In some ways we may see 
this as a reflection of Hegel's own attitude, in particular to 
the philosophy of law.) Temple seems to have followed Caird in 
this view18 ; it is therefore not unexpected that we find his 
Kantianism and Hegelianism transmuted by British Idealism. To a 
brief review of this strand in philosophy we now turn. 
Idealism was, for almost a century, dominant in British 
philosophical life. It is now, for various reasons which will 
be apparent, almost entirely neglected, though there are a few 
recent thinkers, notably Illtyd Trethowan and T.L.S. Sprigge 
who show its influence. The term 'Idealism' can be confusing, 
and it will be helpful to clarify what is meant. 'Idealism' is 
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and it will be helpful to clarify what is meant. 'Idealism' is 
generally described as the view that material things exist only 
as the objects of perception: 'realism', by contrast, is the 
view tha t they exis t even when no t perceived. However, the 
British Idealists are not, on the whole, very concerned with 
the theory of perception. The core of their idea is that to be 
real is to be a member of a 'rational system'; that is to say, 
a system which is constructed in such a way that the nature of 
the members can fully be understood only in relation to the 
whole. The system which thus envelops the members is generally 
presented as ideal and spiritual. Here may be seen the Platonic 
influence - in Platonic Idealism the central doctrine is that a 
thing is real to the extent that it participates in the Ideal. 
The British Idealists tend to believe either that the reality 
of a thing is a manifestation of Spirit (Absolute Idealism) or 
it is a member of a community of spirits (Personal Idealism). 
Temple'S thought draws upon both strands the unifying 
principle is God, who sustains the universe; but value is 
realised in community. Either way, there is a tendency towards 
explicit metaphysics. 19 
Bri tish Idealism may be traced back to the thought of S. T. 
Coleridge (1772-1834). In Coleridge we find the emergence of 
concern with the subject-object relationship, a concern evident 
throughout the development of idealism. By 'subject' is meant 
the knowing or perceiving self; the 'object' is the object of 
that self's perception: 'All knowledge rests on the coincidence 
of an object with a subject' 20. We must find the ultimate 
principle in the identity of subject and object, and this 
identi ty is found in the self-consciousness of a spiri t. 21 
However, if the spirit is originally the identity of subject 
and object, it must somehow dissolve this identity to become 
conscious of itself as object, and this requires an act of 
will. For this, freedom is necessary, the freedom of the spirit 
to reconstruct itself objectively to itself. In the further 
development of this idea Coleridge becomes somewhat cloudy; but 
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he notes importantly that the ego is not an end in itself22: to 
understand all existence, we must elevate 
the absolute self, the great eternal I 
our conception 'to 
am' 23. We find in 
Temple, a hundred years later, similar concerns - the move from 
self to God, the concern with the subject-object relationship, 
the significance of self-consciousness and the importance of 
freedom to the intellect. No less important is the cast of mind 
we find in Coleridge - the idea that an Idealist metaphysics 
leads to a spiri tual comprehension of reali ty, underpinning 
Christianity in a conscious opposition to mechanistic 
approaches to nature. 
British Idealism obviously developed a great deal beyond 
Coleridge. Important figures in that development were James 
Ferrier(1808-l864), John Grote(1813-1866), T.H.Green(1836-
1882), Edward Caird, F.H.Bradley(1846-1924), and Bernard 
Bosanquet(1848-1923). It is not necessary for present purposes 
to detail the thought of each of these: rather it will be 
helpful to consider such elements in each philosopher that will 
show ideas that were to be central to the system adumbrated by 
Temple in his works: further parallels will be drawn in the 
detailed analysis of Temple's own philosophy. 
Ferrier emphasises knowledge as a starting point. Nothing can 
be known except in its relation to self as subject - a thing 
has meaning, and indeed is only thinkable as an object for a 
subject. The universe has meaning for a subject, yet further is 
unthinkable except as having existence for a subject. 
Nevertheless, we can consider the universe separately from 
consideration of ourselves, but only, says Ferrier, 'by yoking 
it on, in thought, to some other self.,24 This move seems in 
experience an improbable one, but it is significant, as Temple 
makes a similar move from our minds to the sustaining Mind of 
the universe. Ferrier's eventual formulation is: 'there is 
one ••• Absolute Existence which is strictly necessary; and that 
existence is a supreme, and infinite, and everlasting Mind in 
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synthesis with all things. ,25 For Ferrier, the Absolute is not 
God alone but a synthesis of God and the world: to treat the 
Absolute as God would be to risk pantheism. 
John Grote stresses the subject-object relationship very 
strongly. He follows Ferrier in stating that any phenomenon 
isunintelligible without relation to consciousness. Ferrier had 
said that we can only be ignorant of what is in principle 
knowable; for anything unknowable can have no relation to 
subject and becomes meaningless. The subject has an important 
part to play in constructing an articulated universe; and the 
self has ends teleological activity in so forming a 
conception. We find something of this emphasis in Temple, and 
the language he uses in his development of Na tural Order is 
precisely such a teleological ordering of reali ty as a basis 
for moral acti vi ty. Likewise, Temple shares wi th Grote the 
attitude that science cannot provide total understanding of the 
universe. For Grote, as for Temple, 
existed in abstraction from things 
philosopher, their knowableness 
science works as if things 
as they are known - for a 
is essential; and this 
knowableness exists precisely because the objects of the world 
are consonant with the requirements of mind; they have 
reasonableness wi thin them, and so we can feel a t home wi th 
them and make sense of them. This attitude we find in other 
idealists; and in Temple the point is repeated constantly. 
Temple makes clear his belief that science is not enough, 
emphasising the significance of art, moral ac ti vi ty and will 
and imagina tion in our comprehension of the universe. 26 In 
Temple and in Grote the point is made more overtly than in the 
work of other idealists. 
T.H.Green emphasises the active, imaginative aspects of the 
mind which are essential to full understanding of the universe. 
To understand is nit merely to receive impressions; it is to 
organise and synthesise by mental activity. This synthesisation 
is a developing activity of the human race. Our understanding 
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of mental activity in this way brings moral requirements, but 
these are based on our apprehension of value on the world. 
Further, the need for activity in understanding shows that man 
can only realise himself (understand himself) in activity. This 
activity is free in the sense that his actions are his own, 
tha t he is the author of them. Even if they follow from his 
character, they are nonetheless free. We shall see Temple 
arguing similarly in making the case for freedom of the will, 
that the acts of a self-conscious subject can properly be said 
to be free acts. Temple also follows Green in his belief that 
while the individual must realise himself, the human person is 
essentially a social being, who can only fully actualise his 
potential in society. Nevertheless he follows Green's view that 
'our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth. 
All other values are relative to value for, of, or in a 
person. ,27 For both, society is essential to the development of 
the individual; and society's forms - state, family, and so on 
- must cater for this development. To this point we shall be 
returning frequently in this study. 
Edward Caird has been mentioned. Note was made of his emphasis 
on synthesis and reconciliation, following the Hegelian model -
for Caird, there are no antagonisms that cannot be reconciled. 
If for instance religion and science seem opposed, this is only 
an appearance. For this reason, Caird regretted the Cartesian 
tendency to dualism - the gap emphasised by the traditional gap 
between Cartesians and empiricists. Temple, his pupil, followed 
him in this: 'If I were asked what was the most disastrous 
moment in the history of Europe I should be strongly tempted to 
answer that it w~s that period of leisure when Rene Descartes, 
having no claims to mee t, remained for a whole day "shut up 
alone in a stove",28 For Caird 'the world is a rational or inte 
lligible system,29 Man is thus also united, under the central 
unifying power of God: Temple likewise insists on the unified 
na ture of man - he uses the term 'solidari ty' - under God. 
Caird devoted much of his thought to the development of the 
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religious impulse in man. Consciousness has three elements: man 
may look outwards to the not-self, the object; inwards to 
himself; and upwards to the unifying factor between subject and 
object, God. Caird traces this development in religious 
history. In Ancient Greece, man saw God objectively, as 'out 
there' • In Israel, man looked inwards to the personal God. 
Only in Christianity do we find united the God of both nature 
and morality: differences do not disappear, but are united. 
There follows from this, not surprisingly the view tha t the 
traditional division between Natural and Revealed Theology 
should disappear, subsumed in the philosophical theology of 
Idealism. We find Temple also casting doubt on the divisions in 
theology, from a similar point of view. Common to both men is a 
reaction to the traditional sharp distinctions of Nature, Man 
and God; these must be reconciled, as must the contrast between 
the worlds of 'facts' and 'values' - values are in the facts, 
and every fact has value. To this we shall return. Caird' s 
emphasis on, and interest in, the development of religious 
thought is not surprising given his frank acceptance of 
Darwinism. Throughout his work we find evidence of this 
concern, wi th consideration of the implications of evolution 
for philosophy. Temple follows him in this; after all, 
Frederick Temple had been the first senior churchman overtly to 
accept the evolutionary process as axiomatic, in the Bampton 
Lectures of 1884. 30 
Bradley, the best-known of the Idealists, had perhaps less 
influence on Temple than his contemporary, Bosanquet. 
Nevertheless, we find him quoted quite often by Temple. Temple 
does not devote much space to the discussion of the principal 
matters dealt with in ,for instance, Appearance and Reality but 
he is clearly a t one wi th Bradley in his insistence on the 
intelligibility of reality: as Bradley puts it: 'the universe 
appears to be one system; it is an organism (it would appear) 
and more. It bears the character of the self, the personality 
to which it is relative, and without which it is as good as 
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nothing,.3l He also follows Bradley in his insistence that the 
overall unity contains - and must contain - diversity: the 
theory of concrete universals, the insistence that a universal 
must be a community of its members, nbt an abstraction from it, 
finds echo in Temple's thought. Temple does diverge from 
Bradley, as we shall see when considering his attitude to the 
idea of personality, in his attitude to morality: Bradley seems 
to argue slightly statically - that morality consists in 
large part in simply following the norms of society: 'to be 
moral, I must will my station and its duties. ,32 Nor do we find 
in Temple Bradley's preoccupation wi th his ra ther hazy, and 
logically suspect, Absolute. 33 
Bosanquet was, as we have noted, more influential than Bradley 
on Temple. Part of the reason for this is that Bosanquet, 
perhaps the las t grea t Absolute Idealist, found himself more 
consciously than Bradley trying to hold the Idealistic line 
against a younger generation of British philosophers who, like 
Russell, opposed Idealism. Bosanquet went not so far along the 
road towards the Absolute as Bradley, concerning himself rather 
with matters like art, science, religion and social 
participation. Temple follows him in the view that these 
activities possess real value: in each of his philosophical 
works, Temple draws on these activities - involving as the do 
the traditional Idealist triad of Truth, Beauty and Goodness -
to argue for a theistic system. Bosanquet emphasises more 
strongly than Bradley the significance of value in the world: 
'the character of experience as a revelation of the world of 
values is pretty clear. ,34 Like Bosanquet, Temple gives value a 
central place in his thought: in Bradley it is a more 
peripheral concern. 
So far in this brief review of Idealism, we have concerned 
ourselves with Absolute Idealism rather than with Personal 
Idealism. Here we may content ourselves with a brief glance at 
only two major thinkers: Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856-
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1931)35, and James Ward (1843-1925). The best-known Personal 
Idealist, John McTaggart (1866-1925), found less sympathy from 
Temple, probably because of his atheism: Temple tended to look 
to philosophers for support of Christian theology. The central 
thesis, as we have noted, of the Personal Idealists was that 
the reali ty of a thing is as a member of a communi ty of 
spirits. We may add F.C.Cop1eston's generalisation that 'one of 
the basic factors in personal idealism is a judgement of value, 
namely that personality represents the highest value within the 
field of our experience.' 36 This s ta tement 
glance to be a summary of the central 
Creatrix. However, there are differences 
fundamental views of value and those 
appears 
argument 
between 
held by 
at first 
of Mens 
Temple's 
Pringle-
Pattison. 37 He also harks back to Bradley and expresses the 
wish that Pringle-Pattison should explore the implications of 
his own theism to show the unificatory effects of God38 ; after 
all, 'even Mr. Bradley's Absolute, though itself dark wi th 
excess if light, has something to tell us about its own 
appearances,.39 
Temple describes Pringle-Pattison' s The Idea of God as 'the 
nearest approach to a Summa Philosophiae that any contemporary 
has given us', though he confesses that when reading it' I am 
haunted by a sense of ambiguity,40 in relation to Pringle-
Pattison's ideas both of God and of value. Nevertheless, 
Pringle-Pattison is important to Temple in stressing the 
importance of the individual and his value, which can be lost 
in the emphasis on the Absolute: 'the two posi tions the 
divine personality and human dignity and immortality _ are two 
complementary sides of the same view of existence.' 41 Like 
Pringle-Pattison also, Temple insists that time can be 
transcended: both use analogies from the symphony and the 
drama. 42 Both philosophers insist upon the importance for our 
understanding of the universe of 'the aspects of beauty and 
sublimity which we recognise in nature and those finer insights 
which we owe to the poet and the artist.,43 
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Ward insists upon the significance of theism, claiming that 
this supplies the unity which is missing in pluralism without 
God: 'God is the ground of the world's being, its ratio 
essendi,44: so we find the emphasis both on God and the 
importance of the individual, in a philosopher who insists, in 
true Idealist fashion, that the fundamental structure of 
experience is the subject-object relationship. 
In our review we have noted in passing how Temple may be seen 
to have much in common wi th leading figures of the Bri tish 
Idealist school. In many ways, Temple may be seen, at least in 
his early work, as an example of a late flowering of Idealism, 
and his indebtedness to tha t school of thought is apparent 
throughout his work, though later in his career he makes use of 
philosophers of the realist school. The influence of A.N. 
Whitehead and Samuel Alexander is evident in Nature, Man and 
God. It is therefore not surprising that Temple has suffered 
from the eclipse that Idealism has undergone. Later schools of 
thought have found Idealism rather woolly, and have criticised 
much of its work, or simply ignored it. Idealism was attacked 
by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell (and later by A.J.Ayer) 
among others, on philosophical grounds; but perhaps the 
principal reasons for its eclipse may be found no less in the 
shifts of society. The experience of the First World War, with 
its shattering of complacency, and growing doubts about any 
apparently simple solutions, the overall climate of twentieth 
century uncertainty, may in the end have proved more damaging 
to the status of Idealism than this or that philosophical 
objection. Temple himself sometimes seems to have shared 
something of the complacency apparent in the Idealist school: 
he is said to have been unable only once to answer a question, 
when asked to show reasons for the existence of God - to Temple 
his existence is a datum, and this is frequently evident in his 
writing. One critic, the scientist-churchman Bishop Barnes of 
Birmingham, wrote in a private letter in 1946: 
2 1 
When I first knew him [Temple], he was placidly 
critical ••• 
orthodoxy 
As the years went on, a dreadful 
seems to have enveloped him. His 
extraordinary dexterity with words 
whether the ideas behind the 
increasingly valuable I doubt. 45 
remained, but 
words became 
Whether anything of permanent value may be found in the 
philosophical wri tings of William Temple, it will be part of 
the task of this thesis to consider. 
MENS CREATRIX, CHRISTUS VERITAS AND NATURE MAN AND GOD 
In the course of the review of British Idealism, note was made 
of many of Temple's philosophical ideas. For present purposes, 
it may be helpful to provide a brief outline sketch of the 
arguments of each of the three main philosophical works which 
provide the basis of this thesis. 
Mens Creatrix sets out to demonstrate that the four areas of 
knowledge, art, science, morali ty and religion present 
converging lines of evidence which do not meet unless unity is 
provided by some factor: and this unifying factor is found in 
the Incarnation. Temple considers the first half of Mens 
Creatrix to be philosophical - he takes the conclusions of the 
four areas mentioned to try to synthesise them. 
of the book is theological, attempting to 
revelation of God and that alone - makes 
The second part 
show how the 
full sense of 
experience. His reason for doing so is made explici t: I I t is 
abundantly clear that a perfect theology and a perfect 
philosophy would coincide. There can only be one Truth46 •.• the 
aim of this book is to indicate a real unity between faith and 
knowledge as something to which we can even now in part 
attain,47. Temple claims his method is broadly scientific: data 
is investigated to find a unifying hypothesis; once an 
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hypothesis has been constructed, it is tested by reference to 
data. We shall consider the adequacy of these hypotheses in due 
course. 
Christus Veritas is more directly theological than its 
predecessor: it is an attempt to present a Christocentric 
metaphysic. He deals with such matters as the structure of 
reality, the question of value, religious experience, man, 
history and God, before elaborating on them from the point of 
view of Christian faith. 
Nature Man and God is in many ways different in approach from 
its predecessors, and from the philosophical point of view is 
perhaps more satisfying. Temple makes clear that it is not a 
work in which the theme moves from one argument to the next; 
rather the book is seen as critical in its approach - its 
purpose is 'to provide a coherent articulation of an experience 
which has found some measure of co-ordination through adherence 
to certain principles.,48 There is, however, much development 
in the book: Temple moves from consideration of the world of 
science to an eventual demand for specific Revelation. 
Part of the reason why this book is different from its 
predecessors is that Temple was obliged to follow the terms of 
the Gifford Trust (Nature Man and God is the printed version of 
his Gifford lectures) by lecturing on Natural Theology. We have 
already noted that Temple's mentor, Edward Caird, rejected the 
traditional division between Natural and Revealed Theology, and 
Temple follows him in this. For Temple the task of Natural 
Theology is critical the criticism of religion, using 
criticism in the same sense as in aesthetics or the scientific 
process. To pursue these enquiries, religion must be related to 
its place in our knowledge and understanding of the universe. 
This question is approached from many angles: Temple considers 
science, the acti vi ties of mind, truth, beauty and goodness, 
evil, value, the relations between immanence and transcendence. 
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He returns to his central conviction that 'the primary 
assurances of Religion are the ul tima te ques t ions of 
philosophy,49(Temple's italics), that 'Theological 
Philosophy. •• is in the end the only Philosophy tha t has any 
hope of being satisfactory,.50 Central to all is the place of 
value in the structure of reality; and it is to this vision of 
reality that we must now turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STRUCTURE OF REALITY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As we have seen in the last chapter, Temple's upbringing was 
firmly within the Idealist tradition, and throughout his work 
the concerns and, frequently, the language of Idealism recur. 
Nature Man and God, Temple's last major philosophical work, 
first published in 1934, is dedicated to the memory of Edward 
Caird; and in the introduction to that work, Temple averred 
that 'Such method in thought as I possess ••• I believe myself 
to owe to my Master at Balliol, Edward Caird.' Nevertheless, by 
this time, Temple no longer considered himself an Idealist: 'We 
have ••• rejected by implication both Idealism (which starts 
with Mind and makes the extended world adjectival to it) and 
Ma terialism (which start s wi th the Extended World and makes 
Mind adjectival to, or epiphenomenal to, this) - though our 
starting point is closer to Materialism than to Idealism. ,1 
Elsewhere, he refers to subjective idealism as heresy.2 He now 
describes his own method as Dialectical Realism3 , though he 
insists that his position 'in its positive content is almost 
identical with such an Idealism as that of Edward Caird or of 
Bernard Bosanquet, apart from the method of arriving at it',4 
but 'Realism becomes a basis for the spiritual interpretation 
of the universe,.5 
It is interesting to consider the reasons for Temple's apparent 
change of approach to Realism. An important influence was r I 
suspect, acquaintance with two of the most significant 
philosophers of the Realist school Samuel Alexander and 
Alfred North Whi tehead. Alexander was an old friend. He was 
Professor of Philosophy at Manchester University during 
Temple's time as Bishop of Manchester (1921-1929) and indeed 
presented Temple for his honorary doctorate. 6 Alexander was the 
first British-based philosopher to produce a comprehensive work 
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of Realist metaphysics - Space, Time and Deity - in 1920 - and 
in Nature Man and God Temple quotes from his Beauty and Other 
7 ---Forms of Value . (The strong influence of Husserl on Alexander 
is interesting, and although there is no evidence that I have 
been able to discover that Temple was directly familiar with 
Husserl's work, we shall discover striking parallels with 
Phenomenology).Whitehead had, perhaps, an even greater 
influence on Temple's later thought, though the two did not 
meet until shortly after Nature Man and God was published8 • 
Whi tehead is quoted more often than any other philosopher in 
the Gifford Lectures, and Temple calls Whitehead's then recent 
Process and Reality (1929) a 'great work,9. Temple also makes 
use of Dorothy Emmet's Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism: 
Professor (then Doctor) Emmet was another friend from his 
Manchester days. 
The distinctive feature of Whitehead's philosophy, for Temple, 
is his concern with Process - the concern with making sense of 
a changing and developing universe. Alexander's metaphysic was 
an evolutionary one, as was Whitehead's; and Temple was 
naturally inclined to share this concern: as we have seenlO , 
his fa ther had been one of the first prominent churchmen to 
accept evolution as a datum. A recent commentator11 places 
Temple firmly wi thin the ranks of the Process theologians, 
though one normally thinks of the title "Process Theology" to 
belong - at least in Temple's time - to the Chicago school of 
the 1930's, best represented by Hartshorne. Teilhard de Chardin 
is now generally considered the major theologian of 
evolutionism, but it is easy to overlook the contribution of 
earlier thinkers (at least by date of publication - Temple was 
younger than Teilhard, though only by a few months, as was 
Hartshorne). 
The acceptance of both a Process philosophy and a Process 
theology means that Temple rejects the traditional rather 
static view of metaphysics represented by Aquinas (and also 
28 
what appears to him a static ethical view) in his 1944 Thomism 
and Modern Needs12 • While recognising the greatness and 
significance of Aquinas he urges an updating of his position, 
rejecting both Aquinas' view of Revelation and his distinction 
between Natural and Revealed Theology. That Temple should 
reject the tradition of the 'two theologies' is natural- Caird 
. , 
had already done so13. However, his continued rejection of the 
division is not simply detritus from an otherwise rejected 
Idealism: it is central to our understanding of Temple's mature 
philosophy. I believe that Temple's view of Revelation provides 
a potent clue to understanding both his metaphysics and his 
ethics. 
2. REVELATION 
Temple belongs firmly to the non-propositional school of 
theology. At the centre of the non-proposi tional view is a 
particular understanding of the nature of revelation. 
Historians of theology tend to divide attitudes towards 
revelation into two schools, or streams: those, like many 
Fundamentalis ts today, who take the proposi tional view, and 
those who take the non-propositional view, as do many 
contemporary theologians. The proposi tional view sees belief 
(or faith) as an assent to a series of revealed propositions. 
For instance, a theologian of this kind may tend to refer to 
the Bible as 'the Word of God', and to see faith as an 
acceptance of the Bible. The content of revelation is a body of 
truths about God. Coupled with this view is a tendency to make 
a clear distinction between Revealed and Natural Theology. 
Natural Theology is that part of theology which concerns itself 
with those truths which can (allegedly) be discovered by reason 
alone; while Revealed Theology concerns those truths which are 
knowable only because they have been revealed. A theologian of 
this kind will tend therefore to say, as an example, that God's 
existence can be known by unaided reason, but that He has three 
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Persons, the doctrine of the Trinity, can be known only because 
it has been specifically revealed, in the Bible. 
The non-propositional view holds that the content of revelation 
is God's self-revelation through history: revelation is not of 
a series of truths about God but is God himself revealing 
himself to us. Temple, in an important essay, sees the non-
propositional view as the proper and distinctively Christian 
one: 'In Islam a claim is made for a revelation in the Koran 
similar at first sight to that found in the Bible, and Mohammed 
is regarded by his followers with a veneration greater than 
tha t paid by Jews and Chris tians to any prophet. But he is 
still the Prophet and no more; the revelation is in his message 
not in himself; ••• it mainly consists of precepts and the 
requirement is of obedience to a law rather than of loyalty and 
love to a Person. ,14 The emphasis is therefore on an encounter 
with God, most readily (for a Christian) through personal 
encounter with Christ. 
To hold a non-propositional view of Revelation is to treat the 
Bible not as 'the Word of God', but as an indispensable witness 
to God's revelation. It therefore becomes possible to limit the 
idea of the 'Word of God' to the context of God himself: in the 
New Testament, and most notably in St. John's Gospel, it is 
only Christ himself who is referred to as the 'Word'(Logos). It 
is interesting that, as we have seen1S , Temple spoke of St. 
John as one of the major influences on his thought, and in his 
Readings in St. John's Gospel, he emphasises this 
interpretation of the notion of the Word: 'The whole of Him, 
flesh included, is the Word, the self-utterance of God.,16 
The concomitant of not treating the Bible as the 'Word of God' 
is that it is unnecessary to treat it as infallible. According 
to Cyril Garbett, Temple's friend and successor as Archbishop 
of York, it is impossible 'to accept the Bible as an infallible 
guide: it was not intended to teach man history, science or 
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philosophy. It is the inspired record of God's revelation of 
Himself to man. But its message is not automatic; it is clothed 
in the thought forms of ages far removed from our own, and is 
conditioned by the limitations of those who transmitted it; it 
is always golden treasure but sometimes conveyed in earthen 
vessels. ,17 The implications of this view, for a Christian 
philosopher, are considerable. As we have seen, Temple himself 
had no difficul ty in accepting the theory of evolution, or 
other scientific discoveries, precisely because of his view of 
scripture. 18 The Bible is an indispensable guide to revelation 
because, according to the non-propositional view, it contains 
the original witness to the major events of revelation. 
However, the New Testament does not merely contain eye-witness 
accounts of the ministry of Jesus (or, at least, recalled eye-
witness accounts) but testimony based on belief"that Jesus was 
indeed the Messiah. The gospels are written from the standpoint 
of faith. Regardless of inner contradictions and historical 
errors in the texts, there is no doubt that the gospel 
narrators see Jesus as the Son of God; not as a prophet, or a 
good man, or a deranged political agitator; and this vision is 
simply given, not argued for. Such a view of scripture is best 
summed up in an often-quoted passage from Paul Tillich: 
The documentary character of the Bible is identical 
with the fact that it contains the original witness 
of those who participated in the revealing events. 
Their participation was their response to the 
happenings which became revealing events through 
their response. The inspiration of the biblical 
writers is their receptive and creative response to 
potentially revelatory facts. The inspiration of the 
writers of the New Testament is their acceptance of 
Jesus as the Christ, and with him, of the New Being, 
of which they became wi tnesses. Since there is .!!2. 
revelation unless there is someone who receives it as 
revelation, the act of reception is part of the 
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event itself. The Bible is both original event and 
original document; it witnesses to that of which it 
is a part. 19 (my italics) 
Here we may note two relevant points. Firstly, we can see the 
appeal of this view to Temple: it concurs with the Idealist 
concern with the subject-object relationship: the relationship 
between Mind as the principle of the universe, and the 
individual mind seeking unity with it. The Idealist sees a 
possibility of close relationship between the Mind of the 
universe and the individual mind; but so do many Christian 
thinkers. Origen, for instance, says: 'There is a kinship 
between the human mind and God; for the mind is itself an image 
of God, and therefore 
nature. ,20 Temple, and 
introducing a new 
can have some 
others like 
insistence 
conception of the divine 
him, are not therefore, 
on the subject-object 
relationship, though they are more insistent than previous 
thinkers about its significance. 
The second fea ture of this view of scripture is, from the 
philosopher's viewpoint, both more significant and more 
worrying. It is tha t there is an insistence on events being 
interpreted or experienced in a particular kind of way. Nowhere 
in the Bible is there any attempt to 'prove' the existence of 
God, or the nature of Jesus, or any of the attributes of God. 
(This is important: I shall suggest in later chapters that 
certain tradi tional a t tributes of God are incoherent.) As a 
matter of historical record, the biblical writers experience 
their society in way in which God is vividly present, as much 
a character in the 'story' as Abraham or Moses or Elijah. The 
problem, however, is that another observer of the events of 
Palestine in the first century might not interpret those events 
in the way that the St.John of the gospels did. Another 
observer, like Josephus, migh t report Jesus as a poli tical 
agi ta tor. Ches terton says of Chris t 's life and teaching tha t 
'it is not for us to blame anybody who should find that first 
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wild whisper merely impious and insane. ,21 The question is 
therefore how this interpretation of revelation, rather than 
that, is to be justified. The obvious Christian answer would be 
that we justify faith by saying that we find ourselves in 
accord with the Biblical writers, that if we reflect upon our 
experience, we find that the Christian thesis, the Christian 
revelation makes more 'sense' of our experience than any other. 
This view, however, contains many problems: to speak of making 
'sense' of our experience is to assume that there is 'sense' to 
be made - that the world (or universe) is a coherent whole; and 
that our vision of it is more or less coherent as we more 
orless accept a Christo-centric view. It is precisely that 
coherence which a radical doubter denies (though, as we shall 
see, Temple a t tempts to prove coherence); and it is hard to 
see, without recourse to justifying criteria outside the 
context of revelation, how that revelation can be justified by 
reference to itself. For the non-propositional view of faith, 
there are further logical difficul ties. Logic provides tools 
for the analysis of propositions: but it provides none for the 
person who is the content of revelation. The non-propositional 
view finds the formulae of language about God inadequate: 
Tillich, for instance, speaks of the inadequacy of our 
statements about God - 'The segment of finite reality which 
becomes the vehicle of a concrete assertion about God is 
affirmed and negated at the same time.,22 While it is true that 
religious thinkers have always been aware of the limitations of 
religious language - as Aquinas makes clear in the doctrine of 
analogy23- nevertheless, they have, in general, attempted to 
justify their formulations as philosophically sound. The danger 
with the non-propositional view of faith is that the attempt to 
justify belief is left aside for a kind of voluntarism: that 
one believes by the sort of leap of faith on which Kierkegaard 
was so insistent: 'By relating itself to its own self and .Qy 
willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the 
Power which constituted it. And this formula ••• is the 
definition of faith. ,24 (my italics). Faith of this kind is as 
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much a rna t ter of will as anything; it certainly goes beyond 
mere intellectual assent. Karl Barth, in the same collection 
that contains Temple's essay on Revelation, speaks of faith as 
a 'free act of human choice and decision; a work of the heart, 
the will, and the understanding. ,25 While all Christian 
theologians agree that there is, by definition, a real act of 
choice, and an act of will, in faith, their use of religious 
language is such that dissent (or assent) is possible. So, for 
instance, when St. Anselm in his Ontological Argument for the 
existence of God, in Prosologion, Chapter Tw0 26 , presents his 
'proof', although he begins with a prayer, '0 Lord, Who giveth 
understanding to faith', he gives the argument in such a way 
that one may either concur or dissent, using the normal methods 
of philosophy: in short, he uses the methods of natural 
theology. The non-propositional theologian does not do this. A 
good example may be found in Bonhoeffer's Christology27. 
Throughout the lectures that constitute the work, Bonhoeffer 
insists that the question to be asked is not one about Christ, 
'How is He?,28, but one to Christ, 'Who are You?,29. It is 
evident that these questions are of different logical types, 
not concealed by the copula 'is'. The first question asks for a 
cognitive answer, one whose truth or otherwise is 
theoretically verifiable. The second question is certainly not 
so unambiguously cognitive: it is also not clear how it can be 
answered, or even whether it can be answered. An atheist would 
expect the question, addressed to a long dead agitator, to be 
answered not by 'I am/am not the Son of God', but by 
silence. The continued life of Christ is presupposed by the 
question; if there is no continuation of life, the question 
becomes hollow, mere empty words. If the atheist were to ask a 
Christian theologian 'What is He?' he would receive an answer 
which he could then, perhaps, meaningfully discuss. 'Who are 
You?' also presupposes a means of receiving an answer; and it 
is not clear what those means might be. Nor, if an answer is 
received, is the veracity of the answer guaranteed. Any 
guarantee is based on verifiability - a return to the 'What is 
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he ?' kind of question. If a sentry cries out to a complete 
stranger, his first question may be, 'Who are you, friend or 
foe?' If the reply is 'Friend', the sentry's next consideration 
is not 'Who are you?' (though that may be, in colloquial usage, 
how he phrases his means of establishing identity), but, as an 
intellectual consideration, 'Is he a friend, as he claims?'; in 
short, 'What is he?' 'Who are You?' may be answered by silence 
or by lies, or by truth: but it can only be tested by recasting 
as 'What is He?', for only the latter provides fully testable 
answers. (It is not an objection to this point to say that in 
answer to the sentry's challenge, the stranger might say, 'I'm 
Major X, and I'm a reconnaissance officer from H.Q.' The answer 
'I'm Major X' is that to 'Who are you?' The remainder of the 
sentence is an answer to the implied 'What is he?') "Who are 
You?' is plainly a philosophically inadequate question. 
Nevertheless, holders of the non-propositional view of theology 
eschew Natural Theology. When Karl Barth was asked to give the 
Gifford Lectures in 1935, which are on Natural Theology, he 
wrote back to say 'I am an avowed opponent of all na tural 
theology,30 
Temple, while by no means reluctant to give the Gifford 
Lectures, shared, as we have seen, Barth's rejection of the 
traditional distinction between natural and revealed theology: 
Nature, Man and God culminates in an attack on natural theology 
- 'Natural Theology ends in a hunger for that Divine Revelation 
which it began by excluding from its purview,.31 Temple's 
acceptance of the non-propositional view of theology is 
radical. He does not merely speak of a personal encounter with 
God as witnessed in the Bible, but finds revelation in the 
whole of creation and in its relation to God. In Nature, Man 
and God, Temple clarifies this point: 
What we find in the Old Testament Scriptures is not 
mainly, if 
theological 
at all, authoritative declarations of 
doctrine, but living apprehension of a 
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living process wherein those 
enlightened by divine communion 
the purposive activity of God. 
whose minds are 
can discern in part 
Revelation so conceived is the full actuality of ... 
relationship between Nature, Man and God .•. First 
there is the world-process, which, in its more 
complex components, if not throughout, is organic in 
principle; secondly, we have the fact that certain 
organisms, to wit ourselves, occurring as episodes of 
the world-process, are able to apprehend and in part 
to comprehend tha t process; thirdly, we infer from 
this that the process, in order to give rise to such 
episodes in its course, must be regarded as itself 
grounded in a mental principle; fourthly, enquiry 
into that interaction of the intelligent organism 
with its environment, which we call thought, compels 
the assertion that the principle in which the world-
process is grounded is not only mental but personal; 
fifthly, this leads us to the conviction that the 
process itself and all occurrences within it 
including the intelligences of men - are due to the 
purposive action of that Person whose reality has 
been established as the governing fact of existence. 
He guides the process; He guides the minds of men; 
the interaction of the process and the minds which 
~ alike guided EY Him is the essence of 
revelation32 
It is clear that here Temple does not restrict the mode of 
revelation to scripture: it is discovered - he argues - in the 
consonance of our minds with reality. He returns in this 
passage, and particularly in the last sentence, to the Idealist 
concern with subject-object relationships. He is emphatic about 
this - 'Whether we think of the unceasing revelation afforded 
in the whole world process or of the occurrences which 
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constitute revelation in the specialised sense of the word the 
, --
principle of revelation is the same - the coincidence of event 
and appreciation. ,33 This insistence on the coincidence of 
event and appreciation is, we may note paranthetically, not 
limited to Idealists: some commentators have remarked on it in, 
for instance, Aquinas. 34 
If, as Temple asserts, the whole of creation is the mode of 
revelation, it might at first appear that he is attempting an 
updating or modification of the Design Argument , as used by 
Aquinas or Paley. A closer study of his language makes it clear 
that this is not so. For instance, in the long passage quoted 
above, he draws distinctions which are important. His first 
point, that there is a world-process, is an assertion; the 
second, that we are episodes within the world process, is a 
'fact'; but in the third, that the universe is grounded in a 
mental principle, the fourth, that the world-process is 
personal, and the fifth, that there is a personal purpose, he 
speaks of inference: 'we infer', 'compels the assertion', 
'leads to the conviction'. It might seem tha t to speak of 
inference is to be concerned with logical inference, in which x 
follows from y. because it must. I think Temple is rather 
concerned with our everyday use of language, in which we 
'infer' without complete proof. I might say, for instance, that 
I infer from my cat's behaviour that it is presently bor"ed -
this seems a reasonable interpretation of its conduct - but I 
cannot prove that in any logical way, as I cannot make an 
informed statement about its state of mind. Inference of this 
kind is about probabilities, or, rather, it is my attempt to 
comprehend - to interpret - a reali ty of behaviour which is 
outside myself - I experience the cat's behaviour as boredom: 
but there is always the possibility that I might be wrong. 
Similarly, to speak of the compelled assertion, or the 
conviction, is to talk not about the world, but to speak of how 
we feel obliged to interpret or experience it. 
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This, I think, is an important realis a ti on i n ou r a tt emp t to 
understand both the non-propositional v iew of fait h and 
Temple's version of it. John Hick has drawn attent i on t o t his 
aspect of the non-propositional view the idea o f 
'experiencing as ... ' He suggests that Witt genstein's comment s 
on puzzle-pictures 35 , which may be seen in several ways, remind 
us of how we have experience of 'seeing as'. This, of course, 
is a commonplace of life. In the desert, we see an oasis in the 
distance; it is only as we approach that we recognise that it 
is no oasis at all, but a mirage. This example is 
epistemologically interesting, as is the puzzle picture. If we 
say 'there is an oasis', we speak falsely; we have mis-seen. 
But if we say 'there is a mirage', we see truly. One is a 
correct account of our perception, the other mistaken. With a 
puzzle-pic ture we have the phenomenon of two or more 
simultaneous interpretations. In this famous example.(fig.l), 
(Fig.l) 
we see both a candlestick and two faces, not merely one after 
another, but interchangeably and both together. Neither version 
of 'seeing as' is incorrect - unlike the example of the mirage 
- each is as 'true' as the other. Hick, I think, misses this 
, 
important distinction in his use of Wittgenstein's example. Two 
interpretations of a puzzle-picture may have equal validity, 
and can both be held together. The same is not true of the 
theistic thesis, or the Hick/Temple view of non-propositional 
revelation. One may experience the world as God-dominated, or 
one may not; but only one of these views can be correct. Templ e 
holds, of course, that the religious experience - the religious 
'experiencing as' - is the correct one; but with this view o f 
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revelation and of faith, there is no immediately apparent way 
of argument. A man may say 'i interpret the universe as God-
given'. An answer 'Well, I don't' is, in one sense, sufficient 
answer - though no contradiction. The disagreement is not - as 
Wisdom has pointed out 36 in his famous parable of the garden _ 
about the facts of the universe (that is a separate matter), 
but about interpretation. The assertion of interpretation, 
however, is one about how one feels/sees/understands; and it is 
itself not open to argument. If I say 'I see an oasis' when in 
fact I see a mirage, if I am speaking in good faith my 
statement is true as an expression of my perception even though 
I can be brought, by closer inspection, to recognise myself as 
having misperceived. In the case of the oasis, there is a way 
in which the correctness of my perception can be verified. This 
however is not the case 
verification) with the theistic 
(discounting eschatological 
view presented by Temple: he 
rules out the possibility of genuine verification. He eschews 
natural theology: and so he rules out the external methods, the 
purely philosophical methods of verifying his point of view: 
'By what means does the revelation authenticate itself? From 
the nature of the case it must offer its own credentials; that 
revelation should have to appeal to anything outside itself to 
establish its character as revelation, would be patent 
absurdity_,37 This seems, frankly, a shabby argument. What are 
credentials but a reference to another source to cross-check 
the information offered? It seems not an absurdity, but merest 
common sense, to ask of the bearer of startling news some 
authentication. In the case of the theistic argument, it seems 
necessary to ask for the only available cross-check, that the 
view shall at least be reasonable. 
To argue, as Temple does, that the character of revelation is 
such that we must accept its veracity on its own authority has 
two consequences, each with its own inherent problems. The 
first is that Temple's position on this matter is simply a 
sophisticated version of the argument of the Jehovah's Witness 
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who tries to convince me of the authority of the Bible by 
reference to itself, even though the Bible contains no argument 
for its own authority (nor indeed does the Bible assert that 
authority). The second consequence is that because there is no 
unambiguous authentication in the world, the world itself is 
ambiguous. This theme, of the ambiguity of the world, has been 
best expressed by Pascal, in a famous passage: 
It was not right that He should appear in a manner 
manifestly divine, and completely capable of 
convincing all men; but it was also not right that He 
should come in so hidden a manner that He could not 
be known by those who should sincerely seek Him. He 
has willed to make Himself quite recognisable by 
those; and thus, willing to appear openly to those 
who seek Him wi th all their heart, He so regulates 
the knowledge of Himself that He has given signs of 
Himself, visible to those who seek Him, and not to 
those who seek Him not. There is enough light for 
those who only desire to see, and enough obscuri ty 
for those who have a contrary disposition. 38 
In one sense, this view of God, as the Deus absconditus, the 
hidden God, reflects the traditional view of Christians, that 
if God's existence were utterly unambiguous there would be no 
moral value in the virtue of faith - faith involves commitment 
to belief. There is no virtue in belief in Pythagoras' Theorem: 
to disbelieve it is not in some moral sense unworthy - it is 
simply ignorance. In another sense, however, to accept the 
notion of a Deus absconditus is to seem to rule out the idea 
that God is intrinsically knowable. One cannot prove him by 
reason (contrary to some Catholic thought which has argued that 
God's existence is in principle provable, if as yet unproven); 
one can only accept him by a form of voluntarism. The point is 
well made by Temple's friend, Dorothy Emmet: 
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Faith is distinguished from the entertainment of a 
probable proposition by the fact that the latter can 
be a completely theoretic affair. Faith is a "yes" of 
self-commitment, it does not turn probabilities into 
certainties; only a sufficient increase in the weight 
of evidence could do that. But it is a volitional 
response which takes us out of the theoretic 
attitude. 39 
It is evident that Temple accepted the attitude that reason was 
not able of itself to authenticate faith. As late as 1944, he 
spoke of 'Pelagianism - which I still regard as "the only 
heresy that is intrinsically damnable." ,40 (Pelagianism is the 
heresy that we may be saved by our own unaided efforts, without 
the intervention of divine grace. It was widespread in North 
Africa in the early Fifth Century, and has been sometimes 
revived.) This attack on Pelagianism is a frequently repeated 
theme in Temple's work. 
Because it is necessary - on Temple's analysis - to accept 
faith on its own merits, it seems that he is particularly open 
to Anthony Flew's charge tha t: 'i t often seems to people who 
are not religious as if there was no conceivable event or 
series of events the occurrence of which would be admitted by 
sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for 
conceding "There wasn't a God after all" •.. I therefore put 
• •• the simple central question, "What would have to occur or 
to have occurred to constitute • • • a disproof of • • • the 
existence of God?",41 It seems that Temple is very keen to 
retain all options. For instance, he argues throughout his work 
that purpose is readily discernible in nature; and it seems 
that for him, nothing counts against this view. In Nature, Man 
and God he says: 
Much of the divine action which sustains the world is 
such as to produce apparent uniformity in the world-
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process ••• But of course this apparent uniformity 
may itself be due to an elaborately designed balance 
of mul tiform adjustments. If those scientists are 
right who regard recent developments as having 
introduced indeterminacy into the basis of Physics, 
so that the laws of causation are to be understood, 
not as real uniformities but as statistical averages, 
the theistic philosopher will be prepared with the 
account of the (physically) indeterminate behaviour 
of electrons and of the resultant constancy of 
natural processes, which has just been offered. If on 
the other hand the older scientific view of uniform 
causal processes ultimately prevails, for this also 
the theist has his explanation, both in the constancy 
of the Divine Nature which will vary its activity 
only for sufficient reason, and in the need for 
substantial uniformity as a basis for moral action. 42 
In this passage, one feels that Temple is having matters both 
ways. If nature is, after all, uniform, all well and good; but 
if it isn't, it is apparently so - and tha t will serve his 
purpose equally well. A philosopher not involved in special 
pleading will not be satisfied with this. If the structure of 
the world is indeterminate, it is important to understand this; 
and its apparent uniformity requires further explanation. Is it 
to return to Temple's non-propositional view that we 
experience the world as uniform? If it is so, then we would 
perhaps be best advised to ask questions about our own minds. 
It is possible that - as existentialists suggest - we see the 
world as in some sense uniform so that we can manage our own 
existence: to do so is necessary for our survival. We find that 
for psychic health we need to treat the world as coherent, just 
to make our everyday existence possible. According to Freud, 
primitive religious beliefs spring out of that very need for 
coherence: 'Impersonal forces and destinies cannot be 
approached; they remain eternally remote. But if the elements 
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have passions that rage as they do in our own souls, if death 
itself is not something spontaneous but the violent act of an 
evil Will, if everywhere in nature there are Beings around us 
of a kind that we know in our own society, then we can breathe 
freely, can feel at home in the uncanny and can deal by 
psychical means with our senseless anxiety. ,43 Our own 
experience tends to confirm this: when we meet 
outside the normal in our experience, we speak 
ourselves with it we work to make it 
something alien, 
of familiarising 
cohere with our 
understanding, to make 'sense' of it, 
disturbs us. In doing this, however, we 
object, and the coherence may be a false 
so that it no longer 
may mistake the alien 
one. A primitive South 
Sea islander, finding a refrigerator in a crashed aircraft, may 
make 'sense' of it by treating it as an object of worship - but 
his 'sense' is a nonsense to those for whom the refrigerator is 
a commonplace. We can be mistaken. 
Temple wi 11 have none of this. In Fai th and Modern Thought, 
published in 1910 (his first book), he asserts: 'the truth 
about facts is what satisfies the mind of man: that is the 
basis of all science.' 44 The obvious objection tha t the mind 
may be too easily satisfied does not apparently concern him -
as we shall see in the next section, he assumes that mind's 
experience is true. he does not appear to have changed his view 
in any fundamental way: towards the end of his life he 
asserted: 'If the triumphs of Natural Science have any meaning 
at all, as distinct from the obvious conveniences with which 
they have supplied us, it is that all the Universe is knit 
together in an intelligible system.,45 Despite his disclaimer 
of Idealism as starting with the mind and making the world 
adjectival to it, it is clear that Temple invites us to begin 
with the mind, but to accept its perceptions as - at least in 
principle - correct. 
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3. THE WORLD AS UNDERSTOOD 
In the sense that the perceptions of mind are - in principle _ 
correct reflections of the world, Temple may be justified in 
considering himself a Realist. Certainly he rejects the kind of 
Idealism which he associates with Descartes. We have noted 
already how Temple spoke of Descartes' shut ting himself in a 
stove as 'the most disastrous day in European history.' 46 In 
the third lecture in Nature, Man and God, he devotes himself to 
what he calls the 'Cartesian Faux-Pas,.47 Temple's objection to 
Descartes is interesting: it is based on psychology. He speaks 
of 'the inherent error of ••• [the Cartesian] ..• assumption 
that in knowledge the mind begins with itself and proceeds to 
the apprehension of the external world by way of construction 
and inference. ,48 He argues that Descartes' attempt at radical 
doubt is psychologically unconvincing: 
Doubt, as an active movement of the mind, does not 
commonly arise through looking for reasons to 
believe in this or that; it arises from an apparent 
collision between one actual element in experience 
and another - it may be of fact with theory, or of 
theory wi th theory, or of fact (as observed) wi th 
fact (as observed). What Descartes indulged in his 
stove was purely academic doubt; he was really as 
sure of the stove as of himself. If it be urged that 
this academic doubt was not an empirical absence of 
assurance but an "ideal supposal", I must reply that 
this method is permissible enough, but that 
Descartes found the wrong residuum. What he ought to 
have reached as the irreducible basis of all 
thought, including doubt, was the subject-object 
relationship49 (my italics) 
Temple clarifies this last point: 
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••• it seems that in fact I cannot really doubt all 
else except myself; I cannot really doubt the earth, 
or the stars, or (above all) my friends; so that I 
cannot find in fact any greater psychological 
assurance about the existence of myself than about 
the existence of a great deal else. And there seems 
no reason to regard the assurance at which Descartes 
arrived as more than psychological... it is 
impossible to think without thinking something. The 
subjective function of thought can be properly and 
usefully distinguished from every object of thought 
taken separately; but it cannot be isolated from all 
objects of thought whatsoever without ceasing to 
exist •.•• The appearance of logical cogency is 
illusory; the assurance to which Descartes clings is 
psychological only.SO 
From this discussion of Descartes, two things stand out. First 
we may note his characteristically brusque approach to doubt: 
in the last chapter I noted his comment about his own method -
'the enquiry is tentative; but for the sake of clearness the 
exposition will be confident. ,51 His contemporary, G.M.Young, 
noted this tendency to trample on doubt: 
In the introduction to W.T. 's Gifford Lectures, 
there is a passage which reminds me very forcibly of 
his manner of thinking, and expounding, in 
conversa tion or essays. He describes two ways of 
arriving at conclusions one by considering the 
evidence, the other by intuition, so that he found 
himself propounding as certain a proposition he had 
only just thought of. One heard so many of these 
propositions, e.g. 'Browning never wrote a line that 
was not poetry'. His exuberant self-confidence in 
action took, in thinking, the form of an equally 
exuberant certitude. And the Aristotelians 
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('Aristotle had the mind of a churchwarden') did not 
at all approve. 52 
There is something here reminiscent of Johnson kicking a post 
and saying of Berkeley's philosophy 'I refute it thus'. However 
necessary such an attitude of certainty may be in a church 
leader, it creates problems for the philosopher, to whom the 
luxury of such certi tude is rarely properly present. (This 
attitude in Temple seems to me a fundamental problem in 
considering him - without qualification - as a philosopher.) We 
may note here also Temple's reliance on intuition, which often 
creates in the thinker's mind a greater sense of certainty than 
would be given by a more systematic approach to reality. 
The second feature of Temple's comments on Descartes is his 
insistence - yet again - on the subject-object relationship as 
the fundamental of thought. This is, as we have seen so often, 
the characteristic feature of British Idealism; but it is also 
true tha t we cannot make sense of Temple's comment s on the 
world unless we remember that he is constantly concerned with 
the world as experienced: 'My own endeavour is ••• to provide a 
coherent articulation of an experience which has found some 
measure of co-ordination through adherence to certain 
principles. 'It is therefore clear that he sees the 
philosopher's task not as saying 'we misperceive, the truth is 
otherwise', but as clarifying and making sense of 
('interpreting as') experience which basically faithfully 
reflects reality but has not yet fully integrated it into a 
coherent whole. 
For this reason, it is not possible to divide easily his 
metaphysics from his epistemology: both are present together. 
In certain important respects, therefore, we may detect in 
Temple certain similarities to the methods of Husserl and other 
Phenomenologists. For Husserl, consciousness is something which 
it is impossible to doubt or to prescind from, though we must 
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distinguish between consciousness, which is a complex of 
experiences, events and psychical facts, and the objects of 
consciousness; but these objects of consciousness have meaning 
only as they have meaning only as they appear to or for 
consciousness. Brentano had already insisted, as we have seen 
Temple do, that consciousness is consciousness of, that to 
think is to think of something. This approach will help us to 
clarify certain parts of Temple's thinking - I shall argue in a 
subsequent chapter that there are significant similarities in 
the approaches of Temple and Brentano to the basics of ethics: 
that these similarities are based on a comparable approach to 
metaphysics and epistemology is not irrelevant. 
Hence we find in Temple's approach to reality an insistence on 
how tha t reali ty appears to us, even though he will argue 
elsewhere that reality is more or less as we see it to be. His 
view of the structure of reality is one which can be 
encapsulated simply, as he did himself in a sermon: 
The world as we see it exists in grades; and it is 
the destiny of each to be controlled by what is 
higher than itself; indeed, only as this happens 
does each grade reveal its latent capacities. Thus 
matter is controlled by life, and reveals hitherto 
unsuspected qualities; life is controlled by mind, 
and reveals hitherto unsuspected qualities; mind is 
controlled by spirit and reveals hitherto 
unsuspected qualities. Highest in all of these 
grades is Personality. As known to us this may not 
be the last term. But it affords the best analogy we 
have for the Most High. We shall think of Him more 
accurately when we think of Him in terms of 
personality than in any other way.53 
Temple's use of language is significant. He speaks not in terms 
of 'this is', but of revelation. Matter 'reveals', life 
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'reveals', and so on. Things are 'as known to us', 'as we see 
it' - in short, how we interpret them. If in other respects 
there is carelessness in expression - as for instance in the 
use of 'control', a word that implies rational decision and 
power - there is none in the repeated reference to revelation. 
This is confirmed in other writings on the same 
Temple's essay 'Symbolism as a Metaphysical 
published in 1922, or the reworking of that 
Christus Veritas of 1924. In Christus Veritas he 
theme, as in 
principle,54 
article 55 in 
uses the same 
language of revelation - 'Matter only reveals what it really is 
when life supervenes upon it' 56; 'Life only reveals wha tit 
really is when Mind supervenes upon it. No study of zoology and 
biology will enable the student to predict the occurrence among 
living things of the mathematician or the financier. The use of 
faculties, which at first are used for mere survival, must 
occur in fact before it can be anticipated in theory. ,57 It is 
notable here that scientific study is seen as reflection upon 
what is revealed to us - the integrity of reality 'out there' 
is maintained: the job of our minds is to make order or 
coherence out of it: 'the generic character of scientific 
knowledge requires the individuali ty of things from which it 
abstracts in order to make sense of itself.' 58 In a passage 
reminiscent of his earlier sermon, Temple asserts both aspects 
of his approach, the £!Q ~ aspect as revealed to us, and its 
objective reality: 
• • • we • • • notice that each [grade of reality] 
depends for its actuality upon those which are below 
it. Matter itself as experienced by us can be 
reduced to what is simpler than itself, whether to 
• •• [alpha, be ta and gamma] ••• particles ••. or 
still more ultimately to Space-Time ••• Life is 
unknown apart from living organisms, which are 
Matter informed by Life. Mind is unknown except in 
reasonable organisms. Spiri t is unknown except in 
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conscientious, reasoning, living organisms. Whether 
the higher grades can exist apart, there seems to be 
no means of deciding; in our experience they never 
do ••. such seems in fact to be the structure of 
Reality.59 
We may note, in passing, tha t Temple has here avoided the 
problems inherent in the word 'controls' - he uses such words 
as 'supervenes', 'inform'. 
We can see that, for Temple, the structure of reality consists 
of four grades, Matter, Life, Mind and Spirit, though he is 
careful to remind us that to separate them is an ordering of 
reali ty by our minds. Reali ty is a continuous whole - as he 
pointed out 'these "grades" taken singly are abstractions. 
Reali ty is a continuous whole wi thin which the mind of each 
individual finds itself.,60 Nevertheless, he says, in an essay, 
there is a 'perceptible scale of being' 61 covering the range 
'from mere inorganic matter at one end, through organic matter, 
vegetable life, animal life, to personality as we know it in 
human life. ,62 It is also possible therefore to speak of 
'lower' and 'higher' grades. Matter is the lowest grade: 'The 
piece of mere inorganic matter (if it exists) is insentient; we 
treat it as we like without considering its feelings, because 
we assume it has none ••• its individuality, though it exists 
(for it is "this" and not another) is negligible. ,63 We can 
talk of a 'higher' grade, such as life, because life makes 
'sense' of the lower: 'Matter only reveals what it really is 
when Life supervenes upon it.' 64 This can only mean tha tit 
makes sense, reveals itself to us, when it is touched by life -
or, as we shall see when considering value, its value is only 
realised as value for consciousness, for life, and so on. 
- -
To have recognised a scale of being, yet to have maintained the 
continui ty of the whole, presents special difficul ties. For 
Temple, this vision of reality 'seems to involve an infinite 
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regress, and suggests an infinite progress. ,65 He claims 
indifference about this problem: 'whether there is in fact a 
lowest and highest term in this scale of finite existences, I 
do not know and do not greatly care. ,66 Nevertheless, he 
addresses this question in Mens Creatrix, attempting to show 
tha t there is no logical or ethical objection to an infini te 
serl·es. He notes that 'l't l'S . . bl qUlte lmpossi e imag~iam 
te regress but ••• not impossible to conceiveit.,67 He finds it 
consistent to conceive of the world 'as an entity consisting of 
elements which it is for ever harmonising and systematising. ,68 
Temple does not see the need for the end of the world in the 
traditional Christian sense, rejecting the idea of a literal 
'Second Coming' and associated millennial beliefs: for him the 
Second Coming has already happened, after the Resurrection: 
scriptural grounds for the millenium seem to him confused and 
inadequate; and the only sense in which the Second Coming is in 
the future is an ethical one - 'not all have eyes to perceive; 
and the time when "every eye shall see Him" is still future, 
and this is the truth in the expectation of a Return or Second 
Coming. ,69 Just as Temple does not feel bound to the notion of 
an end, so too he consciously rejects the need for a First 
Cause: 'It is urged that if the series is infinite, then, 
though every part may be linked to every other part, the whole 
at any rate is indeterminate. But this argument can be 
satisfied only by the positing of a First Cause, which is 
itself undetermined. ,70 We would expect, having seen Temple's 
rejection of natural theology, to find in him an unwillingness 
to accept a Thomist underpinning of faith, but I think he comes 
close to the view of those neo-Thomists who see God not so much 
as First Cause as Ultimate Explanation of creation. 71 We see 
this view clearly in Fai th and Modern Thought: 'My knowledge 
••• is one of the facts, which must be held together in this 
coherent scheme ••• this seems to involve ••• that there is 
some mentality ..• in all the facts of our experience. I do not 
mean to say tha t the chairs and tables are thinking; I mean 
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that everything which exists must be the embodiment of rational 
principle. The universe turns out to be a rational whole. ,72 
Whether the universe is a rational whole, as Temple asserts, is 
of course open to doubt. If we accept the non-proposi tional 
view of revelation, as Temple expects us to do - if we are to 
accept the idea of interpreting ~ - we are surely committed to 
a recognition of ambiguity in the universe as a whole. The idea 
of a Deus absconditus, recognisable if we wish, not if we wish 
not, rules out the idea that the universe is evidently 
rational. The indeterminacy of much in physics - over which 
Temple passes so glibly - may properly seem to point not to 
purpose, not to 'ra tional principle'. If we find our world 
appearing stable, we should not be surprised. As Hume pointed 
out, the universe is bound to have the appearance of design; 
things must have adapted to each other for any kind of life to 
persist. It could simply be - on the Epicurean or Nietzschean 
model - that in infinite time all the particles of the universe 
go through every combination open to them; and that those 
particles have currently combined in such a form that a 
relatively stable order exists. On a Darwinian model, the 
graded reali ty, which Temple perceives as the resul t of a 
purpose, may be simply the resul t of a blind struggle for 
survival. To say that the development of the universe seems to 
be the result of a rational process is not to say that it is 
such: we may misperceive or misinterpret. That something 
appears rational and is then achieved does not mean that the 
achievement is rational. For instance, I know that for a kitten 
to grow large and healthy it must eat - eating is the only way 
it can grow. When my kitten does not eat, I worry; but when it 
does, it does not do so for rational reasons - it does not say 
'I will die if I do not eat.' Its eating is instinctive, not 
rational- and I err if I attribute rationality to what - from a , 
scientific point of view - is a rational result. A rational 
resul t may be achieved in a varie ty of ways - whe ther by 
accident, instinct, or even perverted design. 
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To be consistent with his view of revelation, Temple should say 
that the universe 'appears to be' a rational whole, and to 
suggest why we should find his interpretation to make better 
sense than the alternative - which is to see the universe as a 
mere brute fact. (But, of course, if the universe is - as the 
atheist avers - mere brute fact, we should not be surprised if 
we cannot make sense of it: to make sense, to reduce it to 
discernible system, may itself be to distort it for the sake of 
comfort.) Because of his rejection of natural theology, I do 
not think he is able to do more than follow the procedure he 
does which is to analyse experience; though to test the 
validity of experience by - and only by - experience is fraught 
with difficulties. 
In Temple's experience, the truth about the universe as the 
result of divine purpose (and that purpose is, he says, the 
result of a personal God) may be found by an examination of how 
we feel about the order of the universe: 
Willingly to believe what is suspected to be false 
is felt to be not only a degradation of the 
credulous believer's personality, but an offence 
against the order of reality. This feeling is quite 
unreasonable if the order of reality is a brute fact 
and nothing else; it is only justifiable if the 
order 
mind, 
of reali ty is 
for the sense 
the 
of 
expression of a personal 
moral obligation towards 
Truth is of that quality which is only appropriate 
in connexion with personal claims. 74 
Temple confesses that he cannot prove this claim: 'it is an 
intuitional judgement. ,75 Nevertheless, he produces some 
supporting evidence. He claims that in our experience we place 
more value and feel a greater sense of obligation towards 
claims based on personal relationships than we do towards 
impersonal or abs tract ones. (This view is, as we shall see, 
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fundamental to his ethical method). That we attach a moral 
importance to being accurate about the structure of reality is 
evidence for the personal quality of that reality: 
My contention is that the quality of feeling 
entertained towards it by even materialistic 
scientists is often such as can only be justified 
if, in fact, the world-order thus apprehended is the 
expression of personal mind. It is no answer to that 
contention to say that this feeling is due to a 
surviving Theism which ought to be discarded, for 
such a reply admits the implications of the feeling, 
and these constitute the point of the contention. If 
on all grounds the conclusion is accepted that there 
is no personal mind expressing itself in and through 
the order of the universe, the existence of our 
feeling towards Truth may be explained by reference 
to the fact that during most of the ages of history, 
men have believed that there was such a mind: the 
influence of that belief appeared in the form of 
reverence fel t for Truth, and this feeling may be 
held now as an anachronistic survival. I am not at 
present arguing against that as a possible 
hypothesis. I am urging only that most of us feel 
that reverence, and must either accept its 
implications or regard it as due to a mistake, and 
therefore deserving to be discarded. And it is very 
relevant to observe that this quality of reverence 
for Truth is specially evident among those who have 
felt bound, out of loyalty to Truth itself as they 
had been able to receive it, to abandon belief which 
alone could justify it. It would seem as if there 
were some potent force compelling in them an 
attitude of mind which their own convictions have 
rendered obsolete. All this is intelligible on b 
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oasis of avowed Theism, but highly paradoxical on any 
other. 76 
As Temple points out, this is hardly a philosophical argument; 
but it is consistent with his commitment to an analysis of 
experience. The obvious approach here is to analyse one's own 
experience and to see whether it concurs with Temple's 
interpretation. I doubt for instance whether all scientists go 
about their work dominated by a reverence for truth; I suspect 
that most follow the established norms of their profession 
without ever thinking much about them the approach is 
conditioned by habit and training. Whether 'most of us' feel 
the reverence for truth which Temple claims I also doubt - not 
because of malevolence; but because most people seem not to 
have much time or inclina tion to delve very far into these 
matters. Concern for truth, even in its most general form, 
seems to me conditioned by law or by upbringing. I also think 
that Temple is being sentimental in his talk about the 
materialist scientists - evidence suggests that few scientists 
have changed their views from theism to atheism on purely 
scientific grounds; though they may have had all sorts of other 
reasons. T. H. Huxley for ins tance did not reject Chris tiani ty 
because of his acceptance of Darwinism: he had already rejected 
Christianity and seems to have treated Darwinism as a club for 
battering Christians. 77 
My objections to Temple's assertions are, of course, no more 
philosophically sound than his. He has one set of feelings 
about how people feel about reality - I entertain another. That 
as he part-way acknowledges lies a t the heart of the 
problems raised by his philosophical method. 
He continues his argument for the personal, and hence purposive 
nature of reali ty by considering the two other parts of the 
traditional triad of truth, beauty and goodness. The search for 
truth alone is not sufficient to enable us to justify God. In 
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Mens Creatrix, Temple says: 'The l"ntell t k" 1 ec wor lng on y upon 
the principles of its ~ procedure will never lead us to the 
Transcendent God of Religion, for its claims can be satisfied 
with less, and the further step is a leap in the dark such as 
Science may not take. ,78 I have noted in the last chapter that 
the theme of Mens Creatrix is how art, morality, science and 
religion together point to a personal God; and Temple takes up 
this theme. 
He notes of beauty, after referring to Lord Balfour's Gifford 
Lectures, Theism and Humanism: 'the mental attitude of deep 
appreciation is of its own nature akin to worship. The whole 
aesthetic experience is unintelligible unless there comes 
through it a revelation from spirit to spirit. There is more in 
Beauty than Beauty alone. There is communication from, and 
communication with, personal Spirit. ,79 It is obviously 
impossible here to rehearse the whole of aesthetic theory; but 
some comments immediately spring to mind. Firstly, we may 
question whether in our experience deep apprecia tion is, as 
Temple suggests, akin to worship. I find it hard from my own 
experience to assert a similarity in the two attitudes, because 
they are not, I find, clearly analysable. When I apprecia te 
something I am too concerned wi th it to analyse my feelings; 
when I indulge myself in introspection, I have turned away from 
appreciation of an object and am involved in another mental 
activity not identical with the first. I find a painting 
striking; but once I consider why I should do so I am 
appreciating the painting, but myself. Secondly, even if 
appreciation and worship are akin, it is not legitimate to take 
Temple's leap to treating them as if they were identical: 
kinship and identi ty are not the same thing. If I find an 
aesthetic experience vividly mediating the presence of God, I 
may be transferring from one attitude to another; but it is 
also true that a man may have an aesthetic experience and see 
it purely as such, without any transference to worship. 
Thirdly, we may suggest that the aesthetic experience is - or 
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at least, may be - unintelligible. Certainly we cannot say 
clearly why we find this more beautiful than that while someone 
else should see things in another way. One may argue tha t 
beauty is in the eye of the beholder - and we might expect this 
in Temple, given his general philosophical method - but he 
seems to revert to a Platonic ideal of Beauty - he sees it as 
objective: 
I look back with some astonishment to a time when I 
admired Dor~'s pictures more than Rembrandt's, and 
enjoyed Spohr's music more than Bach's. The cruder 
artists had an appeal to my primitive taste which 
was lacking in the others. But I submitted to 
authority enough to look at pictures and listen to 
compositions which others told me were good as well 
as those which appeared good to me. Imperceptibly a 
change took place. By intercourse with the better 
art I became sensitive to it and appreciative of it, 
and in the process lost most of my liking for the 
cruder and more sentimental expression. The real 
good began to appear good by the transformation of 
my taste under its influence. 80 
I find this astonishing. Temple comes close to restricting the 
use of the term 'beautiful' to only the highest examples of 
are:. If he found some value in the music of Spohr - on its 
terms - it is hard to see, given his insistence on the £££ ~ 
aspect of understanding, that he can treat it later as if it 
had never had value. Mos t of us see beauty in more general 
terms: we find this more beautiful than that. I find Bach's 
music more beautiful than Spohr's; but that is not to say that 
Bach's music is beautiful and Spohr's not; there is much to 
value in Spohr, even though my valuation is of a different kind 
from that which I place on Bach. Indeed, in certain respects, 
and in certain circumstances, I might prefer Spohr to Bach 
(e.g. for relaxation), while nevertheless considering Bach the 
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greater composer. (Of course, which we consider the greater 
composer is conditioned by a host of imponderables - culture, 
tradition, upbringing, mood, temperament, and so on.) 
Goodness, according to Temple, reveals particularly the 
personal character of the universe. He argues throughout his 
writings for the idea that 'the essence of morality is personal 
fellowship, or respect for persons as persons,8l. He suggests 
that self-sacrifice is only called out of us by people, and by 
the personal character of their demands. Temple insists tha t 
'there is no morali ty beyond absolute devotion to the public 
good,S2; and that the call of people is far more important than 
that of a merely abstract call of duty: 'no Law, apart from a 
Lawgiver, is a proper object of reverence. It is mere brute 
fact; and every living thing, still more every person 
exercising intelligent choice, is its superior. The reverence 
of persons can be appropriately given only to that which itself 
is at least personal.,S3 I do not propose, for the moment, to 
examine these claims in detail; they are the theme of 
subsequent chapters. 
By his consideration of the nature of beauty, truth and 
goodness, Temple intends to convince us of the personal - and 
hence theistic - character of the universe; but he is conscious 
that they do not constitute a complete justification. In the 
end, he considers belief, as we might expect, a matter of 
individual experience: 'individual belief rests primarily, as I 
think, on religious experience, and finds its intellectual 
support in the reflexion that this belief is capable in 
principle of supplying an explanation of the very existence of 
the Universe, which no other hypothesis available to us affords 
any hope of doing. That is no proof. ,84 This religious 
experience is, as Temple suggests in a sermon, beyond the power 
of language to explain: 'to ask a religious man why he believes 
in God is like asking a happy man why he enjoys life. No verbal 
answer can be given.'SS But he says, in the same sermon, that 
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the greater the faith, the more complete the feeling that the 
theistic interpretation of the world is the only satisfactory 
explanation of the world 86 H' . d h one. e 1S conV1nce t at the only 
available to us is one in terms of purpose: 'when you ••• ask. 
"Why this 
possible, 
and 
except 
scientific demand 
nothing else?" there is no explanation 
in terms of purpose: tha t is to say, the 
that the world shall correspond to the method 
of our intellect, the scientific demand for an intellectually 
satisfactory world, can only be satisfied by belief in a 
Purpose running through the whole, a Purpose rooted, as all 
purpose must be, in Will. ,87 
To argue like this is to argue that nature does indeed conform 
to the requirements of mind as Temple suggests that it should. 
This, of course, is to argue that the universe is (at least in 
principle) , explicable. I t may be, that because we tend to 
assume that we understand something when we explain (though I 
am not entirely convinced that explanation and understanding 
are synonymous), we feel that to understand the universe we 
must be able to explain it. The human mind baulks at the idea 
that the universe as a whole may be ultimately inexplicable: it 
seems to run counter to our quotidian experience. However, that 
the idea of inexplicability seems scandalous does not make it 
impossible: we have to face the possibility that the universe 
may be sheer brute fact. Temple, on the other hand, seems to 
feel happy once the mind feels happy with the conclusion it has 
reached: 'Whenever the subject of enquiry is traced to the 
action of intelligently purposive mind, the enquiry is closed; 
Mind has recognised itself and is satisfied.,88 Mind is never 
happy with inexplicability; but from this it does not follow 
that it should rest content when an explanation is found. 
In this section we have come full-circle back to the assumption 
that mind's perceptions are - in principle - correct. We should 
now briefly examine Temple's interpretation of the nature of 
mind. 
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4. MIND 
A grave problem in dealing with the subject of mind is, as Owen 
C. Thomas 89 has POl' t d t th T 1 n e ou, at emp e uses the words 'mind' 
and 'Mind' with a host of different meanings according to 
no doubt, this variety of meanings can be 
circumstances in which Temple wrote his 
Despi te this, and despi te the lack of a fully 
context. In part, 
attributed to the 
philosophy. 
integrated account of mind from Temple's pen, it is possible to 
discern the general pattern in Temple's thought. 
Certain of his principles are deducible from our consideration 
of his views about the structure of reality. He asserts a real 
kinship between mind and the world because of his basic 
metaphysical position that reality is an integrated rational 
whole, and, as we saw when considering his remarks on the 
grades of reality, the mind is an integral part of the whole 
system. While it is true that there is a subject-object 
relationship, and that neither is reducible to the other, 
nevertheless, Temple insists, the mind is part of the world-
process. He rejects the idea tha t he associa tes wi th 
Cartesianism which tends to see the mind simply as a passive, 
apprehending entity. For Temple, the mind has an active, 
creative part to play in the world-process, and, more than many 
other philosophers, he emphasises the imaginative, creative 
aspects of it. In this, he is close to the position adopted by 
Brentano and subsequent phenomenologists, which was itself a 
reaction to Cartesian approaches to epistemology. (Elements of 
this will be explored in subsequent chapters.) Even in simple 
apprehension Temple notes the way in which the mind creates 
new forms. He quotes Dorothy Emmet with approval: '''The abiding 
value of the Kantian philosophy lies in the discovery that an 
act of experience is a process of construction. But according 
to Kant, the objective world is constructed by the subject 
experiencing; while in Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism the 
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experiencing subject arises out of the world which it feels 
, 
and constructs its own nature from the way it feels it.",90 
Temple emphasises the way in which the mind constructs its 
picture of the world, and creates a vision of itself: 
••• one of the ways in which the human experiencing 
subject feels the world is to gather up in the span 
of a single comprehension an entire period of the 
process out of which it arises. A man is born at a 
particular point in history. At first his mind moves 
only in the service of his bodily needs; but even so 
it very Soon uses memory of the past to guide action 
in the present. Gradually, as language is acquired, 
the general quali ties offered by perceived objects 
are more and more detached from the empirical 
instances by the help of the names for these which 
language supplies; sequences are traced out; and at 
last something that may be called a historical grasp 
of personal life, of family, of nation, is found to 
exist. 
What is implied in this? First, that "present" 
experience is apprehended as Continuous with the 
"past" out of which it arises. The "present" is never 
the mathematical point at which past and future meet; 
that concept is the fruit of abstraction. The present 
is so much of the empirical process as is immediately 
apprehended. This is far more than the passing sense-
impression of the moment. It is all which is 
. h h· . 91 apprehended as continuous Wlt t at lmpresslon. 
Mind creates this present, and sense of wholeness, because 'it 
is distressed by the apparent transitoriness of all things. 
Arising out of flux, and itself in origin an episode of the 
flux ~ of which it arises, mind declares its ~ nature EY 
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demanding permanence. 92 According to Temple, 'the mind, having 
the power to form concepts, is thus set free from bondage to 
particular occasions. The concept is a "free idea",.93 
A potent clue to clarifying the implications of Temple's view 
of mind can be found in the work of the great Polish 
philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski. Kotarbinski develops the idea 
that the only constituents of the world are physical objects -
he is the principal figure in the Reist or (later) Concretist 
school. What concerns us, however, is his analysis of language, 
reminding us of how, in the process of abstraction, we create 
onomatoids or apparent names. An onomatoid occurs, for 
instance, when we abstract a general quality from the world of 
things, and treat it as if it were a thing in itself. So, for 
instance, we observe various objects which share in common 
, greenness' 'green grass', 'green book', and so on. Because 
we perceive features in common between these objects, we 
abstract, for convenience' sake a portmanteau noun 'green' to 
express the common features. That, of itself, is a legitimate 
procedure so long as we do not trea t the new noun as if it 
were a thing in itself. However, once we make the transference 
there is a danger that we will begin to think of 'green' as a 
thing in itself: when people say 'Green is my favourite 
colour', or 'Green is restful', they slip into this error, 
missing the point that what they really mean is 'I prefer green 
things to things of other colour' or 'green things are 
restful'. When we consider onomatoids such as 'love' or 
'justice', (abstracted from 'loving beings', 'just men') the 
problem - as we shall see in the next chapter - becomes more 
pronounced. 
Kotarbinski considers 'class' to be onoma toidal: 'Concretism 
would hold its position in the face of the problem of classes, 
and it would be justified in stating that there were twelve 
apostles without assuming that an object called the class of 
apostles, and different from the totality consisting of the 
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apostles as 
apostles. ,94 
component bodies, existed in addition to the 
He argues further (in the light of such 
mathematical concepts as set theory) that it is possible to use 
sentences without any reliance on the concepts 'class' or 
'class of classes'. He gives an example: 
There are two M's =~x, y ((X€M)A(yeM)A(x¥Y))A Tfz((zE 
M) 4 ~ (( z=x)" (z=y))). This is read: there are two 
M's is the same as: there is such an x and there is 
such a y that x is an M and Y is an M and x is not 
identical with y, and moreover what is an M is 
identical either with x or with y.95 
Temple, in a less organised way (he could not have known of 
Kotarbinski 's work) is conscious nevertheless of the way in 
which the mind abstracts from the world of objects, and hints 
at the idea that 'class' is unreal: 
••• attention, in fixing itself on the general 
qualities of objects, detaches these in thought from 
the objects themselves, and so forms concepts, which 
the mind can handle in complete independence of 
particular objects, though they have application and 
meaning only in reference to particular objects •.• 
Real thinking, though it makes use of concepts 
throughout its course, is directed to the actual 
world of objects, which are particular instances of 
general qualities, and seldom, if ever, exhibit any 
general quality in precise correspondence to the 
concept, because the presence of other general 
qualities involves some modification of that which is 
the special object of attention. 96 
We may note that while the thrust of his argument is similar to 
Kotarbinski's, Temple's wording is less precise - in a Platonic 
way, he speaks of 'particular instances of general qualities', 
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a mode of language I consider onomatoidal. A clearer use of 
language would, I think, have enabled Temple to avoid certain 
problems in his theory of value. (see next chapter) 
Similarity with Kotarbinski's approach may be discerned in 
Temple's treatment of time. We have noted already how Temple 
sees 'mental' time as not coincident with actual successiveness 
in objects. Kotarbinski insists that 'the nouns "time", "space" 
and "characteristics" are ••• onomatoids: "located in time" 
means "being somewha t" , "located in space" means "being 
somewhere", and "having physical characteristics" means "being 
physically such and such",97 in short 'time' is an 
abstraction from our interpretation of the successiveness of 
objects. 
It would, of course, be an error to reduce the whole outlook of 
Temple on the question of mind to that of a concretist like 
Kotarbinski, revealing though the parallels are. Kotarbinski 
holds that material concrete objects are 'the only elements of 
reality,98 - with that, Temple as a theist would be unable to 
agree. Nevertheless, in the treatment of language, and the 
separation of the perceiving mind from the world in flux - in 
the sense tha t al though the mind is part of the world, its 
perceptions are shaped into thoughts which often do not 
faithfully reflect the world they tread a similar path. 
Interestingly, Kotarbinski considered Brentano' s approach to 
the world, at least in his last writings, a primitive form of 
reism, though Brentano maintained a duali ty of substances -
bodies and souls99 • It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that 
we shall discern many similari ties between Brentano' s ethics 
and Temple's if each is based on a similar attitude to 
perception. Temple, like Brentano, cannot accept a purely 
material view of the universe (its ultimate constituents may be 
things, but these may be spiritual 'things' and material 
'things', and not material things only the comments on 
onomatoids would still apply): the self is an example of 
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something non-material: 'It appears that there is in the brain 
no one centre of consciousness to which all sensations are 
communicated; I, who see, am the same I, who hear; yet there is 
no physiological basis of this "I" to whom all the sensations 
belong; the Ego or Self is therefore non-material. ,100 It 
should be noted that many philosophers have seen the 'self' as 
purely a logical construction created out of impressions 
received: they have not found it necessary to posit a non-
material being - this debate, it could be argued, is one about 
the temptation to create onomatoids. 
At the beginning of this section, I noted that for Temple the 
mind is not merely passive, but organising and creative. It is 
not, for present purposes, necessary to rehearse this in any 
detail. We have seen how he claims that the mind reorganises 
material to form concepts. These concepts permit the 
development of science; when the mind seeks permanence it is 
able to achieve this 'by formulating changeless principles of 
the constant change of experience - laws, which themselves 
unchanging, describe the course of the change which the various 
objects of attention follow; this is the method of science. 1101 
However, the scientific method is not the only activity of 
mind. Temple, more than many philosophers, considers the 
artistic, imaginative aspect of mind no less important. He 
develops this theme in Mens Creatrix: 'Art is, in structure, 
Logic in excelsis,102, and he quotes Bosanquet with approval: 
••• all logical activity is a world of content reshaping 
itself by its own spirit and laws in presence of new 
suggestions; a syllogism is in principle nothing less; and a 
Parthenon or "Paradise Lost" is in principle nothing more. ,l03 
Temple glosses this: 'intellect as a rule is content with. the 
skeleton and persists in pushing the enquiry further, while 
imagination clothes the skeleton with flesh and then 
contemplates its finished work until satiety overtakes it. Each 
would find fulfilment only in the full apprehension of the 
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structure of 
expressed. ,104 
the universe adequately embodied and 
Wholeness of understanding is therefore found not in scientific 
enquiry only, but in the combination of understanding and 
imagination. Both, he argues, are necessary to the activity of 
will. He describes the most familiar problem in the practical 
moral life as 'that of carrying out in actual practice what we 
know to be right. ,105 For Temple, mere scientific knowledge 
does not give any spur to action: 'it may be said that a purely 
intellectual idea, a mere scientific formula, has no power to 
awake desire and so stimulate action •.. in the cases where the 
true principle is intellectually or scientifically grasped, but 
there is lacking any desire to act according to it, imagination 
must come to the aid of intellect and give body to the right 
principle, so that it may have attractive power. Imagination is 
normally the link between intellect and will.,106 
Imagination is the spur, because it enables us to visualise 
results, which a mere call to duty does not do. Temple says of 
himself: 'I do not find that the recognition of a duty is of 
any great assistance to its performance. ,107 For him, 
imagination, particularly about people, is essential to action. 
He imagines seeing a man given to excessive drinking hesitating 
before the door of a public house: 'I should not dilate on the 
evils of indulgence, but should try to call up a picture which 
would appeal; I should not say, ,t Indulgence is sure to bring 
b Of d hOld ",108 its penalty" but rather, "Remem er your Wl e an c 1 reno 
The use of imagination, he argues, enables us to avoid errors 
in our moral judgments: 
Everyone agrees 
a post of great 
that of his 
that no man should appoint another to 
responsibility on any grounds except 
fitness for the post. But very 
respectable citizens are liable to appoint a man 
"because it will please his old father", or for some 
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other wholly irrelevant consideration. And the 
failure is due to lack of imagination. On one side 
there is the pleasure of the well-known old man 
clearly envisaged; on the other there is an arid 
principle. But if this arid principle is translated 
into the actual distress of many families through 
financial incompetence on the part of the old man's 
son, or of death and bereavement due to military 
incapacity, or of whatever definite evil is likely to 
result in the particular instance, the man 
responsible for the appointment will no longer be 
ready to buy an old friend's pleasure at the cost of 
so great a risk. I09 
However, just as scientific error is possible, 
be errors of imagination. He implies that 
pictures be tested by relating them to reality 
so too there may 
our imaginative 
as apprehended -
he insists on care in our 'interpreting as' of imagination: 
••• if imagination is the raising of the image-element to 
adequacy, there must first be a meaning to which it may be 
adequate, otherwise it degenerates into fantasy, which is the 
making of images with no regard to realities; when images thus 
made are of a kind to stimulate emotion and consequently also 
activity, they lead men's whole conduct astray. It is thus that 
men follow the will-o'-the-wisps of superstition.,IIO 
We have moved from apprehension of reality to talk of ethics. 
Part of the role of both scientific enquiry and imagination is 
the ability fully to apprehend the universe. One of the 
fundamentals of 
scientifically 
apprehension of 
impossible. 
the universe is our 
and imaginatively of 
value, Temple argues, 
apprehension both 
value; for without 
ethical behaviour is 
66 
NOTES 
1. Nature Man and God: p.198 
---
2. ibid.: p.2l3 
3. ibid. : p.498 
4. ibid. : p.498 
5 • ibid. : p.498 
6. F.A.lremonger: William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: 
p.311 
7. Nature Man and God: p.163 
8. F.A.lremonger: William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: 
p.528. In a B.B.C. Radio interview broadcast in1983, Professor 
Dorothy Emmet revealed how she effected the introduction. 
9. Nature Man and God: p.270 
10. Chapter 1, n.30 
11. John Mcquarrie: Twentieth Century Religious Thought: p.269 
12. Published in Blackfriars, March 1944, reprinted in 
Religious Experience: pp.229-236 
13. See Chapter 2, above. 
14. Essay in Revelation, ed. John Baillie: p.117 
15. See Chapter 2, above, and Mens Creatrix: p.7 
16. Readings in St. John's Gospel: p.13 
17. Cyril Garbett: The Claims of the Church of England: p.38 
18. This, of course, is not purely a twentieth century view. 
Origen (De Principiis IV,I,16) doubted the scientific veracity 
of Genesis: 'Who is so foolish as to suppose that God •.• 
planted a paradise in Eden ••• ? ••. I do not suppose that 
anyone doubts that these things figuratively indicate certain 
mys teries. ' 
19. Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology: 1,35 
20. Origen: De Principiis: 1,1,7 
21. G.K.Chesterton: The Everlasting Man: p.229 
22. Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology: 1,239 
23. Summa Theologica: 1,13, art.5 
24. S.Kierkegaard: The Sickness Unto Death: p.216 
25. Essay in Revelation, ed. John Baillie: p.60 
67 
26. I concur with D.P.Henry's opinion that Chapter 3 is not a 
reformulation of the Ontological Argument. See D.P.Henry: 
Medieval Logic and Metaphysics: pp.l05-ll7 
27. It is unclear whether Temple was familiar with Bonhoeffer's 
thought. G.K.A.Bell, Bishop of Chichester, was a close personal 
friend of both men. 
28. Bonhoeffer recasts this in the form 'How?', but it is clear 
that he intends the question to mean a) What is the cause of x? 
b) What is the meaning of x? c.f. D.Bonhoeffer: Christology: 
p.28 
29. c.f. Bonhoeffer: Christology: p.29: '''Who?'' is the 
religious question.' Compare this with Temple's 'God must be to 
us neither It nor He, but Thou': Social Witness and Evangelism, 
reprinted in Religious Experience: p.60 
30. K.Barth: The Knowledge of God and the Service of God: p.6 
31. Nature Man and God: p.520 
32. ibid.: p.3l2 
33. ibid.: p.315 
34. c.f., e.g. G.K.Chesterton: St. Thomas Aquinas: p.119: 
'Either there is no philosophy ••• or else there is a real 
bridge between the mind and reality.' 
35. L.Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations: Part II, 
Section 11, quoted by J.Hick: Faith and Knowledge: p.142 
36. John Wisdom: 'Gods', Proc. Aristotelian Society, 1944-5: 
pp.191-l92 
37. Nature Man and God: p.323 
------
38. B.Pascal: Pensees: No.430 
39. D.E.Emmet: The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking: p.140 
- -
40. 'Thomism and Modern Needs', Blackfriars, March 1944, 
reprinted in Religious Experience: p.234 
41. Anthony Flew: 'Theology and Falsification', in New Essays 
in Philosophical Theology: quoted by J.Hick: Faith and 
Knowledge: pp.167-168 
42. Nature Man and God: p.3l3 
------
43. Sigmund Freud: The Future of ~ Illusion: The Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: XXI, p.16 
68 
44. Faith and Modern Thought: p.14 
45. 'Christmas Broadcast', published in Religious Experience: 
p.237 
46. Nature Man and God: p.57 (see Chapter~, above.) 
47. ibid.: p57 
48. ibid.: p.73 
49. ibid.: p.66 
50. ibid.: p.63 
51. Mens Creatrix: p.23 
52. Quoted by F.A.Iremonger: William Temple: Archbishop of 
Canterbury: p.58 
53. Sermon preached in Manchester Cathedral, July 6th 1914, 
reprinted in Religious Experience: p.61 
54. Mind: Vol. XXXVI, No.124, reprinted in Religious 
Experience: pp.77-86 
55. Differences between this article and Chapter 1 of Christus 
Veritas are trivial. In the latter, Temple adds a few 
additional explanatory paragraphs, and there are minor 
differences of paragraphing and punctuation: the substance is 
unchanged. 
56. Christus Veritas: p.5 
57. ibid.: p.5 
58. Mens Creatrix: p.70 
59. Christus Veritas: p.6 
60. ibid.: p.5 
61. 'Some Implications of Theism' in Contemporary British 
Philosophy: Vol.l, p.418 
62. ibid.: p.418 
63. ibid.: p.418 
64. Christus Veritas: p.5 
65. ibid.: p.4 
66. ibid. : p.4 
67. Mens Creatrix: p.271 
68. ibid. : p.272 
69. Readings in ~ John's Gospel: Vol.2, xxi. See also, The 
Kingdom of God: pp.36,38 
69 
70. Mens Creatrix: p.270 
71. It should be noted that F.C.Copleston in A History of 
Philosophy, Vol.2, Part 2, pp.60-61, suggests that Aquinas 
himself was referring to God as Ultimate Explanation. 
72. Faith and Modern Thought: p.11 
73. David Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: Part 
VIII 
74. Nature Man and God: p.250. The whole passage is italicised 
in the original. 
75. ibid.: p.250 
76. ibid.: p.251 
77. For a fascinating account of the effects of Darwinism on 
scientists see Owen Chadwick: The Victorian Church: Vol.2, 
Chapter 1 
78. Mens Creatrix: p.86 
79. Nature Man and God: p.253 ~....;;.....;;;..;;;...;;..---
80. ibid. p.515 
81. ibid. p.254 
82. Faith and Modern Thought: p.99 
83. Nature Man and God: p.254. The whole passage is italicised 
in the original. 
84. 'Symbolism as a Metaphysical Principle' (see note 54) 
reprinted in Religious Experience: p.80 
85. 'Religious Experience', (Sermon preached in Manchester 
Cathedral, July 6th 1914), reprinted in Religious Experience: 
p.60 
86. ibid.: p.69 
87. Faith and Modern Thought: pp.26-27 
88. Nature Man and God: p.257 
89. Owen C. Thomas: William Temple's Philosophy of Religion: 
pp.70-80 
90. D.E.Emmet: Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism: p.48, quoted 
in Nature Man and God: p.202 
.;;;.;..;;.;.~~---
91.Nature Man and God: p.203 
------
92. ibid.: p.204 
93. ibid.: p.202 
70 
94. Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Gnosiology: p.437 
95. ibid.: p.437 
96. Nature Man and God: pp.201-202 
97. Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Gnosiology: p.434 
98. ibid.: p.437 
99. ibid.: p.432 
100. The Nature of Personality: p.xxv. This idea is not 
uncommon in Idealism: it may be found, for instance, in the 
works of R.H.Lotze. Temple has much in common with this 
philosopher - a belief that for truth about the universe we 
must turn to experience is one important example, which sets 
both men apart from a pure Platonism. 
101. Nature Man and God: p.204 
102. Mens Creatrix: p.154 
103. Bernard Bosanquet: The Principle of Individuality and 
Value: p.333, quoted in Mens Creatrix: p.155 
104. Mens Creatrix: p.155 
105. ibid.: p.156 
106. ibid.: pp.157,159 
107. The Kingdom of God: p.59 
108. Mens Creatrix: p.158 
109. ibid.: p.158 
110. ibid.: p.160 
7 1 
CHAPTER FOUR 
VALUE 
1. THE APPREHENSION OF VALUE 
We have seen, when considering the nature of mind, how, for 
Temple, the mind is not purely passive; how, indeed, it 
restructures and shapes apprehension in both scientific and 
artistic understanding. What we have not considered is how the 
mind - according to Temple - apprehends value. To say that is 
perhaps to imply that there is an objective value or scale of 
values to be apprehended Temple believes that there is, 
though many philosophers would, as we shall see, dissent. 
Nevertheless, Temple argues from experience, that from our 
experience of value we are able to discern objectivity. 
Temple claims 'tha t in actual experience Fact and Value are 
given together, and 
room for both and 
••• our conception of the world must make 
disclose a relation between them in a 
coherent scheme.' 1 It is unsurprising therefore tha t Temple 
should draw attention to the central place which value occupies 
in philosophy, though he believes that the relationship between 
'Value ••• (and) ••• Reality is by most writers either not 
discussed or is very sketchily outlined. ,2 
His notion that fact and value are given together in our 
experience is an important one, not least because it may serve 
to obviate the fact-value dichotomy which has concerned so many 
philosophers. If the two are perceived together, rather than 
one being derived from the other, then it would seem that one 
of the prinCipal problems in the history of philosophy has been 
resolved. I am not convinced that Temple has resolved the 
issue, but his view should be explored. 
He is clear that we cannot derive value from fact; he says that 
it is impossible to do s03, and it is evident that in formal 
logical terms such a move cannot be made: to derive value from 
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fact is to derive an 'is' from an 'ought' - which cannot be 
done. Temple does not attempt to do this: value is something 
which is perceived in the object - it is not the case - he says 
that we first contemplate the object, and then, from 
contemplation, derive the value. We experience the object as 
itself (fact) and as valuable - though there is no logical link 
in this. 
I am not sure that Temple is correct in this description of 
perception. Certainly though both fact and value may be held in 
our experience of an object, it does not follow that they are 
given together. If I meet something strange, my first, 
instinctive question is 'What is it?' - and not until later do 
I ask 'What is its value to me?' I find that I cannot value -
or at least, do not thoughtfully consider value in - things 
that I have not yet begun to understand. Further, I may - and 
do - perceive the existence - the fact - of things, without 
ever considering their value. If I look into someone's kitchen, 
I may see a considerable array of cooking tools and recognise 
them as such. Nonetheless, though I recognise, and can, if 
pressed, say for what they are useful (what their instrumental 
value is) I have no consciousness of perceiving their value: I 
glance, accept their existence and consider their value not at 
all. In no normal sense of apprehension do I apprehend their 
significance. Their instrumental value is not apparent in 
perception 
to prepare 
the value 
as such; it is only realised in action - if I have 
a meal in the stranger's kitchen, I then think of 
of this or that implement. In my own kitchen, 
instrumental value for me has become familiar - so familiar -
that if a visitor asks me what an implement is, I may think of 
it first for its utility and only secondly for what it is: my 
answer could well be 'I find it useful for x(value) .•• it's a 
y(value)' and I may well think of it in that order. But my 
visitor's first question is one of fact, 'What is this?', and 
normally, only secondly 'What do you use it for?' 
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If my experience is correct, and our perception of instrumental 
value is both sequential and dependent on circumstances, it is 
proper to ask whether in our experience any other kind of value 
strikes us immediately as we perceive a thing's existence. Of 
course, in an abstract, philosophical/theological sense we may 
argue, as Temple or Trethowan4 would, that existence is a good, 
and that, therefore, the thing has goodness by virtue of 
existence. That may be true, but it is not, I think, how we do 
in fact perceive things. No-one, I suspect, seeing a thing as 
existing is immediately conscious of its goodness, even though 
he may accept philosophically the goodness of existents: it is 
only on reflection that he would relate the thing to his 
philosophical presuppositions. Further, that there are those 
who perceive mere exis tence as - of itself - value-free, who 
accept that x exists without attributing value in every case, 
implies that value is not a matter of automatic experience, 
that fact and value are not given together. 
Temple's view makes more sense if he means that we can somehow 
hold a sense of the value of an object in our experience 
together with its factual nature; and of course we can do this; 
we can say of a thing that we contempla te 'x is of such a 
nature and I value it thus ••• ' But this is not to derive one 
from the other - it is to report on our experience: 'I perceive 
x and I find it valuable' - the conjunction does not imply 
derivation the sentence describes two separate (though 
possibly contemporaneous) experiences: wha t the two have in 
common is that they are both experiences about the object. It 
is important to notice how I have formulated the sentence: 'I 
perceive x and find it valuable (or, I value it thus ••• )',and 
not 'I perceive x and its value is ••• ' The first formulation 
is nearer to Temple's approach: like revelation, like the 
perception of the world, it is a formulation E£Q~; the second 
formulation implies that any value is inherent in the object x 
_ a much more debatable proposition. ;/hile it is true that 
Temple argues for the objectivity of values, and not that they 
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are subjective only, he begins with the subjective aspect of 
values - how they exist E£Q me. (We may note, at this point, 
how thinkers such as Brentano have pointed to the idea that any 
perception of value is pro ~, but in the sense that an active 
mind, with its own preconceptions, is involved in any act of 
apprehension. Thus, that we may sense both existence and value 
at the same moment may simply be the coincidence of already 
valuing subject and eXisting object: to assume the value is in 
the object would be to misunderstand the nature of ones own 
perception.) 
The discovery of value, is, Temple argues, the characteristic 
activity of mind: 'Value ••• (is) ••• grounded in the discovery 
by Mind of itself - or its own kin - in its object'S, and he 
argues tha t value is the clue to interpreting both existence 
and itself. 6 We find here all the principles tha t we have 
already noted about Temple's philosophy - the subject-object 
relationship, the need for mind to find itself reflected in the 
structure of the universe. These are large claims, but larger 
still, and most significant, is the idea - already encountered 
- tha t mind is indeed the principle of the universe. I t is 
therefore clear that while we must begin with value as it 
occurs in our apprehension, we must go on to consider Temple's 
wider idea that the universe is itself the expression of the 
value of its controlling Mind. 
2. VALUE AS APPREHENDED 
So far, I have used the term 'value' rather broadly, and 
without further qualification. In my example about kitchen 
implements, I spoke of 'instrumental value', as the value of a 
kitchen implement to me is its value for a purpose. 
Philosophers generally are careful too distinguish kinds of 
value instrumental, intrinsic, teleological, moral, 
aesthetic, and so on. Temple, however, tends to speak of value 
in a broad sense, without bothering very much to distinguish in 
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a categorical way between different senses of the term. 7 There 
is perhaps some justice in this, for rarely is the value of an 
even t purely of one kind. We may, for ins tance, see a grea t 
play, and derive from it aesthetic value; but we derive many 
other kinds of value moral, perhaps (it inspires us to 
improve our own conduct), instrumental (it has enabled us to 
fill an otherwise empty evening), or teleological (it was 
. attended so that we could write about it). Nevertheless, by 
distinguishing between the different kinds of value, we are 
able to clarify our own thinking. Tha t Temple does not so 
carefully distinguish proves unsurprising when we see how 
mutable he considers value as apprehended. 
That values change - or appear to change - as apprehended is 
fundamental to Temple's approach. He gives many examples of 
this. The most significant perhaps is his example from the 
events of history: 
The successive events that constitute Process are, as 
events, unalterable. Whatever may be a true 
description of them at the time of their occurrence 
remains a true description throughout the whole 
course of time. Hamlet killed Polonius; no length of 
years can make it true to say that Polonius killed 
Hamlet. Conversely, if it is now true that the earth 
revolves, and from the formation of the solar system 
has revolved, about the sun, then it was never true 
to say that the sun revolves about the earth. In this 
sense the event is always unalterable, and not even 
God can change the past. But it is not true that the 
value of the past event is unalterable; when it is 
seen in the context and perspective of a longer vista 
of time, what was, as an isolated event, evil may be 
appreciated as an element in a total good - not only 
as a price paid for a consequent good, but as an 
indispensable element in what as a whole is good. And 
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this again is not to be interpreted merely as a 
preponderance of good in a whole which also contains 
evil; the thing that was evil becomes a positive 
ingredient in a total good. 
No doubt it is only by rhetoric tha t this can be 
called an alteration of the past; for the past event, 
as past, is what it always was. But the present 
appreciation of the past discloses a character which 
in the past was imperceptible. It would be 
inconceivable that anyone should misunderstand the 
rhetoric which declares that the past is not 
unal terable, unless some persons had in fact 
misunderstood it. For it is the whole point of this 
way of thinking that the past gua past was what it 
was; if it was bad, it is now true to say that it was 
bad; but though it was merely bad, it is now an 
integral element in good. To turn at once to a 
supreme instance, the crucifixion of Jesus of 
Nazareth, interpreted as Christians have interpreted 
it, was for a moment the worst of all manifestations 
of evil; but throughout the ages it is the best of 
all manifestations of good; and the Christian scheme 
of redemption affirms, not only a preponderance of 
good over evil, so that the temporary victory of evil 
is wiped out by a more decisive victory of good, but 
the conversion of defeat itself into triumph. 8 
At certain basic levels, Temple is, of course, correct. It is 
true, for instance, that Christians have long interpreted the 
crucifixion as at once the greatest of all possible evils (the 
scandal of the murder of God) and the greatest of all possible 
goods (the redemption of mankind) and that they have, as a 
matter of record, held both interpretations together. As Temple 
himself notes9 it is not relevant whether the interpretations 
are true: merely that we can interpret the same event in both 
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ways is enough. (We may add that a non-Christian can interpret 
the crucifixion in other ways - seeing its significance as a 
source of myth, or a triumph for colonial justice, for 
instance.) It is also true that time may alter the significance 
of an event. At the time, the English Reformation may have been 
interpreted as a purely religious phenomenon: it is only in the 
longer perspective, and with the benefit of hindsight, that we 
are able to see tha tits principal significance was in the 
revolution it caused in social structure and economic 
organisation. In the shorter span of our own lives, our 
perspective on events alters. A life-endangering operation 
seems an unmitigated horror at the time, and yet it can become, 
in retrospect, the source of good, making possible the 
realisation of new opportunities. 
By insisting upon the unalterability in themselves of past 
events, but stressing that what had one apparent value may now 
seem to have another, Temple seems at first to be maintaining a 
separation of the world and our interpretation of it. This 
appears to imply that the criterion of value is what we 
consider it to be. We recognise value, as we recognise truth, 
by our feeling of satisfaction: 'Value is recognised by a sense 
of kinship or "at-homeness" which we may call satisfaction. 
Where a man claims to find this, his claim cannot be disputed. 
To every man his own sense of value is final. ,10 In one sense, 
the latter point is true if and only if one cannot be brought 
to change one's estimate of the value of something by argument 
or experience. In the last chapter, I cited Temple's own 
account of the development of his artistic and musical taste ll 
- a case in which he changed his values through a revaluation 
based on experience. Presumably therefore, if we do not have 
closed minds, we are always open to the revaluation of our 
values - we need not accept our values as 'fixed' or 'final' 
until and unless we choose to do so. That is one possibility: 
but another is to posit that there are some values which are 
absolute - we may not at first recognise them, but when we do, 
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there is no dispute. And it is clear that for Temple there is 
such absolute value, 'known to us in the three forms of Truth, 
Beauty, and Goodness (of character).,12 This creates immediate 
problems of reconciling our perception of value - which is 
apparently relative ('I can see no reason why the value of any 
object should be identical for all people.,13), beyond argument 
( 'One cannot ever argue about q~estions of value.' 14), yet 
intuitive and ultimate ('All value-judgments are ultimate. The 
terms good and bad cannot be analysed. There is no more to be 
said about them than simply to find out to what objects they 
can be applied. All value-judgments are in their nature 
intuitive, and they do not admit of argument. ,15), 
unjustifiable ('To justify is to approve as righteous by 
reference to some external standard; righteousness itself, 
therefore, which constitutes the standard, cannot be justified; 
we can only describe it and ask - Do you like it or not?,16) 
and unprovable (' I know of no way of proving ~ priori that 
anything is good or evil: we must go to our own moral 
judgements,17) with the claim that value is ultimately 
absolute. I think tha t, in part, the problem is caused by 
Temple being pulled in two opposite directions, by his Idealist 
past on the one hand, and his attempt to justify Christianity 
on the other. His instinct as we have seen18 - was to 
synthesise. In certain respects this was not always possible. 
Temple attempts to link the fact of value as existing in our 
perception and its actual existence in reality by a simple 
device. He argues that values are present in the world, but are 
realised in our apprehension of them: 
••• into value the subjective element enters not as 
a limitation, but as a constituent. Value exists in 
order to be appreciated; and though the appreciating 
mind finds rather than creates the value, yet the 
value is dormant or potential until appreciation 
awakes it to energy and actuality. Value, in short, 
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is actual in experience. And it is one of the 
advantages of a philosophy which makes Value its 
central principle that it thus in its central 
principle holds objective and subjective together. 
If a philosophy can be constructed on this basis at 
all, it will a t leas t be free from the di vis i ve 
claims of the objective and the subjective. Whatever 
may be true of knowledge and fact, there is no doubt 
that in actualised Value subject and object are 
united on equal terms. 19 
These claims, in Christus Veritas, are broad. He emphasises the 
point in Nature, Man and God: ••• Value depends for its 
actuality on the appreciating mind. That does not mean that the 
Value resides in the subjective experience of that mind: it 
means that the appreciation brings to actuality a quality of 
the object which previously belonged to it really, but 
potentially and not actually - , ••• for value is "objectively 
real, but subjectively conditioned.",20 The central place which 
Temple gives to value is unsurprising if it is the key to the 
subject-object relationship, if it does provide the element of 
synthesis. 
Temple uses this notion of value to provide the basis for 
theism. In Christus Veritas, he says: 
••• if our whole theory is sound, value determines 
existence, but value is only actual when it is 
apprecia ted; therefore Man's apprecia tion of the 
world is the first instalment, so to speak, within 
the Time process, of the rea1isa tion of tha t for 
which the world was made, though in the eternal 
Mind which comprehends all Time this is actual 
eternally. It is Man who first rises to the 
question why there is a world at all. It is in 
Man's appreciation of its Value that the answer 
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begins to appear; for the solution of the problem 
of existence is found in the experience of what is 
good. Thus the whole universe is created to reflect 
the manifold goodness of the Creator, and to 
produce within itself beings who may share with the 
Creator His joy in the goodness of the created 
thing ••• The universe exists to reveal the 
goodness of God so far as it evolves intelligences 
capable of receiving the revelation. 2l 
We note, parenthetically, the characteristic stress on the 
experiencing nature of revelation. Taken as a whole, the 
argument is unsa tisfactory. We need mention only two points. 
Firstly, Temple uses an argument reminiscent of Berkeley in 
speaking of 'the eternal Mind (in) which (the value of things) 
is actual eternally. ' Berkeley explained the continued 
existence of things, when not perceived by us, by saying that 
God was perceiving them. Temple explains the continued value of 
things by saying that God is valuing them. There is an element 
of circularity in such an argument. We are aware of the value 
of things and hence of the purpose behind them. Secondly, we 
may note some dishonesty in the penultimate sentence in this 
extract. To use 'thus' is to imply a logical connection between 
the sentence about the universe revealing the creator's 
goodness and the preceding one about the experience of 
goodness. There is no such logical connection. We may indeed 
experience goodness, as an interpretation of the world; but it 
does not follow from this that the - apparent - goodness of the 
world need be any more than accident, or, more simply, how it 
appears to us. 
In Nature, Man and God, Temple uses a different argument for 
the existence of God - a variant on the First Cause argument, 
as he notes 22 - again based on value: 
8 1 
••• in actual experience Fact and Value are given 
together ••• accepting Value as equally real wi th 
Existence, ••• we find in Value the clue to the 
interpretation of the totality which includes both . 
••• The Process, in certain of its parts, apprehends 
itself as exhibiting that same character of Mind by 
which this apprehension is possible; for Value 
arises through Mind's discovery of itself in its 
object. Mind, then, though it appears within the 
Process at ~ late stage, discovers throughout that 
Process the activity of Mind .:. universally in the 
form of Truth, comm~only in the form of Beauty, 
sometimes in the form of Goodness. That Mind is 
pervasive of Reali ty is ~ necessary inference from 
this method of apprehending the world. If that 
method is justified, ~ ~ have tried to show that 
it is, the conclusion is inevi table. Mind is the 
principle of uni ty in Reali ty, .2!. a t least the 
fullest expression of that principle known to us. 
But Reality is first presented as Process. We have 
found that the Process is subject to Mind, and when 
Mind expresses itself through process, its activity 
is called Purpose. We are therefore led to enquire 
whether Purpose can be the governing principle of the 
world-process. It has, at least, this advantage as a 
candidate for that function; it is a principle of 
explanation which itself requires no further 
explanation. All other types of explanation set new 
problems; of any other answer to the question Why? we 
ask Why? again. But Intelligent Purpose is self-
explanatory. When we have traced an occurrence to the 
Purpose of an intelligent being, we are satisfied. 
And this is natural enough. Mind has referred the 
occurrence to itself as cause. 
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Now it cannot be said tha t we are under the same 
necessity to refer the course of the World-Process to 
Mind as we are to regard Mind as its governing 
principle; for there might be other causes unknown to 
us to which it could be referred. Yet if there is one 
and only one principle known which fulfils the 
requirement of supplying an explanation without 
demanding one, it is reasonable, a t the least, to 
experiment with the theory that this does indeed 
supply explanation of the universe. But that theory 
is Theism in one or another of its forms. 
When we begin to follow up the theory tha t Mind 
Purposive, or Intelligent Purpose, supplies the 
explanation of the world, we are at once confronted 
wi th the fact tha t Purpose is directed to Value or 
the Good, so that the theory involves the logical 
priori ty of Value to Existence. Objects come into 
existence, if this theory is sound, because they are 
good, or because some good can be brought into 
existence by means of them ••• 
.•. Our minds both exhibit and co-operate with the 
essential activity of the Mind which pervades and 
explains the Process. 23 
There is some irony in this argument. As we have seen, Temple 
rejected natural theology and its methods, yet here we find him 
using a strange amalgam of the First Cause Argument (in the 
form of Ultimate Explanation24 ), the Cosmological Argument, the 
Design Argument (purpose in the universe), and the Moral 
Argument: these will be considered in detail in a subsequent 
chapter. 
Temple asserts, in simple terms, that our values are a guide to 
reality. I am reminded of Baillie's comment: 'Either our moral 
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values tell us something about the nature and purpose of 
reality (i.e. give us the germ of religious belief) or they are 
subjective and therefore meaningless,25 and to both the 
objection applies that it does not follow from any subjectivity 
of values that they are meaningless. Even if purely subjective 
they have meaning for me - just as, if I say 'I prefer apricot 
to strawberry jam', the statement, though entirely subjective, 
has real meaning, so too, if I say 'I value beautiful things', 
however much beauty may be purely subjective, the statement is 
meaningful to me, and I suggest, would also be to a hearer. 
That a statement of value may be meaningful in this sense is 
not to imply that we may therefore infer absolute value. 
Nevertheless, Temple is not unique among modern philosophers in 
arguing in this way. Trethowan argues that if we try 'to find 
absolute value in human activity alone •.. this does not make 
sense,26 and he maintains of God 'that he is the source of 
being is to say that he is the source of all good because it is 
fundamentally in terms of value (whether we realise this 
1 · . 1 ) h d . h· 27 . t· th exp lClt y or not t at we lscover 1m •.. 1 lS as e 
source of value that we come to know him. ,28 The question here 
is whether the mistake may not lie in attempting to find 
absolute value; or whether, as I shall suggest in the next 
section, that it is mistaken quest. 
We may question also whether the universe is as purposive as 
Temple implies, or whether indeed it reveals purpose a tall. 
Temple seems to share the optimism apparent among many of his 
contemporaries, such as H.G.Wells, of evident and inevitable 
purposive progress Wells speaks, at the conclusion of his 
Outline of History of man standing upon the earth as upon a 
- 29 . foot-stool and reaching out towards the stars. ThlS sense of 
purpose seems hard to justify in the face of evil. As Professor 
Rogerson has said: 'I cannot accept Temple's philosophical 
attempt to present the universe as purposive, as sacramental, 
as the expression in all its parts and processes of absolute 
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value. I cannot justify evil as a necessary part of purposive 
reality, for all that I accept that good can come out of evil. 
To take perhaps a bad case, I do not think that I could have 
encouraged the inmates of Auschwi t z or Buchenwald wi th the 
thought that their suffering was a necessary part of purposeful 
it •.• Faced with 
must either be 
reality and that good was bound to come of 
Temple's repeated claim that reality 
inexplicable or capable of explana tion in 
will, I would have to opt for the 
reality. ,30 Indeed, we may say that 
terms of purposive 
inexplicability of 
the dilemma for the 
Christian lies preCisely in attempting to come to terms with 
the apparent pointlessness of the world as we find it: many of 
the most significant contemporary Christian thinkers, such as 
Rudolf Bultmann, have taken little comfort from the structure 
of the world, arguing not that it reveals God, but that it is 
something inexplicable of which we must somehow make sense. It 
could further be argued that an adherence to a non-
propositional 
absconditus, 
overt purpose. 
theology, with 
should lead us to 
its 
expect 
emphasis on 
few evident 
a deus 
signs of 
Temple himself, towards the end of his life, perhaps through 
the events of the Second World War, came to change his mind. On 
16th July 1942, he wrote to Dorothy Emmet: 
The particular modification to which I am feeling 
driven is not substantial, though I think it is very 
important. It is a much clearer perception of what is 
worked out in the Gifford Lectures about process and 
value. What we must completely get away from is the 
notion that the world as it now exists is a rational 
whole; we must think of its unity not by the analogy 
of a picture, of which all the parts exist at once, 
h 1·f 1·t is good but by the analogy of a drama were, 
enough, the full meaning of the first scene only 
becomes apparent with the final curtain; and we are 
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in the middle of this. Consequently the world as we 
see it is strictly unintelligible. We can only have 
faith that it will become intelligible when the 
divine purpose, which is the explanation of it, is 
accomplished. 31 
It is a pity that Temple did not live to work out the 
implications of this change of mind. 
3. THE NATURE OF VALUE - OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT 
It is important for any attempt to evaluate thought to see 
whether it is possible to retain any part of his approach to 
questions of value, without a commitment to the existence of 
objective values. It is, I think, possible to do so. It is 
outside the scope of this thesis to provide a fully articulated 
theory of value, but it is, I think, helpful to mention some 
possible directions of thought which would retain a notion of 
value wi thout falling - on the one hand - into the idea of 
objective values, or - on the other - into a mere narrow 
subjectivism. 
We note, when we study many contemporary philosophers, a 
tendency to be uncomfortable with ideas of value. Popper notes 
that 'few philosophers with scientific training ••• care to 
talk about values. The reason is simply that so much of the 
talk about values is just hot air. So many of us fear that we 
too would only produce hot air or, if not that, something not 
easily distinguished from it.,32 Popper, however, is not 
content to 
be derived 
facts. 33 
ignore value - he argues that although values cannot 
from facts, they, 
He argues for a 
claiming their dominance in 
like problems, somehow emerge from 
limited objectivity of values, 
the realm of world 3 34, which he 
sees as partially autonomous 35 (Popper speaks of three worlds, 
the world of things [world 1], of subjective experiences [world 
2], and the world of statements in themselves [world 3])36. In 
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one sense, at least, the objects of world 3 may be considered 
real 37 , because they can act upon physical objects 
nevertheless the reality of world 3 objects is not the reality 
which Plato asserts of his Ideal Forms, though effects are real 
enough. Popper is emphatic that '1. regard world 1. as being 
essentially the product of the human mind. ,38 
Popper's view is important, 
the possibili ty of finding 
I think, 
a place 
because he demonstrates 
for meaningful discourse 
to the actual objective about values without a commitment 
existence of values as a constituent of the world - as against 
the beliefs of Temple, Baillie and Trethowan, who would - as we 
have seen - argue that talk of value immediately commits us to 
an acceptance of an objective ground of value. 
It is easy, however, to see how philosophers can fall into the 
trap of thinking that values have an objective, 'real world' 
existence. The trap is well-illustrated in a passage from 
Meinong: 
• • • That we are 
possibilities is 
dealing 
shown by 
with more than mere 
a group of entirely 
attributions such as those we encounter when someone 
speaks of a pleasant bath, fresh air, oppressive 
heat, vexatious noise, beautiful colour, a gay or 
sad, tedious or entertaining story, a sublime work of 
art, excellent people, good intentions, etc. The 
close relations of such attributes to 
not open to question, but it 
unquestionable that 
completely analogous 
they 
to the 
are, 
other 
our feelings is 
is just as 
as attributes, 
properties set 
before us by presentative ideas in quite familiar 
fashion. If I say' of the sky that it is blue, and 
again say of it that it is beautiful, I seem to 
credit the sky with a property in one case as in the 
other, and since a feeling participates in the 
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apprehension of the relevant property in the one case 
while an idea does the work in the other it is 
natural to ascribe the presentative function to the 
feeling in the former case as we do to an idea in the 
latter. 39 
Here, Meinong appears to be saying that evaluative statements 
have a straightforwardly factual character - the two statements 
are 'completely analogous'. I should argue that even in 
everyday discourse we do not consider them so. I once had the 
misfortune to travel by train wi th a pompous colleague who, 
looking out of the window, said, "You know, Michael, the sky 
today is what I like to call blue." This struck me then - and 
strikes me now - as merely tiresome circumlocution. The point 
was so evident, so beyond argument, as to be not worth mention. 
If, on the other hand, the fellow had said that the sky seemed 
to be of a particularly beautiful blue - it was a winter's 
morning - there would have been something to discuss, the kinds 
of blueness that we found beautiful, and so on. Indeed, the 
very subjectivity of the statement of value would have made 
possible discourse which the mere factual assertion did not. 
But the point is deeper than this rather trivial example. We 
may ponder whether a statement of value is a true predication. 
We may consider three statements: 
a) The sky is existing. 
b) The sky is blue. 
c) The sky is beautiful. 
adjective seems to be a straightforward 
predica te, describing the object. Closer inspection 
demonstrates that this is not so. Since Kant's rejection of 
Descartes' version of the Ontological Argument (which claims 
that existence is a defining predicate of God), philosophers 
have not normally treated 'exists' as a predicate: to say 
something exists, Kant argues, is not to add existence to our 
concept, together with all its other predicates. It is to 
In each case, the 
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assert that there exists in the real world an x which 
corresponds with our concept. This thought is further developed 
in Frege-Russellian language by the notion of an existential 
quantifier - (Ix)(x ••• ): which means roughly 'There exists x, 
such that x is ••• ' 
This view of statement a) suggests a line of thought for 
dealing with statement e). Is to say 'x is beautiful' to make a 
straightforward predicative statement, or is it rather to say 
'I value x as beautiful', so that the true predication is not 
of the object, but of myself as witness? To say 'x is 
beautiful' is not, on deep inspection, therefore to make a 
statement analogical to 'x is blue'; it is rather to say 'I 
value x ••• ('I perceive the sky is blue' might at first 
sight, seem analogous; but it isn't, if, as I think, the sky's 
blueness is evident to all perceivers: it retains its blueness 
whether I perceive it or not, whereas the valuation of beauty 
is dependent on my observation.) 
Such a view, necessarily undeveloped, nevertheless enables us 
to retain Temple's perception that 'value is only actual when 
it is appreciated,40 though we have shifted the locus of value 
from the world of objects to the appreciating mind. 
This shift of locus may, at first sight, seem to bring us back 
to a straightforward subjectivism (the idea that value is 
purely in the eye of the beholder) which Temple was trying to 
avoid by insisting on an objective real basis for values. We 
have seen4l that Temple insisted that value has a subjective 
content, and that at times, it appears that it is entirely 
subjective): 'About intrinsic value there can be no argument: 
one approves or not and there's an end ••• As Mr. F.R.Bradley 
has argued - "Our sense of value, and in the end, for every man 
his own sense of value is ultimate and final. And since there 
is no court of appeal, it is idle even to inquire if this sense 
is fallible.",42 (Temple was sufficiently struck by this 
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passage of Bradley to quote it more than once. 43 ) Closer 
examination of this quotation shows an implicit acceptance of 
the objectivity of value - the clause 'About intrinsic vale 
there can be no argument' can be taken to mean ei ther that 
statements of value are straightforwardly factual (with all the 
problems which such a v~ew implies) or that, at least, there is 
intrinsic value to be approved. Temple certainly means the 
latter, which he seems to take to imply the former. 
However, it is possible, I think, to avoid the objectification 
of value without falling into the narrow subjectivism of which 
Temple is so fearful. Popper points the way with his treatment 
of value as a world 3 component. Once it is placed in world 3, 
value can be spoken of, as we have seen, meaningfully. 
Antony Duff has, in an important paper44 , indicated the 
problems of a purely subjectivist account of ethical values. He 
argues that a purely subjectivist account does not allow for 
certain features of moral thought. He notes for example that 
charity is not merely, as the pure subjectivist 
desire of the individual: 'To the moral agent, 
of others matters not just under the aspect 
wasted, but under the aspect of something which 
on him and on his concern45 ••• The distinction 
would claim, a 
the well-being 
of something 
makes a claim 
between desire 
and duty draws its sense from the moral agent's conception of 
values independent of, and imposing requirements on, himself 
and his concerns: he recognises not only that particular 
desires may conflict with these requirements, but also that his 
own grasp of these values could be mistaken46 .•• a moral agent 
distinguishes between the good and what he happens to desire or 
value: the orientation of his concern is towards the good, and 
his concern is to bring his desires into agreement wi th the 
good: only thus can he see other desires he had or might have 
to be wrong. 47 , The individual has therefore, in these terms, a 
sense of an absolute claim on himself: if we take a purely 
subjective approach, the good, the beautiful, become simply 
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what pleases us. Duff is noting that we do, in fact, find that 
we have a sense of the claim of these things over against our 
desires, which enables us rationally even to alter those 
desires. In this sense, at least, we may speak of values which 
are absolute. We are not, however, bound to deem values as 
objectively existent, other than in a world 3 sense; though in 
that sense we may consider them existent for us. Meinong 
expresses this idea well, tha t by the intentionali ty of the 
mind, a value may have objectivity for us, as a result of our 
mental action (this view, of course, retains Temple's notion of 
the place of mind in making value dependent on the appreciation 
- Meinong would say 'intention' - of mind). As Lindsay puts it: 
'Meinong holds that intentionality is always two-sided: it has, 
we may say, its me-wardness and its object-wardness, its 
relation to my subjective mindedness ••• on the one hand, and 
its relation to objects of varying sorts, on the other. It is, 
moreover, only by having a specific me-wardness, or immanent 
content, that it can have a specific object-wardness or 
transcendent objectivity. ,48 
If it is the case that we can speak in a world 3 sense of an 
absoluteness of value for us, we are able to find a link with 
the attitudes which are apparent in Temple's approach to 
revelation, in particular the sense of 'experiencing as' which 
so much concerned us in the last chapter. Duff, in his paper, 
speaks in terms of moral absolutes appearing wi thin a moral 
perspective. He says that 'the assertion of the absolute status 
of some particular moral value ••• makes sense only within a 
particular moral perspective, which provides those shared 
cri teria of sense and nonsense, of truth and falsi ty, which 
gives such claims their sense. Thus we can provide a 
philosophical explication of the logic of different moral 
perspectives, and show how different moral values have such an 
absolute moral status within them, as fundamental truths: we 
can show that, and how, for instance, a prohibition on suicide 
is absolute within a Catholic perspective, but not within 
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various humanist perspectives ••• ' 49 Here, then, is a way of 
explaining differences between views of moral absolutes in a 
manner consistent with Temple's approach, though Temple would, 
I suspect, differ from Duff's belief50 that there is no clear 
way in which we can indicate that this perspective is superior 
to that. More importantly, Duff is here able to indicate ways 
in which there can be real discourse about absolutes deemed 
'real', without any problems of 'ontological status'. 
For the moment, one question remains. If it is possible to 
speak of absolutes of value without avowing an objective 'real 
world' existence, how then are we to decide when we have 
encountered an absolute value? Connected with this, and flowing 
from Duff's ideas about different perspectives, is it possible 
to find common ground in our talk of absolutes of value? 
Several approaches suggest themselves 51 , but I shall consider 
only one - the idea of satisfactoriness, and, connected with it 
(in answer to the second part of our question), whether there 
is common ground for all people to find similar values 
satisfactory. 
As we have seen, Temple was much attracted to the idea of 
satisfactoriness as a criterion for judging truth: in Faith and 
Modern Thought he said: 'the truth about facts is what 
satisfies the mind of man' 51, and his attitude was not to 
change. 
At first sight, there seems something rather cosy about 
speaking of value in terms of satisfaction (not only because of 
the emotional overtones of the world itself): there is 
something more pleasing (at least to the puritanical mind) 
about Kant's severe notion of duty. As we have seen53 , however, 
Temple finds a simple appeal to duty psychologically 
unconvincing: 'I do not find that the recognition of a duty is 
of any great assistance to its performance. ,54 A sense of duty, 
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without imagination, is, 
realisation of value. 
for Temple, no spur to action, to the 
His Own belief is that the final 
encouragement is not in imagination alone: 'It is in this 
supplying of the motive that religion comes in. ,55 In this need 
for motive, of course, Temple is passing from a pure ethic of 
values to something more complex. (See Note A to the present 
chapter, below.) 
Temple is not alone in considering a kind of satisfactoriness 
essential to our judgment of value. Duff, in the paper cited, 
notes the inevitable component of satisfactoriness in the 
subjectivist approach to ethics 56 , by implication if not by 
name. Anthony Quinton, more radically, claims that ethical 
statements of value are, in essence appetitive. 57 He speaks of 
value-judgments almost exclusively in terms of satisfaction: 'A 
material criterion of morality would be that a value-judgement 
is moral if it evaluates actions in the light of their bearing 
on the satisfaction and suffering of everyone affected by them. 
It is prudential, by contrast, if it evaluates actions in the 
light of their bearing on the long-term satisfaction of the 
agent; technical if the evaluating factor is the minimisation 
of time and cost; aesthetic if it is the reward of satisfaction 
available in the long run to a contemplative spectator; and so 
on. ,58 
The idea of satisfactoriness is expressed with special clarity 
by Franz Brentano in his seminal lecture, The Origin of Our 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong 59 • Brentano argues for the 
intuitive nature of rules 'which can be known to be correct and 
binding, in and for themselves, and in virtue of their own 
nature. ,60 He claims that we have an intuitive sense of values: 
So far as the feelings about 
concerned, we might say that 
sense quali ties are 
these things are a 
matter of 
disputandum." 
taste, and "De gustibus non est 
But this is not what we would say of 
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the love 
say that 
and that 
Brentano 
of error and the hatred of insight. We would 
such love and hatred are basically perverse 
members of the species in question [N.B. 
is speaking of a hypothetical species] hate 
what is 
what is 
indubitably and intrinsically good and love 
indubitably and intrinsically bad. Why do we 
answer differently in the two cases when the feeling 
of compulsion is equally strong? The answer is 
simple. In the former case the feeling of compulsion 
is merely instinctive. But in the latter case the 
feeling of compulsion is a higher love that is 
experienced as 6l being correct. When we ourselves 
experience such a love we notice not only that its 
object is loved and capable of being loved, and that 
its privation or contrary hated and capable of being 
hated, but also that one is worthy of love and the 
other worthy of hate, and therefore that the one is 
good and the other bad. 
Let us consider another example. Just as we prefer 
insight to error, so, too, generally speaking, we 
prefer joy to sadness - unless it be joy in what is 
bad. Were there beings who preferred things the other 
way around, we would take their attitudes to be 
perverse, and rightly so. For here, too, our love and 
hatred are experienced ~62 being correct •.• 
• •• Our knowledge of wha t is truly and indubi tably 
good arises from the type of experience we have been 
discussing, where a love is experienced ~63 being 
correct - in all those cases where we are capable of 
such knowledge. 
We should note, however, that there is no guarantee 
that every good thing will arouse in us an emotion 
that is experienced as 64 being correct. When this 
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does not occur, our cri terion fails, 
the good is absent so far as our 
concerned. 65 
in which case 
knowledge is 
In passing, we may observe several features. Brentano's 
formulation enables us to retain Temple's central stress on 
'experiencing as' while maintaining the sense that values can 
be absolutes for us, in the world 3 sense of Popper or the 
moral perspective sense of Duff. The absoluteness of these 
values is indicated elsewhere by Brentano: 'The principles of 
ethics, like those of all other sciences, must be cognitions; 
they cannot be emotions. ,66 But this absoluteness, the apparent 
concreteness implied by speaking of cognition, does not in fact 
imply an existential status to value; the absoluteness, to 
Brentano, is a fact of our psychology rather than a quasi-
objective reality of the type implied by Temple. From time to 
time, Temple does refer to intuition ('Reason is essentially a 
special kind of Intuition - the Intuition of Totality or of the 
Whole and of every fact in its place in the Whole.,67) but he 
does not give to it the radical centrality that we find in 
Brentano. 
In our own time, we find a strong correspondence between the 
attitude of Brentano and that of Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul 
II). Wojtyla, like Brentano, holds that 'judging is cognitive 
and thus belongs to the sphere of knowing,68, and we may note 
parallels between his views and both Temple's and Brentano's: 
••• it seems that the intuitive experience of objects is 
always accompanied by judgment; inasmuch as values are the 
object of intuition, it is a judgment of values, a judgment 
positing a given value. The character of this kind of judgment 
is not then discursive; the value is not reached in the course 
of a process of reasoning; instead we find it in our knowledge 
ready-made rather than formed by reason. ,69 as if it were 
Wojtyla thus retains the intuitional character of value-
judgments; but the value is in the judgment, in an 
95 
axio1ogica1 70 rather than an existential sense: he speaks of 
'the axiological (or moral) truth, which is differentiated from 
the ontological and logical "truth". In grasping it we assert 
the value of an object rather than what the object itself or as 
cognised actually is.,71 
Here we find the clue to the weakness of Temple's position. He 
does not recognise, as Wojtyla does, and as I have suggested, 
that a statement of value has something of the character of an 
assertion, and, further, he appears not to recognise - and 
certainly does not differentiate - the two kinds of 'truth' 
illustrated by Wojty1a. Temple's inability to separate kinds of 
, tru th " and 'fact', to equa te - if you like - the world 1 
objectivity from the kind of objectivity of values in world 3, 
has led to the confusion which has committed him to an 
implausible position - that value has some sort of objective, 
real-world, existential status. 
If, as I think, the absoluteness of value, and its 
satisfactoriness, is a matter of some sort of intuition, it is 
proper to enquire whether it is true that there can be such a 
form of self-evident intuition, and, further, whether it is 
possible to show that such intuition is a fundamental 
characteristic of the human personality. 
NOTE A 
In this chapter, we have seen Temple building his philosophy, 
and his ethics, (to be developed later) on a basis of value; 
and have noted Wojtyla's endorsement of an axiological 
approach. 
Not all Christian moralists find such approaches acceptable. In 
a recent (1975) work, the Catholic theologian C.Henry Peschke 
comments: 
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Ethics of values ascribes (sic.) the perception of 
moral values to an irrational feeling ..• it is left 
to the individual's discretion to decide which are 
the moral values that are worthy to be accepted and 
to be realised. There is no criterion superior to a 
person' s subjective feelings. This lack of a 
superior, objective criterion for the morally good 
creates a void, which will easily be filled by the 
criteria of eudaemonism and utilitarianism 
• • • 
••• ethics of values is (sic) not able to provide a 
satisfactory basis for the categorical character of 
the moral demand. What is at stake •.• is the 
realisation of certain moral values, which will not 
be brought into being. Everybody will agree that this 
is regrettable, just as everybody will find it more 
or less regrettable if aesthetic values are destroyed 
or not realised. But it does not appear too difficult 
to put up wi th such a loss. Precisely because the 
moral values are independent entities and not related 
to any superior purpose of God's glory or man's 
salvation, the system is unable to provide a 
peremptory sanction of the moral order. Axiological 
ethics misses the stern inexorability of a divine 
will avenging uncompromisingly offences against the 
moral law and demanding atonement for its 
infringements. 72 
I have little sympathy with Peschke's chillingly ferocious view 
- it approximates too closely to an uncharitable approach; and 
it does not show how we are to determine the existence - or, 
indeed, the appearance of the inexorable divine will. 
Peschke, speaking of a 'peremptory sanction' seems not to be 
demanding ethics a tall, but a divine legal sys tern. Wha tever 
the faults of the systems of Wojtyla and Temple, these 
distinguished churchmen do not ignore humanity or forgiveness. 
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Nevertheless, this mention of Peschke does serve to indicate 
that in their various philosophies, Temple and Wojtyla should 
not be considered mere mouthpieces of views shared by all their 
co-religionists. 
NOTE B 
We have seen (note 19) that for Temple the experience of value 
provides the means of uniting subject and object in a way which 
is satisfying. 
Wojtyla takes a contrary view: 
In true willing the subject is never passively 
directed to an object. The object - which may be a 
good or a value ..• - never leads the subject back 
upon itself; it never forces the subject into its own 
reality thereby determining it from without; that 
kind of subject-object relation would in fact amount 
to determinism; it would mean that the subject was in 
a way absorbed by the object and also that innerness 
was absorbed by outerness. The moment of decision in 
the human will rules out any such pattern of relation 
73 
• • • 
But Wojtyla is not a member of the Idealist school, and his 
concerns are different - his attitude towards the idea of the 
mind as itself active in perception can be traced directly to 
the work of Brentano. Whether the problem of the subject-object 
relation is resolved by consideration of value may prove 
irrelevant: as we shall see in the next and subsequent chapters 
the two men's differing attitudes to value nevertheless yield 
remarkably similar results. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PERSONALITY - THE HIGHEST VALUE 
1. THE NOTION OF PERSONALITY 
Throughout his philosophical career, Temple was insistent on 
the centrality of personality as the key both to our 
understanding of the universe, and to our ethical lives. One of 
his earliest books 1 is devoted entirely to the subject and he 
returns to the concept repeatedly in his later works. 
Nor is this at all surprising. If it is true, as Temple 
asserts, that the central guiding principle of the universe is 
purpose (God's purpose), then it follows that the principle is 
personal. A simple reflection reveals this: a theist, if he 
describes the cosmos as purposeful, means that it shows forth 
the personal creative power of God - the atheist, at least 
normally, denies purpose in the structure of the universe and 
perceives in it no personal character. The issue between theist 
and atheist is - usually - whether the universe is purposive. 
Temple has no doubt. Further, he argues that purpose is the 
only satisfactory explanation, the only ultimately self-
explanatory explanation of the universe. Nowhere does he set 
out this view with greater lucidity than in one of his later, 
and I would say most characteristic, books, Christiani ty in 
Thought and Practice2 , written after his Gifford Lectures. His 
whole argument is worth considering, containing as it does 
themes that we shall find recurring repeatedly: 
• • • 
as 
in this purpose which is characteristic of man, 
it is characteristic of no other part of the 
universe so far as we know, we find something that is 
unique; namely that it is a princilpe in its own 
nature self-explanatory. 
1 0 2 
If there is to be an explanation of the world, of 
course it must be found in something concerning which 
the mind does not ask any further question. We must 
not need to explain our explanation. We need, then, 
something which is self-explanatory. If there is one 
thing and one thing only which answers to that, it 
will be reasonable to experiment with the hypothesis 
that this is indeed capable of serving as the 
explanation of the whole. 
Now purpose is, in fact, such a self-explanatory 
principle ••• 
••• When science sets out to investigate the causes of 
things, all that it can do is to trace certain 
uniformities which are observable in the behaviour of 
natural objects, and by help of these to declare what 
must have preceded the facts now under observation. 
It explains today by reference to yesterday; and 
yesterday by reference to the day before; and the 
solar system by reference to the nebula; but where 
did that come from? And if you can trace out where 
tha t came from and call it "X" then where did "X" 
come from? Always the same process will press you 
further and further back. You ask "Why" of every 
presented fact or theory, and to every answer you 
bring forward the question "Why" again. 
But when you find that something has been done by a 
human being for a purpose which you understand, you 
do not ask "Why" any more. You say, "Tha t explains 
it." The stock instance is that of a geologist who is 
investigating the formation of a mountain range. He 
notices the various strata, the faults in these, and 
so forth. Then his attention is caught by some stones 
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heaped together in ways for which it is 
difficult on his principles to account. 
very 
When he has given his geological explanation of the 
strata and their faults, he may be pressed further 
back into the place where geology merges into 
astronomy and so on to the nebula, as I indicated 
just now; but concerning these stones there seems no 
explanation along those lines. But when he returns to 
his inn in the valley and speaks about them, he is 
told that they are piles of stones erected by the 
inhabitants of the two valleys to mark the most 
convenient track from one to the other. And he asks 
no more questions. That does explain it. He does not 
say, "Why did they do tha t?" He does not even say, 
"How did they do that?" unless some of the stones 
seemed heavier than men could lift. He is satisfied; 
the mind has found something which satisfies its own 
demand whenever it can trace an observed fact to a 
purpose. 3 
This might at first appear to be an attempt to prove the 
existence of God; after all, Temple once again refers to the 
notion of sa tisfactoriness, which he frequently takes as the 
criterion for assessing truth. Nevertheless, he is careful to 
note 'if there is to be an explanation of the world ••• ' leaving 
open the possibility that there might be none. He makes this 
clear in Christus Veritas: 
The only explanation of the Universe that would 
really explain it, in the sense of providing to the 
question why it exists an answer that raises no 
ld b demonstrat1"on that it is further question, wou e a 
the creation of a Will which in the creative act seeks 
an intelligible good. But that is Theism. Theism of 
some kind is the only theory of the universe which 
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could really explain it. Theism may be untenable; if 
it is, the universe is ultimately inexplicable 
Philosophically everything is ready for Theism. But 
actual belief rests primarily, as I think, on 
religious experience, and finds its intellectual 
support in the reflexion that this belief is capable 
of supplying an explanation of the very existence of 
the Universe, which no other hypothesis available to 
us affords any hope of doing. That is no proof. It 
cannot be laid down as an axiom tha t there mus t be 
some explanation of the existence of the Universe. If 
the existing scheme of things be internally coherent, 
it cannot be said that the intellect imperiously 
demands more than this for its satisfaction. 4 
Temple is therefore frankly basing his theistic, purposeful, 
personalistic view on a hypothesis, which he finds more 
satisfactory than any alternative. But that does not rule out 
the alternative. (Detailed consideration of Temple's arguments 
for thism will be given in the next chapter - many present 
themes will recur - but for the moment our concern wi th the 
fact of personali ty.) The idea tha t religious belief is a 
matter of experience, that the sense of the personal, is a 
datum of religious experience, is at one with Temple's 
acceptance of the non-proposi tional view of revela tion, that 
the content of revelation is not a body of propositions but the 
person of God himself. As we have seen in Chapter ThreeS, he 
takes this personal character of revelation to be the 
characteristic feature of Christianity; and, of course, his 
view is a theological commonplace. Christian teaching 
continually refers to the personal character of God, salvation 
is through the person of Christ, in ethical behaviour, the 
Christian is urged to be Christ-like, and so on. We should be 
surprised therefore if Temple were to attempt an analysis 
without a personal character. However, even outside the 
Christian tradition, Temple believes that any satisfactory 
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theistic interpretation must lead to a notion of a personal 
character for God, that to consider God as the ground of 
absolute value is to infer personality: 
Plato at one stage found the ultimate principle of 
existence in the Idea of Good, but later was 
dissatisfied with this and passed over to the more 
living phrase, "the royal mind of Zeus" .•• Plato and 
many other philosophers conceived the ultimate 
principle as the good, though Plato was dissatisfied 
with that and went on to reach higher categories, and 
so some among us have always represented God or the 
ultimate principle as properly conceived as the 
absolute sum of all possible values. 
But what is there causative in value? Is it manifest 
on the face of it wi thout any further factor being 
introduced that because a thing is good it shall be 
real? Why should we suppose that there is any sum of 
all possible or even all actual values gathered 
together in some one supreme good? Surely it is true 
that to make good effective and operative there must 
be the vitalizing principle of will or purpose. There 
must be personality. It was under that impulse that 
PIa to passed from one type of phraseology to the 
other, and I think tha t we shall always be pressed 
from the thought of God as only a sum of values to 
the thought of Him as a living person, or at least as 
a Being in whom personality is a real constituent 
factor; for that is the more adequate way to speak if 
we are to find an explanation of the world in the 
belief that He created it 6 
We noted in Chapter Four 7 how Temple argued that value begins 
to give the clue to the nature of the universe, how value leads 
us to purposive mind8 , but we have now moved, through tracing 
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identical steps, to the mind as personal, and not as a mere 
abstract thing. In this, of course, Temple owes much to the 
Personal Idealist school: we noted in Chapter One, Copleston's 
comment that 'one of the basic factors in personal idealism is 
a judgement of value, namely that personali ty represents the 
highest value within the field of our experience. ,9 
Consideration 
personality. 
of value leads 
* * * 
to purpose, purpose to 
Divine personality may be the highest form of personality, but 
Temple is insistent that we know personality most evidently in 
the individual human being. One of the most notable features of 
personality is individuation - this is the characteristic of 
humanity. In Christianity in Thought and Practice, Temple 
develops this idea, referring back to the order of reality we 
noted in Chapter Three - Matter, Life, Mind and Spirit. In 
passinglO we saw Temple saying of ma t ter, 'i ts indi viduali ty, 
though it exists (for it is "this" and not another) is 
negligible. ,11 He now develops this idea, working through each 
grade. Speaking of matter he cites the predictability of 
movement in mechanical objects - 'they act as they are acted 
upon and not otherwise, so that when you want to find out what 
will be the result of bringing together two forces, your 
calcula tion is rela ti vely simple; and their indi viduali ty is 
negligible. 12 Individuation begins to appear with life: 'Here 
at least specific, if not individual, differentiation begins to 
count for a great deal in reaction to environment. You put two 
stalks into the same water and one of them flowers into a rose 
and the other into a carnation - because of the kind of stalks 
they were, of course. But it cannot be said that the water did 
it all. Something, which has to be allowed for, is contributed 
by the reacting organism' 13 This individuation is yet more 
marked: 'Nobody who has been intimately acquainted, shall we 
say, wi th a Scotch terrier, is going to say tha t all dogs 
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behave in the same way in 
They have markedly, in the 
it is a bad use of . lt, 
determination. ,14 
relation 
ordinary 
wills 
to the same environment. 
sense of the word, though 
of their own and great 
This process of individuation reaches a high point in man - for 
in him ' you arrive at a stage where, at least in many cases, 
individuality seems to account for as much as any generic or 
specific quali ty in determining reaction to environment. You 
may have two brothers brought up under the same conditions, so 
that they have inherited the same stock, have come under the 
same influences, and in all respects shared, it would seem, the 
same experience; yet in front of some sudden challenge, perhaps 
of danger, their reac tions will be totally different.' 15 In 
this indi vidua tion we have personali ty - the human being has 
become this individual rather than that. 
This individuality is well expressed by Etienne Gilson, in an 
argument which closely parallels Temple's: 
Man is an individual by his body, but he is more than 
an individual, he is a person. Precisely because the 
form of his body is an intellect, the relation of 
soul and body is very different in man from what it 
is in any other animated being. Animals, even trees, 
are individuals, and they are such by their bodies, 
it being impossible that the matter of a certain 
animal body, or of a tree, should be at the same time 
numerically the same as tha t of another animal or 
another tree. But in their case the force that builds 
up those bodies spends its whole strength in 
supporting them. In the case of man, the living 
principle, before being an organic principle, is an 
intellect. It is, in fact, an intellect that builds 
itself body, because it needs it for its own to a 
intellectual operations. No concepts without 
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sensations, no sensations without a body; here is why 
the human intellect has a body and is a soul. Such 
being the case, there is in man something far above 
the animating powers of his soul; an intellect which 
is an original principle of knowledge and of self-
determination. Each of us is not only numerically 
distinct from the others, he is something that is 
unique in himself, an irreducible value, for which no 
other possible substitute could be conceived. 16 
We note the parallels; but also, I think, the superiority of 
Temple's method over that of the neo-Thomist Gilson. Temple 
speaks of experience as observed: the language of 'the force 
that builds up' or the 'intellect that builds up' is alien to 
his method: it is certainly difficult to make sense of. For all 
that, we note the two very different Christian thinkers 
demonstrating the special nature of the human personali ty in 
its individual aspect: as Gilson says, 'Person is note merely 
individual, it is singular, as having properties or characters 
not shared by any other member of the same species.' 17 Both 
Temple and Gilson would agree, based on individuality, that 
personality is the highest degree of reality - Temple does not 
develop his 'grades of reality' beyond personality. As Aquinas 
has it, 'Persona significat id quad est perfectissimum in 
natura. ,18 
Gilson finds the personal character of individuation in self-
determination and knowledge: Temple finds it in our attitude to 
time, in will, in action, in value, and in personal 
relationships. 
For Temple, man has a special nature because of his 
organisation of time, through the activity of mind and 
imagination. Purely material things have no sense of time. 
Vegetable life, while time is important to it, in the sense 
that 'vegetable life depends upon the order in which these 
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stages (of development) take place ,19, has no consciousness of 
time. In the animal, Temple discerns 'some sense, at least, of 
the significance of time, not having any long view forwards or 
backwards, but obviously not living wholly in an immediate and 
momentary present ••• There is a rudimentary sense of the 
movement of time, but there is not enough of this to constitute 
the opportunity for the formation of anything like a purpose in 
11' fe. ,20 It 1'S no t t' d h necessary 0 cons1 er wether Temple is 
correct in this interpretation of animal consciousness, though 
it is a question which has much exercised philosophers in 
recent years2l - like most of his contemporaries, he is little 
interested in the problem. 
In man the 'comprehension of the time process has no parallel 
at these other levels of existence. First of all, his memory is 
vastly more capacious and retentive, but still more important 
is his anticipation and his capacity to form plans to the 
future, and to make choice between the possible plans that he 
might form or follow. ,22 Temple frequently refers to the way in 
which we are able to reorganise time in our minds. We can, in 
certain respects, escape time altogether: 'in Mathematics we 
are emancipated from Time by the way of sheer escape; we are 
free from it because our material, being an object of thought 
only, is itself non-temporal. ,23 It is true that there is 
successiveness in our thoughts about mathematics, but the 
innate nature of mathematical formulae is not itself in any way 
dependent upon successiveness. For the mind, history is 
reorganised so that in a special sense it is present: 'The 
"past" is that which can be inferred from "present" sense-
perception. We infer the death of Julius Caesar from documents 
and other extant forms of evidence. That is truly past. And in 
ordinary activities, when the mind is not specially stimulated 
to extend its span, continuity is felt as extending over very 
short stretches of duration, so that if I am to know what 
happened five minutes ago it must be by deliberate recollection 
or by inference, and then what happened five minutes ago is 
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past. It is not become unreal. It is still present to 
omniscience, if that exists. It has its place in the real 
Process,· but that place is not "now" l' 'th' . d' 
, . e W1 1n my 1mme 1ate 
apprehension. ,24 This passage is interesting for several 
reasons. Firstly, we find again the notion of 'revealed to us': 
the past has value in relation to us - as we saw in the last 
chapter - but it also appears that reality is dependent upon 
the realising mind, and for its persistence upon the 
appreciating mind of God. Yet again Temple is verging on 
Berkeley's position on the existence of God. (In his next 
paragraph, Temple argues 'The conception of an "Eternal Now" -
the "moment eternal" is thus seen to be by no means 
contradictory. Even in our own limited experience we find 
illustrations of the principle. ,25) 
For Temple, the 'presence' of the 'past' is nowhere more 
clearly illustrated than in art, for art is in a special way 
able to provide the sense of permanence (a sense outside time) 
that - he argues - is indispensable for the satisfaction of 
mind: 
The mind is distressed by the apparent transitoriness 
of all things. Arising out of flux, and itself in 
origin ~ episode out of the flux out of which it 
arises, mind declares its own na ture .Qr demanding 
permanence. It achieves this in two ways. One is by 
formulating 
change of 
unchanging, 
changeless principles of the constant 
exper ience laws whi ch, thems el ve s 
describe the course of change which the 
various objects of 
method of science. 
attention follow; 
The other is 
this is the 
by holding a 
dura tional period in a single apprehension so tha t 
process becomes a constituent of the non-successive 
experience achieved. This is the method of Art. It is 
essential to the drama of Hamlet that the scenes 
should succeed each other as they do; if all were 
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played a t once, 
their order were 
Process, and 
the drama would be destroyed; if 
altered, it would be another drama. 
precisely this process, is 
indispensable; 
ideally should 
but this process is a unit, and 
be complete in the apprehension of the 
spectator as a "present" fact. 26 
It seems to me that Temple is right in this: indeed it is the 
basis of art that the mind can retain as 'present' that which 
has gone before. A novel would be quite without meaning if I 
could only comprehend the word presently before me: I need to 
retain 'the story so far' for any meaning to exist, and indeed 
to make the novelist's and my enterprises worthwhile or even 
.possible. And it is also true that science does attempt to make 
present the principles of change by the construction of laws: 
if it did not do so, there would be no science - merely a 
record of instances: 'the generic character of science requires 
the individuality of things, from which it abstracts in order 
to make sense of itself.,27 What is not so certain is that in 
na ture there is - as Temple thinks there is - the permanence 
which mind seeks. I might like there to be unicorns; but no 
amount of wishing for them will cause them to exist. 
As we have seen28 , Temple believes tha tone fea ture of our 
sense of time, and organisation of it, is the ability to 
anticipate and to plan for the future. This, of course, 
involves will if any plan is to consist in more than mere idle 
imagination. It follows from this that we find something 
distinctly human in will - animals, having no sense of future 
and being - apparently - without imagination (which, as we saw 
in Chapter Three, is an essential ingredient in will) cannot in 
a real sense have will: hence, as we saw29 , Temple feels that 
it is 'a bad use' of the word 'will' to apply it to an animal. 
Though we may properly attribute 'wilfulness' to an animal, we 
are describing its behaviour, not its state of mind, and we may 
not properly deem it to have will: as Aquinas would have it, we 
1 1 2 
are speaking analogically, not uni vocally. We interpre t the 
animal's behaviour in human terms: it does not, so far as we 
can tell, consciously plan for the future. 
If will is a characteristic of man, we are faced with the 
traditional philosophical question of free will. Temple has no 
doubt that we do - as Christians assert - have free will. His 
argument is worth examining. 
* * * 
At first sight, Temple's defence of free will appears to be 
based purely on a verbal analysis, derived from Locke: but 
closer examination reveals that there is more to his argument: 
Will is not a separate entity: the tendency to regard 
it as such seems to arise from the failure, not of 
intellect but of imagination, to apprehend activity 
apart from something which acts; imagination is, of 
its very nature, always materialistic, and has 
imposed upon thought an unreal demand for substances 
which may support attributes and activities. This 
demand in psychology led to a belief in "faculties" 
as actually constitutive parts of a substantial soul: 
and as Purpose is certainly different from anyone of 
our chaotic impulses and ideas, a Will was invented 
to be the organ of Purpose. It was then asked how 
this will is determined, and whether it is free. The 
absurdity of the latter question is sufficiently 
exposed in Locke's celebrated chapter on "Power", 
where he points out that it is sensible to ask "Is 
man free?" or "Has man a will?" - for these mean the 
same thing; but to ask "Is the will free?" is 
nonsense, for it only means "Has the power to choose 
got power to choose?" Locke thus reminds us that the 
fact before us is Choice; it is actual concrete cases 
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of choice that we are concerned with; and for the 
explanation of choice I believe we cannot improve on 
Aristotle's account of ••• the union of Appetition 
and Intellect. 30 
Temple is not here resolving the question of whether man has 
free will, as casual reading of some of his commentators would 
seem to imply31, but asking for a more careful definition of 
the question, in the form, 'Is man free?' 
Temple has no doubt that in a significant sense he is free. He 
finds the source of this view in the organising power of mind, 
the way in which it can reshape and reorganise time and has the 
ability to plan. At a basic level, evidence for this is given 
in our observation of others: ••. two plants will respond 
quite differently to the same environment, and among the higher 
animals it becomes impossible to predict how one of them will 
behave in any given circumstance ••. a knowledge of men in 
general becomes almost a contradiction. We all know how 
disastrously shallow is the insight of the sort of person who 
is said to "understand men", and how fallacious is his 
guidance. ,32 Of course, to speak of the unpredictability of 
others may simply be testament to imperfect knowledge on our 
part - that we are unable to see the causes of their behaviour. 
It appears true that behaviour is caused, that cause, even 
though internal, is a feature which characterises the nature of 
choice. It is this internal cause which is taken to imply that 
we do not have freedom of choice. That we are able to give 
reasons for choice is taken by some determinists to indicate 
that our choices are dictated. Anthony Kenny has pointed out 
the linguistic error involved - the determinist's 'argument 
rests on the view that when we say that someone did something 
because he wanted to, the "because" indicates a causal 
relationship. ,33 The error lies in treating 'cause' and 
'reason' as synonyms - which they are not. As Kenny notes: 
1 1 Lt 
'there may be a perfectly adequate reason for performing an 
action and yet the action not e s . h n ue, wlt out this fact casting 
any doubt on the adequacy of the reason. ,34 Kenny continues: 
an 
Reasons explain actions that have been performed in 
the same way as practical reasoning leads to 
decisions about reasoning about actions that are to 
be performed. Practical reasoning - reasoning about 
what to do - differs from theoretical deduction in 
important way: to use a convenient technical term 
borrowed by philosophers from lawyers, practical 
reasoning is defeasible. That is to say, a conclusion 
which may be a reasonable one from a given set of 
premisses may cease to be a reasonable one when 
further premisses are added .•• Because rules of 
practical inference are defeasible, whereas causal 
laws are not, reasons cannot be considered as 
causes. 35 
I think Kenny is entirely right in this. Nevertheless, I would 
add a further consideration which seems to me directly relevant 
to Temple's consideration of free choice. 
Philosophers tend to speak of the question of freedom of choice 
in terms of cause or of reasons. It seems, however, that there 
are occasions on which it is possible to speak of real choice 
without reference either to reasons or to causes - choice which 
is impulsive, yet nonetheless real. When I enter a restaurant 
and scan the menu, I frequently find it difficult to decide 
what dish to choose. Certain of my choices have clear reasons. 
I do not choose any fish dishes, because I dislike fish. But 
between this or that meat dish, I find rational choice 
difficult. My appetite tells me nothing about whether to choose 
Tournedos ~ la Rossini or a simple grilled steak. I like each 
equally, and may fancy each equally. I am unmoved by concern 
about calory content: I know only that I cannot eat both. When 
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the waiter comes to take my order, I simply name one dish - I 
make a decision. On any ordinary use of language, I have made a 
choice and yet in no sensible way can I cite cause or reason. 
The only way in which I can say that the choice has been 
compelled is that I have been compelled to make a choice - the 
choice itself is uncompelled. And yet I have chosen, and must 
take the consequences of the undetermined choice. I have had 
the power to decide, and in the act of decision, I have 
asserted a freedom of choice - if I could not decide, had no 
capacity for decision, then it could properly said I had no 
free choice. In this sense, choice is free, or at least random. 
Now, it may be that it is this that accounts for the 
unpredictabilty of man, that some choices will be inevitably of 
this decisive, random kind; but that some choices are 
uncompelled seems to imply that we may speak of others -
rational though they may be - as intrinsically uncompelled, 
because there is a moment of decision when we decide to 'plump' 
for this option rather than that, and as Kenny has implied, no 
reason, however logical, forces that moment of decision. 
Temple notes this phenomenon: he distinguishes between impulses 
and real choice. If the determinist position is true, then all 
decisions are the result of inner impulse; yet it appears that 
we can control and direct most (I think not all) decisions: 
The impulses of human nature all have a place in the 
economy of the ideal human life, but they can only be 
made elements in such a life by much effort. If left 
undisciplined they will not make up a single moral 
life at all; the man will remain a chaos of impulses; 
and he cannot himself conduct this discipline at 
first (though as it moulds him he becomes able to co-
operate with it and to conduct it altogether at 
last), because at first he is just the chaos of 
impulses. Society educates and disciplines him ••• 
1 1 6 
••• This is the true freedom of man, when his whole 
nature controls all its own constituent parts.36 
Real freedom, according to Temple, only exists when we have 
purpose in life: it is this which gives the personality a 
standard for relating its ideas, and hence to make an informed 
choice: 
True freedom is not only or chiefly a freedom from 
external control, but from internal compulsion; it is 
found, not when a man says, "I did it, and no one 
else," but when a man says, "I did it, and I am glad 
I did it, and if opportunity arises I will do it 
again." Only such a man is really free or really 
directing his own life. The man who has no purpose in 
life, or having one yet perpetually acts in direct 
opposition to itself, is in bondage to a part of 
himself. 37 
Temple distinguishe~ between freedom and responsibility; we 
may, though not truly free, nonetheless be held responsible. We 
may rush 'into an action directly contrary to our general 
purpose in life, an action that we regret as soon as it is done 
••• Of course we are responsible for our act, but it is not an 
act of real freedom. ,38 
It would appear that in this sense we are never truly free: and 
Temple concurs with this: 'in our experience this ideal of 
perfect self-determination does not exist. Not only do we 
depend very largely on our environment, but we have not 
complete control of ourselves. We have no purpose in life wide 
enough to include the satisfaction of all our impulses and 
strong enough to check each from undue indulgence. ,39 
If this is true, it therefore follows that strictly speaking we 
never achieve full personality - that quality is, as we shall 
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see in the next chapter, found only in God. Our task is to 
bring forth the fullness of personality, which brings true 
freedom of will. That is why personality is - in Temple's sense 
- a value, and not simply a factual statement of what we are. 
Temple does not mean by personality the word as used in 
ordinary language ('Barbara has a pleasant personality') but 
strictly in the fullness of personality as a goal towards which 
we are striving, which in ourselves we are attempting to 
realise, just as we realise goodness, beauty or truth in 
ourselves by the act of appreciation. Like these other absolute 
values, personality becomes actual in ourselves. 
We find this actualisation present - albeit incompletely - in 
our actions. If it is true that 'true freedom manifests itself 
in constancy and stability of character,40 then it would appear 
that character will show itself in its actions. It is clear 
that Temple believes that this is the case: 'we never know what 
anything is apart from its activities; we know nothing about 
substances; we know only actions and reactions. ,41 The 
individuality of a man is only properly realised by 
consideration of his functions - hence, in his actions: 
'individuality ... is determined ~ function. ,42 It is in 
action that free will is most evidently revealed: 'freedom 
is found when a man not only recognises that an action is his 
own, but when he feels that he has truly expressed his whole 
dl .. . . t ,43 nature in it and can wholehearte y reJOlce ln 1 • 
In this we can see similarity with Wojtyla's ideas on man as 
the acting person. Wojtyla believes that 'only the acting, in 
which the agent is assumed to be a person ... has moral 
significance. ,44 The action brings out value. 
By our action, value is realised; and there arises the question 
of personality establishing itself by reference to value. If we 
have any real choices, our choice of action is likely to be 
determined by our sense of value - we will tend to choose an 
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action which most evidently realises the values we have 
apprehended, and in doing so we move from a merely passive 
stance to the active one of obligation. As Wojtyla has it: 'in 
each of his actions the human person is eye-witness of the 
transition from the "is" to the "should" - the transition from 
"X is truly good" to "I should do X",45 In this sense of 
obligation Temple finds another source of personality: man is 
subject to obligation: 
It is, of course, in relation to ••• (the) ••. making 
of plans for the future that he becomes a subject of 
moral obligation. This is because he is aware that 
upon his choice of this course or that there depend 
issues affecting far more than himself, and that he 
is not entitled to make those plans with regard to 
himself alone. It is in the very act of becoming 
capable of some comprehension of future time and some 
present adjustment of his own conduct in relation to 
it that he also becomes aware that he does not live 
for himself only, but is under obligation. 46 
The question that arises is whether the sense of obligation is 
intrinsic to man or whether it is socially conditioned - that 
it is an artificial acquisition. To consider this will be to 
continue the discussion begun in the last chapter about whether 
a sense of value is indeed instinctive to man. If it is true, 
as both Temple and Wojtyla suggest, that our sense of 
obligation arises out of our sense of value, then it follows 
that we can properly connect the two when considering the 
extent to which these senses inevitably arise from the nature 
of ourselves as human. 
Temple seems in little doubt that obligation is natural and 
instinctive: 'A man who has a moral sense cannot ignore it; it 
is part of his nature as much as his instinctive impulses, and 
to ignore it or defy it is a sure method of failing to achieve 
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satisfaction. But the moral sense l·S not deducible from 
elsewhere.,47 The moral sense seems at least intuitive (as we 
shall see, Brentano holds that it is intuitive but not 
instinctive), and is certainly more than simply our acceptance 
of the norms of our society: 
••• it is no doubt the case that the content of men's 
sense of obligation comes to them for the most part 
out of the tradition in which they have lived. The 
moral conventions which we accept are supplied to us 
by the society that has trained us. But that would 
not account for the sense of obligation in itself in 
the form in which people do actually feel it. It 
would account for the sense of a strong pressure upon 
us to behave in one way or another, but not for our 
tendency to feel ashamed when we have lived according 
to one principle, and to approve ourselves when we 
have lived according to another. 48 
Whether he is correct to find this moral sense intrinsic to our 
natures, we shall now consider. 
2. OBLIGATION AND VALUE - A NATURAL INSTINCT? 
Whether there is a natural, intrinsic sense of value and 
morality is a question of great significance, not only for our 
discussion of the nature of personali ty, but for our 
consideration - in a subsequent chapter - of natural law and 
natural order. It is not possible within the brief compass of a 
thesis such as this to review the whole history of natural law 
theory; we are compelled to curtail discussion to consider 
largely recent developments and some general considerations, 
though I hope that this will be enough to indicate whether 
Temple at least may be correct that - as St. Paul has it of the 
'what the law requires is written on their gentiles 
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hearts. ,49 I shall consider three types of evidence 
psychological, bio-ethical, and anthropological. 
a). Psychological Evidence 
The prevailing current of opinion is that moral sense is 
acquired, rather than being instinctive. Of the earlier 
generation of psychologists, Brentano is perhaps a good example 
of those who held that moral sense is acquired even though - as 
we saw in the last chapter - he held that moral judgment is 
intuitive. He is certain that no ethical axiom can be a matter 
of heredity. He argues that no cognitions are hereditary: that 
all have to be learned by experience: 
We can recall to consciousness knowledge which we 
have acquired during our lifetime in one of three 
ways. 
(1) We re-establish the basis for it; or 
(2) we a t leas t have a clear recollec t ion 
of having discerned, at an earlier time, 
grounds for holding it and cherish a 
reasonable conviction that our judgement is 
true, even if we do not at present review 
its basis; or 
(3) we no longer recall the foundation, but 
our earlier knowledge inclines us to agree 
with it, just as dispositions to perform 
similar acts are built up by habit. We form 
judgements out of force of habit. 
To which of these would a conviction which we have a 
hereditary disposition to hold be analogous? Not the 
first, or the second, but the third. But that is as 
much as to say that it is not a question of 
cogni tion. In jus t the same way, wi th an equally 
strong impulse, we could hold what is false to be an 
. truth, as well as what is true; we could ~ prior1 
1 2 1 
claim, e.g., that ghosts exist. And that even 
third case does not occur is to be seen from the 
that not even associations are hereditary. 
Chinese have ancestors who have spoken the 
this 
fact 
The 
same 
language for thousands of years ••• but each 
descendant has to learn it from scratch. 
Just as surely as there are no synthetic a priori 
cognitions, so surely is it impossible for the 
principles of ethical knowledge to be counted among 
them. 50 
All judgments are therefore learned, according to Brentano. It 
is the justification of ethical and value judgments that is 
intuitive - but we have still to discern the instinct (if it is 
such) to make particular judgments. 
Brentano is perhaps better known as a philosopher than a 
psychologist. Nevertheless, his view on the nature of cognition 
as learned was a commonplace of orthodox psychologists of his 
time. a similar view of the cognition of ethical judgments may 
be found in the work of the English psychologist, Spearman: 
'With regard to the biological "environment", the "situations" 
and the stimuli of a man - as also his more philosophically 
pointed "private universes" these (in so far as 
psychological) really consist in nothing else than portions of 
his cognitive field. ,51 (Interestingly, Spearman was deeply 
influenced by Idealist philosophy: one of the subjects which he 
considers, from a psychological point of view but with 
language similar to that of his philosophical contemporaries -
is the whole question of the subject-object relationship. 52) 
Today's orthodoxy is most clearly represented in the work of 
Piaget. For Piaget, morality is essentially the product of 
socialisation: from respect for adult restraint, the child 
learns the morality of heteronomy; from mutual respect with his 
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both are peers, he learns the morality of autonomy. 
intrinsically social. Piaget claims that the child begins life 
in a state of 'anomy' - a stage in which he is unconstrained by 
rules; it is only in growth, learning through intercourse with 
others, that he develops autonomy in his judgments. This is a 
consequence of reciprocity, the idea that goodness is strictly 
fairness. So, therefore, the child develops rudimentary moral 
values: he finds, for instance, that deception destroys mutual 
trust, or that offensive behaviour harms co-operation: support 
for his growing moral sense is given by the social relations in 
which he inevitably - finds himself. (Piaget's notion of 
reciprocity has been considered by some commentators 53 too 
broad a definition: but this need not detain us here.) 
Whether it is true that - as Piaget claims - the child does, by 
an 'almost automatic process' 54 achieve true moral autonomy 
through his social relations, I tend to doubt. Piaget seems to 
feel that in the process of growth reciprocity - the idea that 
'if I do this to you, you will do it to me' - will naturally 
mature into a universal morality of love and forgiveness, self-
directed. (In fairness to Piaget, it should be noted that his 
investigations are little concerned with the question of the 
autonomous adolescent: his observations are largely confined to 
younger age groups.) It appears, as far as I can tell, tha t 
many people never achieve real moral autonomy: adults will give 
as reasons for acting or refraining from action such 
explanations 
trouble if I 
as 'it is against the law', 'I will get into 
am found out', or 'how would I like it if he did 
(simple reciproci ty) - reasons which are qui te 
with childish notions of adult constraint, 
that to me' 
consonant 
unfairness, fear of 
universal morality. 
losing 
Temple 
esteem, 
seems 
and 
in 
hardly at all with 
his psychologically 
unsophisticated way - much closer than Piaget to reflecting the 
real world in his insistence that full autonomy is rarely if 
ever reached - that fullness of personality is a goal, a value, 
to be striven for. 
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There are, of course, other defects in Piaget's arguments. 
Various studies (e.g. The Character Education EnguirySS, 
Adolescent Character and Per I" S6) sona lty have demonstrated 
empirically that Piaget takes too little account of the variety 
in children's moral development, the differences caused by 
variations in intelligence, social class and sex differences , 
and his idea of a stimulus-response pattern of learning tends 
not to explain such things as the behaviour of the anti-social 
child or the phenomenon of the child who rises morally above 
his peers, nor indeed the frequently growing complexi ty of 
interpersonal relationships with parents. (In the move towards 
autonomy one· would, on Piaget' s analysis, expect children to 
drift away from parents.) 
Nevertheless, I think Piaget is broadly right to emphasise the 
social aspect of the growth of morality. Temple insisted - as 
we shall see in the next section - that the personality only 
develops and has meaning in the context of community. The sense 
of morality develops most evidently in a society, and it is 
noteworthy that a child develops a high level of positive 
social relations and maintains these before even the 
development of personal play, the spirit of co-operation or the 
social use of material. S7 
Support for this purely social nature of moral development can 
be found in consideration of the so-called 'feral child'. 
Attested cases of feral children - children who are exposed or 
lost in infancy and who are reared by animals (like Romulus and 
Remus) - show them to be wholly bestialised; but this is merely 
to emphasise (perhaps) tha t the human capaci ty for a moral 
sense needs to be developed by society; but that what is 
intrinsic is not so much a moral sense as a capacity for moral 
sense: to this extent, Bull's assertion that such a child 
'remains an animal,S8 is untrue if we hold that humans have -
innately (under normal circumstances) - a capacity for moral 
h t that a sense of morals is judgment. The truth is per aps no 
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unborn, but that moral capacity is as Bull says: 'Both 
heredity and environment are involved in the process of moral 
development,59; heredity only by virtue of providing the moral 
capacity. Actual morality is, at least initially, a process of 
socialisation - feral children seem quickly to adapt. 
However, recent research, particularly in the Uni ted States, 
has suggested that the orthodox view - represented by Piaget -
that the child has no innate moral sense may be profoundly 
mistaken. Signs of altruism have been noted in children as 
young as two days old. Martin Hoffman found that two-day-old 
infant s in hospi tal often become more agi ta ted and cry more 
loudly when other children are crying than they do when they 
hear other loud sounds. 60 Various other observations by the 
American National Institute of Mental Health show remarkable 
results: data shows that 'children have a capacity for 
compassion and for various kinds of prosocial behaviour from at 
least the age of one. ,61 Some sociobiologists suggest that 
there may be a genetic cause for this phenomenon:: after all, 
al truism brings, from the evolutionary point of view, 
advantages to one's genetic line. Nevertheless, one scientist 
suggests that the right conditions have to be present for 
empathy properly to develop62 - this would be consistent with 
the view that moral capacity is inborn, though the evidence of 
the crying babies suggests that the mere presence of other 
people may be sufficient condition. If that is true, it is 
difficult to see, on a traditional stimulus-response basis, how 
the mere presence of others constitutes sufficient stimulus for 
the responses elicited. 
The idea that the sense of morals may have a genetic basis has 
been given a further stimulus by consideration of the 
psychopathic personality. The complete psychopath is a moral 
imbecile without moral control of any sort (I am speaking of 
the total psychopath - not merely a subject with psychopathic 
tendencies), entirely at the mercy of impulse. Two suggestions 
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about the state bear on our discussion: some researchers 
believe that the psychopath is due to a defect in the central 
nervous system tha t prevents any form of condi tioning - the 
capacity for moral sense is simply not present. Other research 
traces this defect to genetic abnormal ity63 - an idea which is 
consistent with the evolutionary need for altruism, as 
societies reject and not infrequently attempt to destroy the 
psychopath as profoundly threatening to their own continuing 
existence. 
We have come, therefore, to the question of a genetic source 
for an innate sense of morality - to the considerations of bio-
ethics. 
(b). The Evidence of Bio-ethics 
Recently, much attention has been given, by biologists and 
others, to the question of a biological basis for ethics. 
Findings - so far - are tentative: more concrete evidence is 
still needed. If the case is proven, the consequences for 
ethical philosophy will be profound, not least in the 
resurgence of natural law theory. I am not yet convinced that 
the case has been so proven, and therefore I raise points with 
caution. 
One of the principal figures in the development of sociobiology 
is Edward o. Wilson. He believes that the main task of 
contemporary philosophy is to come to terms with the genetic 
structures of human life: 
••• innate censors and motivators exist in the brain 
that deeply and unconsciously affect our ethical 
premises; from these roots, morality evolved as 
instinct. If that perception is correct, science may 
soon be in a position to investigate the very origin 
and meaning of human values, from which all ethical 
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pronouncements and much of poli tical practice flow. 
Philosophers themselves, most of whom lack an 
evolutionary perspective, have not devoted much time 
to the problem. They examine the precepts of ethical 
systems with reference to their consequences and not 
to their origins. Like everyone else, philosophers 
measure their personal emotional responses to various 
al terna ti ves as though consul ting a hidden oracle. 
That oracle resides in the deep emotional centres of 
the brain, most probably within the limbic system, a 
complex array of neurous and hormone-secreting cells 
located just beneath the .. thinking" portion of the 
cerebral cortex. Human emotional responses and the 
more general practices based on them have been 
programmed to a substantial degree by natural 
selection over thousands of generations. The 
challenge to science is to measure the tightness of 
the constraints caused by the programming, to find 
their source in the brain, and to decode their 
significance through the reconstruction of the 
evolutionary history of the mind ••. Success will 
genera te ••• the dilemma, which can be s ta ted as 
follows: Which of the censors and motivators should 
be obeyed and which ones might better be curtailed or 
sublimated. 64 
Many consequences flow from Wilson's hypothesis. Firstly, if he 
is correct in placing the cause of moral sense in genetic and 
evolutionary factors, there would be no ground for the theist's 
view that moral sense 'reveals' the personality of God, or must 
be - somehow - planted by God. A naturalist explanation of this 
kind restricts argument about God to the question of his 
existence as ground of being. (Evolution of itself does not 
rule out ground-of-being or first cause arguments. To say that 
something happened very slowly rather than - in the Genesis 
story _ very quickly does not explain that it happened at all.) 
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Secondly, the consequences of a purely genetic basis for 
morality opens up (frightening?) possibilities for future 
genetic engineering. Thirdly, as Hefner has pointed out 6S , the 
findings of sociobiology point towards a possible solution to 
the traditional is/ought problem. Fourthly, as Wilson himself 
notes, merely to show the mechanics of the instinctive emotions 
of the mind does not enable us to determine precisely how we 
should behave. For ins tance , ins t inc t s towards aggre s s i ve and 
violent behaviour, necessary though these may be in primitive 
stages of the struggle for survival need to be consciously 
curtailed for the continuing evolution of civilisation. What 
was once useful may no longer be so - and the social pressure 
of necessity gives support to our attempts to control violent 
tendencies. This view is consistent with Teilhard de Chardin's 
evolutionary account of how, through the development of 
consciousness (noogenesis), man is able consciously to shape 
the future growth of evolution. It also brings into sharp focus 
the value of Temple's insistence on the need for real autonomy 
- the point at which we so control our actions that we can say 
'"I did it, and I am glad I did it, and if opportunity arises I 
will do it again.",66 
To say that moral sense is instinctive, that it is conditioned 
by evolutionary requirements of survival, may seem to imply 
that any morality will be ultimately egoistic - I do this that 
I may survive. This would seem to rule out any altruism, which 
some philosophers have considered an essential part of true 
morality. But a pure egoism implies that any 'morality' will be 
based purely on an ethics of reciprocity. I have suggested, 
when considering psychological evidence, that there may be an 
evolutionary requirement for altruism. It is now time to take 
this argument a little further. 
In a recent and most suggestive work67 , Professor Singer has 
given several striking examples of how altruism is an aid to 
evolution and survival. I give one example in full: 
128 
Suppose two early humans are attacked by a sabretooth 
cat. If both flee, one will be picked off by the cat; 
if both stand their ground, there is a very good 
chance that they can fight the cat off; if one flees 
and the other stands and fights, the fugitive will 
escape and the fighter will be killed ••• From the 
self-interested point of view, if your partner flees 
your chances of survival are better if you flee too 
(you have a 50 percent chance ra ther than none at 
all) and if your partner stands and fights you still 
do better to run (you are sure of escape if you flee, 
whereas it is only probable, not certain, that 
together you and your partner can overcome the cat). 
So two purely self-interested early humans would 
flee, and one of them would die. Two early humans who 
cared for each other, however, would stand and fight, 
and most likely neither would die. Let us say, just 
to be able to put a figure on it, that two humans 
cooperating can defeat a sabretooth cat on nine out 
of every ten occasions and on the tenth occasion the 
cat kills one of them. Let us also say that when a 
sabre tooth cat pursues two fleeing humans it always 
catches one of them, and which one it catches is 
entirely random, since differences in human running 
speed are negligible in comparison to the speed of a 
ca t. Then one of a pair of purely self-interested 
humans would not, on average, last more than a 
single encounter with a sabretooth cat; but one of a 
pair of altruistic humans would on average survive 
ten such encounters. 
If situations analogous to this imaginary sabretooth 
cat attack were common, early humans would do better 
hunting with altruistic comrades than with self-
interested partners. Of course, an egoist who could 
find an altruist to go hunting with him would do 
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better still; but altruists who could not detect _ 
and refuse to assist purely self-interested 
partners would be selected against. Evolution would 
therefore favour those who are genuinely altruistic 
to other altruists, but are not altruistic to those 
who seek to take advantage of their altruism.68 
to altruism in 
it is wrong to 
Singer notes that an alternative explanation 
this example could be an inna te sense tha t 
desert a partner in times of danger 69 , but tha t is again to 
give an essentially moral account of an evolutionarily valuable 
sense of self-preservation. 
Support 
helpful 
for 
for 
the view that an innate 
considerations 
evolutionary purposes 
of animal behaviour. 
sense 
may 
It is 
of 
be 
well 
altruism is 
drawn from 
known that 
blackbirds and thrushes give warning calls when hawks fly 
overhead; such calls doubtless decrease the chances of the 
caller's survival because they serve to give away his own 
position. A much-quoted example concerns Thomson I s gazelles, 
small antelope hunted in Africa by packs of dogs. When a 
gazelle notices a dog-pack, it bounds away in a stiff-legged 
gait called 'stotting', which acts as a warning signal to the 
rest of the herd. This happens whenever a gazelle is attacked, 
and only at the last moment will the singled-out gazelle 
stretch to its full running stride (faster than a dog's). In 
this, there is no advantage to the individual gazelle - it 
risks its own life for the sake of the herd. This is surely 
altruism of an instinctive kind, making evolutionary sense only 
in the context of survival of the species. 
There is, it appears, a significantly communal aspect to any 
innate morality: from these brief examples it seems that 
instinct in the evolutionary sense is geared to the 
preservation of the species, rather than simply to the survival 
of the individual. Similar altruism is apparent in human 
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behaviour. Self-sacrifice in war has been a commonplace of 
history: people from the three hundred Spartans under Leonidas 
at Thermopylae 
kamikaze pilots 
themselves to 
to the American heroes of the Alamo, or the 
of Japan in 1945 have willingly sacrificed 
ensure the continued survival of their 
communities. Individual acts of heroism - like that of Captain 
Oates tell a similar story. This sense of altruism - if 
instinctive - coheres with Temple's ideas about the personality 
in community, which will shortly be developed. 
The significance of bio-ethics and 
fully apparent. For the moment, I 
Singer's appraisal: 
sociobiology 
am happy to 
is not yet 
concur with 
When well-grounded theories are relevant to an 
ethical decision, they should be taken into account. 
The particular moral judgments that we end up making 
may reflect these theories. For this reason it is 
perfectly true that philosophers, along with everyone 
else, should know something about the current state 
of biological theories of human nature. To ignore 
biology is to ignore one possible source of knowledge 
relevant to ethical decisions. 
There is, however, no justification here for dramatic 
claims about explaining ethics "at all depths" or 
fashioning a biology of ethics which will do away 
with the need for ethical philosophers. Even if we 
should uncri tically accept the sociobiological view 
of human nature in its entirety, the new facts we 
would have learned would affect ethics only at a 
relatively superficial level. The central question of 
ethics, the nature and justification of fundamental 
ethical values, would remain the same. 71 
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The significant point, I think, is that bio-ethics enables us 
to see the possibility of the hereditary nature of much of the 
moral sense it points beyond mere social condi tioning to 
other possibilities. It also serves as a caution: it reminds us 
of the way in which our minds are rooted in - and are not apart 
from - na ture. As Hefner remarks, 'biological, psychological, 
and sociological facts about the human evaluator and the 
environment are relevant to the evaluative judgment. The human 
evaluator is part of the world, not alienated from it.,72 The 
tendency to treat the appreciating mind, the soul, as somehow 
sui generis, disembodied from the world has been a persistent 
and lamentable error in Christian thinking, an unfortunate 
consequence of Platonism. The attitude persists, despite 
frequent condemnations, by, for instance, the Councils of Brega 
(561), Constantinople (869-870) and Vienna (1311-1312). At the 
latter, the Council fathers declared, 'we define that from now 
on whoever shall presume to assert, defend, or obstinately hold 
that the rational or intellectual soul is not in itself and 
essentially the form of the human body, is to be censured as a 
heretic. ,73 As we have seen74 , Temple emphasised the rootedness 
of the mind in the world: he speaks of the mind 'arising out of 
flux, and itself in origin an episode out of the flux out of 
which it arises. ,75 There is nothing in bio-ethics 
fundamentally inconsistent with his views. 
(c). Anthropological Evidence 
Irenaeus (c.130-200) spoke of an innate sense of morality: as 
a Christian thinker, he nevertheless recognises the existence 
of 'the law of nature, by which the natural man is justified, 
which, even before the giving of the Law, was kept by those who 
were justified by fai th and pleased God'. 76 In a subsequent 
chapter, we shall consider whether there is indeed an intrinsic 
sense of a na tural law, though as we have seen, the so far 
sketchy evidence of bio-ethics seems to point 
direction. In the last fifty years, increasing 
in that 
study of 
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anthropology in particular the study of primitive groups, 
to point to the presence of an innate moral sense. 
seems 
Certain common features of primitive tribes stand out. 
Firstly, the unit of the family seems common to all societies. 
As Philip Ekka has noted: 
No totally 
discovered in 
promiscuous 
the world. 
society has yet been 
The Eskimo who have the 
custom of lending their wives on occasions to guests 
and friends, and the Shoshoneans who permi t their 
wives sexual relations with tribal members other than 
the husbands when these are away hunting, are both 
basically monogamous people. 
The Masai and the Chagga, both African tribes, 
recognise the family as a social unit, but they also 
allow their younger class of adult men dedicated to 
warlike activities in regimental organisations to 
have promiscuous relations with the younger class of 
adult girls. After their marriage, they settle down 
to regular family life. 77 
From a purely evolutionary point of view, the maintenance of 
the family uni ty makes evident sense. It serves to provide a 
source of maintaining the fabric of society. As Singer notes, 
'When families see that the children are fed, kept clean and 
sheltered, that the sick are nursed and the elderly cared for, 
they are led by bonds of natural affection to do what would 
otherwise fallon the community itself and either would not be 
done at all or would require labour unmotivated by natural 
impulses ••• Given the much greater intensity of family feeling 
compared with the degree of concern we have for the welfare of 
strangers, ethical rules which accept a degree of partiality 
toward the interests of ones own family may be the best means 
of promoting the welfare of all families, and thus of the 
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entire community. ,78 This sense of the fundamental 
significance of the family is reflected in the failure of 
modern attempts to avoid the apparent limitations of the family 
uni t. Two significant examples - one from Israel, the other 
from the Soviet Union - will suffice. In the early years of 
the kibbutz movement in Palestine, an attempt was made to make 
the family unit entirely subordinate to the community. For 
children, the kibbutz provided nurses, teachers, and meals and 
entertainment, all on a communal basis. Children were 
encouraged to call their parents by name. This system was 
devised to produce a deeper sense of community, particularly at 
a time when Israel fel t under threat from surrounding Arab 
states. The underlying reason for this has been stated by 
Yonina Talmon: 'Family ties are based on an exclusive and 
discriminating loyalty which sets the members of one's family 
more or less apart from others. Families may easily become 
competing foci of emotional involvement tha t can infringe on 
loyalty to the collective. Deep attachment to one's spouse and 
children ••• may gain precedence over the more ideological and 
more task-orientated relations wi th comrades.' 79 This system 
has largely broken down, and the family unit has reasserted 
itself. Families spend more time as units, children frequently 
sleep in the family unit rather than in the children's house, 
and meals are often taken in the family unit rather then in the 
communal dining halls. Part of the reason for this may be the 
traditionally strong Jewish sense of family reasserting itself; 
but much more, I think, is the innate sense of family kinship. 
Evidence for this is strengthened by consideration of the 
Soviet experience. In the years following the 1917 revolution 
attempts were made to break down the traditionally strong sense 
of family by a regime encouraging free-love. This quickly 
broke down, and traditional patterns reasserted themselves, 
with many traditional features. 80 Attitudes towards the nature 
of marriage are almost unchanged since pre-revolutionary 
days.81 As Geiger says: 'the record suggests that many in the 
population have found the ideal marriage pattern both desirable 
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and attainable.' 82 At tempts 
ideological grounds in the 
proved similarly ill-fated. 83 
to break down the family unit on 
Peoples Republic of China have 
If it is true, on evolutionary grounds, that the instinct for 
family life is necessary for survival, it follows that we will 
be able to discern a consistent nexus of ethical rules which 
will lend to the preservation of the family against intrusion, 
and to regulate its internal structure. One obvious example of 
such rules is the universal prohibition on incest: Levi-
Strauss notes: 
Wha t remains true is tha t every socie ty, pas t or 
present, proclaims that if the husband-wife 
relationship ••• implies sexual rights, there are 
other relationships equally derived from the familial 
structure, which made sexual connections 
inconceivable, sinful, or legally punishable. 
The universal prohibition of incest specifies, as a general 
rule, that people considered as parents and children, or 
brother and sister, even if only by name, cannot have sexual 
rela tions and even less marry each other. In some recorded 
instances - such as ancient Egypt, pre-Columbian Peru, also 
some African, Southeast Asian, and Polynesian kingdoms - incest 
was defined far less strictly than elsewhere. Even there, 
however, the rule existed since incest was limited to a 
minori ty group, the ruling class ••• ; on the other hand, not 
every kind of close reI a ti ves were permi t ted as spouse: for 
instance, it was the half-sister, the full being excluded; or, 
if the full sister was allowed, then it should be the elder 
sister, the younger one being excluded. 84 
Leslie Paul suggests that incest is the supreme taboo, and 
indeed forms man's first moral absolute: 
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No matter to what primitive people one turns, incest 
meets with horrified condemnation and is held to 
merit exile or death. 
far greater than 
people we find 
• • • 
that 
It provokes an emotional shock 
murder. @And in people after 
the most 
institutions have come into 
elaborate 
being to 
social 
render 
intentional incest so manifest and culpable that it 
can be detected and punished with the greatest of 
ease. Clans and subclans, totemic groups and 
marriage groups, and similar social institutions ... 
mark firmly and publicly the groups tabooed to each 
other and do so with a force greater that any law as 
we understand it in the west. Even so, they are 
seldom ••• sufficient to overcome incestuous desires. 
They are invariably discovered side by side wi th a 
most rigid etiquette which cuts the contacts between 
brothers and sisters to a minimum, and ensures that 
such a minimum is conducted in the public view. 8S 
The ban on incest seems universal and apparently instinctive. 
Yet, if it is an instinct it is difficult to account for. No 
parallel instinct seems to exist in the animal kingdom. While 
it is possible to argue that inbreeding does indeed damage a 
family (wi tness the instances of haemophilia in the Imperial 
Russian Royal Family), this seems insufficient reason for the 
basis of an instinct: the knowledge of damage is a scientific 
rather that an intrinsic instinctive one, and such scientific 
knowledge would not be available to a primitive society. The 
ban on incest makes sense only within the context of a prior, 
social sense of family; and it is that prior social sense which 
is - or may be - innate. 
It seems that anthropological evidence of an innate moral sense 
is only reasonable if it can be shown to be universally the 
case, in all societies. If it were possible to demonstrate 
that there existed a tribe without such a sense, with no 
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concern for family, then it would not be possible to posit ar 
innate sense of morality - it would follow that any such senSE 
must be social. In recent years, since the publication of 
Colin Turnbull's The Mountain People 86 , there has been much 
debate among anthropologists about the Ik, a tribe from 
Northern Uganda. Following the turning of their traditional 
hunting grounds into a national park, and a period of famine, 
the Ik were forced to become farmers in an arid mountain area. 
According to Turnbul1 87 , Ik society collapsed in consequence. 
Parents turned out three year old children to fend for 
themselves, the old and the sick were mocked, it was considered 
foolishness to help another. Turnbull's book has been 
thoroughly criticised for subjectivity, and anthropologists 
have suggested other interpretation of the phenomena than the 
total abandonment of values. Even if we take Turnbull's 
analysis as correc t as an account of Ik life, it is evident 
that certain taboos remain. The Ik do not kill each other, nor 
do they resort to cannibalism, which one would expec t if it 
were true that all moral inhibition had disappeared. (There 
have been well-publicised cases of cannibalism among western 
people under the strain of hunger, and the Ik have known severe 
famine.) Although the Ik appear to have lost all conventional 
morality - including the taboo on incest - they do seem to have 
some minimal (if to us unacceptable) moral code. 88 Further, as 
the Ik previously had a severe moral code (e.g. adulterers were 
burned) the phenomenon is a breakdown of moral sense, and not 
an example of a society which never had such a sense. As it is 
possible to conceive of an individual choosing to ignore other 
instincts (a hermit scorning the instinct of gregariousness, a 
hunger-striker ignoring the instinct for food), so it is 
possible to ignore a moral instinct as, for instance, 
concentration camp attendants have done, though we consider 
this bru talisa tion. And if this ignoring can be done by an 
indi vidual, it can be done by a communi ty. Tha t a hunger-
striker refuses food does not mean that there is no instinct 
for food: we speak of self-will overriding instincts. Having 
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an instinct does not mean that it will always be followed, or 
that if we see someone not follow an instinct, that the 
instinct therefore does not exist. If so basic an instinct as 
that for food can be ignored, so, I think, can any other. Just 
as I can say that my life is insignificant and I can starve 
myself to death for a cause, and do, so too I can perceive my 
moral instincts as pointless (as the Ik appear to do) in the 
face of famine, and choose not to follow them. This seems to 
be the case with the Ik. Turnbull shows how the Ik laugh at 
moral injunctions; if these were without meaning, one would 
simply expect them to be ignored. It seems impossible to use 
the Ik to demons tra te a lack of inna te moral sense, though 
their apparent perversi ty s till requires explana tion. Other 
groups in similar circumstances have maintained moral 
integrity. 
It is, I think, possible 
tentative conclusions from 
evidence, conclusions which 
Temple's sense of community. 
* * * 
to produce certain broad if 
this very brief review of the 
will lead us on to consider 
It seems at least probable that there is an innate capacity for 
morali ty even if not an innate sense of moral requirements. 
However, this is not to prove the theistic thesis in the way 
that Trethowan seems to think it does. It does not follow from 
a sense of morality that this sense is God-given. As we have 
seen, a purely secular evolutionary account of its cause can be 
given, without reference to God. Just as the fact of evolution 
is philosophically neutral as a proof or disproof of God, so is 
any moral capacity grounded in a moral sense which is itself a 
fact of evolution. If it is possible - as I think - to base a 
natural law approach on the fact of innate moral sense, such a 
natural law theory can be built up without reference to 
theological presuppositions. 
1 3 8 
That such a theory can be built up appears however to involve 
the traditional fact/value, is/ought problem, that it seems 
formally impossible to derive an actual rule of moral conduct, 
or a value, from a mere statement of the facts. I wish to 
indicate here one possible way of avoiding this problem, 
compatible with Temple's thought. Hefner suggests a possible 
way forward based on bio-ethics: 
The sociobiological interpretations of life suggest 
that our very existence takes place within the 
institution of evolution, governed by the dynamics of 
natural selection • • • One does not have to make a 
decision to "evolve" in order to live. One does not 
decide to set the genetic dynamics in motion in order 
to live. It is not legitimate to hold a person 
accountable for his or her genes' following the laws 
of natural selection on the grounds that the person 
accepted that accountability in the act of existing. 
Rather, the very occurrence of genes entails 
development according to the dynamics of evolution 
and natural selection. Therefore, survival is a 
value, in some sense, that is embodied in the 
evolutionary institution in which we all live. All 
••• values could be said, likewise, to be 
institutional facts. 89 
Following some hints of Kotarbinski, I think it possible to 
show this point clearly by an illustration from language. If we 
consider two sentences 'He is hungry', 'He ought to eat', we 
find an apparently straightforward transition from 'is' to 
'ought' the natural way to conquer hunger is to eat. The 
second sentence can be recast in 'is' form: 'The way not to be 
hungry is to eat', thus avoiding 'ought'. It is argued that the 
moral 'ought' is different from the 'natural 'ought'. However, 
if it is true that moral sense is a natural, genetic, 
evolutionary need just as eating is, it will follow that a 
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similar transition is possible, provided that the subject is a 
person. This is a difficult idea, which I shall try to clarify~ 
If I say 'Life is pleasant. Therefore I ought to avoid 
suicide. " it is clear tha t there is no formal logical link 
from 'is' to 'ought', from the particular status of the first 
sentence. But, if I personalise the ideas, 
transi tion, ei ther by removing the 'is', or 
'ought'. Thus I may say 'life-enjoying I 
suicide', awkward though it might sound. The 
I can avoid the 
by removing the 
ought to avoid 
'I' of personal 
identity is inseparable from the life-enjoying 'I' - I am not 
I, but someone else, without that life-enjoying capacity; and 
it naturally follows from the particular 'I' that I am when I 
utter the sentences not only that I ought not to commit suicide 
(which is how I might verbalise it) but that so long as I am 
the "I" that I am, I will not commit suicide (thus avoiding the 
'ought'). It is true that tomorrow I may no longer enjoy life; 
but the non-life-enjoying "I" is not the 'I' of whom I spoke 
when I said 'Life-enjoying I ought not to commit suicide.' Now, 
this example is based on the 'I' of mood - sometimes I enjoy 
life, at other times I do not. But the I of the evolutionary 
process remains; the genetic, evolutionary 'I' is never not 
genetic or evolutionary; and all 'oughts' that pertain to that 
part of me remain. What these 'oughts' are is more difficult to 
say, though I sugges t tha t they are those I find na tural to 
protect my own survival and that of my species. Indeed the cast 
of mind that leads me to 'ought' is natural and instinctive. 
A further consideration enables us to deepen our understanding 
of the personal 'ought'. There is a feature of uttering an 
'ought' sentence which is concealed by the conventions of 
grammar. In the sentence 'I ought to give alms to the poor', 
the utterance, grammatically speaking, is present tense; but 
the act of giving alms must inevi tably be future from the 
utterance, even though it may be a future act only by a matter 
of seconds. Thus, even if I say 'I ought to do this now', that 
apparently present 'now' in fact refers to the future: the time 
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may be only instants in the future. There is therefore a 
temporal gap between utterance and the doing (or not dOing) of 
the act referred to in the utterance. I shall call the time of 
the utterance tl' the time of the act, t
z 
- this refers to the 
indefini tely future time in which I will (or will not) be 
performing the act. 
It follows that if at tl I say 'I ought to give alms to the 
poor', at t z either it is true that I am giving alms to the 
poor or it is not true that I am giving alms to the poor. Thus, 
at tz, any utterance about what I am doing is straightforwardly 
cognitive - it is a statement in the 'is' form. The 'ought' at 
t2 has disappeared. If at t2 I am not giving alms to the poor, 
and still I ought to, the points made about t2 still apply to a 
future t3. 
So, by tz, ought has disappeared. What therefore is the status 
of 'I ought to give alms to the poor' at tl? It is, I suggest, 
a straightforwardly factual statement of preference for a given 
state of affairs at t2. At tl I am saying 'I wish to see x (my 
almsgiving) at t 2 .' It is not necessary to specify the nature 
of preference, whether it is for reasons of my pleasure, duty, 
greatest good of the greatest number or whatever: it is a datum 
of human na ture tha t we have a capaci ty for preference; the 
reasons for the preference may not be determinable or even open 
to argument (Temple's 'To every man his own sense of value is 
final,gO may be recalled ). Here we return to human nature, to 
the ' I' which says 'I ought to give alms to the poor.' The 
whole complex, evolving, conscious 'I' has the innate capacity 
of imagination - the ability to stand at tl and to foresee, to 
plan, a possible scenario for t2' even to the extent of being 
able to foresee alternative possible scenarios: 'I ought to do 
x (at tZ) but I know (i.e. foresee) that I will not'. Indeed, 
without the faculty of imagination, without the ability to 
foresee, the word 'ought' would become meaningless. 
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In this 
both in 
interpretation of 'ought', we are at one with Temple 
his stress on the role of imagination in the act of 
willing as able to reshape 
experiences, to make past events present and to imagine the 
and in his notions of mind 
future. Nowhere is this clearer than in the statement, about a 
past event, 'I ought to have done x'. In retrospect, we can 
imagine the consequences of having done 'x' rather than 'y' -
we can imagine a state of affairs - at a time subsequent to the 
original decision - different from that which did obtain: we 
can imagine a scenario different from that which was. 
By forethought and by hindsight it is thus possible in a human 
context to see a way in which a tl is a tz statement of fact. 
Certain further remarks need to be made. There is in common 
usage a mode of speaking which seems to imply a present 'ought' 
- people say, 'I am doing wha t I ought to be doing'. The 
difficulty is more apparent than real; the utterance is made at 
tz, but the 'ought' refers to the prior sense of rightness of 
the preference at a preceding t 1 , because it is only in 
relation to a previous sense (even immediately previous) that 
one can now utter 'This is what I ought to be doing'. 
I have insisted that this analysis only applies to the personal 
use of 'ought'. I would argue further that 'ought' only makes 
sense in a personal context. Even when we use it to present an 
apparently non-personal idea, 'Life ought to be enjoyed', 
'Beauty ought to be appreciated', it is evident that there is 
an underlying personal element - 'you/people/I/we/he/she ought 
to enjoy life/appreciate beauty': one is asking oneself or 
others to contemplate the advantages of a future scenario in 
which life is enjoyed or beauty appreciated. Similarly, to say 
'those stones ought to be bigger' is to say among other things 
_ 'to build a wall (say) I need bigger stones' (a statement of 
fact). It is the merest nonsense to say 'those stones ought to 
be bigger' meaning 'you stones - grow!' Having no 
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consciousness, stones cannot foresee growth, let alone grow. 
Such a use is empty. 
Given the evolved fact of the human mind, with imagination and 
foresight, the development of an idea of 'ought' seems to me 
inevitable. Because we can imagine alternative futures, we 
find - for whatever reason, whether heredity, survival instinct 
or conscious appraisal - that we prefer this vision of personal 
future to that; and we express that preference by the term 
'ought', referring to the kind of action that we believe or 
know will lead us to achieve that preferred future. We may not 
take that action, through lethargy, temptation, or whatever; 
the recognition of the possibility of the action is enough for 
us to say 'I ought to to do that'. It is a psychological fact 
that our minds can foresee a future scenario; and that, in a 
psychological if not strictly logical way, leads from 'is' to 
'ought'. Bit this is only possible if we introduce into our 
argument the aspects of present and future time: strict 
logicians, concerned with the timelessness of their formulae, 
rarely introduce time. 
This discussion of the is/ought question naturally bears on 
thought about the fact/value problem. If it is natural for the 
mind to think in terms of 'ought' when considering possible 
alternative futures, so too it is natural to consider the 
proposed option as valued. Indeed, it is almost tautological 
to speak in this way - the statement of value is a statement of 
preference. When I say 'I ought to do x', I am saying 'I value 
x more' 91, x being a course of action. Likewise of other 
values: to say of a beautiful object, 'y is valuable' is a 
straightforward statement of preference. And because we can 
conceive of alternatives, and indeed may be able to perceive 
actual alternatives and hold both y and the alternative within 
the mind's eye simultaneously (or nearly so), it is possible to 
express our preference by speaking of the value of it. Nor is 
this to fall into a narrow subjectivism; we can express 
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(normally) reasons for preference, and the experience of an 
object can be shared, though it will not be identical for all 
observers. Thus, for instance, all who see the Mona Lisa may 
share a sense of its beauty, and hence value it; though each 
observer (for reasons of heredity, upbringing and so on) will 
have his own reasons for finding the painting beautiful, each 
perception being subtly different. (Pure subjectivism, it 
appears,m tends to concentrate on the difference between 
observers rather than on what they have in common, and to give 
too Ii t tIe weight to the discourse between observers, which 
itself leads to a deepening of individual perception. I shall 
return to this 
education(. It 
subject when considering Temple's views on 
is true of course that sometimes we cannot 
state reasons for preference; but it is nevertheless also true 
that in our discourse we distinguish between preferences for 
which we can give reasons ('I like x because .•. ') and those for 
which we cannot (' I don't know why I like x, but I do'). 
However, even in the latter case, when we cannot express our 
reasons in works, it is reasonable to assume that there is some 
kind of innate reason, though we find it inexpressible. Even 
without reasons, it remains a fact that it is our preference. 
(See Section 1, above) 
A word of caution. I have not attempted to derive 'ought' from 
'is' or 'value' from 'fact': I have rather tried to show that 
it is because of the structure of human nature a transition 
from 'is' to 'ought', ' fact' to 'value' 
can be expressed in terms of the other. 
this is a strictly logical procedure -
inevitable one. 
is natural; that one 
I do not pretend that 
merely tha tit is an 
To speak of the is/ought problem in terms of preference is to 
return to the heart of the human personality, to the way we are 
as products of heredity, socialisation, and environment. As 
Temple says, 'my likes and dislikes are not free; they are 
fixed by my heredity, training and circumstance,92. 
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3. PERSONALITY IN COMMUNITY 
For Temple, the meaning of personali ty is realised fully _ 
indeed, in any significant sense, only - in the activity of 
personality in relationship with other persons: personality is 
realised fully only in communi ty. He expresses this view 
forcefully: 'The isolated individual may be wise or foolish; 
he cannot be moral or immoral. An atheistic debauchee upon a 
desert island is not liable to moral censure.' 93 There is a 
characteris tic exaggera tion here; it may properly be asked 
whether there are nonetheless duties to self the term 
'debauchee' implies improper neglect of duties to self: the 
term implies censure, as if the foolishness of debauchery were 
a mat ter of moral regret. Even so, Temple's general point 
seems credible: it is clear that without others to be the 
subject of considereation, any moral growth or fullness is 
impossible. Nor is this true only of moral development: other 
talents are dependent on relationship with others 
communication, whether in art or any form, is so by definition. 
Temple's point is that only in relation to others can we judge 
rightly moral action. I further suggest that this insight 
provides another key in the attempt to make some sense of the 
is/ought problem. If my suggestion that 'ought' is an 
expression of preference for a particular future 'is' is 
justifiable, there remains the problem of determining a reason 
for preferring this state of affairs to that. If no such key 
is available, there remains only a crude emotivism, with 
attempts to justify one feeling as somehow 'better' than 
another, or more 'appropriate' than another, with the attendant 
suggestion that society's pursuit of a 'criminal' is no more 
than the majority attempting to impose on the fugitive its 
feeling of appropriateness of conduct. For a Christian, like 
Temple, this cannot be acceptable - he is obliged to discover 
objective criteria, which he finds in the value of personality. 
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This value of personality is, as already hinted, found in the 
personality operating within the community. Temple speaks 
categorically of man: 'his destiny is fulfilled in the 
achievement of two unities, unity of individual personality and 
unity of universal fellowship. ,94 The need for both unities , 
Temple believes, is both epistemological and moral: we can 
fully perceive only in community, and our moral impulses can be 
fully developed only in community. 
A. THE CARTESIAN ERROR 
Temple emphasises the limitations of the individual mind. His 
rejection of Cartesianism, which we shall now explore in 
further detail, is frequently repea ted and specific: 'It has 
been the habit, and ••• the besetting sin, of philosophy to 
take cognition as the initial form of apprehension, and to 
seek, by such expedients as may be available, to evolve the 
other forms of apprehension, such as appreciation, from this. 
That is the source of the Cartesian error, though indeed it is 
much older than Descartes. ,95 The Cartesian error lay in 
mistaking the nature of knowledge: 'the inherent error of its 
initial assumption that in knowledge the mind begins with 
itself and proceeds to the apprehension of the external world 
EY way of construction and inference. ,96 From the error, 
various consequences follow. In politics one consequence of the 
implied individualism was the growth of nationalism: 'In the 
sphere of Politics, the unmitigated assertion of national 
independence led to the fuller development of the various 
national types, with consequent enrichment of the art and 
literature of the world, and to local experiments of universal 
value in the making of constitutions and in the relations 
between political and social life. But it also led through 
various instances of national self-assertion to the 
international Hell or Bedlam of the years 1914 to 1918.,98 Nor 
was religion free from the 'infection' of excessive 
individualism: in the face of war, 'the check which it might 
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not be 
and was 
have been hoped tha t Religion would exercise could 
applied, for Religion also had become departmentalised, 
by most people regarded as a "private affair between a man and 
its main if not its only concern was with 
Art likewise has suffered from the 
has followed from the Cartesian habits of 
his Maker," so that 
personal piety. ,98 
individualism which 
mind: 'the formula "Art for Art's sake" in which the movement 
of emancipation eventually found expression, is an exaggeration 
as false and pernicious as the contrary error. It expresses a 
complete detachment of Art from all other interests or modes of 
experience so that artists, under its impulse, are liable to 
become engrossed in self-expression without any enquiry whether 
they have a self which is worthy, or even fit, to be 
expressed. ,99 
Temple's comments are, in one sense, part of the common 
currency of intellectual history: the growth of individualism 
since the Renaissance, and its effects, have been well-
documented - as Temple has it, 'the chief characteristic of the 
modern or post-Reformation period has been departmentalisation. 
The great enterprise of all-inclusive unity, which was 
characteristic of the Middle Ages, was progressively 
abandoned. ,100 What is notable is not the historical point, but 
the vehemence wi th which it is expressed: he refers to 'the 
principle of departmentalisation which finds its grossest 
expression in the formula "Business is business", and its most 
immoral in "My country, right or wrong".' 101 Temple's work is 
peppered with references to the 'Cartesian Faux-Pas'; but his 
solutions to this problem, as he sees it, do not lie in 
reaction. While the Roman Catholic Church of his time reacted 
to the disintegrative tendencies of modern life by a conscious 
medievalism (typified by Pope Leo XIII's encouragement of neo-
Thomism, the condemnations of Modernism of Pius IX and St. Pius 
X, and in England by the romantic ideals of the Distributist 
League and its supporters, most notably G.K.Chesterton, Hilaire 
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Belloc and Vincent McNab), TempI d 
e, as a goo Hegel ian might, 
looked to a future based on synthesis: 
Return to the concrete richness and bewildering 
variety and still more bewildering interconnexion of 
actual experience must be the mode of deliverance 
from the false scent on which Descartes set the 
modern mind in its search for truth. It is not a 
return to the Middle Ages that we want. It is not 
desirable any more than it is possible to put back 
the clock. Those are not wise guides, I am very sure, 
who wish to cultivate a medieval mentality on the 
ground that we need to recover the medieval sense 
alike of objectivity and of unity. It is our task 
consciously and deliberately to construct a 
"synthesis" of the classical and medieval "thesis" 
with the modern "antithesis" , and this in some 
fundamental respects will resemble the "thesis" more 
closely than the "antithesis". But it will not leave 
the "antithesis" unexpressed; we cannot go behind the 
Reformation that great bouleversement of human 
thinking, wherein it was for the first time fully 
recognised that each man is by nature the centre of 
his own universe, however true it be that his most 
urgent need is to discover that it does not involve 
about him as its pivot. The "duty of private 
judgement", the autonomy of the individual 
conscience, the integri ty of the individual mind -
all these which find their basis in the proclamation 
of personal sincerity as the fundamental human 
excellence - not the highest but the most basic - are 
realities discovered in the period of departmentalism 
and never again to be forgotten. 102 
For Temple, it would be a fundamental task, as we shall see, to 
develop an ethical theory suitable for the syntheses of a new 
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era. It maybe that Temple paints with too broad a brush: 
Edward Heath has noted that 'some may feel that in a search for 
a fairer society William Temple placed too little emphasis on 
the need to maintain personal freedom,103; the divide in 
philosophy between pre- and post-Reformation thought is not 
perhaps so decisive as Temple suggests the primacy of 
individual conscience is forcibly expressed by Aquinas, for 
instance; but questions of this kind should not obscure what 
Temple saw as the lesson of history. 
The departmentalism of human intellectual effort has damaged 
the practice of philosophy no less than other areas of 
activity: 
Philosophy meanwhile has been involved in the same 
process. 
pursuit 
science, 
Inasmuch as every particular study or 
of knowledge is the subject of a special 
Philosophy has been left with the study of 
knowledge in general, and has been in preposterous 
disproportion occupied wi th the enquiry whe ther and 
how Knowledge may be possible at all. Mankind, being 
quite well aware that it possesses some fragment of 
what is Knowledge if such a thing exists and must 
pass for Knowledge if it does not, leaves Philosophy 
to spin its cobwebs and gets on with the business of 
the world as best it may.104 
That was written in 1932, four years before the publication of 
Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, perhaps the high point of the 
development of analytical philosophy, not so much for any 
intrinsic profundi ty or originali ty as for the trenchancy of 
its attack on the traditional metaphysics of which Temple is an 
exemplar. Ayer had been deeply influenced by though he 
developed his thought in new directions - Russell; and both saw 
themselves in the tradition of the British empiricists. It is 
notable that Russell devoted much of his philosophical work 
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(other than his seminal expositions in logic) to questions of 
even his elementary text, The Problems of 
almost exclusively concerned with 
epistemology 
Philosophy is 
epistemologyl05, and Ayer has likewise devoted much of his 
writing to the same subject. At the time of his writing, Temple 
would have been aware of his contemporaries' concerns - whether 
his strictures on philosophical activity are equally applicable 
to the non-Bri tish scene is open to doubt. (In Poland, for 
instance, Kotarbinski, almost an exact contemporary, while 
producing major work in epistemology continued to develop 
theories of metaphysics which remain significant, while 
Lejewski maintains that metaphysics is the central discipline 
in philosophy. ) Temple quotes, wi th approval, Pringle-
Pattison's stricture on the empiricists: 'it was the most 
unfortunate error of the Scottish philosophers that they 
identified the epistemological with the metaphysical 
problem.,I06 We are perhaps close to the reason for much of the 
neglect of Temple's philosophical work, that in content and in 
style it is out of tune with dominant currents in British 
thought of the past half-century. Ayer's claim that 'the 
philosopher is not, gua philosopher, in a position to assess 
the value of any political theory: his function is simply to 
elucidate the theory by defining the symbols which occur in 
it,107 reveals a habit of thought quite at odds with Temple's 
style and method. 
If it is true tha t Temple is out of tune wi th much recent 
philosophy, it is notable that by the time of Nature, Man and 
God while still describing himself as 'a loyal pupil of Edward 
-' Caird,I08, he wishes to distinguish himself from the Hegelian 
tradition. He does so by referring to 
finds within the British Hegelian 
Hegelians laid reiterated emphasiS 
distinction between Self and Not-Self 
an innate Cartesianism he 
tradition: 'the English 
on the fact that the 
is drawn within the given 
unity of experience. But 
sufficiently prevailed to 
in them still 
lead to an 
the old tradition 
assumption of an 
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epistemological and thus (for this philosophy) a metaphysical 
priority .of the Subject in the Subject-Object relation of 
Knowledge. For this there is no foundation if once the 
Cartesian starting-point has been discarded.' 109 Temple does 
not reject the emphasis on subject-object relationship which we 
have seen to be basic both to his thought and to Idealism; but 
he is concerned to stress that undue weight on the subject is 
not for him. (In a subsequent chapter, we shall see how Temple 
differs from the neo-Hegelians in accepting a version of 
natural law.) 
If the error of Cartesianism lies in emphasis of the subject at 
the e~pense of the object,it is unsurprising that Temple will 
develop an ethic based on the needs of others, and the 
realisation of others' intrinsic value. Bit to do this, it is 
necessary to develop first a philosophical basis. He quotes 
extensively from Baron Von Hugel 110 : 
Modern philosophy started with a strong emphasis upon 
the subject, and this starting-point was first 
impressively articulated in Descartes' famous (but, 
alas, dangerously inadequate) fundamental formula -
his one axiom - 'cogito, ergo ~'. We thus take for 
granted, as rock-certain, what is demonstrably non-
existent: 'I think' instead of 'I think such and 
such realities', or at least, 'I think such and such 
objects'. The subject and object, always 
interconnected in man's actual experience and hence 
to be assumed in their interconnexion, were thus 
severed from each other, in the very starting-point 
of philosophy; and then this severance and quite 
artificial separateness could hardly any more be 
bridged over - the object could hardly be recovered, 
since man (after all) is in fact restricted, and is 
here rightly recognised as restricted, to the 
analysis of what actually exists, and to what he 
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really experiences. The appeal here to its 
experience was, then, right; what was wrong was the 
exclusion, before any and all investigation, and 
without any justification, of one entire third of 
every living experience. For all experience is 
always threefold: it is always simultaneously 
experience of the subject, of the object, and of the 
overbridging thought; indeed, clear consciousness 
always first concerns the object, and only much later 
on the subject. And thus, through tha t artificial 
abstraction, there promptly arose such sheer figments 
of the brain as knowledge, not of objects alone, but 
of subjective states alone; and (stranger still) 
knowledge that objects exist, and that they all have 
an inside, but an inside which is never actually 
revealed to us by the qualities of those objects; and 
(culminating miracle of strangeness) that this inside 
abides ever essentially unknowable by us, and yet, 
all the same, we absolutely know that it contradicts 
all these appearances. Man thus , though well within 
the universe, isolates himself from it; he imprisons 
himself in his own facul ties, and, as to anything 
further, knows only that objects exist as to which 
these facul ties essentially and inevi table mislead 
him. 
Here no cri ticism of the logic of the posi tion is 
sufficient; indeed, such criticisms mostly end by 
bearing unwilling, or even unwi t ting, tes timony to 
the general self-consistency of this subjectivism. 
Only a cri ticism, not of the conclusions as 
consistent or not with their premises, but of these 
premises as adequate or not to real experience, 
sufficient. 111 
is 
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Several points are notable here. It is easy to see why this 
extract so appealed to Temple: the author uses the traditional 
language of the Idealists to make his point - truth lies in the 
right ordering of the subject-object relationship and the 
emphasis on the 'overbridging thought' which links the two. 
The point is made that the experience of objects is also - and 
simul taneously - an experience of an experiencing self; any 
separate analysis of the components of the experience is an 
afterthought, or, more clearly, a subsequent reflection - an 
abstraction from the original experience; and in that 
abstraction false emphasis is possible. This explains the 
reason for continuing the quotation to include the point that 
logical analysis of the Cartesian posi tion is unhelpful: the 
appeal of subjectivism is precisely that it has apparent formal 
logical consistency (with minor amendments: cogito ergo sum is 
not formally an analytic proposition) the most potent 
criticisms tend to be not that there is error in the logic, but 
that the argument begins from an erroneous premise. Gilbert 
Ryle famously at tacked Cartesianism in The Concept of Mind; 
though his reasons are different from Temple's, we may perhaps 
rightly see both men as part of a general reaction to this 
dominant strand in modern philosophy. 
The erroneous 
von Hugel, 
experience. 
propositional 
real as the 
premise was, for both William Temple and Baron 
that the Cartesian view was inadequate to 
Again, we find Temple's underlying non-
approach - the world is experienced ~ real, as 
subject. For Temple, we must 'return to the 
concrete richness and bewildering variety and still more 
bewildering interconnexion 
extent tha t Temple was an 
1 . ,112 T th of ac tua experl.ence • 0 e 
Idealist, he was a wri ter wi th a 
natural disinclination to speculate without reference to 
experience. 
B. VALUE AS OBJECTIVE 
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Man is bound to his experience; but in that binding, he must 
recognise his limitations as an individual. Early in his 
career, in Mens Creatrix, Temple developed an argument for the 
epistemological significance of community: 
In countless ways it appears that only through the 
diversity of personalities is the whole of Reality 
apprehended or its whole Truth known. For it seems 
impossible to deny that when a beautiful object is 
appreciated, it gains in quality itself. Whether or 
not a thing can fitly be called beautiful if no one 
can see it, I do not know; but I am quite clear that, 
if no one can see it, it does not matter if it is 
beautiful or not. Its value begins when it is 
appreciated. Good must mean good for somebody; apart 
from consciousness, value is non-existent. 
And yet it seems impossible to say that the value is 
in the appreciating mind. It exists for it, and only 
so; but it is in the object. So the object when it 
is appreciated becomes something which it was not 
until then. But if so, and if there are various 
values which cannot all be realised for the same 
consciousness, then the variety of intelligences is 
necessary for the full actualisation of the value of 
the world.; The complete truth, therefore, if we 
include Value, is only grasped by the whole society 
of intelligences, and can never be fully grasped by 
one alone. 113 
This is a curious argument, not least because of the 
assumptions underlying it. The crucial question, shortly to be 
developed, is whether it is possible to accept Temple's belief 
in an objective value: on this depends much else. Evident in 
this passage is the necessary relationship between the subject 
and object the object realises meaning only when it is 
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appreciated, a point we have seen so frequently in Temple. What 
is evident in his argument here, however, is the belief that 
when an object is appreciated it increases in value in itself. 
Temple states categorically that 'it seems impossible to say 
that the value is in the appreciating mind'. Much depends on 
what is meant by 'in', as if there were an ontological category 
of value which might somehow subsist here or there. 
Whatever may be meant here, there is still the question whether 
the value of something is in itself or as appreciated - that a 
thing's value is that I find it so. It seems not at all 
impossible that in this sense value is in the appreciating 
mind, as I have previously maintained. Thus, I may say that 'I 
find this vase/symphony/sonnet beautiful', by which I mean 'I 
value x as beautiful'. My statement is clearly about myself -
the 'I' who values, and not a t all about the object of my 
valuation: the link between the subject and the object is not 
the object's beauty, but my finding it beautiful. I can analyse 
the object and give reasons why I find it so symmetry, 
melodic power, choice of words - even though those reasons are 
never complete. When they are incomplete, when I cannot give 
full expression to my appreciation of a Shakespeare sonnet or a 
Beethoven quartet, it is simply that I cannot fully put into 
words, however I may try, the total reaction of my 
intellectual/emotional/imaginative self. I may turn to a critic 
who, through more developed skills, may give fuller, clearer 
expression than I can give, of a reaction. 
Wha t Temple is a t tempting to do, I think, is to sus tain the 
aesthetic notion of the beauty of things in themselves - to 
maintain that a Shakespeare play is somehow intrinsically more 
valuable than a Mickey Spillane novel; and to put this 
perception on a more certain and reliable basis than simply 'I 
prefer Shakespeare to Mickey Spillane.' We have seen in Chapter 
Three my suggestion, here repeated, that the locus of 
valuation is in the self and not in the appreciated object. It 
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is now necessary to develop this topic in relation to 
collective or communal perception. 
Temple suggests that there is a distinction between different 
people's views of aesthetic value 'there is a clear 
difference between the judgment "This is beautiful", where it 
is a real analysis of experience, and "This is beautiful" where 
it is the repetition of the verdict of an expert: in the former 
case it means, "This gives me aesthetic pleasure", while in the 
latter it means, at best "This would give aesthetic pleasure to 
anyone of sufficiently trained susceptibilities", and in this 
case the value is itself still potential and not actual.,114 He 
notes differences of perception, but refers to the 'value 
itself' : he is quite specific that there is real value that 
ought to be apprecia ted: 'inasmuch as there is a particular 
character which every individual, as this member of the society 
of spirits, ought to make his own, so, by consequence, there 
are certain values which he ought to appreciate and thereby 
actualise,115. 
He is fearful of accepting a purely emotive view: he refers to 
such a notion as 'utter chaos,.116 I think he is mistaken, in 
that it seems possible to retain the idea that 'x is valuable' 
(i.e.'people value it and it ought to be maintained'( without 
a t all valuing it oneself. In this sense, something may be 
valued in the community, and so maintain its worth to persons, 
wi thout being a t all significant to the individual. Thus, I 
find that I value music very highly, literature and art to a 
large extent: and dance not at all. On my rare excursions to 
the ballet, like Anton Bruckner at the premiere of 'Parsifal', 
I am blind to the stage action. I find myself, however much 
encouraged by my reading, however much the subject of 
balletomanes' enthusiasm, entirely unable to appreciate what to 
me are meaningless gestures and gyrations. Gestures I can be 
taught to interpret; the discipline I can recognise, but I 
recognise it as I recognise the precision of the Brigade of 
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Guards, and wi th as Ii t tIe emotional involvement. I do not 
therefore say that dance is not valuable, or not worthy of 
support and apprecia tion: it is merely not valuable to me. 
The consequent reflection is not that ballet is meaningless, 
but that my aesthetic capability is limited. In other worl~s, 
in this subject there is an incapacity to appreciate that 
object. Each act of appreciation is different, not necessarily 
because of a change in the object, but a change in the subject. 
The Mona Lisa is much the same today as yesterday, exhibited in 
much the same light, at the same temperature in the same 
ambience. If yesterday I appreciated it differently from the 
way I appreciate it today, the change is in me, as the 
valuation is in me. And if another subject sees it, he may 
value it differently; but in discourse we may discover common 
or at least similar reactions. 
Likewise, discourse reveals common or similar reactions in our 
appreciations of Shakespeare and Mickey Spillane. It is 
consensus, both among present cri tics and across the years, 
which places one author above another. I t is also common 
features of intellect and emotion, common qualities of the 
subject, which cause us to share, or perhaps rather to hold, 
similar perceptions. Now this does not leave an 'utter chaos' 
of subjectivism. It is not meaningless to develop aesthetic 
concepts of aesthetic, critical discourse. ~e value of these 
follows precisely from the changes and variations in the 
subject across time. It is not that I innately appreciate art, 
merely that I have some capacity to do so; my appreciation has 
grown because others have said 'you'll enjoy this because ... ', 
or 'why don't you try ... ?' or 'can you see how .•• ?' 
Aesthetics seems to be as much involved with recommendation and 
encouragement as with appreciation alone. If it is true that 
de gustibus ~ disputandum, it is also true that taste may be 
developed, affected, altered by the growth and change of self 
in relationship with others. 
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It is this truth that 
be in assuming an 
assumption leads him 
Temple seems aware of" his , 
underlying, unalterable 
to the second part of his 
error seems to 
value. This 
argument, that 
'the variety of intelligences is necessary for the full 
actualisation of the value of the world. The complete truth 
••• if we include Value, is only grasped by the whole society 
of intelligences'. It is one thing to say that a variety of 
perceptions by a number of intelligences will provide a greater 
total of understanding than one intelligence alone; but it is 
quite another to suggest that therefore the totality of 
intelligences will perceive the whole value of the world. I 
cannot see how such an assertion can be made, as the basis for 
it cannot by definition be ascertained by a single 
intelligence. If a single intelligence could know that all 
value were perceived by the totality of intelligences, he could 
see the totality of value, to make the assertion: and that, 
according to Temple, is precisely what he cannot do. Temple's 
assertion seems impossible without an inference of an 
omniscient God, but he seems to consider this inference, at 
this stage of his argument, unnecessary: 
••• when we consider our experience as it 
by knowledge, we find a world which is 
appreciated by the whole society 
intelligences. The whole grasp of their 
experience cannot be held in one 
consciousness however "Absolute" or 
is handled 
known and 
of finite 
collective 
centre of 
"Infinite", 
because some of the elements are intrinsically 
incompatible. There cannot be one Mind which 
includes all of this. The Absolute Being (so far) 
. f . tIl· 117 appears precisely as the soc1ety 0 1n e 1gences. 
Temple appears to be saying, as I understand it, that he 
accepts that no intelligence can - even in principle - know the 
totality of value; and that he would include God in this. It 
may be that God cannot know the full texture of a thing as I 
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value it - directly - in that I may attach a particular balance 
of value to a given object (I would not see it as God sees it), 
but an omniscient God would surely know that I saw the object 
in such and such a way, and thus have the knowledge that the 
whole range of possible valuations is held by the totality of 
observers, including myself. (An omniscient God would know the 
range of possible interpretations.) But it does not follow 
from this that all possible interpretations, all possible 
valuations, are actually held. If even an infini te centre of 
consciousness cannot know all possible valuations, because some 
'elements are intrinsically incompatible' it is surely 
impossible to make any claim about the totality of 
intelligences. Even if one could notionally total the sum of 
all knowledge held by all intelligences, one could not then 
notionally total the sum of the not known - the sum of unknown 
quantities must itself be unknown. I think that Temple is here 
guilty of false analogy. It is true that my knowledge of 
astronomy is severely limited compared with the sum of present 
knowledge of astronomy; and present knowledge is doubtless 
severely limited by comparison with the total knowledge past, 
present and future. (I assume, though Temple does not here 
make the point explicit, that he means the society of 
intelligences across all time.) But the total of knowledge 
held is not necessarily the same as the total of all knowledge 
possible to be held. The total of astronomical knowledge may 
forever be necessarily inadequate - it is inconceivable, to me 
at least, that every past astronomical event can be intimately 
known, without invoking the truly omniscient God; and that is 
no proof of his existence, for it is not inconceivable that an 
event may be forever unknown. (We can conceive of an unknown 
event: if I see certain astronomical phenomena, and I know that 
there was a time when no human intelligences existed, I can 
imagine that certain similar astronomical phenomena could have 
taken place, though I have no knowledge of ei ther time or 
details. Such an event, though conceived of, remains strictly 
unknown. ) 
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* * * 
Temple is about to leave philosophising behind, and explicitly 
to move into theological speculation. He makes the transition 
within a single sentence: 
The conception of the Universe coming to focus in a 
multitude of intelligences, and realising its own 
value in their manifold appreciation of it, is not a 
notion which degrades our spiritual life; nor is it 
alien from the life of religion; for this Society of 
Spirits is the Communion of Saints, and the agency 
that builds it up is the Holy Church, which is that 
Communion as so far realised and active, and its 
spiri t of self-transcendence and self-sacrifice 
(which are two names for one thing) is the Holy 
Spirit. 118 
It is now possible to recognise the significance of what Temple 
is attempting to achieve in apparently denying full omniscience 
to God. As a Christian he is trying, I think, to justify the 
crea tion of a universe. Underpinning his view is the view, 
similar to that of Teilhard de Chardin, that the fullness of 
God, though ever-present, is realised or manifested through and 
in his own creation; that God is 'built up' in the mystical 
Body of Christ, through the 
God. For this reason, as 
solidarity are important 
scheme. 
creative co-operation of man and 
for Teilhard, co-operation and 
essential in the theological 
Nevertheless, the argument Temple has used, based on the sum of 
all knowledge held by all intelligences, remains a curious, 
and, I believe, unsatisfactory one. The reason for holding 
such a view may be found in the Hegelianism of Caird - the idea 
that the Absolute is discovered through the dialectical 
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processes, by which one man's partial perception of truths, 
countered by another's, leads ever onwards to the stage of the 
fullness of the Absolute, in which is fullness of knowledge. 
In that sense, there is, in the totality of all perception, the 
completeness of all knowledge. More directly, and more surely, 
we can point to a significant dictum of Bradley, that reality 
is experience: 'When we ask as to the matter which fills up 
the empty outline, we can reply in one word, that this matter 
is experience 
and what is 
• •• Sentient experience, in short, is reali ty, 
not this is not real.,119 Within such a 
definition, it would follow inevitably that the sum of all 
reality is the sum of all experience; and this, for Bradley, is 
the essence of Idealism. 
I set out Temple's argument without reference to Bradley's 
dictum, to examine it on its own merits; I suggest that it is 
unsatisfactory, for the reasons given. But I wanted also to 
use this argument to show how Temple was to shift his position 
away from Idealism and neo-Hegelianism by the time of Nature, 
Man and God, which, for reasons I hope to make clear in a 
subsequent chapter, left open the way for the development of a 
natural law position. I have noted already120 that no longer 
could Temple be considered an Idealist: nowhere is this more 
clear than in his treatment of collective consciousness in his 
later book. 
In the later book, Temple speaks of the Commonwealth of Value, 
in Lecture XVI. 121 The idea that the totality of perceptions 
provides completeness of possible knowledge of value is 
entirely missing. Instead of an Idealist gloss, there is 
instead the move from an epistemological bias - that community 
provides knowledge - to a religious one, that it is central to 
our spiritual natures to be communal: 
• • • 
finite souls are to a very great extent 
reciprocally constitutive of one another. We have our 
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whole being in fellowship wi th each other, and are 
what we are because of the tradition that we inherit 
and the influences tha t play upon us. Some thing of 
our own we bring to this, but only the omniscience of 
God can discriminate between this original 
contribution and the work of social influences. It is 
partly because of this essentially social character 
of finite mind that self-centredness and self-concern 
are suicidal; they set up an absolute contradiction 
between the activity of mind and its own nature. But 
if the mind or soul is thus constituted, then it may 
at least reasonably be regarded as requiring for its 
own fulfilment the special social relationship that 
may exist between it and every other mind, while 
every other will be the poorer for the lack of social 
relationship with it. Moreover, what is in question 
here is not only the good enjoyed by each in proper 
appreciation of the other, but the special good of 
each waiting to be actualised by others' appreciation 
of it. It is possible, no doubt, to conceive the 
Commonwealth as a series of eccentric circles, each 
representing the sphere of social relationships 
proper to an individual soul. And some such notion 
would be natural if not inevitable if the 
Commonwealth itself were conceived on republican 
principles, that is to say, as a fellowship cohering 
by the attachment of members to one another. But we 
have seen reason for conceiving it as a Monarchy, so 
that the fellowship coheres by the allegiance of all 
members to the King or Head, and to one another in 
and through Him. The conception congruous with this 
is that each member should have, or be destined to 
have, through Him a fellowship with all others who 
owe to Him the same allegiance. 
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Such a commonwealth must bind into unity all spirits 
of all periods of time. In other words i t involves 
everlasting life for all who are its members; but 
this life is something more than everlasting. It 
must, at least progressively even if never 
completely, partake of the nature of eternity, 
wherein all successiveness is united in a single 
apprehension. Only so could the whole value of all 
the social relationships comprised in it be 
actualised. 122 
Differences between this argument and that of Mens Creatrix are 
evident. Temple retains the idea that the universe comes into 
focus in the Communion of Saints (' We have called it the 
Commonwealth of Value; its Christian name is the Communion of 
Saints,123), but he speaks only of 'the whole value of all the 
social relationships comprised in it', something very different 
from 'the complete truth ••• grasped by the whole society of 
intelligences.' 'All successiveness ••• united in a single 
apprehension' is not the same as 'the full actualisation of the 
value of the world'. 
In this argument, Temple passes from philosophy to theology. He 
emphasises the limitations of individual mind, and argues that 
we contradict our own natures if we are self-centred - he is 
again indicating the limitations of beginning our enquiries in 
a Cartesian manner. Self is only fully realised in the 
appreciation of others. What is not apparent is the meaning of 
this appreciation, and it raises problems which Temple does not 
consider. A practical example may illustrate this. I have a 
certain talent as a painter, possibly not very great. At one 
level, it is evident that my talent is wasted if it is not 
appreciated by others - pictures nobody looks at might as well 
not exist. But it does not follow that I as painter am realised 
or fulfilled by others· appreciation of my pictures. If I am 
dead, I might be fulfilled in that my talent has at last been 
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recognised; but I am not fulfilled in that I am not conscious 
of that appreciation. Value in this sense is never truly 
fulfilled to me; and any joy that may exist in my relationship 
with Viewers, across space and time, is lost to me - it is 
locked in their perceptions. That my value is wholly realised, 
in the full sense of being known, is something that can be true 
only within an eternal life. Of course, Temple presumes this, 
but it is not deducible from the appreciation of me by others. 
That particular conditions need to exist for something to 
happen does not entail that they will exist. In the temporal 
order alone they do not exist. 
Temple tries to make this leap - 'if the mind or soul is thus 
constituted, then it may be at least reasonably regarded as 
requiring for its own fulfilment the special social 
relationship that may exist between it and every other mind.' 
Specifying the necessary conditions for something does not, as 
we have seen, then involve the fulfilment of those conditions. 
To say of the commonwealth of value that it must do this or 
that is not a logical entailment; it is a leap of faith. It 
does not follow from this that Temple's point is meaningless; 
theologically he performs a worthwhile function in providing an 
argument that if there is an eternal life then it would surely 
be communal: 'for the self-centred spiri t there can be no 
eternal life. Even if it should exist for ever, its existence 
could only be an ever-deepening chill of dea th. Because it 
seeks its satisfaction in itself, where none is to be found, it 
must suffer an always intenser pang of spiritual hunger, which 
cannot be allayed until that spirit turns to another source of 
satisfaction. ,124 It is easy to understand Temple's lifelong 
hatred of Pelagianism as 'the only intrinsically damnable 
heresy. ' 
The religious assumption is also apparent in Temple's idea that 
the commonweal th is a monarchy rather than a republic - he 
wishes to retain the idea of the Body of Christ, which involves 
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the kingship of Christ. This should not surprise us the 
epistemological significance of community inevitably for 
Temple - involves a religious dimension. 
Temple believes that the meaning of religious experience is 
found in the whole experience of religious persons.' 125 This 
experience is personal and all-pervading; the religious man 
experiences the world as a religious whole: 'the religious man 
is not only religious when he prays; his work is religiously 
done, his recrea tion religiously enjoyed, his food and drink 
religiously received; the last he often emphasises by the 
custom of "grace before meat". He does his duty religiously; 
above all, his failures in duty affect him religiously. ,126 The 
community's importance lies in sustaining the religious life of 
its members. In a sermon preached in Manchester Cathedral in 
1914, Temple is specific: 'To ask a religious man why he 
believes in God is like asking a happy man why he enjoys life. 
No verbal answer can be given. But if we live in that man's 
fellowship, or in the fellowship of a society of such men, 
which is what the church ought to be, we may catch the secret 
by sympathy. ,127 We learn within the community of believers -
'in any individual the type of religious experience will depend 
upon the religious tradi tion prevalent in his social 
environment. ,128 From the significance of the environment 
enormous consequences flow: 'the immense importance of securing 
that the traditional and prevalent belief of any community is 
in the closest attainable correspondence with truth, alike by 
the exclusion of falsehood, which, in this field, is idolatry 
or superstition, and by the inclusion of all truth which is 
relevant. Correctness of belief is of high importance to the 
individual ... But it is very much more important to the 
communi ty, because wha tever is the prevalent belief of the 
communi ty will be accepted uncri tically by grea t numbers of 
individuals and will predispose them towards forms of religious 
experience, and of its issue in religious and moral practice, 
corresponding to that belief. Heresy may be compatible in the 
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individual with deep religion which as a whole is sound; but 
the Church is bound to regard heresy as for lOts purposes a more 
serious evil than some aberrations which in the individual 
would be more pernicious. ,129 
This is an odd passage, which perhaps raises more questions 
than it answers; and Temple does not expand on it. It seems to 
argue for an ecclesiastical authoritarianism: heresy is an evil 
which must be kept out of society to avoid confusing the 
uncri tical mass of people. This view is based upon the idea 
that the majority over the years perceive most closely the true 
values of things. It is a view concordant with the theory of 
mass-perception advanced in Mens Creatrix, but it is difficult 
to relate it to a more liberal view of religious freedom. The 
obvious objection to such an opinion is the difficulty of 
determining the identi ty of the true guardians of authori ty, 
and the difficul ty of deciding the boundary be tween crea ti ve 
innova tion wi thin a tradi tion and heresy. Perhaps the answer 
lies in the episcopacy - for Temple it presumably would - but 
there is no guarantee of right judgment in all cases of the 
bishops: this has never been doctrine (though at times it may 
have appeared to be the practice) of the more overtly 
authoritarian Catholic church - it certainly seems at odds with 
Anglicanism. Perhaps the lack of further clarification of this 
passage is the consequence of hurried writing, though I confess 
that there are a number of passages in Temple which seem to 
argue for authoritarian approaches to dissent; but we should at 
least note that it provides part of the important view that 
religion is never purely a private matter: it must affect 
poli tical life. Temple was never afraid to intervene in the 
political life of the nation, though he believed that a 
churchman should not take a party political stance. In 1926, he 
took an active part, with other churchmen, in attempting to 
resolve the miners' strike. This was held by some to be 
unwarranted interference. At the time, Temple defended his 
actions robustly: in a letter to The Times (August 19th, 1926) 
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he wrote: 'if it is urged tha t such action as we took is 
improper in principle, we completely disagree with such a view. 
As Christians, and most of us as Christians charged with 
official responsibility, we saw two parties doing great damage 
to the community by a continued conflict which was bound to be 
ended by negotiation sooner or later; our religion and our 
office required of us that we should do anything which lay in 
our power to bring them, in the literal sense, to reason. ,130 
Years later, he noted: 'It is commonly assumed that Religion is 
one department of life, like Art or Science, and that it is 
playing the part of a busybody when it lays down principles for 
the guidance of other departments, whether Art and Science or 
Business and Politics. When a group of Bishops attempted to 
bring Government, Coal Owners and Miners together in a solution 
of the disastrous Coal Strike of 1926, Mr. Baldwin, then Prime 
Minister, asked how the Bishops would like it if he referred to 
the Iron and Steel Federation the revision of the Athanasian 
Creed: and this was acclaimed as a legitimate score. ,131 The 
involvement in poli tical life was a legacy from his fa ther: 
Archbishop Frederick Temple, when Bishop of London, had 
attempted, together with Cardinal Manning, to mediate in the 
Dock Strike of 1889. In William Temple there was profound 
belief in the moral requirement and, indeed, moral 
inevitability - of personal involvement in community. 
* * * 
Morali ty begins in the recogni tion tha t man is inevi tably a 
social creature. It is evident that Temple had read Bradley's 
!'tt Station and Its Duties132 • There, Bradley asserts 'no ••• 
individual men exist ••• what we call an individual man is what 
he is by virtue of community. ,133 He explains what he means by 
this: 'Let us take a man, an Englishman as he is now, and try 
to point out tha t, apart from wha t he has in common wi th 
others, apart from his sameness wi th others, he is not 
Englishman nor a man at all; that if you take him 
an 
as 
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something by himself, he is not what he is •.• he is what he is 
because he is a born and educated social being, and a member of 
an individual social organism, ••• if you make abstraction from 
all this which is the same in him as in others, what you have 
left is not an Englishman nor a man, but some, I know not what, 
residuum which never has existed by itself and does not so 
. t ,134 F thi d eX1S • or s reason" Bra ley argues that moral 
behaviour lies in ci tizenship, in the community in which we 
live. Bradley, in Hegelian tradition135 , sees that community as 
the nation-state: 'we must say that a man's life with its moral 
duties, is in the main filled up by his station in that system 
of wholes which the state is, and this, partly by its laws and 
institutions, and still more by its spirit, gives him the life 
which he does live, and ought to live. r136 This sounds a very 
conservative position, and A.J.M.Milne comments that it is 
clear 'that what Bradley had in mind in that doctrine is 
something along the lines of morality at the level of rule and 
custom rather than the levels of spheres of rational 
activity. r137 
Temple's view, as we shall see, moved beyond a simple 
nationalism and pure custom. I shall suggest that adoption of a 
natural law position, particularly in the final stages of his 
career, represents a fundamental breach with Hegelian Idealism. 
Nonetheless, elements of the earlier thinkers still re-emerge: 
this may indeed help to explain the extraordinary passage on 
heresy138, already quoted. Temple's broadening out of the 
principle, his move to a less conservative, less Bradleian, 
more overtly Christian position is signalled in Nature, Man and 
God. He notes that 'Our actual obligations depend on our 
membership of society and on the character of the society of 
which we are members. r139 (It is possible to see that 
obligations are dependent on circumstances, an idea to be 
developed in our consideration of natural order.) But Temple 
does not accept that our own community is therefore the 
pinnacle of moral behaviour: 
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But that does not affect the nature of obligation 
itself, or the inherent logic which makes it a 
principle of progress. For no stage or level of 
civilisation is satisfactory in itself; certainly no 
one proposes to leave all things just as they are in 
this present year of grace! The sense of obligation 
to serve the common good as apprehended at any time 
is inevitably a sense of obligation also to apprehend 
it better. The limitations set to the community in 
which membership, with its obligation of loyalty, is 
recognised are more and more evidently accidental or 
artificial. At one point after another it becomes 
manifest that the accepted convention is in fact 
contradictory of the principle of fellow-membership 
which is the root and moral sanction of all 
conventions, until the one universal law is known in 
the form "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself", 
where "neighbour" is interpreted, as in the Parable 
of the Good Samaritan, to mean any human being with 
whom even accidental contact occurs, and even though 
according to current convention he would be an object 
of hatred and contempt. 140 
Much is significant here. It is apparent that Temple 
distinguishes between actual obligation - the obligations that 
are naturally entailed by our functions as family members, as 
citizens, as workers and absolute obligation. The 
distinction is made between a rule of conduct and absolute 
obligation. In a later work, Temple clarifies his point: 
I do not myself believe that there is any rule of 
conduct, strictly so called, that is of absolute 
obligation. I think that with regard to all rules of 
conduct strictly so called it must be admitted that 
there might be circumstances which would make it 
obligatory to break them rather than to keep them. 
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It is true that "Thou shalt do no murder", because 
murdering is the kind of killing that is wrong; but 
it had to be changed to that from the earlier form , 
"Thou shal t not kill", precisely because there are 
some kinds of killing which seem to be least 
justifiable. Therefore, if you like to say so, "Thou 
shalt do no murder" is of absolute obligation; but 
the question may arise in the courts of law whether 
the killing tha t took place was murder or was no t; 
and , therefore, this law does not give us absolute 
direction with regard to our conduct in all possible 
circumstances. If you come into a room and find some 
bully about to torture and kill a child and you swing 
the poker at him and in fact kill him, most of us at 
any rate will say you did quite right, and such 
killing was not wrong. In other worWs, it was not 
murder. You are not called upon at such a moment to 
be careful so to measure the strength of your blow 
tha t you may by all means avoid killing the bully. 
the vi tal ma t ter is to stop him from killing the 
child. If you can do that without killing him, so 
much the better, but don't think too much about 
it. 141 
The example of killing is a commonplace of ethical discussion, 
and there is a clear and important distinction between killing 
and murder. 'Murder is wrong' is tautologous (Wrongful kill~is 
wrong'); 'killing is wrong' is not. But Temple's point is a 
deeper one than simply saying that not all killing is wrong. 
He is close to W.D. Ross's position of distinguishing between 
actual and prima facie duty. Ross makes the point that every 
rule has exception, but that there are certain duties which, 
all things being equal, ought always be carried out. Thus, I 
should always, prima facie, keep promises; but it may be that I 
have promised to help a man in a particular enterprise, but I 
now discover that enterprise will culminate in murder. Now all 
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things are not equal: my actual duty would be to break my 
promise and to attempt to frustrate the enterprise. Temple had 
clearly read Ross, but his own definition of distinctions is 
deeper - 'Dr Ross is right to hold that the good to be gained 
by breaking a promise_must be very great before it is right to 
break the promise, but he does not probe deep enough for the 
ground of his conviction. It is not because "a promise is a 
promise" tha t a man mus t keep ita t grea t inconvenience to 
himself and even to others. It is because a promise creates a 
personal claim, and to break it for any reason which the man to 
whom it was made cannot be expected to regardas compelling, is 
to ignore his claim and so 'to flout the sancti ty of his 
personali ty' .142 Temple's point is made on the basis of the 
particular value of persona1i ty. The prima facie duty is to 
the human personality: 'there is no universal rule of action, 
there are universal principles to be applied in action. What 
act is right or wrong may depend on circumstances. But the 
distinction between right and wrong does not depend on 
circumstances, nor does the obligation to do the right,143 So 
the absolute duty is to do right; what that right will be 
dependant on circumstances. Temple believes that this is not a 
very difficult distinction: 
The popular riddle concerning the reconci1ia tion of 
an absolute moral obligation with the variety of 
actual moral codes or conventions did not of itself 
cause very much trouble, for we found that universal 
obligation attaches not to particular judgements of 
conscience but to conscientiousness. What acts are 
right may depend on circumstances, social history and 
context, personal relationships, and a host of other 
considerations. gut there is an absolute obligation 
. b . ht 144 to will whatever on each occaSlon e rlg •.• 
The distinction may be readily comprehensible, but the problem 
of application is complex. Temple is conscious of the 
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temptation to determine the right steps in a particular 
situation by a form of utilitarianism; but he finds this 
impracticable: 'we ••• recognise that this criterion [the view 
that those acts are right which are productive of most good 
•.• ], however sound in principle, is inapplicable on any large 
scale in practice, partly because no one know the whole train 
of consequences that will follow from his action, but partly 
also because it provides no cri terion by which to frame a 
comparative estimate of different kinds of good.,145 
The solution to this problem is 
difficulty, but it is evident that 
is itself creative as we saw 
a matter of intellectual 
for Temple this difficulty 
earlier 146, the lack of 
satisfactoriness we perceive in communities creates the 
'inherent logic' which makes obligation a 'principle of 
progress'. The clue to the solution of the problem of 
application may be found in three ways: through our perception 
of others, through a sense of vocation and through Natural 
Order. Our discussion of the third way will be the subject of 
a subsequent chapter; but it is appropriate to consider 
perception of others and vocation here. 
a) The Moral Value of Others 
That man is a social being has been an intrinsic idea in social 
and political philosophy from the beginning Aristotle 
famously asserts 'man is by nature a social being. ,147 This 
perception was carried into Christian thought, so that it is 
natural for Aquinas to say that 'since man is naturally a 
social animal, as needing for his life many things tha t he 
cannot prepare for himself, consequently he is naturally a part 
of some multitude, from which he receives help in living 
we11.,148 In our own day Wojty1a insists that 'the mark of the 
communal - or social - trait is essentially imprinted on human 
existence itself. ,149 Daniel Maguire believes that moral 
development consists precisely in the growth of society: 'As 
1 7 2 
persons grow and develop in what I have called the foundational 
moral experience, community, something qualitatively better 
than coexistence develops. ,ISO 
Temple is evidently wi thin this tradi tion. We shall consider 
the similarities between his thought and the ideas of Wojtyla 
and Maguire. What is significant, and, I think, of lasting 
importance in Temple, is his abili ty to clothe a tradi tional 
insight with imagination and passion; and to build an important 
edifice upon that insight. 
His starting point is the second form of Kant's Categorical 
Imperative - 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own 
person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, 
never as a means only.,ISI This idea is fundamental to Temple: 
as we shall see, his whole idea of Natural Order is based upon 
the right ordering of means and ends, whether in individual 
action or in the collective actions of societies. 
In Nature, Man and God Temple avers that his wish is to develop 
the idea 'in a more concrete form.' 1S2 His view is clear and 
unambiguous: 
The principle of morality is that we should behave as 
Persons who are members of a Society of Persons - a 
Society in which Personality is itself a valid claim 
of entrance. We are to treat all Persons as Persons, 
and all as fellow-members with us in the Society of 
Persons. Actual duties will depend upon actual 
personal relationship; there is a special duty of 
parent to child and child to parent; there is a 
special relationship between citizens of anyone 
nation; the duty of an Englishman to a Frenchman is 
not to treat him as if he were an Englishman, or as 
if no national distinctions existed, but to recognise 
that devotion to France is as excellent in him as 
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love of England is in an Englishman. In practice, no 
doubt, the main task of each man's moral life is to 
secure that his own self counts for no more with him 
than anyone else's self. The Englishman should be 
loyal to England, not because it is his country, but 
because he is 
it belongs to 
he belongs to 
reached as we 
each narrower 
its citizen - not because in some sense 
him, but because in a far deeper sense 
it. And this stage is the more easily 
follow the sound principle of checking 
loyalty by what is wider. A man cannot 
do much to serve humanity as a whole directly; but he 
can check the narrower loyalty by the wider, so that 
he will serve his family, but not at cost to his 
country, and will serve his country, but not at cost 
to mankind. 153 
Temple was never a narrow nationalist, as the events of his 
life make clear. However, we may note here, particularly in the 
final sentence, Temple's idea of the right ordering of 
priorities - the 
as far as it is 
the parts. The 
key to Natural Order. Knowledge of the whole, 
possible, should lead to true perspective of 
precise nature of our roles is limi ted and 
part we play in socie ty as a whole; and his 
situation defines the moral requirements that are placed upon 
defined by the 
us. 
For this reason, and it is central to the view of ethics we are 
considering, we are obliged to reject any Pharisaic notion that 
ethical propriety lies in strict adherence to this or that 
code: as Temple said, in an earlier work, 'Generalisations, if 
taken as a direct guide to conduct, are the source of all 
manner of evil.,154 He makes the same point in Nature, Man and 
God: 'personal relationships can seldom be precisely 
formulated; and as our actual obligations are such as rise out 
of our actual moral relations they can seldom be represented by 
any formula. For this reason, as well as because in these 
• 
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relationships intuition so far outstrips reflection, it is best 
in action to rely chiefly on the spontaneous reaction of our 
moral nature to the situation confronting us.,155 The justice 
of Temple's point may be recognised by reflection on history 
and society. My objection to many policies in many states lies 
in an objection to the placing of an ethical goal above the 
individual needs of members of the society. Lenin said that 'To 
us morality is subordinated to the interests of the 
prole taria t 's class struggle ••• morali ty is wha t serves to 
destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all the working 
people around the proletariat, which is building up a new, a 
communist society. ,156 That subordination of morality led in 
practice to vast suffering, deaths, and curtailments of freedom 
in the name of the necessary progress of the Soviet Union. In 
other circumstances, failure to direct attention to the needs 
of this person, gua person, has led to the particular horrors 
associated with racialism in many contemporary societies, with 
genocide, and with unreasonable demands made by rulers of those 
governed. The institution of slavery encapsulates the 
philosophy that sees people as economic objects, as things and 
not as persons. There is a tendency in all of us to treat 
particular classes of people as groups to speak of 'the 
poor', 'the blacks' as if they were not a collection of 
suffering individuals. Temple's friend Chesterton drew 
attention to 'the huge modern heresy of altering the human soul 
to fit its conditions, instead of altering human conditions to 
fit the human soul,157, and said that 'all institutions shall 
be judged and damned by whether they have fi t ted the normal 
flesh and spiri t. ,158 This, in characteristically flamboyant 
style, is an expression of the point which Temple more soberly 
makes: 'wha tever is a truly personal good a good which 
resides in a person - takes priori ty over all non-personal 
goods, because morali ty is the discovery or recogni t ions by 
persons of personality on others, to whom by the common 
attribute of personality they are bound in the ties of 
community membership. ,159 
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The directness of Temple's personalism, and its effectiveness 
as a spur to action may be seen by comparison of his principle 
of justice - 'the main task of each man's moral life is to 
secure that his own self counts for no more with him than 
anyone else's self,160 - with that of other philosophers. The 
great Victorian, Henry Sidgwick, formulated his principle of 
justice thus: 'it cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner 
in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the 
ground tha t they are two different individuals, and wi thou t 
there being any difference between the natures or circumstances 
of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for a 
difference of trea tment. ,161, or again, 'the good of anyone 
individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if 
I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other,162. 
Rashdall produced his Axiom of Equity: 'I ought to regard the 
good of one man as of equal intrinsic value with the like good 
of anyone else.' 163 The difference between Temple and other 
philosophers is not that there is anything radically new about 
his theory, but that he has particular insight and imagination 
in its expression. If Temple was a philosopher he was also a 
preacher; his aim was to encourage people to do better. 
Temple significantly linked imagination with ethical behaviour. 
In an earlier chapter I noted this link164 ; speaking of the 
role of imagination, Temple says: 'the apparent good is not only 
that which seems good, but also the good which appears, which 
. h . . t' ,165 Wh t takes shape before the senses or ln t e lmaglna lon. a 
imagination provides is the specific shape of a moral 
circumstance we recall Temple's advice to the drinker 
hesitating before a public house 'I should not say, 
"Indulgence is sure to bring its penalty", but rather, 
"remember your wife and children.",166 This specificity of 
thought is, as we have seen, characteristic - like Brentano, 
Temple holds that to imagine or to think is to think of some 
particular thing: 'without some percept or image I cannot hold 
a concept in my thought.' 167 This provides the clue to our 
1 7 6 
giving equal weight to others: we need to have imaginative 
insight into the other person if we are to serve him: 
••• it will not be possible to treat another human 
being altogether as an end in himself, truly 
considering what is his welfare, unless I have love 
for him in my heart - love in the two forms which it 
must always take: concern for his welfare with desire 
to serve it, and insight into his needs so that I may 
judge wherein his welfare truly consists. 168 
There is precedent for this need for insight within the 
Idealist tradition; especially in the work of Josiah Royce, the 
American Idealist, which was familiar to Temp1e. 169 Royce asks 
the question, 'What then is our neighbour?': 
We find that out by treating him in thought just as 
we do ourselves. What art thou? Thou art now just a 
present state, with its experiences, thoughts and 
desires. But what is thy future Self? Simply future 
states, future experiences, future thoughts and 
desires, that, although not now existing for thee are 
postulated by thee as certain to come, and as in some 
real relation to thy present Self. What then is thy 
neighbour? He too is a mass of states, of 
experiences, thoughts, and desires just as real as 
thou art, no more but yet no less present to thy 
experience now than is thy future Self. He is not 
that face tha t frowns or smiles a t thee, a1 though 
often thou thinkest of him only as that. He is not 
the arm that strikes or defends thee, not the voice 
that speaks to thee, not that machine that gives thee 
when thou movest it with the offer of money. To be 
sure, thou dost often think of him as if he were that 
automaton yonder, that answers thee when thou 
speakest to it. But no, thy neighbour is as actual, 
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as concrete as thou art. Just as thy future is real, 
though not though thine, so thy neighbour is real, 
though his thoughts never are thy thoughts. Dost thou 
believe this? Art thou sure what it means? This is 
for thee the turning-point of thy whole conduct 
towards him. What we now ask of thee is no sentiment , 
no gush of pity, no tremulous weakness of sympathy, 
but a calm, clear insight. 170 
Royce's development of the pOint, in essence the same as 
Temple's, presents clearly both the value and the difficulty of 
attaining what Royce calls 'the moral insight'. It is a block 
to such an insight to assume that my neighbour is just as I am 
- I like this, hate that, think this, feel that; and so must 
he. That is a common fault in human intercourse - it is the 
explanation of much unfairness, as when a person is appointed 
to a post because he shares some background with his 
interviewer: the interviewer's unconscious error is to think, 
'I went to this school and I'm a good chap: he went to this 
school and therefore he must be a good chap.' It is a common 
enough error, perhaps as prevalent as that, already noted, of 
treating whole masses of people as if to say, 'this man is 
black' is sufficient to summarise his sufferings, fears, 
doubts, beliefs, hopes - a Nigerian friend said that the worst 
form of racialism he encountered was that of whi te people 
telling him not what he ought to think, but what he did think. 
This problem is tacitly acknowledged by Royce: 'Just as thy 
future is real, though not thine, so thy neighbour is real, 
though his thoughts never are thy thoughts.' Tha t the other 
person is still inevitably other should not hold us back from 
the realisation that he is as fully human as I am. He has an 
inner life as I have, and just as it is a matter of surprise to 
me when I discover that others' perceptions of me at a given 
time are quite different from the perceptions I recall of 
myself (as for instance when others comment on my calmness in 
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certain circumstances when I was conscious of anger and 
confusion) so it should not be a matter of surprise that my 
perceptions of others are so often at odds with their 
experiences. The essence of moral insight is awareness 
paradoxically - of limitation. That is why Royce calls for 
'calm clear insight', and Temple for 'insight into his needs so 
that I may judge wherein his welfare truly consists.' 
True judgment requires imagination. When we judge the correct 
action for dealing with a person, Temple suggests, we should 
begin with his needs; and experience would indicate that this 
is not simply a matter of stated need. Any schoolteacher, any 
parent, is aware of this distinction; and we know from our own 
experience that we will articulate needs in one way because we 
are inhibited or unable to articulate them in another - we have 
the sense that 'if I 
unacceptable/impossible/make me 
say 
look 
this it 
silly. ' 
will be 
Articulated 
requests are frequently negotiating positions - 'if I ask this, 
I may go some way towards achieving that' - and the word and 
the wish are not identical. Imagination is necessary to 
recognise the possible real needs of the other - to determine 
what it is that he needs. But it is imagination built upon 
certain facts: an awareness of the actual position in which the 
other person may find himself. This cannot be perfectly known: 
but what is known is that part of the other's position is his 
relationship with myself - I am part of his world - and I 
should have some knowledge of relevant information about 
myself. My perspective is not his; but both perspectives 
overlap, and there is a common society in which the two of us 
are bound together. 
Temple is fully conscious of this aspect of moral insight. He 
wishes to demonstrate that it develops only in its relationship 
wi th others. Speaking of love of neighbour, concern for his 
welfare, the desire to serve it and insight into his needs, he 
continues: 
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In our own day we have to see this in a much fuller 
relation than has been customary to this other 
consideration, that personality only comes to itself, 
only becomes what it is capable of being, through its 
development in the reciprocal relationships of 
society. This, of course, has never been denied, but 
it has received comparatively little emphasis until 
la tely in mos t ethical schemes. Indeed the form in 
which these present the matter is, as a rule, that of 
my obligation to recognise that, just as I am I, so 
somebody else is also an I, a centre of consciousness 
and claims. But that puts it wrongly. What has to be 
said is that I am only I in my relationships with 
You, and You are only You, or capable of being called 
an I, in your relationships with Me. It is positively 
in the interaction of embryonic personalities with 
one another that the resultant personality is 
developed. Personality is always a social product; it 
is not something which only has to allow for the 
expression of a similar principle in other beings 
alongside of its own development; it is something 
which can only reach its own full development in its 
intercourse with others similarly developing in that 
intercourse. 171 
Temple here goes beyond Royce. He is at one with much modern 
theology. Comparison with other thinkers is illuminating. Most 
striking is the similarity with Martin Buber, the Jewish 
theologian: 'I become through my rela tion to the Thou; as 1 
become 1, I say Thou. All real living is meeting. fl72 (Whether 
Temple had read Buber I cannot tell. Ich und Du was published 
in Germany in 1923, but not translated into English until 1937. 
Temple wrote Christianity in Thought and Practice in the winter 
of 1935-1936. He met - through his international activities -
most of the leading Protestant theologians of his day, many of 
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whom 
Buber.) 
e.g. H.Richard Neibuhr were deeply influenced by 
The distinction Temple is trying to draw is this: my 
personality is developed only in relationship with others; and 
that relationship can only develop as, and in so far as, I am 
conscious of the fullness of being - have the moral insight -
of others. I move from treating others as depersonalised 
objects if I am aware of the fullness of myself - as Buber 
would put it, if.J:. move from an I-It relationship to I-Thou. 
('Thou' carries the implication of personhood: the 
distinguished and personal second-person singular, like the 
French 'tu'). Temple moves from simple epistemic awareness of 
the other to actual personal involvement; moral awareness leads 
to moral activity. 
Moral activity is the essence of ethics, which is necessarily 
about performance: moral awareness which does not culminate in 
something being done can scarcely be deemed ethical - thinking 
pleasant thoughts is not of itself moral activity, and because 
no moral good flows to persons, it is hard to see that it is 
moral at all. We return to Temple's moral debauchee alone on 
the island. It might be argued that he would be a better person 
by thinking moral rather than immoral thoughts, but it is a 
very limited sort of improvement: a man can think kind 
thoughts, which might encourage him to be kind if circumstances 
allow: but he can only be a kind man by acting kindly, and that 
is only truly possible in the presence of others. He can 
prepare to be kind by mentally rehearsing kind acts - he may 
put himself in the frame of mind for acting kindly - but he 
cannot be kind. It is analogous to the way in which I can 
prepare to play cricket by solitary practice: but I need others 
to play the game. This indicates a limitation on Temple's 
original point: the debauchee can only be moral in the presence 
of others but it does not mean he has license to disport , 
himself precisely as he wishes: for he has (I think) a moral 
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duty to conduct himself so that he may (when circumstances 
change) be of right mind to behave morally. And this state of 
mind can only be created by the use of imagination, by having 
images of others and their needs: for the real people, by 
definition, are not present to the man alone. Right imagining 
is important: if an overheated imagination has conceived of 
people only as objects of lust, then his return to society will 
be a monstrous event. (His 'wrong' imagining consists precisely 
in seeing people as objects for his use, not as persons in 
themselves.) 
Temple's concern 
Maguire, the 
conclusions are 
expressed: 
has recently found echo in the work of Daniel 
American Catholic philosopher. Maguire's 
similar to Temple's, though differently 
Ethics • • • is 
existentially 
centred on persons. Persons 
realised and particularised 
• • • are 
in the 
shaping influences of social and historical reality. 
• •• Personal life, like all life, is a process, a 
personing process ••• Persons are distinguished by 
such things as their capacity to imagine, create, be 
amused, and love benevolently ... The person becomes 
a person and grows in personhood interpersonally. The 
self is the counterpart of other selves. Thinking, 
choosing, and growing cannot take place or be 
understood apart from our sociality. The social 
ambience in which we are formed as persons •.• will 
differ according to culture and will affect different 
individuals differently ... 
• • • 
Tha t is moral which befi ts and enhances the 
humanisation of persons as they are. Persons are in 
some ways unique and importantly different. Therefore 
what befits one may not be right for another, and 
what befits a person now may not be good for that 
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same person later ••• No sensitive ethics will bunch 
disparate persons under one rubric. 173 
For Temple, as for Maguire, each person must be seen 
sensitively in his own circumstances. That is why Temple was so 
insistent on the relativity of ethical judgment, emphasised so 
strongly that 'actual duties ••• depend on actual 
relationship' 174, and why he placed so much stress on the 
notion of vocation. 
b). The Sense of Vocation 
If it is true, as Temple believes, that each person is both 
defined and limited by his fellowship with other men, then it 
follows that he is also ethically circumscribed by his 
relationships with them. Each of us has his own sphere of 
action and his own particular set of moral requirements placed 
upon him. I can do good or ill in various ways: but those ways 
are defined by circumstances. If I live entirely cut off from 
the company of others, I cannot be cruel nor kind. If I have no 
children I can nei ther be a cruel parent nor exercise the 
virtues of being a good father. And all my other duties flow 
from the circumstances of my life. My duties to my employer 
grow out of my relationship with him; so long as I am his 
employee, having promised to work for him, I am, I believe, 
obliged to carry out certain tasks that I contracted to do, 
even at the expense of other charitable possibilities. If I am 
contracted to teach a class on such and such an evening I am 
morally required to do so; even though in doing so I may have 
to refuse to take part in some apparently grander charitable 
enterprise, like collecting money for the Third World. Actual 
moral duty is definable by my circumstances. Temple gives a 
concre te example, referring to a conversa tion he held wi th a 
group of students 'who were in sympathy with the Labour Party 
in domestic politics and were thoroughgoing pacifists in 
foreign politics': 
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Our conversation concerned the latter group of 
problems. They urged that the British Government as 
representing the British people was required by 
Christian principles to prefer the interest of other 
nations because this is the course dictated by love. 
But they had no useful reply when I replied that of 
course they would demand of a Trade Union Committee 
during an industrial dispute that it should prefer 
the employers' interest to that of the workers. 
Obviously this would be a ridiculous demand. If the 
committee acted thus it would be dismissed both 
justly and ignominiously, and men would be elected in 
its place to represent as powerfully as they could 
the cause for which they were trustees. The way of 
love in such a case is not the way of altruism; it is 
the way of reasonable claim and jus t award. Each 
party should state its claim as strongly but also as 
fairly as it can, with determination to accept the 
judgment of the most competent and impartial tribunal 
that can be devised; in other words, the way of love 
lies through justice. 175 
It is clear that Temple rejects any hazy or sentimental 
altruism: if one finds oneself elected a trade union officer, 
there is a specific group of demands which follows. The 
expectation of ones fellows is that of behaving in an 
appropriate manner: and that manner is defined by role, which 
itself is the consequence of specific rela tionship. A 
mediator's task is different from that of a trade union 
official. (We have, in some ways, a throwback to Bradley's 'My 
Station and Its Duties': 'we may take it as an obvious fact 
that in my station my particular duties are prescribed to me, 
and I have them whether I wish to or not •.. here and now ... 
my life has this and that function in this and that case.,176) 
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It may even be the case tha t a duty which appears eVidently 
right may, by circumstances, become wrong. Temple is conscious 
of this dilemma: 
It may be right for a man on whom no one is dependent 
to throw up a lucrative employment in order to work 
in poverty among slum-dwellers. Is it equally right 
for him to do this if he is married? It can only be 
so if then his wife is willing to join in the same 
sacrifice. If both are agreed, it may be a noble act. 
But now suppose that they have an infant child. Is it 
still noble? Is it even permissible? The child cannot 
give consent, and its whole future, even its physical 
health may be jeopardised. A clear divine call may 
override all other considerations; but apart from 
such a call it may safely be said that duty forbids 
to the married man wi th children wha tit might 
require of him if he were unmarried. And the duty of 
the family as a whole is not the same as that of an 
isolated individual. 177 
This is not an academic argument, particularly in the Church of 
England. One of the greatest problems of the nineteenth century 
was the development of industrial slums. It was often difficult 
to find clergy to staff town parishes; clergy were unwilling to 
submit their families to the life involved. 178 Temple's point, 
however, raises the question of the right ordering of demands. 
One frequently has a conflict of demands, created by different 
requirements of different orders: wi thin one communi ty there 
are many sub-communities, of family, work-place, trade union, 
church, nation, and a host of others. It is necessary at times 
to choose between them, and to balance their demands. 
Bradley had 
family, then 
society, and, 
recognised this: 'there are such facts as the 
in a middle posi tion a man's own profession and 
over all, the larger community of the state.,179 
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Bradley followed Hegel in his identification of the particular 
value of the state, with a relativity attaching to its laws. 
That is to say that for a Hegelian, as we have seen, there is a 
particular and, ultimately, unquestionable value in the state 
(see note 135): the state is the moral communi ty. We have 
already seen180 Temple's comments on the limitations of 
considering the particular community of the state; now we must 
take up his suggestions of the priority of types of community, 
for these suggestions contain the basis of a post-Idealist 
doctrine of Natural Order. 
Temple recognises three main types of groupings: each type 
requires close attention. 
(i). 'The natural grouping by family or locality' 'the 
community,181 
The first group contains all the categories envisaged by 
Bradley: it contains 'the local group - village, town, country, 
state, nation,182, and consists of the persons resident in that 
group. They are ' conscious of a common tradi tion, a common 
interest and, to some extent, a common purpose; they are also 
conscious with greater or less vividness of a distinction 
between their own and all other groups. ,183 We should note that 
our participation in the community is inevitable by virtue of 
birth and nurture; it is not a rna t ter of choice, though the 
part we may play in the community certainly is. It is a matter 
of awareness, not will, that we are members of the community. 
For this reason, that adherence requires little intellectual 
effort, its appeal is especially powerful. Temple sees this as 
egoistic, and the cause of narrow nationalism: 
A community ... is inevitably self-regarding. Its 
whole raison d'etre is to be itself ••. the devotion 
on which a community relies in its members is 
devotion to itself, not to any object beyond itself. 
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And the community will display a natural egoism far 
more intense than that of the individual. In 
particular the nation is capable of developing an 
almost overwhelming power of egoistic energy. It has 
a uniquely penetrating hold upon the loyalty of its 
citizens, because it appeals to higher and lower 
nature - to their altruism and egoism - both at once. 
Consequently a whole-hearted response is possible 
wi thout any preliminary conversion ... The natural 
community has by its nature an exorbitant egoism, 
partly because it is the end or goal of its own 
being, partly because its effectiveness 
that end rests upon its appeal to 
in serving 
the self-
assertiveness of its members, while it also gives an 
outlet to their generosity and self-sacrifice; it is 
of its essence self-centred in a supremely high 
degree. The effects of this can only be mitigated if 
the members of the community feel themselves also to 
be members of something wider than itself. 184 
The c.ommunity is natural to us; but it is not the whole answer 
to our needs. It is something of which we may be aware, and 
awareness can be fostered: a state and its politicians can - as 
the Nazis did - foster a perversion of community by emotional 
appeals - through flags, parades and other trappings - to the 
populace. Experience shows that unreflective nationalism is 
readily aroused: an awareness of the community is already there 
in the citizens, almost - as it were - awaiting encouragement. 
(ii). Association 
Unlike our sense of communi ty, which follows simply from the 
fact of our existence as social beings, the sense of 
associa tion requires an act of will. To be a member of an 
association requires a conscious act of determination to join: 
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The second type of group is appropriately designated 
by the term "association". This represents the 
voluntary 
object 
coming together of men for a specific 
the protection of some interest or the 
promotion of some cause. It may develop into a 
company of personal friends, but in itself it is 
limited by its own object and seldom creates much 
consciousness of difference between itself and other 
groups, unless these are concerned to resist it or to 
compete with it. 18S 
There are many organisa tions which fi t Temple's description. 
Any student of industrial relations is conscious of how a trade 
union, for example, is such a voluntary organisation; and it is 
noticeable how the self-consciousness of a union - apart from 
among a handful of activists - only tends to develop when it is 
under pressure. If livelihoods or living standards are 
threatened a previously largely passive group will become 
ac ti ve, and members become aware of their membership. Temple 
gives reasons both for this phenomenon and for the limitations 
of association: 
An association is not of its essence self-regarding. 
Its purpose lies beyond itself. It exists to effect 
something. The aim may be very comprehensive or very 
limited; in either case the devotion on which it can 
count in its members is their devotion not to it, but 
to the object which it exists to serve. l86 
One becomes a member of an association for a particular purpose 
or set of purposes - one may join a political party to attempt 
to bring about the political circumstances under which one 
would wish to live. 
It is noticeable, however, that it is not always possible to 
make a clear distinction between 'community' and 'association': 
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••• some associations tend to pass into communities. The great 
opposing groups of employers and employed are now very nearly 
natural communities, for men find themselves in one or the 
other more by force of circumstance than by choice, and each 
group has developed tradi tions of its own which are valued 
almost as much for their own sake as for their effectiveness in 
producing results.,187 There is a significant point underlying 
Temple's comments. As we shall see when considering Natural 
Order, Temple, particularly towards the end of his career, was 
concerned to stress the significance of the 'right ordering' of 
means and ends: an action exists for an end. Sin and disorder 
occur when means and ends are confused, when means to an end 
become an end in themselves. Thus, for instance, someone may 
join a political party to try to bring about a change in social 
conditions - the collective action of the party is the means to 
tha tend. But it may happen 
forgotten: for that activist 
that the end may come to be 
the good of the Party takes 
precedence over the ends for which the party came into being. 
As a political phenomenon, this valuing of party above its 
purpose has become a commonplace; but the same effect is seen 
when an employee places loyalty to the 
demands loyalty to the organisation) 
organisation (or worse -
above the purposes for 
which the organisation exists. Indeed, this confusion 
and ends disorders the organisa tion and weakens it, 
recently emphasised by R.E.Ewins: 
of means 
a point 
The point of any co-operative enterprise is the 
production of some good. Tha t point, or the common 
aim of the enterprise, properly informs the 
organisation and the rules allocating jobs and 
claims. Insofar as the rules fail to correspond with 
that point, the activity becomes more coercive and 
pointless and less cooperative. Requirements that 
somebody bear burdens unnecessary for the carrying 
out of the enterprise makes that enterprise less co-
operative. 188 
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Any association is open to the ebb and flow of greater or 
lesser commitment; or it may be abused, as when a man JOlns an 
association not for the sake of its purposes but for his own, 
as a man may become a Freemason not to serve the cause of 
universal brotherhood but because he believes that it may 
advance his career. As association is imperfect, though 
necessary, Temple posi ts a higher form of social grouping, 
which he calls 'Fellowship'. 
(iii). Fellowship 
In examining Temple's concept of Fellowship, we pass out of any 
purely political philosophy into theology: 
• • • there is 
the name of 
whose union 
the type of group which alone deserves 
"fellowship". It is a group of people 
with one another is voluntary in the 
sense that it is neither a given natural fact, as 
with the family, nor compulsory as with the criminals 
collected at anyone time in a prison. But it is not 
voluntary in the sense that it is deliberately 
planned by its members; rather they find themselves 
bound to one another by a common response to an ideal 
or to a leader. They have not banded themselves 
together to serve that ideal or to follow that 
leader; but each has made his own response, and 
therein has found himself united to all others who 
have also made it. An "association" formed for the 
promotion of some good cause may grow into this as 
the members rise to a higher level of devotion. But 
the only perfect example of such a "fellowship" is 
the Christian Church ••• It is a true "fellowship" 
••• for its members are bound to one another by their 
partnership in something else, which is that same 
Holy Spirit. 189 
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We are now in the realm of the most altruistic form of grouping 
the most voluntary, and hence the most conscious. It is 
evident that what Temple has in mind is that traditional 
theological concept, the Body of Christ: 'The name of this 
fellowship, which ought ideally to be so close as to constitute 
a single personality, is the Church. ,190 
This fellowship within the Body of Christ has profound 
significance within Temple's non-propositional view of faith, 
the view that the Word of God is not the Bible but Christ 
himself. Nowhere is the connection clearer than in an article 
of 1937: 
• • • the Christian Church, the new Israel . . . is 
cons ti tuted by the Incarna te Word of God, the Word 
spoken in Jesus of Nazareth; and it is itself a part 
of that Word which constitutes it. For the Living 
Word of God is the knowledge of God given to the 
commissioned communi ty, and the fellowship of 
believers is not merely the congregation to which the 
Word is proclaimed, but is, in virtue of its nature 
as fellowship, the proclamation of t~at Word. 19l 
Clearly this fellowship is not merely an ethical or political 
fact: it is the essential condition of Christian life. Temple 
is at pains to stress the reality of his belief: fellowship, 
whether between people or with Christ, is direct: 'The 
fellowship of the Christian with his Lord does not in the 
smallest degree resemble the kind of communication which 
spiritualists believe to be possible between the spirits of the 
departed and ourselves. It is an intimate, personal 
fellowship. ,192 Temple is here entirely consistent with his 
non-proposi tional view , perceiving the world as in communi ty 
wi th Chris t. There remains the central philosophical problem 
that one is placed in the position of accepting and sharing in 
such a view, or rejecting it. Temple believes the issue to be 
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clear-cut: 'I do hold most emphatically that the choice for us 
lies between Christian Theism and ultimate scepticism. And a 
priori I prefer the former ••• ,193 This is an assertion of his 
belief that reason is fundamentally an intuitive thing, built 
out of the way we experience the whole universe: 'Reason is 
essentially a special kind of Intuition - the Intuition of 
Totality or of the Whole and of every fact in its place in the 
Whole. ,194 
This perception of the fundamental nature of fellowship - and 
especially Christian fellowship lies at the heart of Temple's 
ethical and political thought. He stresses the point repeatedly 
- and this rather lengthy exposition of his thought on value in 
communi ty has been necessary to begin to do justice to the 
insistence of this theme, both socially and theologically. In a 
lecture just a year before his death, Temple emphasised the 
significance of the communi ty of religion: 'All the way down 
God has worked through this community of people, not only in 
isolated individual instances but in a social group, because 
the nature of man is fundamentally a social thing and if man is 
to be redeemed it must be a social redemption.,19S In this, as 
in so many other ways, Temple parallels the 'living for 
others', the finding of the Word wi thin the communi ty, so 
passionately embraced by Dietrich Bonhoeffer: 
Who is God? • • • Encounter with Jesus Christ. The 
experience that a transformation of all human life is 
given in the fact that 'Jesus is there only for 
others'. His 'being there for others' is the 
experience of transcendence ••• Our relation to God 
is not a ' religious' rela tionship to the highes t, 
most powerful, and best Being imaginable - that is 
not authentic transcendence - but our relation to God 
is a new life in 'existence for others', through 
participation in the being of Jesus. The 
transcendental is not infinite and unattainable 
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tasks, but the neighbour who is within reach in any 
given situation ••• The Church is the Church only 
when it exists for others ••• The Church must share 
in the secular problems of ordinary life, not 
dominating, but helping and serving. 196 
Bonhoeffer and Temple represent an important strand in modern 
Protestantism. Temple's friend, R.H.Tawney, in Religion and the 
Rise of Capitalism had drawn attention to the effects on 
society of the individualism implicit - and sometimes explicit 
in Protestantism, frequently accompanied by a radical 
separation of authority between Church and secular authorities. 
In their thought, and by the example of their lives, both men 
embody a different orientation towards society; and we are here 
able to discern the theological underpinnings of their views. 
In the Catholic tradition, Wojty1a likewise emphasises the idea 
that transcendence, the outward reaching of the self, is found 
in participation with others: 
It is the person's transcendence in the action when 
the action is being performed "together with others" 
- transcendence which manifests that the person has 
not become a1 together absorbed by social interplay 
and thus "conditioned", but stands out as having 
retained his very own freedom of choice and direction 
- which is the basis as well as the condi tion of 
participation. It also corresponds to the situation 
we emphasise over again, namely, of the integration 
of the person in the action; as we know, the latter 
is a complementary aspect relative to the former. To 
be capable of participation thus indicates that man, 
when he acts together with other men, retains in this 
acting the personalistic value of his own action and 
at the same time shares in the realisation and the 
results of communal acting. Owing to this share, man, 
when he acts together with others, retains everything 
1 9 3 
that results from the communal acting and 
simultaneously brings about - in this very manner -
the personalistic value of his own action •.• 
everything that constitutes the personalistic value 
of the action and the realisation of the 
transcendence and the integration of the person 
contained in it is realised because of acting 
together with others ••• We see now that 
participation is the factor that determines the 
personalistic value of cooperation. The sort of 
cooperation - or more precisely, of acting together 
with others - in which the element of participation 
is missing, deprives the actions of the person with 
their personalistic value. l97 
Wojtyla's comments provide a useful gloss on Temple. He makes 
clear the idea tha t part iCipa tion in fellowship mus t be more 
than merely formal: it is not sufficient simply to act wi th 
others - which necessarily we do through the interdependence of 
society - but we must make a full commitment of self in order 
to realise that self. To participate is to make an act of will, 
that we work for and with others; only thus is self realised. 
There is a special significance for this within the Christian 
community. At face value, it might appear that an eremitic 
existence - like that of a Carthusian or Trappist monk - would 
contradict the participative role demanded by Temple, Wojtyla 
and Bonhoeffer: the most frequent complaint against the 
contemplative life is than it is a withdrawal from the world. 
Wojtyla's view points in another direction. If it is true, as 
he suggests, that participation lies in the self, in the 
commitment of heart and will, and not simply in the performance 
of tasks with others - in the formal act of doing so - it would 
follow, given the Christian belief in the efficacy of prayer, 
that the commitment of heart and mind in the act of devotion 
for the world is both a concrete and true participation (in 
Wojtyla's terms) in human affairs. This is entirely consistent 
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with the actions of vocations directors in monasteries who give 
short shrift to novices who appear to wish to withdraw from the 
world. On this, Wojty1a and Temple are at odds. In The Kingdom 
of God, Temple wrote: 'With all its enormous virtues, the great 
objection to the monastic system appears to me to be this: it 
ignores the fact that you cannot cut yourself from your 
generation and live in it a life which is altogether at 
variance with its prinCiples. If you do, it will be something 
forced and not natural. ,198 
This difference in view is significant: it is perhaps most 
important in the question of the content of the idea of 
participation. It is one thing to talk of the need for 
fellowship and participation, another to give it concrete 
substance. There is in Christian thought a real controversy 
about the nature of this partiCipation. Aquinas says that 
'After God we are obliged by charity to love our neighbour, to 
whom we are bound by special social ties due to our common 
vocation to happiness. What charity obliges us to love in our 
neighbour is this: that together we may attain to 
happiness' .199 It is clear that for Aquinas, the sense of 
community, while inevitable, is not endowed with the totality 
with which if is imbued by Temple: 'man is a naturally 
sociable animal; men even in the state of innoce4nce would have 
lived in society. Social life among many could not exist, 
however, unless someone took the position of authority to 
direct them to the common good. For many people are by their 
very multiplicity interested in a multiplicity of ends, while 
one person is concerned wi th one end.' 200 The tone here is 
very different from that of the three modern churchmen we have 
considered: for 
nature, but the 
Temple hopes to 
legalistic one: 
Aquinas, community is 
community is not the 
see its function 
'it is permitted to 
a fact of our social 
spiritual entity that 
is interpreted as a 
the entire community, 
d 1 to establl' sh a law'. 201 a1 though no t to single indi vi ua s, 
Intense participation in the world, of the type embraced by 
1 95 
Bonhoeffer, is quite alien to the medieval schoolman, who 
stated, 'the marriage bond is to be avoided at all costs by 
those tending to perfection, because this bond entangles a 
person in worldly cares'.1202 
There are here clearly distinct views. On the one hand, we 
have Aquinas emphasising salvation obtained through love of God 
and the duty of charity towards the neighbour, on the other, 
Temple stressing social obligation, and, as we have seen, 
vocation in his specific sense with its echoes of Bradley. the 
concreteness of Temple as opposed perhaps to the more 
individualistic, perhaps, in the pejorative sense, monastic 
view of Aquinas lies in the emphasis203 he gives to the 
individual in his station as bound by the activities of others 
in the community. His participation - like Bonhoeffer's - lies 
in the reali ty of his posi tion in the world. for Temple, 
monasticism cannot be part of that reality as it could be on 
Wojtyla's analysis of participation: for us, the question of 
the content of participation must remain open, but it is 
legitimate to ask whether Temple may not somewhat undervalue 
the extent to which we may properly alter our manner of 
participation, as, for instance, if I choose to alter my life 
to a new pattern, to undertake a new career, even to enter a 
monastery. Perhaps Temple would have emphasised this aspect a 
little more had he had the opportunity to consider the radical 
" " I" t 204 b t "t freedom of choice emphasised by the eX1stent1a 1S s , U 1 
could be argued that for most people such radicalism is never 
embraced: for ordinary men reality is the daily work of lives 
bound willy-nilly by circumstance. 
* * * 
We may conclude our consideration of 
personality by some reflections on how, 
the significance of 
through the route of 
Idealism, Temple had come to a view of the person common to 
many contemporary theologians. We have already seen the 
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similarities with Bonhoeffer and Wojtyla. We may note also 
some comments of Paul Tillich in the autumn of his life: 
Contemporary ethical theory has strongly emphasised 
the person-to-person encounter as the experiential 
root of morali ty. The decisive reason for this is 
the basic difference between the encounter of a 
person wi th another person and his encounter wi th 
nonpersonal realities (Martin Buber's ego-thou as 
opposed to ego-i t) ••• There is, however, a limi t 
here and now in the ego-thou encounter. The limit is 
the other person ••• The acknowledgement of somebody 
as a person remains an external act that can be 
performed with legal detachment or cool objectivity. 
It can achieve justice without creating a 
relationship. Under many conditions this is the only 
way of actualising justice, especially in encounters 
of social groups. But mere objectivity never occurs 
between human beings. Accompanying "pure" detachment 
is always an element of involvement. In the encounter 
of person with person within a community of persons, 
"community" also expresses involvement because it 
implies mutual participation, and, by participation, 
union. And the desire for union of the separa ted 
(which is ultimately re-union) is love. All 
communions are embodiments of love, the urge for 
participation in the other one. Justice is taken 
into love if the acknowledgement of the other person 
as person is not detached but involved. In this way, 
love becomes the ultimate moral principle, including 
d d·· th t· 205 justice an transcen lng lt at e same lme. 
There is nothing here with which Temple would disagree, even to 
the close identification of justice with love: 'it is 
axiomatic that Love should be the predominant Christian 
impulse, and that the primary form of Love is social 
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organisation is Justice,.206 But what is important in 
Tillich's expression of these ideas is the clue provided to the 
question, raised earlier in this chapter, of the is-ought 
dilemma. 
Tillich, like Temple, recognises as fundamental the idea that 
morality is based on the other person. what is significant is 
the realisation that in reality we do treat people in different 
ways. There is a difference between our attitude towards 
personal and non-personal realities. This we know from 
experience. A personal appeal to our charity is more effective 
tha t an impersonal one. If a friend requires help, and I am 
able to give it, I do so: it seems the most natural thing in 
the world, whereas an impersonal appeal in a newspaper 
advertisement has not immediate appeal. The same phenomenon is 
evident to any fund-raiser for chari ty. To make an appeal 
effective it is best to film sufferers directly, to be brought 
into people's homes on television. This is commonplace, and it 
confirms Temple's emphasis on direct appeal, the use of 
imagination and the encounter with 'thou'. but it is necessary 
to take the argument further: and Tillich provides the key when 
he says that 'mere objectivity never occurs between human 
beings,.207 
I have insisted, both in chapter l and in the present chapter 
that the significant point in valuing anything is the valuing 
self: and the common features between members of the community 
that 'this is valuable' (or, more accurately, 'we value this' -
the valuing being a quali ty of the observers) are, I have 
suggested, the basis of useful discourse. I dissent from 
Temple in !Iis attribution of some fixed value within a given 
object, preferring to concentrate on the quality of the 
observer, provided only that the possibility of agreement 
between individuals is borne in mind. 
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A potent clue to the development of this line of reasoning may 
be found in Brentano' s philosophy. In Chapter 3,208 I drew 
attention to Brentano' s emphasis - an echo of which can be 
found in Temple - on 'experiencing as', and the belief that the 
absoluteness of certain values is a fact of our psychology. It 
is now necessary to develop the idea further. 
Brentano believed, as firmly as Temple, in the subject-object 
relationship as the fundamental of philosophical activity. The 
significance of Brentano, the founding father of Phenomenology 
(Edmund Husserl was his pupil), lies in the special analysis of 
the state of mind of the subject. For Brentano, one is never 
simply a detached observer of phenomena. (We may note that 
Brentano argued in the patter part of his career that we are 
presented only with individuals, not propositions or states of 
affairs 209 : this is why Kotarbinski notes tha t 'there is a 
striking similarity between some of the ideas of the old 
philosopher (prentanol and the early ideas of concretism, 
especially those concerned with semantics,.210) Like Temple -
though for different reasons - he rejects any simple Cartesian 
belief in a pure, observing intellect. If there is an act of 
perception there is no neutral perceiver: the perceiver is a 
sentient being, and the act of perception involves in 
Brentano's terms - the primitive emotional experience of love 
or hatred, or as Chisholm more gently expresses it, 'the object 
of presentation is an object of a proemotion or of an 
antiemotion' .211 And from the fact that we experience some 
things favourably and others unfavourably, we develop the sense 
of preference: if I love this and hate that (a primitive 
emotion), I naturally develop the concept that I prefer this to 
that. Preference is a matter of judgment - something which is 
more than a mere desire: 'a man may have a rational preference 
which conflicts with some passionate desire,.212 The 
intellectual side of the concept must be firmly understood, for 
Brentano is not concerned with a simple emotivism. He is 
positive that 'a feeling of compulsion may well be a force that 
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drives us to action, but it is not a sanction that confers 
validity,.2l3 
There is a distinction between feeling and judging. Judgment 
is an intellectual act of decision about the content of our 
original perception. And of judgments we can say, as of any 
significant proposi tion, that they are correct or incorrect. 
Thus if I say I hate the smell of fish, that is a simple 
expression of an emotional reaction: to speak of my statement 
as ' correct' or 'incorrect' (assuming tha t I am known to be 
veracious) is not relevant. But, for Brentano, if I say that I 
ought to do this or that, or that this is 'good', I am making a 
judgment of which it is possible to affirm correctness. From 
this we can derive our notion of the good: 'We call a thing 
good when the love relating to it is correct. In the broadest 
sense of the term, the good is that which is worthy of love, 
that which can be loved with a love that is correct.,2l4 
Brentano holds that the knowledge that a particulat thing is 
good - that we have a duty to behave in a particular way - is a 
matter of self-evidence, not in the sense that a mathematical 
proposition is self-evident, but rather in the fact that it is 
experienced ~ correct 2l5 , in the way noted in Chapter Four. In 
a letter to Oskar Kraus he clarified the distinction: 
"Knowledge is good" is not like the law of 
contradiction; the concepts, just by themselves, do 
not enable us to see that it is a true proposition. 
In this way it differs from the principles of 
mathematics; one can see, from the concepts alone, 
equal to three 
'
for "two plus that two plus one is 
one" is the analytic definition of "three". 
You note, however, that we also know, on the basis of 
concepts alone, that two plus one is necessarily 
equal to three, although the concept of necessity 
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does not lie in the concept of two I What p us one. • •• 
happens in such cases is this: We combine three with 
two plus one by means of a negative copula, and then 
reject this combination apodictically. We are then 
led to concepts such as that of the impossible by 
reflecting on the apodictic judgement. Thus there is 
an experience from which we derive such concepts as 
that of the impossible, and the object of this 
experience is the apodictic judgement. 
It is in this way, then, that we arrive at the 
judgement, "It is necessarily true that two plus one 
is equal to three," despite the fact that the concept 
of "necessarily true" is not included in that of "two 
plus one". And this is quite different from the way 
in which we arrive at a generalisation such as,"It is 
necessarily true that a physical body that is at rest 
will remain at rest unless it is disturbed by some 
other physical body, and that a physical body that is 
in motion will move in a straight line and with a 
unifurm speed unless it is disturbed by some other 
physical body". In the case of mathematical 
judgement, but not in the present case, the apodictic 
judge ment, which provides the occasion for 
abstracting the concept of impossibility, arises out 
of the concepts alone. The ethical case is also 
unlike that of mathematics: the mere concept, 
"knowledge which is not good", does not provide the 
occasion for an apodictic rejection. 
Thus still another experience is needed. The concept 
of knowledge must give rise to an act of love, and 
this love, just because it does arise in this way, is 
experienced as being correct. For a purely 
intellectual being, the thought that "two plus one is 
not equal to three" would be sufficient to give rise 
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to its apodictic rejection; but (supposing for the 
moment, that the concept of the good is given a 
priori) the thought that "Knowledge is not good" 
would not give rise to apodictic rejection. 
But the experience required is analogous to the one 
that we undergo upon contemplating, "It is impossible 
for two and one not to be equal to three". For the 
love that is experienced as being correct also arises 
out of concepts, and it is just because of this fact 
that the love is experienced as being correct. And so 
you are right in saying that this way of arriving at 
a generalisation is quite different from what takes 
place when we make an induction. For where we have an 
induction in the strict and proper sense, as in the 
example above, we have only a probable generalisation 
(in the most favourable case, one that is infinitely 
close to certainty). But in the ethical case, we have 
the absolute certainty of an apodictic judgement. 
And so I think we should protest against calling this 
knowledge empirical - despite the fact that, in order 
to acquire the knowledge, it is necessary to feel and 
experience love. The knowledge that we have here is a 
priori. But when we say that a certain type of 
knowledge is ~ priori, we do gQ! mean to imply that 
the concepts which it involves can be given without 
perception and apperception. What distinguishes the 
present type of ~ priori knowledge from the others is 
the fact that one must perceive and apperceive 
certain acts of love and not merely certain 
. 11 1 .. 216 lnte ectua cognltlons. 
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It is clear that Brentano believes that there are several ways 
in which a thing may be self-evident; but it has to be said 
that nowhere does he fully develop a system for doing so. In 
simple terms however we can say that his method is analogical _ 
in several works he stresses that the method is analogical to 
our sense of self-evidence in other spheres: 'We call something 
good in view of the fact tha t the love directed upon it is 
experienced as being correct, just as we say that an object 
exists if the acknowledgement directed upon it is directly or 
indirectly evident. ,217 The implication of this is, I think, 
that to ask for demonstration of the ethical by the rules of 
formal logic, with its mathematical method, is inappropriate, 
in much the same way that formal logic is inappropriate in 
musical appreciation; or indeed in immediate perception, though 
logic is a tool in the interpretation of perception. Just so, 
it can be a tool in the interpretation of initial moral 
impulse, though it cannot justify the impulse itself, just as 
it cannot justify a primitive perception. I suggest, and I 
think Brentano implies, that the sense of duty is itself, at 
least in part, a natural perception built out of human nature, 
rather than by any logical process. Thus, if I have the feeling 
of love towards someone it is a natural and universal 
inclination to do good for her. It is not that I make a logical 
connection between perceiving her as lovable and determining on 
that basis that I ought to act in an altruistic way towards 
her: my behaviour arises directly out of the way I perceive. To 
experience this person in this way is to behave in this way: my 
behaviour is part of my experiencing her as lovable. Intellect 
may then modify or direct my behaviour; but it is not the 
impulse to it. Where intellect does play a part is in the 
action of seeing that if x is worthy of being treated in this 
way, anyone intrinsically like x ought also to be treated with 
similar consideration. Then I am beginning to construct a 
principle of justice: but the impulse of love which gave rise 
to it is, I believe, 
(to an extent) a 
a primitive and natural one. 
scientific reason for it 
I can give 
based on 
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evolutionary, biological and social evidence but not a 
strictly logical one. Brentano implies the same - of right 
feeling, he says 'the natural pleasure we take is a more 
exal ted form of love, experienced as being right. In 
discovering this love within ourselves we recognise the object 
not only as being loved and lovable,but also~s being worthy of 
love.,218 'Worthy of love' implies that the object ought to~e 
loved. 
If it is true that the process of duty follows not by logical 
procedure but out of a natural impulse, it should not be at all 
surprising if, as Brentano asserts, there is considerable unity 
among men on the basis of ethics. 2l9 This we have already 
considered in an earlier section of the present chapter, with a 
variety of evidence. The distinction which Temple draws between 
impulse and contro1 220 is, in its essence, echoed in the idea 
of Brentano that right thinking is 'exalted' and reflective -
that right action follows most truly when the experience of 
love of an object matches the realisation that to pursue the 
object will lead to an increase in happiness, and is thus a 
proper love. 
Two implications of Brentano's thought, which find parallels in 
Temple, must also be mentioned. The first is that any ethics 
must be, if not an ethics of virtue, at least largely concerned 
with the growth of the se1f221 , and, indeed , Temple devoted 
much of his life's work to the question of moral education and 
the moulding of the self to make right judgments. 
Secondly, we may note that Brentano finds that his theory leads 
naturally to a form of Natural Law position, the view that 'the 
word "natural" may refer to those rules which can be known to 
be correct and binding, in and for themselves, and in virtue of 
their own nature; rules that are "natural" in this sense 
contrast with the arbitrary dictates which those in power may 
happen to lay down.' 222 In the traditional conflict between 
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positive and natural law theorists, Brentano is clearly allied 
with the latter. So too is Temple. 
In considering Temple's view of Natural Order, it will, I hope, 
be possible to draw together the threads of the arguments 
raised thus far; but if one area of reconciliation for these 
arguments lies in the community and in our active participation 
in the right ordering of it, another is in the plenitude of 
God. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
GOD - ABSOLUTE VALUE 
If personality is the highest value, God is the supreme form of 
personality. Temple, in holding this view, is in a significant 
of the idea of religious tradition. Aquinas, writing 
personality, says: 
"Person" refers to that which is most perfect in the 
whole of nature, namely to that which subsists in 
ra t ional na ture. Now, because God's na ture has all 
perfection, and thus every kind of perfection, and 
thus every kind of perfection should be attributed to 
him, it is fitting to use the word "person" to speak 
of God; yet when it is used of God it is not used 
exactly as it is of creatures, but in a higher sense, 
just as is the case with other words naming creatures 
••• the word "person" is not discovered in the text 
of the Old or New Testament as referring to God. Yet 
what this word means is often present in Holy 
Scripture, namely, that his is the peak of self-
existence and most perfect in wisdom ••• Although we 
may not use "person" in its original meaning of God, 
we may extend this acceptably for our present 
purpose. Since famous men were represented in 
comedies and tragedies, the word "person" (persona: 
mask) came to be used to refer to men of high rank. 
In the ecclesiastical world there grew up the habit 
of referring to 'personages' of rank. For this reason 
some theologians define "person" as "a hypos tas i s 
distinguished by dignity". To subsist in rational 
nature is characterised by dignity, and so, as we 
said, every individual with rational nature is spoken 
of as "person". Certainly the dignity of divine 
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nature surpasses every nature, and thus it is 
entirely suitable to speak of God as "person".l 
If we take the analogical use of religious language the 
Thomist idea that when we use words like 'faith', 'love' in 
relation to God, we are using them analogically - we find here 
that Aquinas is reversing his common procedure, but he is 
entirely consistent with the view expressed in his Fourth Way 
of demonstrating the existence of God: 'There is ... a truest 
and best and most noble thing, and so most fully existing. Now 
when many things share some property, whatever most fully 
possesses it causes it inn others. To use Aristotle's example, 
fire, the hottest of all things, causes all other things to be 
hot. There is, therefore, something tha t causes in all other 
things their being, their goodness, and any other perfection 
they possess.,2 Aquinas also stresses the idea that 'God is the 
first exemplar of everything. ,3 
On this view, God himself is the truest and most full 
personality: when we claim personality for ourselves we are not 
taking a human quality and attributing it to god; rather we are 
claiming our creature status, reflecting the creator. 
Such an outlook is entirely consonant with the logic of 
Temple's position. If, as we have seen, personality is for him 
the highest value, we would expect God to be the supreme 
exemplification of that personality. In Nature, Man and God, 
Temple is specific about this: 'the explanation of the world is 
to be sought in ~ Personal Reality,~r ~o ~e.-!.!!e historic 
phrase,~n_a Living God.,4 
The Fourth Way of Aquinas is, I think, 
God. argument for the existence of 
comparability of things a greatest in 
only so can a series be judged. But 
larger than another, I do not need 
a particularly weak 
He deduces from 
the series, which is God: 
if I see two books, one 
to infer an infinitely 
2 1 5 
larger book in order to recognise this as bigger than that: the 
existence of the series itself demands the comparison which I 
as observer make. (1 am inclined to believe that the basis of 
comparison is not in the objects or in a relation subsisting 
between them, but in the perception of the observer: the 
comparison 'exists' because the observer has made it.) The same 
is true of moral judgments: if I perceive this person to be 
more generous than another, it is because I see him perform 
more generous actions than the other. From a given series we do 
not need to infer a first or last term. As we saw in Chapter 
Three, Temple expressed a similar view: 'whether there is in 
fact a lowest and highest term in this scale of finite 
existences, I do not know and do not greatly care.'S 
If we find Aquinas' Fourth Way inadequate, it is clear that by 
recognising the possibility of an infinite series Temple is, he 
believes, cutting himself off from any reliance on a First 
Cause argument. It is interesting to follow Temple's arguments 
for God's existence, because he attempts - not always very 
successfully - to base his view on his non-propositional view 
of revelation; which means a tendency to eschew the traditional 
means of natural theology. A close reading of Nature, Man and 
God reveals a tension. The terms of the Gifford Trust require 
the chosen lecturer to lecture on natural theology - and yet 
Temple implicitly rejects the methods of that school of 
thought. At times in the lectures one is conscious that Temple 
is not fulfilling his terms of reference: Emil Brunner, in a 
let ter to Temple, pOinted out that all his conclusions are 
determined by his Christian faith and that: 
Your 
me a 
what 
which 
conception of natural theology does not seem to 
consistent one. On the one hand, it approaches 
---
I would call Christian Philosophy thought 
does indeed start from the Christian faith, but 
which is abstracted from it in the actual process of 
development and presentation; the Christian faith 
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itself, however, determines the course of thought, 
performing, we might say, a regulative rather than a 
constructive function. 
On the other hand, it seems also intended as true 
natural theology, by which I mean a kind of thought 
which does not even allow the Christian faith a 
regulative influence on the thought process, but 
which comes down simply and solely on the side of 
that power of logical argument which is at anyone's 
disposal, and of the facts, which are accessible to 
anyone. 
Thirdly, you understand by natural theology thought 
which includes in its scope the facts of religion, 
and therefore also of Christianity as well, and which 
consequently, as embracing Christianity, seems to be 
striving towards a kind of synthesis of Christian 
faith with reason. So, for instance, your conception 
of religion is determined a priori by Christian 
fai th, and is deduced from it; the same applies to 
your concepts of sin, love, personality, etc. This 
means, however, that in these passages your natural 
theology is natural only in appearance, while it is 
in truth Christian. In the third and final part of 
your book, your exposi tions are substantially, even 
predominantly, nothing more nor less than Christian 
dogma tics, even though the difference in me thod is 
repeatedly stressed. 6 
I see no reason to dissent from Brunner's view: throughout 
Temple's work one is conscious of the Christian attempting to 
express his views in philosophical terms rather than a more 
strictly philosophical approach - Wojtyla, in The Acting Person 
writes as a philosopher rather than a philosophical churchman: 
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there is no internal evidence of the cardinal, as there is, I 
think, in Temple of the bishop. 
The confusion about natural theology is the consequence of two 
factors: Temple's personal spiritual history and the 
personalism of his philosophical approach. 
We have already noted 7 the confidence which characterises 
Temple's approach to philosophical matters. This habit seems to 
have been natural to him. A revealing letter was written to his 
father, by then Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1899: 
There is a great advantage to Kant's system •.. If we 
consider that Time is a real object, of the nature of 
eternal progress, and then say that God cannot 
change, as we must say, we shall very nearly destroy 
the Personality of our Idea; God will appear to us to 
be a fixed Law, capable of no modification, and if a 
Person at all - then a Person incapable of action; 
for action implies change of some sort, though not 
necessarily of character: and, which is far more 
important, we shall be unable to state with reason 
that prayers can have any effect. But if we abolish 
Time, God's Personality is just like ours; His real 
Essence is unaffected by Time; yet He is revealed to 
our sensibility by actions, representing in phenomena 
the Object of Deity. I think this argument is 
correct, and, if so, it is certainly one of the 
strongest I know in favour of Kant's system. 8 
The most significant point is not the validity of Temple's 
argument, but the habits of mind revealed. The characteristic 
concern with personality is already evident. Kant is judged not 
on his own merits, but by whether his view is consonant with 
Temple's previous religious beliefs. A careful study of 
Temple's life shows that he seems to have had a remarkable lack 
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of self-doubt about his religious beliefs. He doubted certain 
aspects of doctrine - the Bishop of Oxford, in 1906, refused 
him ordination because of his doubts about the Virgin Birth and 
the Bodily Resurrection of Christ - there were none a tall 
about the fundamental correctness of the Christian 
interpretation of life. E.V.Knox noted that even as a boy, 'he 
had a sort of quiet purpose that was recognised ••. Temple 
could accept the rough and tumble, be a butt for mockers, give 
as good as he received, keep a fixed resolve and a simple 
faith. ,9 Dorothy Emmet, who knew him well in the last years of 
his life said that 'we get the impression that he is never very 
seriously puzzled.,IO It is said that the only time Temple was 
unable to answer a question was when he was asked to justify 
his belief in the existence of God. We have seen already Bishop 
Barnes' comment that the young Temple was 'placidly critical', 
and tha t la ter 'a dreadful orthodoxy seems to have enveloped 
him' 11: and Dean Inge felt his approach to be insufficiently 
critical. 12 Temple himself believed that his father's daily 
bible readings made 'natural and spontaneous that whole outlook 
upon life which the Bible expresses. ,13 In Christus Veritas, he 
says that he is 'trying to set out a whole view of the world 
and life as it appears to one mind at least from an avowedly 
Christian standpoint. ,14 That luxury is not formally available 
to him in the terms of the Gifford Trust: yet it seems that 
Temple is most himself when writing as a professed Christian. 
His personalism we have seen repeatedly: for Temple, religion 
is a matter of experience. Natural theology is base on the 
idea, as we saw in Chapter Three15 , that reason can, without 
special revelation, deduce certain truths about God. For a non-
propositional thinker, such as Temple or Karl Barth, it is a 
matter of total experience that the world is perceived in a 
particular way. One does not believe in God or disbelieve in 
him as in an intellectual proposition: one either knows him or 
does not, as one knows or does not know a person. It is thus 
little wonder that Temple strikes many readers as uncertain 
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about natural theology: it requires a habit of mind quite alien 
to him. 
Thus we have to consider his views of the existence of God from 
a special sort of perspective. Conventional neo-Thomist ideas 
have a strong natural theology bias, while Temple is unable to 
follow this path. An evident problem arises. If I say 'I 
experience this in such-and-such a way', it is, as I indicated 
in Chapter Three, in one sense sufficient for for my listener 
to reply, 'Well, I don't'. If my response is that I am 
interpreting 'correctly', and my listener 'incorrectly', I 
raise problems of authentication which seem soluble only by 
traditional philosophical means. Some recent philosophical work 
does appear to offer the opportunity of assessing the possible 
validity of experiential approaches to faith: these comments we 
shall consider while outlining Temple's final arguments for 
God's existence. In doing so, we are, as it were, gathering 
together the threads of arguments already delineated in earlier 
chapters. This reflects Temple's own method: he speaks 
variously of concentric circles and converging lines; for him, 
all experience, whether of intellect, of beauty or of ethical 
concerns, points towards the God of his belief. 
THE FOUR DIALECTICAL TRANSITIONS 
In Nature, Man and God, Temple presents in most detail his 
thoughts on God in a form more complete than elsewhere; it is 
therefore most helpful to concentrate our attention on the 
argument of the Gifford Lectures, not least because they bring 
together many strands of arguments already considered. It is 
within this context that criticisms already outlined in general 
terms should be applied with more specific force, and 
implications more thoroughly developed. Recent developments 
have provided ideas in the philosophy of religion - notably in 
. 16 k · 1 7 L . 18 Sh h d19 the work of SW1nburne , Gas 1n, eW1S, ep er , 
O'Hear20, Smart 21 , Hick 22 , Hubbeling 23 and many others - which 
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enable the recent reader to understand Temple's arguments with 
great clarity, and, I shall suggest, to recognise implications 
of which he seems largely unaware. 
In Nature, Man and God, Temple uses a method which he calls 
'dialectical transition'. I think that we should interpret the 
term 'dialectical' very loosely in this context, stripped of 
its Hegelian connotations. It is wisest to understand it as 
being synonymous wi th 'argument from experience' or perhaps 
'interaction of mind with experience'; put simply, it is 
perhaps no more than an arbitrary label for stages in his 
argument, and should be read as no more than that - it is in no 
way central to his views to burden the idea of 'dialectic' with 
any ideological trappings - as Thomas notes: • .• it may be 
that the idea that his argument consisted of dialectical 
transitions was an afterthought ••• and that the method of the 
theistic argument is dialectical only in the general sense 
employed by Plato.,24 
Temple's argument consists of four 'dialectical transitions' or 
stages. The first transition is an argument developed from the 
scientific picture of the world, and the explanatory power of 
mind. The second transi tion is based on the requirement of 
personal reality as an explanation of value. The third 
transition is based on an attempt to answer the problem of 
evil. The fourth is not really a theistic argument at all: it 
is rather an outline of the need for, and a justification of, 
specific revelation. 
a). The First Dialectical Transition 
Temple believes that the world can only truly be understood in 
terms of mind: we can - at least in outline - explain the world 
in this way; and it is inexplicable on any other criterion. The 
essence of this transition is the search for explanation, which 
should be distinguished from an enquiry into causation: Temple 
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is not covertly introducing a version of the First Cause 
argument - if his argument has predecessors, we should perhaps 
look to Aquinas' Third Way, the argument from contingency25. As 
we shall see, a number of recent philosophers, notably 
Shepherd, have concentrated on the explanatory elements of 
arguments for God. 
In our discussion of Temple's argument, we shall note how 
themes developed earlier recur, notably in connection with 
value and personality. The underlying principle of the argument 
is summarised by Temple thus: 
The ground of the universe, by reference to which the 
universe is explicable or intelligible, must be such 
that it requires no further explanation of itself. 
But all ways of accounting for facts 
in terms of physical laws call 
or occurrences 
for further 
explanation - and that in two ways: they explain what 
is by reference to what was; but this in turn calls 
for explanation by reference to what was before that; 
and the physical law itself is not self-explanatory. 
Why is it so, and not otherwise? 
Now Mind, determined by Good as apprehended, is such 
a principle of explana tion as is required ... When 
Mind, determined by Good as apprehended, initiates 
activity, no further explanation is needed. The 
enquiring mind, confronted with an example of what it 
perfectly understands as the essential characteristic 
of its own being, is completely satisfied. Whenever 
the subject of enquiry is traced to the action of 
intelligently purposive mind, the enquiry is closed; 
d . . f' d 26 Mind has recognised itself an 1S sat1s 1e • 
It is necessary to examine each state of the argument as 
presented in Lectures V and VIII: much is more controversial 
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than Temple perhaps realises. Underlying the argument is much 
reliance on Whi tehead' s process thought: the significance of 
this will become apparent as we progress. 
The argument begins in a lengthy consideration of the nature of 
mind in the world and of the coherence of mind with the world: 
'there is a kinship between Mind and the World, so that we can 
assert of the World a relation of correspondence to Mind as we 
know it in ourselves, and can affirm that our minds rightly 
find themselves at home in the world. ,27 He accepts of this 
kinship that 'it may be urged that this is only natural, for 
the mind is a product of nature and has grown up in intercourse 
with nature in order to guide our nature; consequently nature 
seems to correspond to mind because mind was actually 
constructed in correspondence to nature. Even if that be 
admitted ••• yet the actual kinship remains. ,28 
Is there truly the kinship between the mind and nature that 
Temple stresses throughout his work? Some reflections on 
scientific method could suggest - though not prove - otherwise. 
Suppose that an unmanned probe is being sent to some far-off 
planet to investigate its geological structure. It will land on 
that planet and scoop up rock samples which it will then test. 
The tests will have been programmed on earth. Any test will 
necessarily be experientially based; we know how to test for 
silver or for mercury because we have experience of these 
elements. Our earthly programmers would, I presume, incorporate 
into the probe tests for every known element. Suppose the 
planet has elements hitherto unknown on earth. The tests, 
having no point of reference, could at most tell us that the 
planet contains unknown elements, but their nature would be 
intrinsically unknowable unless sufficient data, and probably 
the elements themselves, could be returned to earth for 
experimental analysis. But it is quite within the bounds of 
possibility that an element might be so minuscule or so diffuse 
that it escaped the sensitivity of the testing machines: in 
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which case we would remain quite unaware of its existence. Th« 
probe is such that it can only test truly what it is designe( 
to test. 
Now, the same may be true of the human self. I receivE 
information from the world through the five senses; but it i~ 
not impossible that there may be something in nature that ] 
cannot in any sensible way detect. Not only would it bE 
impossible for me to detect its existence, but I cannot make 
any assertions about it one way or another: I simply have no 
means of detection. I cannot grow another sense in order to 
detect it; and would be unlikely to develop a machine which 
converts it into data I can receive - as my radio converts 
radio waves into comprehensible form if there is no way by 
which my intellect can become aware of it. (This of course is 
not to say we are necessarily unaware of an unseen s tar by 
deductions from the movements of known stars. I am concerned 
here with the possibility of an entity with no evidences, 
direct or indirect, to our senses.) There may be such things or 
there may not: in principle it would be unknowable, and that 
unknowableness surely rules out more than a provisional 
assertion of a coherence or kinship between our minds and the 
universe. 
Again, an evolutionist might argue that a particular 
development of senses might be the consequence of evolutionary 
factors: the human race has developed such senses in such a way 
as are needed to survive. We know that our senses are not the 
same as those of other creatures: bats and dogs have hearing 
abilities to detect sounds to which we are deaf. Further, it 
may be argued that it is an evolutionary necessity to develop 
our perceptions in an orderly way, to perceive them as ordered 
and coherent: if we did not, we should not long survive. But we 
would need only such coherence as would be sufficient for 
survival, and, it may be urged, such coherence as would enable 
us to feel 'a t home' in the world. For psychic survival, we 
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need to feel a sense of kinship with the world, just as we need 
for physical survival a sense of danger. But we have to be 
aware tha t feeling a sense of kinship is not the same as 
actually being akin: a feeling 'that our minds rightly find 
themselves at home in the world', even if universally true of 
humanity, which may be doubted, may not be justified. That 
something 'feels right' does not make it so; something we must 
bear in mind in Temple's several appeals to a sense of 
satisfactoriness. 
The first part of the argument concerns the kinship of world 
and mind, of subject and object. The second involves the 
explanatory power of mind. Temple notes that any complete 
explanation of the world process must incorporate an account of 
the phenomenon of mind: 'our minds discover themselves to be 
occurrences within, and forming part of, the process with which 
they recognise kinship, so that a full account of the process 
must account for them along with the rest, and a full 
explanation of the process must explain how they come to be 
part of it. ,29 
He rejects the notion that there can be a material explanation 
for the emergence. His reasoning is interesting, and depends 
ultimately on experience: 'as far as our experience goes, 
matter does not generate thought, nor does thought generate 
matter.,30 His appeal is to our experience of the phenomenon of 
explanation we naturally have the requirement for 
explanation: it is part of our experience that we want answers, 
and answers that satisfy us as complete. In our experience of 
matter, 'there is no known principle that is self-explanatory; 
of every principle or systematisation of experience it is 
d h · ?,31 possible to ask - Why is it thus an not ot erW1se. 
Temple's rejection of material explanations is very brief. He 
considers the Epicurean thesis in less than a paragraph: 
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At one period a certain school of philosophers would 
have been content to answer that in infinite time 
every permutation and combination of the ultimate 
particles of matter is bound to occur, and this is 
the one that is occurring now. I am not satisfied 
that such a view expresses a sound logic of 
probability; but it is scarcely worth while to 
discuss that point, because the argument in question 
ignores and contradicts the essential principle of 
the organism. An organism is not a mere collection 
of juxtaposed particles or cells. Its nature is 
determined by its principle of unity; and this also 
determines the organisms that proceed from it. 
Consequen tly of the whole organic world - whe ther 
that be the entire universe or not - we are bound to 
say, with Whitehead, 
"The evolution of history can be rationalised by the 
consideration of the determination of successors by 
antecedents. But, on the other hand, the evolution 
of history is incapable of rationalisation (~ that 
means), because it exhibits a selected flux of 
participating forms. No reason, internal to history, 
can be assigned why that flux of forms, rather than 
another flux, should have been illustrated.,,32 
This is an interesting passage. The dismissal of the Epicurean 
thesis omits a critical stage of the original argument, which 
is that if any permutation of finite particles moving in 
infinite time represents a stable order, at some time that 
stable order must occur. NOW, such an order would be bound to 
have the appearance of unity within its organisms - such is the 
nature of stability - and that would be why there is this 'flux 
of forms' rather than that. That stable order would, if it 
could happen, occur. 
Temple's reasons for 
It would have been interesting to read 
believing tha t the Epicurean logic of 
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probabili ty is unsound: but nowhere in his work does he 
explain his thinking. In the absence of such an explanation, 
it seems an inevi table conclusion tha t the Epicurean thesis 
cannot be dismissed so lightly; and despite Temple's dismissal 
of the argument as if it were an ancient notion which some 
philosophers once held, it is very much a live thesis. O'Hear 
believes tha t 'Hume' s Epicurean account of the presence of 
order in the world ••• cannot be lightly dismissed by the 
theist,33 The significant point is that the thesis provides an 
alternative account of how (apparent) order could occur ('once 
••• granted that there could be active and reactive primary 
elements in nature' 34), without reference to a guiding mind. 
Indeed, even among theists, the emergence of mind has been 
explained in terms of evolution. Temple's assertion that 'in 
fact all attempts to trace in evolution an explanation of the 
emergence of mind have totally failed' ,35 is, I think, a 
characteristic overstatement. Teilhard de Chard in attempts 
evolutionary explanation of the rise of consciousness through 
his 'Law of Complexity-Consciousness,.36 While it is outside 
our scope to consider the range of evolutionary explanations 
offered for the emergence of mind, one implication of Temple's 
position needs to be examined. 
If we assume that there is no possible natural explanation of 
the emergence of mind, we are led to a number of difficul t 
conclusions. If all a ttempts to explain this emergence are 
doomed to fail, we would be obliged to infer that there was, at 
a particular point in evolution, an intervention by something 
capable of giving consciousness to crude matter. This thing we 
might describe as God: but however we describe it, we should 
be obliged to suspend our normal methods of scientific enquiry, 
at least at that point. such intervention would, I think, 
create a radical difficulty for theology. In the first place, 
the requirement of a non-material being would create an 
undermining of human free-will as asserted by Christians. For 
all other matters we can provide either a natural or a theistic 
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explanation; it would b odd to have one circumstance in which 
God could not maintain the epistemic distance from the world 
that seems essential to the notion of faith as an uncompelled, 
free response to him. Secondly, to imply that there must be 
such an intervention would be a limi tation on the alleged 
omnipotence of God, for it would seem that he was unable to 
create primal matter of such kind that consciousness could 
emerge out of it. And if it is possible to create primal 
matter of such kind that consciousness could emerge out of it, 
it would - in principle - be possible by examination of all 
aspects of that matter to detect that manner of that emergence. 
A further point arises out of Temple's ideas at this point. In 
summarising his argument, he asserts: 
We have followed the guidance of "modern knowledge" 
so as to see Mind first as something which occurs in, 
or emerges out of, the whole evolutionary process of 
the universe; and our willingness to see Mind as one 
element in Nature has led - not to Naturalism - but 
to a fresh perception that if Nature (containing 
Mind) is to be explained at all, it is Mind that can 
alone supply the explanation. The more completely ~ 
include Mind wi thin Na ture , the more inexplicable 
must Nature become except hY reference to Mind. If 
Nature is only a whirling mass of protons and 
electrons, that gyration might intelligibly go on for 
ever, and at some point in its endless permutations 
would present us with the physical universe of 
contemporary experience. Such a universe might exist 
apart from any Immanent or Transcendent Mind or 
Spirit. But if, as science has disclosed, Mind is 
part of Nature, then Nature (to contain such a part) 
must be grounded in Mind. 
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In short, the more we identify ourselves with the 
rest of the natural order, the more are we compelled 
to assert the reality of a supernatural Creator.37 
Leaving to one side the question of whether nature must be 
grounded in mind, we should recognise an underlying assumption 
that the universe is ultimately explicable. It must be said 
that the issue which divides theist and atheist is, ultimately, 
a disagreement about final explanation. The atheist asserts, 
and the theist denies, that the fact of matter is indeed 
inexplicable - a brute fact. It may be added tha t somewhere 
there is a first fact, either God alone or matter alone: 
theist and atheist begin at different first points the 
atheist's position is, given the fact of matter, to investigate 
how it works. To Temple's comments on the inexplicabili ty of 
nature except by mind, the atheist would say that the evidence 
of mind is too slight to be convincing, and the whole simply is 
ultimately inexplicable. Nor is this an incoherent position: 
it could be argued that in any investigation, something is just 
- has to be - taken as a datum, whether the fact of mind (the 
Cartesian beginning), the existence of objects, the validity of 
a law of nature. Indeed, if we did not accept as a datum a 
starting point, we would make no progress. It is not, by 
extension, an unreasonable or unparalleled procedure to take 
brute matter as a first and irreducible first principle if, as 
the atheist asserts, evidence for going behind that first 
principle is ei ther too slim, or - as some believe - too 
incoherent to be credible. Temple's assertion that the whole 
is explicable is unlikely to convince anyone who believes that 
it is not; the question of where investigation begins, the 
point at which we have to say we must be satisfied, remains 
open. 
Temple is in no doubt that the starting-point is personal 
explanation. He believed throughout his career that only 
personal explanation was self-explanatory: in The Kingdom of 
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God, he reflects Bradley's notion of 'Absolute Reality': 'it 
is not in any kind of sense self-explanatory, because there is 
only one thing in our experience which is self-explanatory, and 
that is a purpose with which we can sympathise'. 38 In Mens 
Creatrix, he says: 
Mind does accept as final an explanation in terms of 
Purpose and Will; for this (and, so far as our 
experience goes, 
final causation. 
paint?" "Because 
this alone) combines efficient and 
"Why is this canvas covered wi th 
I painted it." "Why did you do 
that?" "Because I hoped to create a thing of beauty 
for the delight of myself and others." If, then, we 
find any ground for saying the world is the product 
of an Infinite Will, created for the sake of its 
Value, the intellect, which could not from any 
consideration of i ts ~ procedure reach any such 
result, will none the less accept this doctrine as 
altogether agreeable to itself. 39 
The same point is developed in Christus Veritas: 
••• if we ask for an explanation of the Universe as a 
whole we are bound to formulate the answer in terms 
of Will ••• there I would only submit that there is 
in our experience one, and only one, self-explanatory 
prinCiple - namely, Purpose or Will. No doubt, if 
anyone can believe in a purpose with no will behind 
it, we should have to say "Purpose" only, leaving 
"Will" as a precarious inference; but as it appears 
that Purpose and Will are terms that mutually imply 
each other, we may speak of ei ther indifferently. 
There is a "problem of evil", but there is not in the 
same sense any problem of good. When we find as the 
cause of any phenomenon an intelligent will which 
chose to cause that phenomenon to occur, we raise no 
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further questions, unless we fail to see how that 
will came to seek this occurrence as good. We may be 
puzzled by the way a man exercises choice; but our 
problem here is not, as a rule, a problem of 
efficient causation. when we sympathise, we are not 
puzzled. If I say of anyone "I cannot understand 
acting like that", I do not mean that I cannot give a 
psychological analysis of the motives of the action; 
I mean that I cannot imagine myself doing it. When 
in the causal regress we arrive at a will, the 
regress is at an end, and to understand means, not to 
gi ve a causal explana tion, 
have reached an ultimate 
but to sympathise. 
term. And when we 
We 
do 
sympathise, our mind raises no more questions. The 
only explanation of the Universe that would really 
explain it, in the sense of providing to the question 
why it exists an answer that raises no further 
question, would be the demonstration that it is the 
creation of a Will which in the creative act seeks an 
intelligible good. But that is Theism. 40 
In Nature, Man and God, Temple refers to this idea yet again: 
• •• when we turn from the world as apprehended by 
Mind to Mind which apprehends the World, we find 
among its 
explanatory 
Intelligent 
functions 
the 
Choice. 
a principle 
principle of 
which is self-
Purpose or of 
This is an ultimate principle of 
explanation. When we find that the position of a 
given set of material objects is due to their having 
been arranged with a view to facilitating the 
accomplishment of some intelligible purpose, our 
minds are satisfied. That a plank should lie across 
a stream may call for much explanation if no human 
beings have ever placed it there; but if men laid it 
across to form a bridge, so that they could cross 
231 
over dry-shod, no further explanation is needed. 
Purpose is a self-explanatory principle ..• 4l 
The notion that personal explanation is ultimate is one that is 
clearly fundamental to the whole of Temple's thought, and 
entirely consistent with his non-propositional approach. If 
religious life is encounter with a person - if God is to us a 
person then the evidence of his existence will be the 
evidence of a person. 
The question of the value of personal explanation has, in 
recent years, been discussed by Swinburne, Shepherd, and 
O'Hear, among others. Swinburne takes a view very similar to 
that of Temple - 'I conclude ••• that personal explanation is 
sui generis, and is not reducible to scientific explanation ... 
personal explanation explains, whether or not it involves or is 
backed by scientific explanation,42 - even though I can find no 
evidence that Swinburne is familiar with Temple's thought. The 
advantage of studying Swinburne, in the present context, is 
that he attempts to give a deeper analysis of what personal 
explanation involves. 
For SWinburne, personal 
occurrence of an event E 
explanation applies when 'the 
is explained as brought about by a 
rational agent or person P, having the intention J to bring 
about E.,43 This definition is significant, for it enables us 
to distinguish the features of personal explanation. 
Particularly important is the emphasis on intention, which I 
shall consider shortly: for the moment, we should consider that 
- for Swinburne at least - it would not be sufficient to say -
as Temple may appear to do that if we know someone did 
something intentionally, we are satisfied. To know that an act 
is performed intentionally is not to explain it: we merely 
learn something further about the act - 'E is not explained 
merely by our being told that P intentionally brought it about. 
We need to know how P was in a position to bring it about, how 
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it was that P's intentions were efficacious. ,44 We also need to 
know why P had that intention. 
We may now pick up the threads of certain arguments firs t 
outlined in Chapter Three. There I suggested that the non-
proposi tional view contained an underlying problem, which is 
that to say 'Who are you?' implies a further question, 'What 
are you?', for to receive the answer 'I'm X, asks the further 
question, 'Who is that?', or 
case, the question 'Why did 
'Wha t are you?' In the presen t 
this event happen?' or 'Why is 
of affairs?' is not, I think, there such-and-such state 
sa tisfactorily answered simply by saying, 'I did it', or, as 
Swinburne's initial definition demands, 'I did it and I had the 
intention to do it', or more colloquially but in this case most 
relevantly, 'I did it on purpose.' When an event is 
particularly inexplicable, or apparently so, the instinct is to 
say 'What did you do that for?' NOW, that question does not 
imply that the person who acted did so without reason, only 
that the reason is invisible to us. 
In relation to the central questions of theism, the request for 
information is particularly significant. It is, I think, simply 
not true that 'when we do sympathise, our mind raises no more 
questions. In purely material matters, Temple's answer to the 
plank across the stream is fairly satisfactory: one might 
quibble on detail - why choose to put the plank here? why use a 
plank and not another material? but essentially one is 
content. I am not so convinced about the painting. One is 
surely led to ask a host of further questions, about subject-
matter why was this subject chosen? style, technique, 
colour and so on. And the art-critic is not content to be told 
that the artist did as he did to create beauty: he asks why, 
examining motivation, experience, influences, and a host of 
psychological questions. 
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If this is true, then how much more so will be the posi tion 
with God. If we infer God as explicans of the universe, it is 
insufficien t to say that we encounter a purposive mind, and 
therefore we can be satisfied. The positing of God opens a new 
range of questions - why did he create this universe and not 
another? , if he is a necessary being, why did he crea te a 
contingent universe: why should he need to? and if it was not 
necessary that he should, why did he bother? - more complex and 
more intangible than those about the painter. Indeed, it is 
part of the philosophical problem of seeing God in terms of 
Ultimate Explanation that it seems to require all manner of 
further explanation. 
Dorothy Emmet provides an interesting clue to the dilemma in 
some remarks about Buber's Ich und Du: 
A good deal has been written . . . about Buber's 
distinction between "primary word" signified by the 
expression "I-Thou", and the "primary word" signified 
by the expression "I-it". In the relation "I-it" we 
have the subject's relation to objects apprehended as 
existing contiguously in time and space, and bounding 
one another. In the relation "I-thou" we are 
conscious of being confronted by another centre of 
experience. We cannot include the "Thou" merely as an 
object within our own experience; we must respect it 
as an independent centre of experience from which the 
world is apprehended from a perspective which is not 
our perspective. 45 
If we are to pick up hints from this, we are bound to say that 
the underlying suggestion is that, by virtue of being an 
'independent centre6 of experience, God (or any other such 
centre) is ultimately mysterious, just as the inner life of 
another is a t heart closed to us. We may re turn to Royce's 
insight, mentioned in the last chapter, that the heart of 
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ethics lies in the realisation of the actuality of one's 
neighbour: though 'his thoughts are never thy thoughts.' We 
need the insight of the other, but the insight is imaginative 
and inferential - I realise in my own life what it is to be a 
centre of consciousness, and can infer tha t there would be a 
similarity of capacity - of capabilities of perception - in the 
other person, though the content of that consciousness is 
largely to closed to me. I infer the similarities by 
observation of behaviour and statements, but that observation 
at times brings into sharp focus that there are real 
differences of outlook. Ethics - in part at least - requires a 
concern for the welfare of others, awareness that they feel in 
particular ways, respect for the differences from ourselves. 
Thus, the experience of the other person is forever the 
experience of otherness, which can be understood only 
imaginatively and inferentially. Paradoxically, the fact of 
personal relationship is to be aware of the separateness of the 
other, just as a long-married couple know that there remains an 
inner mystery in each, and full understanding is never wholly 
achieved. 
Perhaps, therefore, when interpreting Temple we should rephrase 
his arguments to say that when we have reached the point of the 
inference of personal explanation, it is not that we are 
satisfied, but that we are unable to progress much further: we 
have reached an essentially unknowable mystery: we cannot know 
it, because we are unable to occupy tha t cen tre of 
consciousness which is not ours. we do - in truth - still ask 
questions, but are aware that we are unable to progress 
further. 
This reading opens up areas for thought: for if God is 
variously described as First Cause or Ultimate Explanation, it 
is not that no further questions can be asked, but that it 
becomes impossible, on a personal thesis, to hope for answers. 
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There is something unsatisfactory about this, for what we have 
found is a stopping-point in enquiry, with the inevitable 
question of why we should stop here and not elsewhere. 
O'Hear has indicated dissatisfaction with Swinburne's use of 
personal agency as a stopping-point, for reasons similar to 
those I gave earlier about Temple: 'his belief that personal 
explanation is the most natural stopping-place for explanation 
is not likely to be accepted by everyone, where God's decision 
to crea te is being taken as a basic datum not to be further 
explained. Is postulating an inscrutable act of will as the 
ultimate brute fact any more natural than postulating some 
facts about rna t ter as no further explicable?' 46 The theis t, 
Shepherd, comments that personal explanation 'may be adequate 
within its own terms, but the continued existence of purposing 
selves remains unexplained in these terms. ,47 
Further significant objections are raised by O'Hear which are 
directly relevant to Temple, most significantly that 'All the 
knowledge we have of personal agency is of fini te, embodied 
agents, whereas the theistic hypothesis postulates an infinite, 
disembodied agent, who brings things about in the world just by 
willing them, a willing which appears to have no further 
explanation. ,48 The most we are able to say is that in looking 
for personal explanation in the universe we find something like 
the kinds of things we find when, in ordinary experience, we 
are aware of the actions of personal agency: in other words, 
our argument is one from analogy, or, more exactly, from a 
model. It is not necessarily that the model is mistaken, or 
that analogical argument is illegitimate. Dorothy Emmet has 
argued powerfully for the value of analogous thinking in 
metaphysics, relating this to scientific models 49 ; but she is 
aware - as we should be - of the limitations of this form of 
argument, that it should be constantly checked against 
experience to see that the model is legitimate. On this matter, 
O'Hear would argue that it is not - the data are too various 
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and contradictory for certainty. The argument is rather similar 
to that employed against the Design Argument. Just as the world 
may in certain respects appear designed, like Paley's watch, so 
in others it appears na tural alone - like a cabbage - which 
takes us no nearer to the inference of a designer. We may 
interpret the evidence either way. So too with explanation. (I 
suspect that a personal explanation argument is closer to a 
design argument than Temple - with his antipathy to natural 
theology - would care to admi t). But in this case, in the 
inference of personal explana tion, there are addi t ional 
problems. Precisely because, unl ike the human agents of the 
model, God is disembodied and thus personal agency must 
function in a different way from that of human purpose 
questions arise about the operation of his explanatory power; 
and if this operation requires explanation itself, it is 
difficult to say with certainty that personal agency is 
sufficient explanation in itself. 
In Temple's case this problem of the model applies with 
particular force. In Chapter Three, we noted tha t he uses 
'mind' and 'Mind' in many different ways, throughout his works. 
Thomas attempts to tease out the variety of meanings: 
• • • 
there is considerable confusion in the Gifford 
Lectures in the use of the terms "mind" and "Mind". 
These two terms seem to be used almost 
interchangeably with the following meanings: the 
complete generic sense including animal, human and 
divine mind, a generic sense including human and 
divine mind, the human mind as a class, the human 
mind as a particular (singular and plural), the 
animal mind as a class, the animal mind as a 
particular (singular and plural) , individual minds 
both animal and human, divine mind in a generic 
. 1 50 
sense, and the divine mind as a part1cu ar ••• 
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and he continues by listing other sources of confusion. Much of 
the time, the variety of meanings is insignificant, because 
context makes clear the meaning; but in the case of this 
dialectical transition, 
apparent in this passage: 
the confusion is crucial. It is 
We find that the Process is akin to Mind1 , that MindZ 
arises in the course of it, and that Mind3 does 
exhibit what is essentially the thing required - a 
self-explanatory principle of origination. It is then 
more reasonable to test the hypothesis that Mind4 
contains the explanation of the World-Process than to 
refuse to test it. 51 (my subscripts) 
Here there are distinct uses of 'Mind'. 'Mind1 ' appears to9 be 
human mind, the known (individual?) experience of which 
provides a pattern or model for further enquiry. 'MindZ ' would 
seem to be the phenomenon of mental activity in the world. 
'Mind3 ' is perhaps almost the same as 'Mind1 ': Temple is, I 
think, saying that 'our known minds provide the paradigm cases 
of a self-explanatory explanation', but it could be argued that 
it is nearer to Mind Z' the phenomenon of mind. But that raises 
significant problems: our earlier comments on the nature of 
other minds would indicate that significant knowledge of other 
minds is inferential only, which would mean that particular 
care should be taken in any attempt to infer the whole nature 
of (collective) mental activity. Mind4 is presumably divine 
mind. 
The significance of the confusion is twofold. Firstly, there is 
a veiling of important difference: the reader is inclined to 
assume synonymy which does not necessarily exist - differences 
between divine and human mind are ellided; and yet we have seen 
from 0 'Hear's comments that there are real differences to be 
explained. Temple is glossing over them - perhaps he still 
felt, as he did in 1899, that 'God's Personality is just like 
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ours', and tnat there is no need to keep a division between the 
two ideas. For Temple, this may be insignificant; but it would 
not necessarily be so to a cri tic. Secondly, if Temple is 
attempting to construct an argument by analogy, to provide a 
model - and the use of 'akin' implies that he is - it is 
fundamental to the construction of that model that the meaning 
of words within that model should be clear. If I say of 
something that it is rather like something else, I need to 
specify common and uncommon features with precision: only thus 
is it possible to judge how far and in what ways the model 
holds, and only thus is it possible to prevent illegitimate 
inference from the model. Temple, by lack of clarity about both 
the model and tha t to which it refers, opens the door to 
uncertainty and confusion - it is difficult to agree that mind 
is of this or that kind if we do not know the precise sort of 
mind we are considering. Temple's own comments are not 
altogether helpful: 
In so far as God and man are spiri tual they are of 
one kind; in so far as God and rational, they are of 
one kind. But in so far as God creates, redeems and 
sanctifies while man is created, redeemed and 
sanctified, they are of two kinds. God is not 
creature; man is not creator. God is not redeemed 
sinner; man is not redeemer from sin. At this point 
the Otherness is complete. 52 
He says that in spirit and reason, man and God are of one kind; 
but it is not clear how this is possible if one is created and 
the other creator: spiritual and rational dimensions will be 
different; and it is that kind of difference, here unexplored 
by Temple, which must be considered in the construction of any 
model. 
* * * 
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Certain of Temple's further arguments in this dialectical 
transition require comment, in particular those concerned with 
time and value. 
We noted, in Temple's letter to his father, an attempt to 
justify the timelessness of God. In Chapter Three, we saw that 
Temple holds tha t the self is non-material and tha t Temple 
holds that the self is non-material and that mental time is not 
coincident with successiveness in objects. In Nature, Man and 
God, he attempts, on the basis of the phenomenon of mind, to 
demonstrate the timelessness of the mind of God. 
His argument is, in essence, a simple one, derived from the 
fact of God's omniscience. He argues that our own minds provide 
a basis for the idea of timelessness, that mental time is for 
us unified: 
•.. "present" experience is apprehended as continuous 
with the "past" out of which it arises. The "present" 
is never the mathematical point at which past and 
future meet; that concept is a fruit of abstraction. 
The present is so much of the empirical process as is 
immediately apprehended. This is far more than the 
passing sense-impression of 
which is apprehended as 
impression. And this may be 
stretch of duration. 53 
the moment. It is 
continuous with 
an indefinitely 
all 
that 
long 
His claim is that mind has the experience of timeless 
perception. He points to our experience of a great play or work 
of art: when we watch it we are aware of successiveness of the 
scenes, but it is as a whole that we appreciate Hamlet: 
Art gives us, in a selected and deliberately ordered 
portion of experience, an illustration of what might 
be extended over the whole of it if our faculties 
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were sufficiently developed. In every act of 
sensation there is 1 d a rea y memory of its first 
instant, and when memory alone retains the sense-
perception, it may still be "present" if its 
continuity with sensation is not only conceptually 
thought but organically felt. It is where the whole 
organic or personal being is involved, as the great 
dramatist goes far to involve it, that the "present" 
is extended to cover a great stretch of what to 
indifferent observation is "past". In other words, 
only Love is qualified to view the world sub specie 
aeternitatis. S4 
What we have, most clearly in the case of a great play, is a 
glimpse of what it is to have the experience of eternal 'now'. 
Whether Temple is correct I doubt. 
Recent philosophers have paid much attention to the question of 
the timelessness of God: and the question of timelessness is, 
in some ways, related to that of immutability. Aquinas argues 
tha t a thing 'lacking change and never varying its mode 0 f 
existence will not display a before and after,S5 and hence, in 
being immutable is necessarily timeless. Swinburne points out 
that 'a totally immutable thing could just go on existing 
forever wi thout being timeless - especially if other things, 
such as the universe, changed, while the immutable thing 
continued changeless. The change of other things would measure 
the passage of time during which the immutable thing changed 
not.,S6 Shepherd is even more forceful, arguing that if God is 
I , 'h t l't ,57 I creator, 'Creativity ..• is corre atlve Wlt empora 1 y. n 
Chapter Three, I noted tha t Kotarbinski held tha t time is 
onomatoidal, a derivation from the existence of objects; time 
is a way of expressing 'existing somewhat': to exist is to have 
some duration. On such a notion of time, 'God exists timelessly' 
is, as I think, a radically incoherent notion: either he 
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exists, and hence has duration, or he does not: the having of 
duration seems to me intrinsic to the idea of existence. 
The reason why Temple wishes to maintain his idea of the 
timelessness of God is evident: 'The mind is distressed by the 
apparent transitoriness of all things. Arising out of flux, and 
itself in origin an episode of the flux out of which it arises, 
mind declares i ts ~ na ture 12Y. demanding permanence.' 58 I 
think that he is confused here. (We may leave to one side the 
dubious inference that because mind demands something that that 
thing exists to meet the demand; though it is consonant with 
his underlying belief that the mind is a model of the structure 
of the universe.) If we are distressed by the transitoriness of 
all things, what distresses is not that things are located in 
time, but that all things in our direct experience are subject 
to change and decay: and the permanence that we demand is not 
freedom from time, but freedom from decay. God is generally 
seen as free from decay: the false inference underlying the 
claim of 'timelessness' is drawn from the unspoken assumption 
that 'time decays' rather than the more exact 'all known 
objects with time decay' - it is the objects which decay, not 
'time' as some mysterious agent which decays them. 
It is, I think, to preserve the concept of God from any notion 
that he can decay that many philosophers - Temple among them -
have tried to remove God from the idea that he is in any sense 
temporal. They have tried - I think - to assert tha t he is 
timeless to maintain the idea of his perfection; if he were 
somehow forced to be wi thin the temporal process, then there 
appears to be a limitation on his power. This is, I suggest, 
mistaken. If we interpret time as Kotarbinski suggests, the 
problem disappears: if being in time is logically intrinsic to 
the idea of existence then it is not to impute imperfection to 
God to say that he cannot perform the logically impossible by 
existing outside time; Aquinas - among many others - points out 
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that it is no limitation on God's power to say that he cannot 
perform the logically impossible. 
If we examine Temple more closely, however, we find that his 
argument would prove something less than the timelessness of 
God: it would - if valid - demonstrate only that he is capable 
of perceiving all things at once; the perceiving mind - if it 
exists - would, I have suggested, remain temporal by the act of 
existing. I am not convinced that it is even possible to 
demonstrate even this very limited notion of 'timelessness'. 
The fact that I can perceive a play or a symphony as a whole, 
in retrospect, does not mean that I perceive it timelessly: I 
continue to exist 'in time', and there is a successiveness in 
my perception, not strictly synchronous with the successiveness 
of objects in the world in the way that the actual three hours 
of the play or hour of the symphony will be, but certainly of 
longer duration than a single instant. I may rearrange time in 
memory, but I cannot thereby either take memory outside time 
nor remove some sense of duration from my recollections. Temple 
seems to be giving a poetic use of 'time' a positive 
ontological status which is not sustainable. 
A further problem arises if we consider Temple's not ion tha t 
mind is purposive; as we have seen, this is central to his idea 
of the explanatory power of mind. It is difficult to conceive 
of any definition of purpose devoid of temporal significance. 
In ordinary usage, to say we have a purpose is to mean that we 
wish to bring about a particular state of affairs; once it is 
achieved, we no longer have tha t particular purpose. If one 
were timeless, one would both have a purpose and have it 
achieved; simul taneously one would have the purpose and not 
have it - which is contradictory. Purpose is, on any ordinary 
usage, rooted in time - and there is no evidence that Temple 
wishes to give it a special technical meaning in relation to 
God: as we have seen, he believes that there is a real 
similarity between God's personality and ours. 
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We may note that a temporal vision of God is not inconsistent 
with Christian belief: Swinburne comments that the 'doctrine of 
divine timelessness is very little in evidence before 
Augustine. The Old Testament certainly shows no sign of it. For 
the Old Testament writers ••• God does now this now that" now , , 
destroys Jerusalem, now lets the exiles return home. The same 
applies in general for the New Testament writers •.• ,59 Tillich 
believes that a God outside time is lifeless; Teilhard de 
Chardin clearly assumes a temporal movement of God between 
Alpha and Omega points. Today, the novels of the American 
theologian Andrew M.Greeley portray a loving God deeply 
involved in the time-process. I cannot see that a Christian 
needs to uphold God's timelessness for reverence or worship: 
eternity of God matters, but the manner of that eternity would 
not. 
Though Temple makes this question of timelessness part of this 
dialectical transition - through the activity of mind seeking 
permanence - I do not think the general thrust of his argument 
for the explanatory power is damaged by its omission. It may be 
seen perhaps as an interesting relic of his enthusiasm for Kant 
which he showed in his youth, and his abiding love of Plato; 
but the logic 
direction. 
of much of his philosophy points in another 
* * * 
The place of value in this dialectical transi tion parallels 
that of mind. If physical facts cannot account for mind, they 
are unable to explain value: 'Starting from the physical end 
we can never account for Mind; and Value shares its precarious 
lot' .60 In Chapter Four, we saw how value is for Temple a 
source of an argument for God, and there is no need to rehearse 
the points made in that chapter, beyond the comment that I made 
that it is not indubitable that value is objective: indeed, it 
is on this matter of the objectivity of value that I am most 
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inclined to quarrel with Temple. The question here, however, 
is not whether one side or the other in this debate is correct , 
but rather that the fact that there is a genuine disagreement 
on the objectivity of values rules out as finally convincing 
any argument based on that premise: as Hubbeling comments, 
'The kind of existence of values is different. They refer to 
states of affairs in an ideal world of which we may wish that 
they were present in our world •.• thus I believe it is wrong 
to ascribe ontological status tot the moral postulates or, in 
other words, to hold that they imply certain states of affairs 
in reali ty, i. e. in this our world. They may imply certain 
states of affairs in an ideal world; but does this ideal world 
exist?,61 Hubbeling, if correct, is asserting that to build an 
argument on value as objective would require the proving of 
many subsidiary hypotheses even before we can take value as 
first premise in a theistic argument. Temple's argument at 
this point may lend possible support to the notion of God for 
someone of neo-Platonist beliefs; but in the face of a 
multiplicity of beliefs about values, it is unconvincing. 
* * * 
In Chapter Four, I noted that the attempt to argue the 
existence of God in terms of ultimate Explanation of mind and 
value is a concealed form of traditional argument. As we have 
seen, he rejected a First Cause argument throughout his career: 
in Chapter Three, we saw his comment that it is quite 
impossible to imagine an infinite regress but •.• not 
impossible to conceive it'. That was in Mens Creatrix. Other 
comments elsewhere he makes the same4 point: in The Nature of 
Personality, he says, ••• I cannot see why the world should 
ever have begun at all. God is its Creator, not because He 
made it at a moment of time, but because from all eternity to 
all eternity it depends upon the Will of God.,62 He clarifies 
the idea in @The Faith and Modern Thought: 'For the life of me 
I cannot understand why it should not have gone on forever. I 
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see no reason why you should suddenly introduce a First Cause 
in that chain of reasoning backwards that is carried on in the 
natural sciences.' 63 This is an appeal to a principle of 
economy, but, as 
themselves omit 
continuing cause 
Explaining-Being' 
I noted in Chapter Three, many neo-Thomists 
the First Cause, seeing God rather as 
or ultimate explanation the 'Cosmos-
of Ninian Smart. 64 Smart believes that it is 
wiser to speak in terms of explanation than of cause; he claims 
that 'explanation' is a more flexible notion that causation. 
Shepherd65 develops the idea further, basing wha t he calls a 
'soft' cosmological argument from the uni versali ty of our 
experience of inference - on a belief that an explanation is 
needed for the continued existence of the universe. He 
maintains that to define the cause of anything is not 
altogether to explain it - causal explanation does not account 
for the continued existence of the phenomenon. We should note, 
however, that Shepherd believes that explanation in terms of 
purpose is open to the same objection as one in terms of cause: 
'My contention ••• is that though causal explanation of anyone 
thing may be adequate to account for it causally, it is 
inadequate to account for it completely, and that is true of 
any causal or indeed theoretical explanation of anything in the 
world ••• And so too with regard to purposive explanation. 
This may be adequate within its own terms, but the continued 
existence of purposing selves remains unexplained in these 
terms,.66 
Part of the problem of an argument built on cause is that cause 
is a temporal notion. Tha t 'X caused Y' does not in any way 
enable us to infer that X has had any continued existence: 
often a cause will disappear in the coming into being of the 
event. A Christian proof of God, as opposed to a proof of 
First Cause, requires the continued existence of God; and this 
cannot be deduced from a First Cause argument. But, as 
to requ1're an explanation for how it Shepherd implies, we seem 
is that the world exists. The search for explanation is a 
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search for a timeless (in the sense of being sufficient for all 
moments) ground of existence. By' ground' we mean something 
more than 'cause': there is the idea of both 'sustaining 
power' and 'explanation'. 
Based on this search for explanation, Hubbeling produces an 
interesting formulation of the Cosmological Argument, which 
would answer Temple's objections to the First Cause Argument, 
for it is based on explanation and includes within itself the 
possibili ty of an infini te series. 
(his Variant II) is: 
Hubbeling's formulation 
(1) There is at least one contingent being. 
(2) This contingent being finds its ground in something 
else. 
(3) The ground of this contingent being is either an 
infinite series of contingent beings or it is a 
necessary being. 
(4) An infinite series of contingent being demands for 
its existence a ground which cannot itself be 
contingent. 
Therefore: 
(5) There must be an ens necessarium, i.e. a necessary 
being. 67 
Hubbeling produces a number of 'proofs' of this formulation 
based on modal logic68 , in a variety of logical languages, but 
he recognises that any systematic proof is based on the premise 
that 'There are states of affairs which have necessarily a 
certain ground, i.e. that in all worlds in which fx occurs also 
b, its ground, occurs'. 69 This may be questioned, but he 
believes that support can be given to his formulations by the 
use of set and lattice theory. 
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He presupposes the a In simple terms, his argument is this. 
priori principle '~nihilo nihil fit,.7l He is arguing that a 
linear causal chain is insufficiently explanatory. In one 
sense this is fairly evident - Hubbeling gives the example of 
our finding the cause of a child in its parents, adding that we 
need a second-order cause of the fact that two parents produce 
a human being - the cause of the causation: 
In this way we acquire the following argument: W 
presuppose that the set of states in this woSrld 
toge ther wi th the relation 'to find its ground in' 
(and this is a translation of the principle 'ex 
nihilo nihil fit') constitutes an ordered set. This 
ordered set is a directed set by which we mean the 
following: If there are two states of affairs within 
the set, say A and B, and A does not find its ground 
in B nor B in A, then there is a third state of 
affairs, say C, which is the ground of both A and B 
(there might of course be intermediate grounds 
between C and A/B) ••• Now this whole set of states 
of affairs, which is ordered by the relation 'to find 
its ground in', has an infinite number of subsets 
ordered by this same relation. And each of these 
ordered subsets again has an infinite number of 
states of affairs as its elements, so that in spite 
of our assumption that the set is a directed set, we 
are far from arriving at a last element .•. 
But now we make another assumption, viz. that there 
are subsets of the same type. ~uch a subset is for 
example the subset characterized by the relation 
'being generated': 
parents, who are 
a child is generated by his 
themselves generated by their 
parents, and so on ••• 
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possible to recognise We now presuppose that it is 
types of ordered subsets. All generations of 
children by their parents constitute one type of 
subset. All kinds of things causing heat constitute 
another type, all kinds of magnetic attraction 
another, and so on. In this way we can make a 
partition within the whole set of states of affairs 
ordered by the relation 'to find its ground in'. We 
thus get a number of subsets characterized by a 
certain type of ground-consequence relation. Now the 
fundamental idea of my reconstruction of the 
cosmological argument is that this number of subsets 
is not infini te, in other works, there is only a 
limited number of types of grounds. 
Once more we seek the ground of these subsets. By 
doing so we apply the principle '~ nihilo nihil fit' 
in a multiple way. That is, we say that the relation 
'to find its ground in' is not only applicable within 
the various subsets, but also to the subsets as a 
whole ••• So this set of subsets is again a directed 
and ordered set and because this directed set has a 
limited number of elements (the elements are here the 
subsets, each of different type) this set has a last 
element according to modern set and lattice theory 
••• Thus we arrive at a last element and this element 
is a ground that we might interpret as God. 72 
The particular advantage of Hubbeling's formulation is that it 
reveals clearly the underlying premises os any such argument, 
in particular the wide application of the principle '~ nihilo 
nihil fi t ' • The value of our excursion into Hubbeling is 
twofold: Firstly that it is, despite Temple's doubts, 
apparently possible to recast traditional cosmological 
arguments in a way that meets Temple's objection to the 
original, simple notion of First Cause; and secondly, that if 
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this is so, and such formulations are available, it is possible 
to construct an outline for Natural Theology. I think that in 
the Gifford Lectures Temple is struggling towards this 
position, but in a rather uncertain way. 
* * * 
This struggle takes us to the heart of the difficulty of any 
assessment of William Temple as philosopher - he is radically 
torn between the demands of theology and those of philosophy; 
and I am not convinced that the two are ever reconciled. Early 
in this chapter, we noted Brunner's comments indicating a 
tension wi thin the Gifford Lectures, and earlier saw Barth's 
refusal to deliver the lectures because of his disavowal of 
natural theology. 
Temple was, by habi t, a synthesiser. Part of his enormous 
success as a churchman, not least within the ecumenical 
movement, was his ability to synthesise widely differing 
viewpoints in a single work. He was much in demand as a writer 
of reports and chairman of committees. Critics might say that 
his talent was for 'papering over the cracks', but there was a 
solid legacy of genuine achievement in the endurance of the 
World Council of Churches, and, I think, his most significant 
memorial, the development of the ecumenical Church of South 
India.IItIThis habit of synthesising is very apparent in the 
philosophical writings, in the initial attempts, in Mens 
Creatrix especially, to marry an Idealist approach with 
Christianity, followed by the attempt to reconcile that 
resulting philosophy wi th Process thought in Nature, Man and 
God. In the next chapter, we shall see how he draws on 
different strands in social thought, combining various 
contemporary ideas, to form a continuous whole. 
I think that this cast of mind applies in his thought in 
philosophy and theology: it is as if he is trying to combine 
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the anti-philosophical bias so evident in the work of Brunner 
and Barth with the influence of his own philosophical 
upbringing. Caird was described by Professor MacCunn as 'a man 
f h i · ,73 b o co erent conv ct10ns , y which he meant tha t Caird had 
the habit of attempting to reconcile very different 
philosophical positions. Shortly before his own death, Temple 
referred to his own 'temperamental disposition, fortified by 
the fact that my master in logic was Edward Caird, to start 
from the assumption that every conviction strongly held is at 
least partly true, and that, as a rule, our wisdom is to find 
out, if we can, where this partial truth fits into the whole 
fabric. ,74 The derivation from Hegelianism is evident, but what 
is particularly interesting is the underlying assumption that 
we should look for the truth in a given viewpoint as a first 
action, rather than - as many of us would - to examine it to 
find out what's wrong with it. There is, of course, a problem 
with Temple's method. The obvious point is that two statements 
are not necessarily compatible, nor partly true. Some men hold 
passionately that the earth is roughly spheroid, others that it 
is distinctly flat. Now, it is not the case that each is partly 
correct; one is right and one is wrong, or each is wrong. Is 
any compromise possible? At first it appears not, but 
reflection might provide one. Each might accept the proposition 
'For the practical purposes of daily life it is possible to 
treat the earth as fla t', or, 'A builder constructing a house 
treats the world as flat'. Two evident points follow. A degree 
of co-operative action is possible - a 'round-earth' builder 
could follow the instructions of a 'flat-earth' architect; they 
could live together with their differences. In such a way, two 
people from different religious traditions can cooperate in 
particular areas of life. The value of this pragmatic 
compromise can be enormous as a social cement much of 
Temple's practical achievement rests on this; but it remains a 
matter of real difference whether the earth is indeed round or 
flat. In certain contexts, it is of purely theoretical concern, 
and can be ignored (though its truth-value remains unaltered); 
251 
but in others, the actual truth of the matter has real factual 
consequences. The danger inherent in the synthetic method is 
that the synthesiser may try to achieve his synthesis by 
concentrating on the 'true' but trivial aspects of each 
position, and ignoring the real questions underneath. (This 
point is very similar to one made by critics of the ecumenical 
movement.) 
It is this problem that seems to underlie the tension between 
writing about natural theology as explanatory and, at the same 
time, trying to reject its methods. To rule out a First Cause 
argument is not, as Temple perhaps imagines, to eschew all 
natural theology: I have suggested that arguments from 
contingency or inference remain live possibilities. What Temple 
is trying to do, I think, is to emphasise the personalism of 
his views: that as his God is personal, he must be known as a 
person - by personal encounter. Hence the emphasis on 'personal 
qualities', such as personal explanation and purpose. In this 
he is close to Barth and some existentialist theologians like 
Bultmann. (I shall explore the idea of encounter a little more 
fully in the last section of this chapter, though it underlies 
much of it.) But his emphasis may disguise certain other 
significant points. If we see the universe in terms of purpose, 
we will wish to seek evidence of that purpose; and purpose, by 
definition, is teleological - purpose is necessarily directed 
to some end. And if tha t is so, we are pointing towards a 
design argument, one of the most traditional of all natural 
theology arguments. There is, I suggest, no significant 
difference between 'the Purposer purposes' and 'the Designer 
designs' from the point of view of creation. The difference of 
language may conceal, but does not remove, the uni ty of the 
underlying concepts. 
One of the traditional objections to the Design Argument (the 
same would apply in terms of purpose) is that, even if correct, 
it wouldn't prove very much. From the results of design we can 
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infer only a limi ted amount about the designer. If I can see 
only one pan of a pair of scales , if the pan is in the air I 
can infer only that whatever is in the other pan is heavier. I 
have no evidence of how much heavier, or what it is. From the 
existence of the world I may infer only - at most - a designer 
able to design it, which is not at all necessarily the all-
loving, omnipotent eternal God - the truly personal God - of 
Temple's Christian belief. 
To infer such a God, other evidence is needed, most 
significantly for the personal reality Temple claims. 
b.) The Second Dialectical Transition 
The second dialectical transition is designed to take us beyond 
the concept of God as 'Purposive Mind' specifically to God as 
person: it emphasises the personality of God - an important 
step for Temple on the way to the culmination of his argument 
in the personal revelation called for in his fourth transition. 
In considering the present concept, it will be necessary to 
attempt to determine whether it is indeed possible to see 'God 
as personality as a coherent concept; we are thus taking up as 
a question the idea which underlies Temple's stress on the 
centrality of personality which was developed earlier in 
largely human terms, and considering the view of Aquinas cited 
at the beginning of the present chapter. It will also be 
necessary, I think, to modify certain views of the nature of 
God as we have already done in considering the concept of 
timelessness: the full significance of this may become apparent 
in the next section. 
Temple briefly summarises his argument for personality: 
Willingly to believe what is suspected to be false is 
fel t to be not only ~ degradation of the credulous 
---
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believer's personali ty, bu t ~n offence agains t the 
order of reality. This feeling-1s guite unreasonable 
if the order of reality is ~ brute fact and nothing 
else;~t-1s only justifiable-lf the order~f reality 
is the expression of ~ personal mind, for the sense 
--
of moral obligation towards Truth is of that guality 
which is only appropriate in connection with personal 
claims. 75 
Of this view, he says: 'I must confess that I know no way of 
arguing this last point, to which, none the less, I a t tach 
great importance. It is an intuitional judgement.,76 In fact, 
Temple's point is an experiential one: he tries to develop his 
view on the basis of how we experience the sense of truth, that 
in feeling a sense of obligation in our search for truth, or 
when confronted by truth, we are aware of a personal quality in 
the universe: 
The exalted language used about Truth and its 
sanctity perplexes those who think of it as a quality 
attaching to isolated bits of information. If I say 
"The sun shone all day in Glasgow on February 24, 
1933", that statement, that statement, though 
admittedly improbable, is either true or false. But 
in neither case has it any sanctity. If I am mistaken 
about it, that does not greatly matter. To say it 
while knowing it to be false would be wrong, because 
to deceive people is to outrage their personali ty; 
but we are here concerned, not with saying what is 
thought, but with thinking what is true; and there is 
no sanctity in correct information about particulars, 
nor any calamity in being misinformed, unless this 
leads to calamitous action. Yet there is a sense in 
II " 77 which Truth is august and compe 1ng. 
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At this stage of demonstration, we may note the Platonic 
influence of 'Truth' as something 'august and compelling'. I 
think that this is an hypostasis - I am unable to see that 
'Truth' has any significance. Temple uses the word, with its 
tell-tale capital letter, as if it signified something in 
itself, as if it had ontological status. There is in Temple _ 
partly under the influence of his avowed Platonism, partly from 
the Idealism of his youth a tendency to Realism, in the 
medieval sense. He is given to assuming that there is 
'something' which is 'Truth', as many philosophers, most 
evidently Plato, have done: he assumes that there is a 
universal, Truth, which somehow exists. It was to the medievals 
a matter of real debate whether universals really exist 
('Realism') or are purely abstractions, forms of words 
('Nominalism'). Some modern philosophers, including Russel1 78 , 
have at various times held that universals have some 
ontological status (though Russell refers to them as 
'subsisting' to distinguish them from 'existing' objects). It 
is not necessary here to develop the debate if we can 
reformulate Temple's position without any reference to this 
peculiar 'Truth'. I believe such a reformulation is necessary 
because it is easy to be distracted by a philosophical debate 
not readily settled. 79 It is therefore perhaps wisest to recast 
his argument in terms of our sense of personal concern or 
dignity in truth-telling. In place of a doubtful and at least 
semi-abstract 'Truth', we posit two less dubitable categories 
of entity, ourselves and the objects about which we formulate 
propositions. These propositions either reflect accurately the 
objects about which they are formulated, or they do not; and 
because it is - as Brentano so notably pointed out - that we 
are not passive observers, but rather creatures so formed that 
we always take an attitude towards the objects of our 
perception80 , we feel a sense of shame of' ha tred' (in 
Brentano's terminology) towards ourselves. It is to this 
sense of shame that I think Temple is alluding; and his 
argument can, without particular damage, be recast without 
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reference to a doubtful ontological category of 'Truth'. For if 
we have this sense of shame about constructing consciously 
false propositions, it could be argued that we are so made that 
we have this shamefulness because God made us to have a 
personal view of the world, to treat it in a personal way. But 
- and this recasting reveals the flaw in Temple's position - it 
could equally be argued that the sense of shame is not that we 
are conscious tha t we are in the face of 'Truth', but tha t, 
because we always have a posi tion of 'love' or 'ha te' in our 
relations with the objects of our perceptions, with the images 
in our minds, we feel that somehow when consciously 
untruthful we are denigrating ourselves. And as we are 
personal we are indeed outraging personali ty: but the 
personali ty is ours. I f this is indeed the case, we are no 
further forward in our attempt to find personality in the 
universe. To this we may add the further consideration that if 
Brentano is correct in his judgment that we see the world never 
wholly neutrally, that we colour it by the preferences and 
antipathies of our own personality, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose (there is a long philosophical tradition for this 
position) that we may see it as personal, not because it is so, 
but because we see it so: we experience it as'personal because 
we are persons. 
For these reasons one is obliged to reject the second 
transition as finally unconvincing: we must, like Temple, see 
it as at most a possible interpretation. But to do this, we are 
bound to consider the question of the coherence of the notion 
that God is a personality, and whether it is possible to find 
significance in Aquinas' idea, cited in the first words of this 
chapter, that God is the only true personality. 
* * * 
At first sight, the idea is a very difficult one. In a recent 
lecture on Descartes, John Cottingham asserted of the Cartesian 
256 
observer, 'what does the thinking is a person, and a person is, 
necessarily, something with a body.,81 Now, in any conventional 
sense, we are confronted wi th a dilemma. If Cot t ingham is 
correct - for the moment it would be wise to suspend judgment _ 
a 'timeless', spiritual, traditional God cannot be a 'person' 
in any normal use of words. In a way, we must accept that in 
humans, the self is expressed through bodily activity; or 
perhaps more accurately, the 'self' is the sum of bodily 
activity (I include mental activity within this description). 
There is - as Wojtyla would agree - only the 'acting person' as 
a psychosomatic unity: and only through action is there 
personality - the composite being is the only agency of it. The 
only direct experience of purposive action that we are certain 
of, and which is indubitable to all humans (some people claim 
awareness of spiritual agency, but this experience is not 
shared by all, and is doubted by many), is that of human 
action. In relation to God, perhaps the phenomenon most 
difficult to imagine is how the immutable, spiritual, eternally 
contemplating God could perform the activity of creation; how 
activity is possible without apparent means. To assert that God 
is omnipotent, and that all things are possible to him, is 
certainly to beg the question. (I have always felt this problem 
to be a greater obstacle to belief than the problem to be a 
greater obstacle to belief than the problem of evil: as we 
shall see, Temple thought otherwise). It could be retorted that 
the whole notion of creation ex nihilo is unimaginable - we 
have no experience of it, yet the fact it is unimaginable does 
not rule it out as impossible; for the central dilemma remains 
that things do exist, and if we rule out the creator as 
unimaginable and inexplicable, we are left even so wi th an 
inexplicable brute fact. It is this 'inexplicable brute fact' 
that Temple wishes to avoid; and only personal explanation 
seems to do that, at the cost of gaps within our conception of 
that explanation. It is not quite the same as saying, 'this 
artefact was made by an electric press, but I have no idea how 
an electric press works'; it is rather, 'this artefact was made 
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by an electric press, though I have never seen one, have no 
idea how it works, nor do I think anyone else has ever come 
across one, either.' The position of the believer is that, 
absurd though it may seem, he believes something like this of 
his God; and the atheist believes that to think such a thing is 
simply absurd. 
But in Christianity, it is - at least superficially - possible 
to point to real personality in God, in Christ. It is a 
commonplace of Chris tian thought tha t the believer knows his 
God only through God-made-man in Christ. John Hick has 
suggested that only in the incarnation may sense be made of 
certain theological and ethical ideas: 
In Christianity, God is known as "the God and Father 
of our Lord Jesus Christ". He is defined as the Being 
about whom Jesus taught; the Being in relation to 
whom he lived, and into a relationship with whom he 
brought his disciples; the Being whose agape toward 
men was seen on earth in the life of Jesus. In short, 
God is the transcendent Creator who is held to have 
revealed himself in Christ. Jesus' teaching about the 
Father is accordingly accepted as a part of that 
self-disclosure, and it is from this teaching 
(together with that of the prophets who preceded him) 
that Christianity professes to derive its knowledge 
of God's transcendent being. Only God himself can 
know his own infinite nature; and our human belief 
about that nature is based, according to 
Christianity, upon his self-revelation in Christ. 82 
The question of transcendence is particularly significant. This 
is the heart of the Christian mystery: if God has revealed 
himself in Christ, the evident question is how. If Christ is 
fully human (and hence, as far as anyone may be, a fully 
integrated person) it is difficult to see how, at the same 
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time, he can be equally and wholly the personality of God, even 
one distilled in human terms. A non-propositional view of faith 
is not as helpful as it might appear. Bonhoeffer's question 
'Who are You?' becomes complex in the light of so difficult a 
personality, and difficult to separate from 'What is He?' The 
quest for the historical Jesus has proved difficult; and 
knowledge of his personality is difficult. Torrance has 
commented: 'Jesus will always prove intractably enigmatic, 
indeed an impossible subject for plastic representation of any 
kind, precisely because He is a Subject who by His very nature 
resists being subjected to what we deem to be observable or 
being interpreted exclusively in terms of cosmic 
perceptibility. ,83 For Torrance, knowing Jesus is not a matter 
of perception, but of 'audition,84; one must listen to his 
word, 'because in Him we hear a Word from beyond, the eternal 
Word of God from beyond the observable, a Word which, while it 
is made flesh at this end, yet recedes into the eternity of God 
at the other end. ,85 Whether this takes us much further forward 
may be doubted: rather the question of the enigma is 
emphasised; we can, as it were, hope only to grasp one 'end' of 
the personality of Christ, and from that deduce where it might 
lead. It might be said that of any other person, we know only 
that part of the personali ty which is exposed to us: we may 
make deductions about other aspects, predictions about future 
behaviour, but we remain aware that we see only an aspect of 
personality: we know that the experiences of others are 
different. I like someone, in consequence of one set of 
experiences as filtered through the particular stance of my 
personality: another will dislike the person, for his 
experiences and personality are different. But while in 
relation to Christ, it may be a false hope to expect to know 
the whole of his personality, there is, nonetheless, the 
special claim made of him that his person has a special God-Man 
character; and if I am to accept tha t claim, it doe s seem 
necessary to have some idea of the special kind of person 
involved. 
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This question has been raised by the distinguished Catholic 
theologian, Walter Kasper, and related specifically to the 
problem of seeing Christ as an integrated personality. Kasper 
confronts the whole concept of person, and, in common with many 
modern thinkers, refers to the idea of any person as an open 
system (in the terminology of systems thinkers who believe that 
any individual may be seen as - rarely - a 'closed system', o~ 
- more commonly - an 'open system', 'open', that is, to the 
influence of the whole environment, on which we are dependent 
and which shapes the options we may take and the resources open 
to us). According to Kasper, there is, in a sense, something in 
common between every believer and Christ himself, a personality 
shaped by being open to God. Of course, Christ's personality is 
that much more open than that of the ordinary Christian - what 
Kasper is pointing to is the idea that we are in error if we 
think of our personalities as an entirely without a dimension 
which Christ has. An imaginative leap is possible: I cannot bat 
like Sir Donald Bradman, but I can bat a little I can 
conceive of, though I could not imagine myself so doing, 
batting in that superlative way. This is an example of analogy, 
in the Thomist sense, based on the relative senses of 
understanding. Kasper is worth quoting at length, because he 
casts particular light on the discussion of Temple: 
The traditional concept of the person ••• is still 
abstract; in the concrete, a person is only 
actualised in relationships. The uniqueness of each 
individual I implies its demarcation from any other I 
and therefore a relation to him. Consequently, a 
person only exists in a threefold relation: to 
himself, to the world around, to his fellow men. A 
person is present 
than him present 
to himself by having what is other 
to him. In concrete terms, the 
essence of the person is love. Hegel clearly defined 
this fundamental law even before the personalism of 
our time (M.Buber, F.Ebner, F.Rosenzweig, and so on): 
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'It is in the nature or character of what we mean by 
personality or subject to abolish its isolation or 
separateness. In friendship and love I give up my 
abstract personality and in this way win it back as 
concrete personali ty. ' These relations on the 
horizontal plane, however, are so to speak crossed 
and supported by the all-embracing relation of man to 
God (here again we must go beyond the traditional 
concept). This applies both to the uniqueness and to 
the unbounded openness of the person. The uniqueness 
of each person demands absolute acceptance for their 
own sake; this is why the person is sacred and of 
inviolable dignity. Here in the conditioned, 
something absolutely unconditional shines out. In 
unbounded openness, the person points beyond 
everything limited into the infinite mystery of God. 
The uniqueness and openness both require a ground, 
consequently the person is not only a reference to, 
but also a participation in God's nature. The human 
person can therefore only be ultimately defined from 
God as ground and in relation to God; God himself has 
to be included in the definition of the human person. 
In this sense, Scripture speaks of man as the 'image 
and likeness of God' (Gen. I. 27) ..• 
• • • 
The infinite distance between God and man, 
Creator and creature, mediation between which is 
hinted at in t he human person in his question and 
hope, cannot be bridged from man's side. By the very 
na ture of the case it can only be done from God's 
side. Man in his personali ty is only the grammar, 
potentia oboedientalis, the purely passive 
potentiality, for this mediation. Its realisation 
remains a mysterium stricte dictum, that is, we can 
grasp neither the That nor the How. We cannot deduce 
that it will become a reality, because as men we have 
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no control over God, and after it has happened we 
cannot understand how it does so, because we cannot 
in thought encompass the relation between God and man 
and so grasp it. What we can do as human beings is 
something purely negative, show that the mediation 
that has occurred in Jesus Christ is not in any way 
in contradiction to man's nature, but is its deepest 
fulfilment. Man as person is, as it were, the 
indeterminate mediation between God and man; in Jesus 
Christ this receives from God its specific form, 
plenitude and perfection. Consequently Jesus Christ 
in person is man's salvation. 86 
Kasper's view is valuable to us, because, like Temple, it is 
based on a profound personalism, and it finds the fullness of 
personality most clearly in community. The definition of 
person is discovered only in the I-Thou relationship, but 
Kasper adds the third dimension of God as sustainer: in this 
sense, God is the explanatory principle. In relation to God we 
complete - as far as it may ever be completed - the principle 
of what it is to be a person. But he retains the sense of God 
as ineluctably mysterious; subsequently he emphasises the 
response of faith as the acceptance of the ultimate enigma of 
God. How complex this enigma is I hope to indicate shortly. 
In Chapter Three, we saw Temple's adherence to a non-
proposi tional view of theology. This involves the idea 0 f 
fai th as the coming-to-know Christ, in a direct and personal 
way. Temple, curiously, suggests that we may do this almost 
because of the difficulty of finding 'the historical Jesus': 
. revelation finds its perfect and focal 
. . . , 
expression in Jesus Himself. It is of supreme 
importance that He wrote no book. It is even of 
greater advantage that there is no single deed or 
saying of which we can be perfectly sure that He said 
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or did precisely this or that. I d d n ee of His sayings 
we have no exact reproduction, for presumable He 
spoke in Aramaic, and our records are in Greek, and 
all translation makes some difference. But the 
revelation is not in His teaching nor in His acts; it 
is Himself. The records which we have bring us 
nearer to Himself than would a series of photographs 
and phonographic records; for persons are known in 
personal relationships and what we have is the record 
of such relationships as illustrated by the 
impression which He made on a variety of persons in a 
series of revealing moments. It is not necessarily 
those who spend most time with a man who know him 
best; it may happen that they see only the routine 
which governs the fabric of his life; those who are 
in his company only for a moment, but that a critical 
moment calling for exercise of all his qualities, may 
see a reality not discloses in daily routine. The 
episodes selected for record in the Gospels are not 
very many; but they are revealing. We can have about 
Napoleon far more numerous distinct pieces of 
information than we have about Jesus of Nazareth; but 
we do not personally know Napoleon as we can know 
Him, even if it be only 'knowledge after the flesh' 
that is in our minds, and no thought of spiritual 
communion with Him as ever present Lord. 87 
On one level, this is a strange argument. If I compare my 
direct knowledge of the Christ of the Gospels with my knowledge 
of Napoleon, I am compelled to say that I can call Napoleon to 
mind with greater clarity. Certain aspects of his life, 
particular episodes, reveal much of the many-faceted genius. 
When I study in detail the tactics of Austerlitz and compare 
them with those of Cromwell, when I know the terrain on which 
the battle was fought, I see in a vivid way Napoleon's military 
genius; and when I put in the scales the personal belongings in 
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the Musee de l'Armee, the glimpses of court life, the 
occasional miscalculations, the lasting monument of the Code 
Napoleon, the aspects caught by different portraitists, I feel 
a profound sense of the man as something more than a name in 
the history books. But I think Temple means something other 
than this. When I say 'I know such-and-such a person', I mean 
not only that I am acquainted with him but that he recognises 
and is aware of me. I may say I have met a particular famous 
person, but I would only say that I know him when he recognises 
me as someone known to him. In that sense, Napoleon is forever 
a stranger to me. For Temple, Christ may be known in the 
personal sense; in the God-Man is personal knowledge of me. 
This, of course, assumes that Christ is accepted as the 'ever 
present Lord': I am unable to see how Temple can say we know 
Christ personally 'even if it be only "knowledge after the 
flesh'" unless he means that Christ knows us personally even 
though we know him only as we know Napoleon. Bu t tha t of 
course is to assume that Christ is indeed who Christians claim 
him to be. 
A further difficul ty, which Temple seems to neglect, is the 
accuracy of our perception. In human affairs, when I 'know' 
someone, I know him only in the aspects which are shown to me. 
Even my closest friends are in some respects unknown to me. I 
may know well a man and his wife; but the privacy of his "-
married life is essentially and necessarily closed to me - I 
may pick up hints, yet misinterpret even those. Likewise, the 
Jesus of the Gospels reveals not the whole of himself: when, 
for instance, he is reported to draw apart from his disciples, 
like them I can only speculate about his inner state. And if I 
claim a personal relationship with Christ, it is at best only 
intermittent and represents only a tiny fraction of his total 
existence. Much remains closed. Even then, I must be 
conscious of my capacity for mistaken judgment and wishful 
thinking - just as I may be tempted to see friends in my own 
image and likeness, so I may interpret Christ not as he is but 
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as I would like him to be. This is a real question for the 
practising Christian: the Christ claimed by some of my 
evangelical friends as their personal saviour is unrecognisable 
to me; I do not know, any more than I know when we perceive 
other people differently, whether one or another of us is 
mistaken or self-deluded, or whether we simply see different 
sides of the same person: and all that is over and above the 
fundamental question of whether Christ is at all as Christians 
claim him to be. 
But if we do accept, on an open-system model, that Christ can 
be a coherent personality, though, as Kasper insists, still 
largely closed to us, we are obliged to recognise the enigma of 
his Godly side: if we can understand Jesus as Man/God as a 
coherent idea, our direct experience is only on Man: we can 
understand the concept of man as an open system, and see Christ 
as such, and yet be unable to imagine that side which is Godly. 
We may not the Kasper clearly refers to God as the true 
personality, of whom man is the 'image and likeness'; this is 
the point made by Aquinas - cited in the opening paragraphs of 
this chapter - which raises, again, the question of whether God 
'as such' can be considered a 'coherent personality'. 
For Temple, as earlier suggested, God in himself, and God as 
revealed in all forms (not as Christ alone) is personal: 
Unless all existence is a medium of Revelation, no 
particular Revelation is possible; for the 
possibility of Revelation depends on the personal 
quality of that supreme and Ultimate Reality which is 
God. If there is no Ultimate Reality which is God. If 
there is no Ultimate Reality, which is the ground of 
all else, then there is no God to be revealed; if 
that Reality is not personal, there can be no special 
Revelation but only uniform procedure; if there be an 
Ultimate Reality, and this is personal, then all 
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existence is Revelation. Either all occurrences are 
in some degree revelation of God, or else there is no 
such revelation at all; for the conditions of the 
possibility of any revelation require that there 
should be nothing which is not revelation. Only if 
God is revealed in the rising of a son of man from 
the dead; only if He is revealed in the history of 
Syrians and Philistines can He be revealed in the 
history of Israel; only if he chooses all men for His 
own can He choose any at all; only if nothing is 
profane can anything be sacred. 88 
This maintains the idea that Christ is not alone the source of 
revelation, though he may be seen as its focus: all that we 
need to know may be found in Jesus. But Temple emphasises also 
the personality of God as perceived in the Old Testament: 
If God is God indeed, then he is Lord not of Israel 
only, but of all nations; and we shall expect that if 
we find His method of disclosing Himself to men, we 
shall also find that it is of general application. 
But there is a difference. I well remember as a 
schoolboy asking my father if Plato was not as truly 
inspired as Isaiah, and his answering 'Yes, but Plato 
did not know he was inspired and Isaiah did.' This is 
the distinctive £:act about Israel - not that God 
cared only for this nation, but that He led them to 
know that they were cared for by a God Who was not 
their God only - to know that they were in the hands 
of the God of all the earth. So from before the dawn 
of exact history we find in the world a community 
conscious of divine commission; if Abraham is the 
name for a tribe in migration, that only underlines 
the fact thus stated. Within this community those who 
live by obedience to God as known to them become able 
to know more and to interpret more profoundly the 
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events which disclose and set forward His purpose. 
The sense of commission takes the form of an 
obligation not only to obey, but to bear witness 
before other nations. To Israel alone has been given 
the knowledge of God, the Ultimate Reality, as Living 
and Righteous Will, to Whom we conform ourselves not 
only by accurate thought as seekers for truth, nor 
only by concentrated contemplation as lovers of 
beauty, but by the obedience to the moral law as 
responsible persons. 89 
This view is entirely consistent with Temple's belief that 
'the whole experience of religious religious experience is 
persons,90, though it is not, it seems, wholly compatible with 
his eschewal of natural theology: if all creation is an aspect 
of revelation, natural theology seems possible, though perhaps 
the thrust of Temple's view is to emphasise the personal 
'experiencing-as', the act of experience, rather than the 
seeking truth in that which is experienced. This vision of 
revelation shows God (perhaps as 'God the Father') as a 
character, a personality, in the history of Israel; and there 
is no doubt that in the language of the Old Testament, God is 
represented as a personality. If that personality is 
inscrutable, it is nonetheless in the experience of the 
biblical writers a coherent entity. 
There is no doubt that there is a real distinction between God 
as represented in the Old Testament and the almighty, eternal, 
immutable, timeless, omniscient God of philosophy. In a recent 
novel, Andrew M. Greeley has his theologian-priest hero, 
Blackie Ryan, say: 
'Anytime the necessities of Greek philosophy force us 
into a position that is at odds with the scriptural 
self-revelation of God, I say reject Greek 
philosophy. But we have raised generation upon 
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generation of Roman Catholics to believe, not because 
of the scriptures, but because of Greek philosophy, 
that everything that happens in the world is directly 
attributable to God. That, it seems to me, is patent 
nonsense. ,91 
Here, Greeley is speaking of omnipotence. In the next section , 
I shall suggest that certain traditional concepts of God, 
particularly in relation to omnipotence and omniscience, are as 
radically incoherent (and at odds with scripture), as I believe 
his timelessness to be. I also will suggest that Temple 
himself, certainly by the time of his later writings, was 
edging away from traditional Platonic views of God; but this is 
a matter of hints and suggestions. 
In the extract from his essay on Revelation, there is apparent 
at least the suggestion of a self-revealing, living (and not 
simply static) God, actively at work, directing and guiding his 
people. But at the same time, this God is omnipresent, working 
in and through all creation. 
J .C.A.Gaskin has suggested that omnipresence creates special 
difficulties, which take us back to Cottingham's idea that 'a 
person is, necessarily, something with a body'. 92 In God and 
Philosophy, Flew argues similarly: 'Being an agent, showing 
willpower, displaying wisdom are so much prerogatives of 
people, they refer so entirely and particularly to human 
transactions and human experience, that it becomes more and 
more forced and unnatural to apply the relevant expressions the 
further you go down the evolutionary scale. To try to apply 
them to something which is not an animal at all cannot but;. 
. f . t· ,93 
result in a complete cutting of the llnes 0 communlca lone 
Gaskin puts the dilemma thus: 'We are asked to suppose tha t 
there could be an enti ty which never had, and does not now 
have, a body of any sort through which it can carry out its 
intentions, but which can, nevertheless, everywhere and 
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anywhere at once will and achieve anything which it is 
logically possible to will and achieve. ,94 
Gaskin believes tha t there are two central problems fatal to 
any attempt to consider God as a person: 
One is the complete loss, for an omnipresent bodiless 
entity, of any point of view, any centre relative to 
the world. I do not think it is merely a failure of 
my anthropocentric 
what it would be 
imagination that I cannot grasp 
like to be a conscious agent 
everywhere at once. Conscious agents ••• act from a 
point of view of the universe. They even have a point 
of view of their own bodies ... God, ~ hypothesi, 
does not. If I imagine myself able, as a basic act, 
to turn the moon round on its axis so that you could 
see the other side of it from earth, I would 
inevi tably conceive of myself seeing the moon from 
some point of view. The supposition of a sight, or an 
awareness, which embraces all points of view, is not 
just omniscience, it is dispersal of the agent. It 
might be like seeing myself from my own fingertip and 
from everywhere else on my own body simultaneously. I 
cannot make much sense of even that degree of 
dispersal of my centre of consciousness, let alone 
understand a dispersal which embraces every view of 
everything in the universe ••• 
••• My second problem with the notion of a 
disembodied omnipresent agent takes the above a stage 
further. The basic acts which a person can perform 
are movements of his own body. Now if God is an 
omnipresent spirit which moves any part of the 
universe as a basic act, this must surely mean, if 
the analogy with a human agent is to hold in any way 
at all, that the universe is identical with God's 
269 
body. If we really have to think in this way in order 
to make sense of the supposition that God is an 
omnipresent agent disconnected from any normal body, 
then two things go wrong. The firs t is tha t, once 
again, control over the body implies a centre of 
consciousness from which the body is directed. An 
equal dispersal of consciousness over the whole body, 
like life in a lump of primeval protoplasm, may 
indicate a living thing in some weird way, but it is 
not a person. So if we are hooked on this strange 
idea that the universe is to God what a body is to 
man, it seems unavoidable to ask: how does the 
directive centre of consciousness relate to it? Where 
is God's mind? The second worry is tha t if God's 
embodiment is the universe itself, and its movements 
are his basic acts, then it would appear to be absurd 
to speak of God creating heaven and earth. Heaven and 
earth are God. All the talk about God being the 
explanation of the fact of order or the reason why 
there is anything at all would then be a theistic 
fantasy. The universe is the eternal, self-explaining 
necessity we take God to be. But this supposition is 
identical in all respects that I can understand with 
the central thesis of classical atheism that the 
physical universe and its movements are the ultimate 
realities. 95 
This touches on many issues, a number of which are beyond the 
scope of the present these96 , but certain comments arise out of 
our discussion of Temple. We have repeatedly seen that for a 
non-propositional theologian, the dominant idea is of 
'experiencing as'; I suggest that it could be argued that God 
is 'experienced as' a person: it is as a person that he speaks 
to the Christian believer. He speaks through the person of 
Jesus Christ, but we recall that Temple also sees him as 
speaking in other guises to Israel. In specific terms, I 
270 
suggest that the Christian believer pictures God as speaking 
from a particular - if unknown - place; God seems to him to 
speak from somewhere. Like Brentano, I believe that the mind 
can only conceive of abstract terms in specific images: thus, 
if I consider the idea of 'justice', I cannot conceive of an 
abstract - my mind sees 'justice' in terms of congeries of 
images - courts, judges, just men, instances of fairness, and 
so on. I may define justice in various abstract ways, but I 
conceive it only in specifics: it is important here not to 
confuse conception and definition. It is clear that the Old 
Testament writers conceived God in these specific terms, and my 
experience is that ordinary believers picture God likewise. If 
Brentano is correct, that is what we would expect. 
We have here a conflict between God-as-experienced and what is 
believed to be the reality of God. A number of questions 
follow, in particular those of the veracity of the God-
experiences claimed. It may be that the clue to the dilemma is 
to be found in Temple's perception of revelation as the self-
disclosure of God. This self-disclosure is most evident in 
Christ, operating as a focus of thought, but this - as we have 
seen - is not the only means used: many people claim to find 
God mediated in this or that aspect of daily life. It has long 
been held that the fullness of God is intrinsically unknowable 
to man - Aquinas argues 97 that God's existence is self-evident 
in itself, but not to us simply because man lacks the 
capacity for full perception and comprehension. It is evident 
tha t we can only comprehend as much as we have capaci ty to 
comprehend. Thus, it is held God uses such means as he 
considers appropriate for our understanding; and it is in this 
guise that he reveals himself. Philosophical speculation goes 
beyond revelation; it could be argued that it thus necessarily 
comes up against the bounds of the unknowable, and finds itself 
trapped in paradox. Religion that draws only on the revealed, 
personal aspect of God can act 
Such a view would, I think, 
as a basis for personal faith. 
be consistent with Temple's 
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teaching; but it does not provide an answer to the questions of 
how we may be certain that our experience is valid. Nor indeed 
is it an answer to the question of whether God is fundamentally 
personal to say that his nature is intrinsically unknowable to 
us; but it is perhaps the only response which can be given. 
Gaskin's second point may be dealt with more briefly - I think 
it is less significant than the first. Christianity has never 
claimed that the universe is the embodiment of God - that would 
be pantheism - having drawn a distinction between creator and 
created. If, as Christians claim, God is omnipotent (even in 
the limited sense I shall suggest in the next section) then it 
would be open to him to create that which is not himself, just 
as when a human creates something it is not a part of himself. 
Indeed, if it were not so, God's omnipotence would be not the 
only capability denied him. If the universe is finite in size, 
then, on Gaskin's view, God also would be finite, thus denying 
the omnipresence which he claims leads us to the conclusion 
that God and the universe are one. Gaskin's error seems to lie 
in his view that 'we are hooked on this strange idea that the 
universe is to God what a body is to man.' The idea is strange 
indeed; but it is not how the average Christian sees the 
universe. To take a crude analogy, the Christian sees the 
omnipresence of God not as meaning he is everything, but rather 
as if he were like water in a sponge. We say 'the sponge is 
soaked through with water', or 'water is in every part of the 
sponge'; but we do not by that mean that the water is the 
sponge, though to our experience water is in every pert of it. 
It is in that sense that God is experienced as omnipresent; and 
that is not pantheism. (I am not suggesting that the analogy is 
more correct than Gaskin's; only tha tit more nearly 
approximates to the common view.) What the analogy does not do, 
of course, is to say what it is of God, what is the 'spiritual 
substance' with which the matter of the universe is charged, 
nor the means by which they are connected with God. But the 
believer would assert - and the non-believer deny - that they 
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exist, just as radio waves exis ted before we had means to 
detect them. This kind of omnipresence does not mean that there 
is no specific 'locus' of God's mind; something may be present 
in a number of different ways. Thus I may say my feet are 
presently under my desk; part of me, and a sensate part of me, 
is there; but it does not follow that my mind is in my feet 
(though the case has occasionally been argued). The question 
becomes a matter of in what sense 'I' am under the desk on 
which I write - but in some sense part of me is present there. 
So with God, the question concerns the sense in which he is 
omnipresent; in the next section I shall suggest that several 
of his qualities require more exact definition than sometimes 
given. 
c.) The Third Dialectical Transition 
The third and fourth transitions are not strictly proofs of the 
existence of God. They concern the problems of the 
relationships of God with human beings, and try to demonstrate 
the meaning and significance of theism in human life. 
The third transition deals with the 'Evil attendant upon finite 
minds and the resul tant conception of the reI a tion be tween 
these and the Transcendent Mind. ,98 To Temple, the question of 
evil was one both of theological and philosophical concern, and 
of practical importance to the work of evangelism. In The 
Kingdom of God, he avers: 'the only religious problem that I 
have ever come across in anyone that I have ever met, 
constituting a real hindrance to religious conviction, is the 
problem of evil. ,99 
It is generally felt that it was a weakness of Idealism that it 
was in part a product of nineteenth century optimism, which 
believed in inevitable progress. I have earlier suggested that 
much of the reason for the eclipse of Idealism was not so much 
the objections of philosophers as the damage to the optimism of 
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its adherents created by the events of the twentieth century. 
W.M.Horton has a telling anecdote: 
As an undergraduate philosophy student I witnessed 
the shattering effect of the sinking of the Lusitania 
upon Josiah Royce, the great idealistic philosopher. 
He confessed to our class in metaphysics, the morning 
after the tragedy, that he was no longer able to 
interpret this war in Hegelian terms (as a temporary 
conflict between thesis and antithesis leading 
towards a higher synthesis) but had to regard the 
ghastly event which had just occurred as a sheer 
unmitigated evil, that nothing could explain or 
excuse. In his earlier works, such as The Religious 
Aspect of Philosophy, he had claimed that idealism 
was so certainly true that every attempt to deny its 
theses only served to confirm them; in his few 
remaining works (for he did not live long after this 
great disillusionment) he spoke of the hope of the 
great community - the hope, no longer the certainty 
of a noble outcome of history.IOO 
Much of twentieth century theology - notably that of Barth and 
Tillich - reflects a profound awareness of the horrors of evil, 
and a reshaping of Christian thought to find a response to it. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrestled with the dilemma of being a 
Christian in a totalitarian state, dying for his connections 
with the conspirators against Hitler. Bishop Bell of 
Chichester, friend of both Bonhoeffer and Temple, protested in 
the House of Lords against carpet bombing of German cities and 
emphasised repeatedly the fullness of the evils of war. Many 
thinkers turned to existentialism, and there was a revival of 
interest in the depiction of human isolation so graphically 
portrayed by Kierkegaard. As he was a child of the nineteenth 
century, lived through the First World War, dealt with the 
injustices of the poor of Britain, especially during the 
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General Strike, and presided over the Church of England during 
the Second World War, Temple would seem uniquely qualified to 
speak on the problem of evil. Yet I find his writings on the 
philosophical issues among his most disappointing, which is 
curious, as some of his best writing deals with individual 
evils. Perhaps the failure was a temperamental one 
W.R.Matthews tells us that 'It was observed by his friends that 
he found it almost impossible to think evil of anyone - a 
charity which caused him sometimes to be deceived,lOl and , 
A.E.Baker adds that 'Considering men's conduct, he always 
attributed the best motives that would account for it •.. he 
did not notice when critics or opponents were rude or 
unjust. ,102 Although he describes evil, reading his 
descriptions one is not fully convinced that he has a full 
sense of the horrors he has described, and some of his 
solutions strike the reader as superficial. 
Intellectually, there is no doubt that Temple is clearly aware 
of traditional forms of the problem. He opens Lecture XIV of 
Nature, Man and God with an apparently bald statement: 
All theistic schemes of thought are confronted with 
one great and apparently insoluble difficulty - the 
fact of evil. The difficulty presented by this fact 
is felt with acuteness varying directly with the 
completeness of conviction that God is good. If 
reality consists only of happenings, void of all 
purpose and 
impossible to 
tending to 
understand 
no 
it 
there is 
occurrences 
then no special 
described as 
goal, it may then be 
at all, but at least 
difficulty about the 
evil. Whatever causal 
processes are recognised to exist are sufficient to 
account for these events, as for others. The very 
fact that evil is felt to be a problem even by many 
of those who avow no theistic faith, is evidence of 
the natural tendency of the mind to seek some 
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explanation of the world in other terms than those of 
purely efficient causation. But as soon as that 
principle is pronounced insufficient, there is no 
alternative recourse save to the principle of 
purpose; and if this be adopted the difficulty 
presented by evil at once appears. l03 
The problem of evil itself is classically presented in the form 
of a dilemma: 'If God is perfectly good, He must want to 
abolish evil; if He is unlimitedly powerful, He must be able to 
abolish all evil: but evil exists; therefore either God is not 
perfectly good or He is not unlimitedly powerful. ,104 The 
Christian problem, as Temple himself states, is that 'We have 
to recognise to the full the reality, and the radical badness 
and wrongness of evil; the universal sovereignty of God; and 
His perfect gooodness.' 105 Any solution to the problem is, 
according to Temple, unlikely to be wholly satisfactory.106 The 
solution, which he has hinted at in terms of purpose, is 
unusual in that it is stated in terms of the idealist's concern 
with Truth, Beauty and Goodness rather than the more 
traditional division of theodicy into moral and non-moral evil. 
It is clear from Temple's reference to purpose that his concern 
is largely with evil as following mental activity (purpose is 
possible only to animate, purposive mind; an insentient being 
cannot entertain purpose). This is clear from his comments on 
pre-human life: 
There seems to be no doubt that life in the jungle 
is, on balance, good. The larger beasts must kill the 
smaller to maintain themselves; but though this 
involves for the smaller beasts moments of terror, it 
seems clear from the accounts of naturalists that 
even for them enjoyment of life is the prevailing 
tone or colour of experience. And though there is 
already some problem concerning the occurrence of any 
evil at all, yet at this level there is reason to be 
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satisfied with the balance of good over evil. That is 
not all that we have to say about it. But it is all 
that arises at this stage; and at this stage it is 
enough. For the stage at which evil may be taken up 
into good and made part of its own excellence is the 
stage of definite moral values. If life at the animal 
stage is good on the whole, then on the whole it is 
good, and no question of its justification arises. If 
later developments appear to offer a justification of 
the subordinate element of evil which it contains, 
that is to be welcomed in the interest of a 
completely rational interpretation of the world; but 
even without it we can safely pronounce that the best 
understanding we can frame of the animal world offers 
no obstacle to a reasonable Theism. I07 
Since Temple's death, philosophers have been much concerned 
with animal rights; I doubt that a contemporary philosopher 
would take so sanguine a view of animal suffering, even though 
much recent debate has concerned human treatment of animals -
which is within our control - rather than the treatment of some 
animals by others. It is certainly true that before the 
emergence of man, moral evil as normally understood did not 
arise; but the question of suffering and apparently 
purposeless suffering certainly does. I may look on the 
destruction of dinosaurs with equanimity - it is something I 
can do nothing about - but it is difficul t for me to assert 
that their purpose was served, and they ceased to exist. I know 
little of their purpose, but it is clear that pain was suffered 
without any experience - on the suffering creature's part -
that it served some significant purpose. To say that evil may 
be taken up into good only makes sense if that which suffers is 
aware of the greater good; otherwise the good of suffering is 
only in the mind of the observer, and not at all in the mind of 
the sufferer. To him, his suffering is real, complete and 
unremi t tingly evil and is so perceived by him, regardless of 
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how I interpret it. If we transfer the question of suffering 
out of the animal kingdom and refer it to human pain, we are 
confronted by particular problems. It is one thing to say that 
out of the suffering of those in concentration camps has come 
certain good - consciousness of human dignity, a new state of 
Israel, and so on - but quite another to suggest that the 
suffering of this individual Gypsy or Jew is thus taken up into 
goodness: his suffering and death remain evil in themselves and 
are experienced by him as unmitigatedly evil. If, when I 
visited Auschwitz, i felt a determination that such a thing 
should not happen again, and thus out of the experience came 
some good for the future, the effect on me did not reduce by 
one jot the evil and suffering inflicted on the camp's many 
inmates. I stress this point, because - as we shall see 
Temple makes grea t play of the idea of experience as somehow 
transmuting evil. 
That for Temple evil is a matter of how things are experienced 
is evident from his blunt statement that 'Evil is Negative 
Va1ue.,IOB That value is known only experientially is evident 
from our earlier realisation that value requires recognition by 
mind: 'The essential condition of Positive Value has been found 
to be the recognition by mind of itself, or of what is akin to 
itself, in its object.'I09 This is pure Idealism; but it also 
raises the question of whether evil arises only when 
experienced as such. If I see a dog savaged by some creature, I 
am conscious of the suffering - it is part of my experience -
but if some primeval animal was savaged by another, I know 
nothing of it. But I find it difficu1 t to draw a distinction 
between the actual sufferings involved; it seems the same in 
both cases, though only one impinges on me. (There is, I think, 
a danger in the view that only what is experienced as evil is 
so, not least that my concern for others may become sentimental 
only. I have never seen bear-baiting, but I consider it evil, 
even though none of the spectators may have experienced it as 
such.) Temple seems to be drawing a distinction between evil 
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and suffering, and to concentrate on the question of evil as a 
matter of perception (if it is negative value, it is a matter 
for the mind) rather than as something which exists in the 
world. If evil is mental only, it may be held - as Christian 
Scientists assert - as apparent rather than real: yet Temple, 
as an orthodox Christian, must assert its reality (I am not 
convinced he successfully does so). But, I suggest that if evil 
is seen as a matter of valuation, and evil is not quite the 
same thing as suffering, an answer to the 'problem of evil' 
will be unsatisfactory to the sceptic. In my experience, when 
the sceptic points to the 'problem of evil', he does not ask me 
to justify how I value things: he points to the problem of 
suffering; he asks 'If God is so good, why do the innocent 
suffer?' and by 'evil', he does not mean 'negative value': he 
means specific, concrete, experienced pain. 
Temple sees evil in terms of the classical triad of Truth, 
Beauty and Goodness: 
When Mind in its aesthetic activity of contemplation 
finds what is strange and alien, that is the 
experience of Ugliness. When Mind in its scientific 
activity of analysis and synthesis finds itself 
bewildered and baffled by its environment, or when it 
acquiesces in an apparent recognition of its own 
principle in that environment, to which other facts 
than those under observation are recalcitrant, that 
is the experience of Ignorance or Error. When Mind in 
its ethical activity of determining personal 
relationships ei ther fails to find its counterpart, 
or finds it as something akin, indeed, but hostile, 
1 E "1 110 that is the experience of Mora Vl. 
I 1 a matter of experience, and we note the Here, evil is c ear y 
stress on moral evil; to the question of suffering, of non-
moral evil, Temple pays scant attention in Nature, Man and God. 
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In Mens Creatrix, he attempts to deal with the problem of 
suffering, but we should note that even here, the question is 
of how it is experienced; and the account of suffering is 
limited to human suffering: 
I can only assert my own judgment that there are 
cases of suffering which, by drawing out real 
sympathy, such as is effective in overcoming the 
suffering, are justified; the existence of the 
suffering and the sympathy together is better than 
the absence of both. The sympathy takes the pain into 
itself and makes it an element in its own good. It is 
true that the average tolerably selfish man can only 
be roused to sympathy by the sight of real pain; but 
that is not the point I wish to emphasise, for it 
seems that so far the dependence of the sympathy on 
the suffering is accidental. But there is a peculiar 
quality about sympathy of this kind which consists in 
the nature of its object, and it is a quality of 
supreme excellence. Pain coupled wi th forti tude in 
its endurance, especially when this is inspired by 
love, and mee ting the full sympathy which a t firs t 
lightens it and at last destroys it by removal of its 
grounds, is sometimes the condition of what is best 
in human life. It is of no use to argue the point; we 
think so or we do not ••• 111 
This does not in any sense answer our question about primeval 
suffering: to the dinosaur our belated sympathy is pointless, 
and it speaks nothing to the animal in pain. If we are able to 
find a justification for even a goodness in human 
suffering, we may perhaps justify the goodness of the creator 
to man; but this does not deal with the other question of how a 
loving crea tor can permi t pointless, Ii terally inhuman 
suffering. Small creatures suffered at the whim of dinosaurs; 
the dinosaurs were wiped out - the point of the savagery of the 
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prehistoric years, not for a short time but for millions of 
years, seems even more pointless. It is the presence of 
suffering a tall, and not in suffering humani ty alone, which 
raises questions about the all-loving creator. 
For Temple, it seems sufficient to 'harmonise experience', to 
create a whole: 
To justify the actual sufferings of men we must seek 
them out and extend our sympathy, spending ourselves 
in the removal of pain and sorrow which are elements 
in the good of the world precisely, but only, so far 
as they are overcome. The theoretical and the 
practical are not really two functions, but one, and 
it is not sensible to give one a priority to the 
other. Always our aim is to systematise or harmonise 
experience; sometimes the mind does this by 
'thinking', sometimes by 'acting'; to leave out any 
of the mind's functions will make it incapable of the 
full apprehension of Reality. The evil we are 
considering is not a concept, but is the actual pain 
and sorrows of men. To make a harmony of these, 
within the beneficent Purpose of God as so far 
understood, involves not the concept of sympathy but 
actual sympathising effort. In the degree in which we 
are capable of love we have the right to say to any 
who in this world are in tribulation, "I have 
overcome the world.,,112 
It appears that for him, the matter may be resolved not by 
explaining away evil, but by a process of harmonisation. In 
Nature, Man and God, this 'harmonisation' is achieved by the 
device of seeing evil as a constituent when in right 
proportion - of supreme good: 
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In each main sphere Evil can be subordinated to the 
corresponding good: Error subserves Truth when the 
explanation of an occurrence illustrates, as a well-
founded explanation must, the rational order of the 
whole within which the error occurred. The climax of 
Art is found when the great artist takes the 
repellent and hostile elements in experience and, 
welding them into the completeness of his harmony, 
makes them while still in their isolation 
horrifying - constituent and contributory elements of 
the sublime. 
But the inherent predominance of Good over Evil is 
nowhere so clear as in the moral and spiritual 
sphere. The presence of wha t is morally good in a 
process or occurrence which as a whole is evil cannot 
add to that evil, nor can the good become in any case 
an evil thing. But the presence of evil can enhance 
the excellence of what on the whole is good, and the 
event or act which in isolation is evil can be itself 
an integral and contributing part of a whole which, 
as a whole, is good. To ci te once more the supreme 
instance; the crucifixion of Christ is (in the 
Christian scheme) supremely bad when taken in 
isolation, but when taken as part of the whole scheme 
of which it is the pivot, it is supremely good. 113 
There is a danger in this type of view, especially in the use 
of the aesthetic analogy. Hick has drawn attention to the 
problem of using the example of artistic creation, the use of 
'light and dark' to form a harmonious totali ty. He comments 
that 'the danger ••• of ••• [the] .•. aesthetic analogy is that 
it is heavily weighted towards monism. Evil tends to disappear, 
its terrible reality concealed within the larger pattern. ,114 
According to Hick, such a view is a legacy of Augustinianism -
he is unhappy about it precisely because it depersonalises the 
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universe: 'The whole aesthetic or quasi-aesthetic understanding 
of the perfection of the universe is sub-personal in character. 
The universe, including the finite personal life within it, is 
seen as a complex picture 
resides in its totali ty, 
with much suffering and 
units. ,115 
or symphony or organism whose value 
and whose perfection is compatible 
sin in some of the constituent 
On this matter, I think Hick is entirely right, and his 
comments have particular irony in relation to Temple, the 
supreme personalist. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Temple refers repeatedly to Kant's dictum to treat people 
always as ends, never as means; and yet in this case the 
indi vidual's suffering is seen as a means to a grea ter end. 
Thus, a concentration camp inmate's suffering is held to have 
meaning within 'Purpose' conceived as a whole; but that meaning 
is apparent not to him, but to the detached observer of the 
whole, or to God. To the sufferer this seems scant consolation; 
and though it may make evil comprehensible from one viewpoint, 
the sensitive sufferer does not share that perception: he 
becomes something to be used. It might be added that on such a 
view God is seen not as the personal God of every individual, 
but as a distant observing critic of his own work. 
The passage ci ted from Temple is not an isolated instance of 
his use of the observer argument. In an earlier lecture in the 
Gifford series, we find: 
••• when it is seen in the context and perspective of 
a longer vista of time, what was, as an isolated 
event, evil may be apprecia.~ed as an element in a 
total good not only as a price paid for a 
consequent good, but as an indispensable element in 
what as a whole is good. And this again is not to be 
interpre ted merely as a preponderance of good in a 
whole which also contains evil; the thing tha twas 
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evil becomes a posi tive ingredient in a total good 
••• the present appreciation of the past discloses a 
character which in the past was imperceptible. ll6 
This comes close to Hick's charge of monism. The irony of this 
is that it is not of a piece with the stress on personality so 
evident in the previous chapter: indeed, Hick's critical view 
of what he considers an Augustinian approach to evil is based 
on the insights of a twentieth century theological approach 
with which we would normally identify Temple: 
Twentieth century theologians of all communions are 
more explicitly conscious than their predecessors in 
most other periods that our positive knowledge of God 
and of His manner of dealing with His creation is 
derived from the Incarnation. And the category that 
inevitably dominates a theology based upon God's 
self-disclosure in Christ is the category of the 
personal. Because God has revealed Himself to us in 
and through a human life we must think of Him and of 
His attitude to ourselves in personal terms ••• 
Instead of seeing human life as a link in the great 
chain of being, we must see fini te personali ty as 
made in God's image and as of unique significance to 
Him ••• Instead of upholding the perfection of the 
universe as an aesthetic whole, we must think of it 
as perfect in the rather different sense that it it 
is suited for the fulfilment of God's purpose for it 
••• if God is the Personal Infinite, man alone among 
God's crea tures is, so far as we know, capable of 
personal relationships with Him. This fact singles 
man out and gives him a special place in the created 
order ••• Instead, then, of thinking of the origin 
and fate of human personality of an aesthetically 
valued whole, we should see the great frame of 
nature, with all its sources of evil, as the 
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deliberately mysterious environment of finite 
personal life... In the light of the Incarnation, 
then, any justification of evil must (I suggest) be a 
jus tifica tion of it as playing a part in bringing 
about the high good of man's fellowship with God, 
rather than as necessary to the aesthetic perfection 
of a universe which, in virtue of its completeness, 
includes personal life. 117 
The aesthetic approach of Temple is emphasised by his constant 
references - in Nature, Man and God to Hamlet, in Mens Creatrix 
to the poetry of Mrs. Hamilton King and G.F.Bradby, to Othello, 
Cordelia and Sophocles' Antigone, to Turner's Fighting 
Temeraire, Perugino's Crucifixion and the Bach B Minor Mass -
to the arts to justify his position. But the aesthetic is 
artificial as a guide on the matter of evil; the artist does 
not include actual, painful evil in his masterpiece, merely the 
image of it. When a play is presented, Othello does not truly 
suffer; he presents only a picture of suffering; but the evil 
of the world is - at least for the Christian - actual, and not 
simply the black of an artist's palette. Temple is here 
mistaking his analogy, assuming that what is true in his model 
is thus necessarily true in the reality it represents. 
Where he comes closer to the personalist school, as described 
by Hick, is in the anthropocentric approach to evil. I happen, 
as already suggested, to consider Temple mistaken about this, 
but it is interesting to note that he shares this perspective 
with Schleiermacher, who makes a direct connection between sin 
and evil: 
••• our proposition implies, first, that without sin 
there could be nothing in the world that could 
properly be considered an evil, but that whatever is 
directly bound up with the transitoriness of human 
life would be apprehended as at most an unavoidable 
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imperfection, and the operation of natural forces 
which impede the efforts of men as but incentives to 
bring these forces more fully under human control. 
Secondly, it is implied that the measure in which sin 
is present is the measure in which evil is present, 
so that, just as the human race is the proper sphere 
of sin, and sin the corporate act of the race, so the 
whole world in its relation to man is the proper 
sphere of evil, and evil the corporate suffering of 
the race. 118 
In simple terms, Schleiermacher's point is that the great good 
off the world, and its sole purpose, is redemption: full 
goodness comes only in the redeemed man, and God has crea ted 
this world as the perfect arena for redemption - without evil, 
and without the 'fallenness' of man, no redemption is possible, 
as there would be no bondage from which man would need to be 
redeemed. The measure of evil is thus how it affects man's 
redemption - suffering, on this view, is significant only as it 
touches man; even natural 'evils' only become so within a 
redemptive vision, 'as man, were he without sin, would not feel 
what are merely hindrances of sensuous functions as evils •.. 
the very fact that he does so feel them is due to sin, and 
hence that type of evil, subjectively considered, is a penalty 
of sin.' 119 We may note - parenthetically - that Teilhard de 
Chardin avoids the problem of anthropocentrici ty while 
retaining the idea of evil as having redemptive significance by 
his extension of the idea of redemption not to man alone but to 
the whole world: 'a world, assumed to be progressing towards 
perfection, or "rising upward", is of its nature precisely 
still disorganised. A world without a trace or a threat of evil 
would be a world already consummated. ,120 Such a vision avoids 
the suggestion that our dinosaur's suffering is valueless, 
though its exact value remains obscure, especially to him. 
Schleiermacher, who died in 1834, may be forgiven for a vision 
of creation as a stage on which man acts out his destiny; it is 
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a little surprising that Temple, a century later, and half a 
century after his father's frank acceptance of evolutionary 
theory, should accept so apparently uncritically a similar 
view. 
Nevertheless, in this at least Temple may claim back his 
personalism, but as we shall see, his account raises particular 
problems. In arguing tha t evil follows from the fini tude of 
self, he seems after all to be attributing evil to the creator 
who made man in his fini tude. The form of this fini tude is 
self-centredness. Mind in man has the ability to think beyond 
the self, by the power of imagination. Here, Temple echoes 
Brentano: 'The mind cannot think without percept or image.,121 
This specific habit of mind leads to the pull of imagination: 
••• imagination, just because it exists offer 
particular instances of general qualities, offers to 
desire the stimulus which the appropriate physical 
objects offer to appetite. Hence comes a great, and 
in principle unlimited, expansion of the life of 
desire, which initially functions only as expressive 
of the vital needs of the organism or as stimulated 
by appropria te objects in the physical environment. 
Desire as so expanded may take the form of aspiration 
or of lust. No doubt it always takes in fact both 
forms at first, and one way of expressing the purpose 
of educational discipline is to say that it aims at 
directing the whole force of desire away from lust 
towards aspiration ••• From these considerations it 
is clear that so far as Evil is a product of 
exaggera ted or 
its occurrence 
makes possible 
••• All depends 
misdirected desire, the condition of 
is identical with the condition that 
all the higher ranges of human life 
h .. d 122 on ow 1t 1S use • 
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That, he says, is the mechanism of evil the mistaken 
following of pictures given by imagination; but what still 
needs to be explained is why man so often chooses evil for its 
own sake: he declares tha t to be impossible, on the grounds 
that no one acts in a way that he does not see as good for 
himself: 'evil for others is still desired as supposedly good 
for him who desires it.,123 Whether Temple is correct in this 
is an experiential matter; it is, however, possible to argue 
that a man may choose evil without a sense that it is good for 
him - he may, for instance, choose to gamble without seeing it 
as good for him or anyone else; but it could, perhaps, still be 
argued that something about the gambling is some form of 
apparent good: Temple himself refers to a man who 'may know as 
a matter of general principle that stealing is not only wrong 
but bad - bad, that is, for him. But if he sufficiently desires 
an object that is within his grasp, he may nonetheless take it 
unless there is also before him the sorrow of the person 
robbed, or the penalty which he is likely to bring upon 
himself. ,124 This example suggests the complexity of human 
motivation, which has been much studied in recent years. An 
interesting concept, which gives support to Temple's intuition 
is Victor H.Vroom's Expectancy Theory.125 This theory suggests 
that motivation is a product of the anticipated outcome of an 
action. The force of motivation may be represented by the 
formula: 
Force = valence x expectancy126 
where force is the strength of a person's motivation, valence 
is the strength of an individual' spreference for an outcome, 
and expectancy is the belief that a particular action will lead 
to that outcome. According to Vroom, there is no motivation if 
there is no value placed on an action. It should be noted that 
Vroom, like Temple, believes that this value is that which is 
given to it by the individual, not an absolute value: in other 
words, Temple's 'apparent good'. 
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The inclination to choose the evil - to mistake the apparent 
good is in large part a matter of character: 'A man's 
character determines his apparent good at any moment; his 
apparent good determines conduct.,127 This, of course, is not 
an original insight: it is the dominant theme of Aristotle's 
Nichomachean Ethics, but it is interesting to consider it in 
relation to Temple's views on education to him, the 
character-forming aspect (which is an education in goodness) is 
paramount: in Mens Creatrix he defines the purposes of 
education as discipline, initiation into social life and 
instruction - 'By means of it the individual is put in the way 
of fashioning the unity of his own soul's internal harmony, and 
becomes fit to take his place in the community as one element 
in that larger harmony.' 128 At the end of his life, he said 
that education's 'job is to develop personality. ,129 This 
educational function is a total one: personality is the highest 
goal, and its development one of public policy - most of 
Temple's interventions in public affairs were concerned wi th 
education in one form or another. Even on such things as house-
building, he emphasised the development of the personality: in 
1943, he told the National Book Council 'that we should urge 
the provision in all new houses of built-in book cases.,130 If 
we have undisciplined characters, Temple believes, we are 
particularly open to temptation, for this is 'more felt in the 
region of bodily appetites, or of personal resentments, or of 
professional or 
sentiment. ,131 
commercial ambition, or of political 
Temple asserts that there 
tendency to evil in human 
is 'an unquestionable bias 
nature,132 and identifies 
or 
this 
character with Original Sin. The reason lies in the nature of 
personality: for mind is not merely reactive; it has the 
abili ty to ascribe value, for 
distinctively 
himself; and 
himself: 
human capacities 
in reflecting on 
its own purposes. One of the 
is that of reflection on 
self, he ascribes value to 
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The mind .£y ~ necessary tendency of its own nature 
attaches more importance to values which find their 
actualisation in itself than to those which find it 
elsewhere;~r~o~t-it crudely, each man cares more 
about what seems good for him than about goods which 
he does not expect personally to enjoy. Even~o~r 
~ he knows of these, they take_a second place~r 
him;~d about many~f them-he knows nothing_._S~he 
becomes not only the subject of his ~ value 
judgements which he can never cease to be but also 
-- --- -- --,---
the centre and criterion of his own system of values 
which he is quite unfit to be. 133 
Thus, the locus of evil is clearly wi thin the individual. 
Temple is absolutely specific in this judgment: 
We totally misconceive alike the philosophic and the 
practical problem of evil if we picture it as the 
winning of control over lawless and therefore evil 
passions .£y a righteous but insufficiently powerful 
reason or spirit.-It~s~e spirit which-1s evili-it 
is reason which is perverted;-1t-is aspiration itself 
which is corrupt. 134 
Such a view resurrects in acute form the question of how God 
could create such a creature, selfish and inclined to evil. In 
creating such a creature capable of such sin, it would appear 
that God had - in contrast to the perfect goodness claimed of 
him - created evil. Temple's attempt to deal with this problem 
raises almost as many questions as it resolves: 
Because it was not necessary that we should err, we 
cannot say that our sin is itself God's act; it is 
our fault, not His, in the first instance. But that 
we are finite selves is directly due to God's act, 
and we cannot doubt tha t God foresaw the issues of 
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conferring selfhood upon finite beings, so that sin 
falls wi thin His purpose, and is even part of it, 
thqugh it can not be said that He directly willed or 
wills it. What He faced was a probability so great as 
to be distinguishable only in thought from certainty. 
"I speak after the manner of men"; of course there 
is, for God's eternal knowledge, no such thing as 
"probability" but apprehension of all reality in its 
ordered completeness. Yet that distinction is 
important. For it means that God did not directly 
cause any man to sin ••• It is not wicked to be 
finite; but it is so improbable as to be beyond all 
reasonable estimate of practical possibility that 
fini te selves, if left to themselves, should not be 
wicked. 135 
It is difficult to follow parts of this: God is assumed to be 
unable to create evil, yet it is somehow - part of his 
purpose. That man will sin is seen as 'a probability so great 
as to be distinguishable only in thought from certainty.' 
Temple is evidently conscious of difficulty here: if he is 
omnipresent, all time is present to God, which makes the 
grammatical mode 'will sin' meaningless to him; for to God - as 
traditionally conceived - there is no future, in the way that 
to us the future is something which cannot be fully known. 
Temple's attempt to deal with the problem appears to attribute 
to God a curious duality. In a footnote to 'eternal knowledge' 
in the passage Cited, he says, 'as distinguished from His 
temporal knowledge. We find ourselves obliged to attribute both 
d ,136 Th" d" t" t" modes of experience and knowledge to Go • 1S 1S 1nc 10n 
is ,developed in a later passage, in which Temple outlines the 
relationship of the eternal God with the temporal world: 
Upon one planet attached to a certain sun (whether 
also elsewhere or not we have no knowledge), His 
creativity expressed itself in beings able in 
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somemeasure thus to enter into His mind and 
understand Hl" s work th" h ,so at ln t em He found a 
fuller counterpart than elsewhere of His own being. 
Rooted in nature they yet are not swayed only by 
natural forces, but by that in which they find 
themselves as God seeks to find Himself in them. 
They, like all else, exist only in dependence on His 
will. But since He has thought it good (that is, has 
found Himself in determining) to fashion them in so 
complete a resemblance to Himself, He must now 
control them according to the law of their being 
which He has imposed on them; He must control them 
through what appears to them good and their power to 
appreciate it that is, through their unforced 
affection and will. Thus He Himself does not know 
beforehand exactly how they will 
various modes of His manifestation 
respond to 
of Himself 
the 
to 
them. So far as He is Himself at work within the 
process of Time, 
unknown to Him, 
the precise mode of the future is 
though its general issue in the 
fulfilment of His purpose is secure. Yet, all the 
same, because He is not in His own nature within the 
Time-process any more than the dramatist is 
personally within the play, and all that happens 
utterly depends on Him, He knows it all with utter 
certainty. to Him the contingent is still contingent, 
as not being compelled by its own past; yet the whole 
is necessary, and therefore also all its parts; and 
the whole is the expression of His will. So He knows 
the contingent as contingent and yet knows it with 
certainty.137 
This approach is a curious one, posi ting as it does a dual 
knowledge: the paradox of a God who in one way knows the 
future, and, in another, does not. This distinction is not held 
by all theologians, though the Averroists denied to God the 
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knowledge of particulars. St. Thomas Aquinas clearly believed 
God's knowledge to be absolute, and without distinction. His 
modern commentator, Etienne Gilson, draws together the threads 
of his argument: 
••• God knows all future contingents, both in their 
causes and in themselves as actually realised. for, 
although future contingents are realised 
successively, God knows them not successively. We 
have already established that God is outside time; 
the standard of His knowledge, as of His being, is 
eternity; now, eternity which exists simultaneously, 
comprises the whole of time in a changeless present. 
God, therefore, knows the future contingents as 
actually present and realised, yet the necessary 
knowledge which He has of them, in no way invalidates 
the character of their contingency. Here again, St. 
Thomas departs from Averroism and even from the most 
authentic Aristotelianism. According to Averroes and 
Aristotle, the essential character of a future 
contingent is that it mayor may not occur; it is 
therefore impossible to conceive how it can be an 
object of knowledge for anyone at all, and, as soon 
as a contingent is known to be true, it ceases to be 
contingent and immediately becomes necessary. But the 
authority of Aristotle is unable to prevail against 
the truth of dogma. To deny to God the knowledge of 
future contingents is tantamount to rendering 
Providence impossible. On this point, as on all 
others which touch the Divine essence, we must 
abandon the Greek philosopher to follow the teaching 
of St. Augustine. 138 
The problem appears to be that Temple is trying to maintain 
both the eternal knowledge of God and to give some meaning to 
the actual experience of God in the world. It is clear that 
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there is a significant difficulty: in a passage cited 
earlier139 , we noted Greeley's comment that we should always 
prefer the God of scripture to the God of Greek philosophy: 
Temple's dilemma (shared by many)) is his attempt as Christian 
and Platonist to reconcile the two, in a God who both wholly 
knows, and yet does not know, the future. Temple attempts a 
justification of this by citing Trinitarian doctrines l40 , but 
confesses, 'There is something here which we cannot fathom ••. 
The profoundest religious intuitions do not here lead to a 
scheme of thought perfectly comprehensible by men.,l41 But it 
is clear that for him - at least in theory - the evidence of 
scripture is primary: he quotes wi th approval Aquinas' 
acceptance of the Augustinian doctrine that we should 'hold the 
truth of scripture without wavering', though not a particular 
explanation of it. 142 Hence his evident embarrassment, for in 
his acceptance of two modes of thought, he abandons the 
classical statement of God's nature by Boethius, which to the 
scholastics was the cardinal text: 
Whatever includes and possesses the whole fullness of 
illimitable life at once and is such that nothing 
future is absent from it and nothing past has flowed 
away, this is rightly judged to be eternal, and of 
this it is necessary both that being in full 
possession of itself it be always present to itself 
and that it have the infinity of mobile time 
present. l43 (my italics) 
Aquinas asserts - on the same basis - that the essence of God 
is self-knowledge; Temple's distinction seems inconsistent with 
this, and with the modern Thomist's view that 'God's knowledge 
d h 1 ,144 ••• is for ever complete an c ange esse 
Perhaps Temple could have avoided the difficulty, or at least 
minimised it, by the suggestion that though we are experienced 
by God in an eternal mode, he is necessarily experienced by us 
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as temporal: our only means of understanding is as successive. 
This does not resolve the question of God's actual knowledge, 
and the historic difficulty of reconciling the absolute 
knowledge claimed for God - with its implicit foreknowledge _ 
with apparent freewill: instead, we are left only with an 
explanation of our experience. It is not part of the task of 
this thesis to outline a revised theodicy, but it may be 
possible to suggest a line of thought which might point to a 
way out of the difficulty. Suggestions in Whitehead and 
Hartshorne, of God as process, are perhaps promising; but I 
suggest that the key issue is that of the temporality of the 
Godhead. I have already said that the 'timelessness' of God is 
as I think, following Kotarbinski incoherent, that 
timeliness is necessary to any endurance. The moment we see God 
as timely, certain consequences follow, particularly for God's 
foreknowledge. It is a truism of Christian theology that it is 
no limitation to God's omnipotence to say that he cannot 
perform the logically impossible - God cannot create a square 
circle, for instance, because the logically impossible is 
merely verbal: the 'square circle' is a form of words which 
cannot refer to an existent. Indeed,· Christian thought is 
careful not to define God's attributes too closely. The Roman 
Catechism, referring to the Nicene Creed, comments that 'the 
pastor should ••• point out the propriety and wisdom of having 
omitted in the Creed all other names of God and of having 
proposed to us only the attribute of "The Almighty" as the 
object of our faith.' 145 The catechism ties omniscience to 
omnipotence, but even so is 
omnipotence is not absolute: 
careful to poin t out tha t God's 
'although God can do all things, 
yet he cannot lie, or deceive, or be deceived; he cannot sin, 
or be ignorant of anything, or cease to exist. These things are 
compatible only with those beings whose actions are imperfect. 
They are certainly incompatible with the nature of God, whose 
acts are all-perfect. ,146 
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'Omnipotence' thus seems less than total: but reflection shows 
this to be necessary. If one has an abili ty, it is logically 
impossible not to have that ability, though it is not logically 
necessary to have to exercise it. 'Omnipotence' means, I think, 
'ability to do all that may (logically) be done'. If this is so 
- and theologians appear to accept this - by extension it is 
consistent to describe omniscience as 'ability to know all that 
may (logically) be known'. Now, what is logically capable of 
being known will be different between a timely and a timeless 
God. A God to whom all times are omnipresent must know every 
possible act of every possible creature; a timely God can only 
know that which it is possible to know. In relation to 
creatures with free will, there would be no possibility that he 
could know with certainty the consequence of free and 
uncompelled choice: the logical nature of future choice would 
render such a thing impossible. If omniscience is, as I 
suggest, 'ability to know all that may (logically) be known', 
then it is no limitation of 'omniscience' to say that it may 
not be possible to God to know that which it is not logically 
possible for him to know: and that state of affairs is, I 
suggest, intrinsic to God's creation of creatures with free 
will, and it would provide the ground for a genuine and 
unambiguous freedom. 
Such an approach would avoid the dualism attributed to God's 
nature by Temple. This dualism is, as I have indicated, a 
feature of process theologyl47, especially that of Hartshorne, 
who distinguishes between 'the God of philosophy' and the 
concrete 'God of religion', shaped in his experience by the 
activity of his creatures. He believes that such a perception 
simplifies the question of the problem of evil to a 'pseudo-
problem'. For Hartshorne, the clue lies in denying the 
traditional concept of omnipotence: the God of process theism 
is unable to control finite beings - he can only set them goals 
which he has to persuade them to reach. The advantage of this 
view is the emphasis on God as one who suffers with his 
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creation: Whitehead refers to God as 'the great companion - the 
fellow-sufferer, who understands. ,148 Within the Christian 
context, particularly within the modern emphasis on the pilgrim 
church, the vision strikes a particular chord: Christ is seen 
as the great suffering companion. (This is a constant theme of 
Andrew Greeley, cited earlier. 149 ) The difficulty of the 
thesis, however, is the innate dualism of 
his knowledge is in two modes; and, 
suggestion that Hartshorne has 'resolved' 
only a t the expense of his omnipotence. 
God, the idea that 
it is argued, the 
the problem of evil 
My proposal is, I 
think, more modest, principally because I am not so concerned 
to propose the 'traditional' views of God, as Temple and 
Hartshorne have done; and because I am concerned to suggest 
that an analysis of 'omnipotence' and 'omniscience' indicates 
necessary limitations. The only significant defence of my 
position is that it is consistent with Christian tradition. 
Traditionally and habitually, Christians as a matter of fact, 
used tensed language to refer to God - 'God did such-and-such 
for the people of Israel', 'God is my companion', 'God will 
come again'. I t is, of course, partly tha t the mode of human 
experience is tensed, and past, present and future are 
differently experienced and may be known with different degrees 
of certainty - these degrees of certainty are condi tioned by 
the fact of a thing's being past or future. It might appear 
tha t we should treat this being , trapped' wi thin the 
constraints of time as limitation, and hence to say that as God 
is unlimited the 'constraint' of time does not apply. But such 
an interpretation is in part a matter of language; what is a 
constraint in one usage is not experienced as a constraint in 
another. Thus, if God exists, he exists; and by the fact of his 
existence, it is not possible (at least in that moment) for him 
not to exist. That is not a matter of limitation, but a matter 
of logic (the law of excluded middle) and in normal discourse 
it does not seem to us a significant constraint. Whether 
existing in time is such an example of logical necessi ty is 
unclear: it is simply that I would hold that 'X exists in time' 
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is tautologous: 'To be in time' is contained in the notion of 
'existence'; and it is not a significant limitation on being a 
particular thing to be that thing and not something else. (It 
is not a significant objection to the omnipresence of God to 
say that there are some things which are not part of God: there 
is no logical contradiction in saying that 'God is not that 
which is not God'; there would be in saying 'God is that which 
is not God'. More to the point, that God is not identical to 
everything is not experienced by believers as at all a 
significant objection to the fullness of God.) 
Such a view is compatible with Temple's view to the extent that 
there is a harmonisation with the actual experience of the 
Christian; in experiencing God temporally, man necessarily 
experiences him and his activity as temporal. As a matter of 
fact, one never does experience the timeless (and hence outside 
experience, which, as Kant pointed out, has temporality as a 
necessary condition of thought) God of Plato. On empirical 
grounds, I am reluctant to posit that which cannot possibly be 
experienced: Temple was not so reluctant, but was evidently 
troubled by the division between the God of his tradi tional 
belief and the God of his actual religious experience. In the 
matter of evil, the tension is, so far as I can see, nowhere 
resolved. 
* * * 
Perhaps Temple would have been most at home with what Kenneth 
Surin has called 'Practical Theodicy', which he bases on the 
work of Dorothee Soelle (1929- ), Jurgen Moltmann (1926- ) and 
P.T.Forsyth (1848-1921). Soe1le makes an important comment, 
potent with insight for anyone who hopes to build a theological 
framework on Temple's perspective: 'That all suffering is 
social suffering ••• means that all suffering is to be worked 
on. No suffering can be clothed and transfigured any longer 
with the appearance of fate.' 150 Soelle emphasises the human 
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being within a community, striving with the brute fact of evil, 
more concerned with how the Christian is to deal with the fact 
than with the theory of whence the evil came. But this emphasis 
- consistent with Bonhoeffer's dictum that 'man is challenged 
to participate in the sufferings of' God at the hands of a 
godless world,15l creates special problems. God is 
experienced rather as companion than creator - the emphasis is 
on personal relationship. This is consistent with Temple's 
religious outlook, but creates problems for a philosophical 
considera tion of God: if he is, supremely, a personal God, 
suffering with the human race, large and apparently insoluble 
problems arise about the or1g1n, meaning and value of the 
objects of the universe; and God seems something less than the 
creator of all. Surin draws out this theme, characterising the 
common features of Soelle, Moltmann and Forsyth: 
1. They affirm the principle tha t God is in some 
sense a deity who suffers with his creatures. 
2. They maintain that the God who suffers in this 
world cannot be an immutable and impassible deity. 
3. They insist that the question of overwhelming 
import to the sufferer is not 'Is theism 
unintelligible because I am suffering?', but 'Is this 
God a God of salvation - is this a God who can help?' 
4. They claim that it is a corollary of (1) and (3) 
that a theological approach to the 'problem of evil' 
from the standpoint of victims will necessarily lead 
to soteriology, or more precisely (given the 
framework of the Christian mythos), into the doctrine 
of the atonement. 152 
The second of these theses is the stumbling block for Temple, 
but it would seem that only by an acceptance of this, as I have 
argued, that God can become at all explicable in relation to 
evil. If he were to accept the line of the 'practical 
theodicists', Temple would discover the possibility that the 
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question of evil becomes as clearly personal as he would wish. 
Alan Garfinkel 153 leads us to see that there are two kinds of 
'spaces' occupied by different approaches to theodicy. The 
traditional theodicist of the 'theoretical' kind is concerned 
with the following objects of explanation: 
Evil exists because 
world is a 'vale of soul-making' 
we are free beings 
good is impossible without the 
possibility of evil 
The 'practical' theodicist is more likely to view the problems 
thus: 
Evil exists because 
I an imprisoned here 
We are being tortured now 
You are indifferent to our 
God is an indifferent spectator 
Surin contrasts the underlying questions behind the different 
approaches. The 'theoretical theodicist' asks: 
Given that there is evil (in general), why does evil 
(in general) exist? 
The 'practical theodicist' asks a more modest but more 
personally orientated question: 
Why is this (specific evil) being done to ~/~s, by 
you/them, here and now?l54 
The need for such a formulation is perhaps a modern perception, 
grown out of the savagery of so much of twentieth century 
experience, though one could argue tha tit exemplifies the 
attitudes of Old Testament characters; but one might wish, with 
his special gifts of imagination and personal insight, that 
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Temple had a t tempted to provide an answer to it, ra ther than 
trying - not very successfully - to answer a more traditional 
series of questions. In this, as in other things, one senses 
him to be on the verge of new insight, but restrained by the 
orthodoxies of his past. 
d) The Fourth Dialectical Transition 
As we have just seen, Surin maintains that a practical theodicy 
leads necessarily to soteriology (the branch of theology which 
deals wi th the saving work of Chris t for the world) and the 
doctrine of the atonement. Temple's fourth transition, which 
itself grows out of the problem of evil, is a theological one, 
based on the idea that 'Natural Theology culminates in a demand 
for the specific Revelation which its principles forbid it to 
include in its own province.' 155 This is not an argument so 
much as a claim that only revelation can fill the gaps in 
argument. From the reader's point of view, there are two 
significant points in Temple's comments - some further thoughts 
on the problem of evil, which indicate possibilities nowhere 
developed; and a reiteration of the non-propositional view of 
revelation 
The fourth transition is the subject of Lecture XX, the final 
lecture in Nature, Man and God. Much of the lecture, as one 
would expect, is recapitulation of the whole course. But the 
development of the comments on evil is significant, principally 
because Temple states in unequivocal terms the challenge which 
he believes evil makes to faith: 'What is wanted is some ground 
for belief that the occurrence of the evil is an actual element 
in total good ••• to show that evil is capable of justification 
is not to show that it is justified; and nothing less than this 
is required. If evil were only a possibility, a possible 
justification might suffice. But evil is actual, and only an 
actual justification is relevant. ,156 
3 a 1 
The justification offered by Temple is a fairly conventional 
one - he follows (and quotes) Bosanquet1 57 in the view that 
evil, at least in the form of suffering, is not simply 
something outweighed by good, but is an integral element in it: 
'evil ••• can be so confronted by him who experiences it that 
the whole is not a mere preponderance of satisfaction, but an 
enriched personality for which the evil moment has made an 
indispensable contribution to the enrichment.' 158 Such a view 
raises considerable problems, as we saw in the last section, in 
that so much evil is difficult to justify. If I suffer pain, it 
may make me a nobler character; but that presupposes my 
survival. A concentration camp victim does not have the 
opportunity to be ennobled by his suffering in any way that is 
visible to us. If he has the opportuni ty in an afterlife, we 
are not in a position to judge this, and cannot with certainty 
assert it: it is a matter of faith. But it is that faith which 
Temple is attempting to justify. It could be argued that the 
existence of equivocal circumstances is necessary to the 
integrity of faith - if the contribution of evil to good were 
beyond all doubt, it could not be a matter of belief - but it 
is this ambiguity that Temple hopes to overcome. The importance 
of this problem is that it points further towards the need for 
specific revelation: natural theology alone cannot point to the 
truth of God; only our experience of Christ could do that. 
An interesting feature of Temple's discussion of evil, 
particularly given the distinction made by Surin, is that 
Temple also gives consideration to the 'theoretical' and 
'practical' aspects of theodicy, and he asserts that 'any 
solution of this whole problem for our minds ••. must be sought 
at the level of our own experience,159; his argument is, as we 
have seen that in our experience evil may be transformed into a 
component of good characteristically, he attempts to 
demonstrate this in relation to beauty, truth and goodness; and 
true realisation of this comes to him who transcends the self 
and its apparent good: 
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The man who would see Truth must yield his mind to 
the facts; the man who would enjoy Beauty must 
surrender his soul to its spell; the man who would 
love must give his very self, for that is what love 
is. At every point therefore the aspiration towards 
these forms of good requires a denial of self, and in 
the measure of its attainment passes over into 
worship, of which the meaning is total self-giving 
and self-submission to the Object of worship. This 
then, it seems, is man's true good - to worship.160 
To worship is to worship God-, and God is discovered in 
revelation. The emphasis is on discovery, for revelation takes 
place within experience. In this last lecture of Nature, Man 
and God, we come full circle, in a frank and explicit 
acceptance of a non-propositional view of faith: 
•.. there [are] no "revealed truths", but ••• "truths 
of revelation". The essential revelation is an act of 
God apprehended in a comple te living experience, in 
which subjective and objective factors are both 
active; it is not capable of isolation from that 
experience itself is recovered or renewed. Sacred 
writings and authoritative formulae are not 
themsel ves the substance or reali ty of revela tion. 
That is always the living God Himself, and nothing 
less or other. But sacred writings and authoritative 
formulae may contain the record of the divine act 
which actually is the revelation, and point the way 
to recovery or renewal of the experience in which it 
is apprehended. Thus for the Christian the Nicene 
Creed is not an object of faith, but a formulation of 
a faith of which the object is God revealed in 
Christ. It is a formulation of inferences drawn from 
l OTh I tOo 1°S Christ Himself as reve atl0n. e reve a 1 n ••• 
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spiritually apprehended by 
enlightened to that end. 161 
minds spiritually 
It is clear that this position is a natural conclusion from 
many strands of Temple's thought: it is a vision of theology 
which relates belief to his concern with the centrality of 
experience, which appears to reconcile the subject and object 
in a significant whole, and which, above all, emphasises 
personality: the personality of the believer encounters Christ. 
A NOTE ON NATURAL THEOLOGY 
As we have seen, Temple is unhappy about natural theology; but 
under the terms of the Gifford Trust, he was required to 
lecture within the natural theology tradition. His final 
comments are interesting: 
• •• Na tural Theology cannot win . . . [a man] . . . to 
worship. I t may assure him tha t there is a God who 
both claims and deserves his worship; it may bid him 
to seek that God and the way to worship Him; but it 
cannot confront him with the God whom it describes. 
It can only discuss God; it cannot reveal Him. And 
for this reason its whole fabric of thought is liable 
to be laid in ruins be devastating doubt. For the 
existence of God is fully credible only if evil is 
being transmuted into good; and that cannot 
demonstrably cannot - finally be accomplished unless 
God the Supreme Good becomes the apparent good to 
every man ••• Natural Theology, which is 
indispensable as a source of interpretation and as a 
purge of superstition even for those who have 
received a true revelation, yet if left to itself, 
ends in a hunger which it cannot satisfy, and yet of 
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which it must perish 
forthcoming. 162 
if no satisfaction is 
The curious point about this passage is that although Temple, 
as a non-propositional theologian, has an instinctive tendency 
to eschew natural theology - this has been a dominant feature 
of twentieth century theology (even in the Roman Catholic 
church, Karl Rahner has pleaded for 'kerygmatic theology' 
directed to preaching and limited almost entirely to the 
message of the gospels, while Orthodox theology has emphasised 
patristic thought, and Barth repeatedly repudiated natural 
theology) - he seems tacitly to accept the twofold tradition, 
so strong in the Roman Catholic church, of Natural and Revealed 
Theology; and his comments may be read as a call for a 
combination of the two, rather than a Barthian rejection. It 
should also be noted tha t there are signs of a re turn to 
natural theology in the work of recent religious thinkers l63 : 
it appears tha t some questions do not disappear, despi te the 
different sets of questions Barthians would wish to be the 
central focus of theology. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NATURAL ORDER 
••• If the conception of a good has to be expounded 
in terms of such actions as those of a practice, of 
the narrative unity of a human life and of a moral 
tradition, then goods, and with them the only grounds 
for the authori ty of laws and virtues, can only be 
discovered by entering into those relationships which 
constitute communities whose central bond is a shared 
vision of and understanding of goods. l 
William Temple's ethical philosophy flows naturally from his 
views on value - if personality is the highest value, then any 
ethic is necessarily personal: it lies in doing good for the 
person wi thin a communi ty. This points towards a version of 
situation or contingency ethics, because the needs of a 
particular person are determined by his circumstances; and 
circumstances arise out of his own nature, his particular 
needs, his role in society, and the exigencies of a given time. 
As we have seen, Temple had been influenced by the Idealist 
vision of a moral code based on 'My Station and Its Duties', 
and much of his wri ting is about the actual life of the 
Christian within a whole community. His concern with political 
life is well-known; as we shall see, this seemed to him an 
inevi table consequence of concern for the communi ty, and the 
growth of an individual's life. If the whole personality is in 
fellowship with others, a community has an inner dynamic, and 
this is political (though not necessarily party political). For 
Temple, as for Aristotle, ethics leads naturally into the 
political area: in ethical matters, he was - certainly towards 
the end of his life - much closer to an Aristotelian than a 
Platonic position than he might have cared to admit; and there 
is no essential difference between his views and those recently 
3 1 2 
expounded by Alisdair Macintyre, cited at the head of this 
chapter. 
One of the tragedies of Temple's life is that we do not have 
from him a single major work on ethics. It is clear, especially 
from his later writings, that he was developing a coherent 
ethical posi tion: Christiani ty and Social Order, wri t ten in 
1941, has an integration in its views not always present in 
earlier writings. The circumstance of war, the social currents 
that led - nationally - to a concern about how society might be 
constructed in the post-war years, seem to have concentrated 
his mind on the fundamental principles which should underlie 
future developments. In these matters, he was an activist: the 
'Temple clause' in the 1944 Education Act is perhaps the most 
famous and certainly most debated section of R.A.But1er's 
blueprint for the next generation. Of course, Temple had always 
been an active commentator on the events of his time, busy on 
commissions and enquiries, a tireless worker on behalf of the 
unemployed and in industrial matters, but what had been hints 
and suggestions in his books hitherto was to be integrated into 
the conception of Natural Order, explicit in Christianity and 
Social Order, though not fully worked out. (I shall suggest 
that various articles show inconsistencies in his scheme, but 
there are clues that he might have been able, given time, to 
present something more permanently valuable.) The concept of 
Natural Order was a conscious attempt to integrate Anglican 
thought into the Natural Law tradition, so strong in the Roman 
Catholic church. Had he lived, Temple might have found 
particular ecumenical value in the development of common 
ethical criteria. (He was President of what was to be the World 
Council of Churches. At this time, the Catholic church refused 
any links wi th thi s body, though Temple did much to develop 
personal ties - in 1939, Temple, the Chief Rabbi and Cardinal 
Hinsley addressed a Royal Albert Hall meeting to attack racial 
persecution in Germany2, and in 1941 was involved, with 
C d o 1 1 d th lOn a JOolOnt letter to The Times ar lna Hins ey an 0 ers, 
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accepting the Pope's 'Five Peace Points. ,3) Iremonger tells us 
that: 
Temple never disguised his belief that the 
differences between the Roman and Anglican Churches 
cut deep into the intellectual and spiritual life of 
both Communions, but this separation did nothing to 
impair his friendship wi th Cardinal Hinsley - there 
was a notable sympathy between the two men, and each 
had a warm regard for the other - and he had begun to 
work happily wi th Hinsley's successor Cardinal 
Griffin, who declared that he was 'looking forward', 
at the time of the Archbishop's death, 'to many years 
of fruitful association' in their 'common tasks'. 
Temple also had plans, towards the end of his life, 
for making a more personal approach to the Vatican, 
in the hope that Roman and Anglican theologians might 
be encouraged to undertake some joint study of the 
Natural Law as the basis of Christian living, but for 
more than one reason he decided to abandon the 
project. 4 
The interest in Natural Law was genuine, as may be seen from a 
late articleS based on an address to the Aquinas Society. This 
is an important piece of writing, because Temple spells both 
his view on the value of Aquinas and indicates where he 
believes Aquinas requires modification in the light of modern 
conditions. The value of this summary for the Temple scholar is 
that we are able to see how the demands for modification in the 
Thomist ethical scheme flow from the developed themes of 
Temple's mature theology. 
Temple believes tha t the Thomis t scheme requires modifica tion 
in six ways: 
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1. The society of the thirteenth century was a stable one, far 
less fluid than our own. This fixity enabled the moral thinker 
to perceive rights and obligations more readily than today: a 
modern recasting of Thomism should reflect this change. 
2. The modern fluidi ty is in large part the consequence of 
modern concern for the individual personali ty - Aquinas is 
insufficiently concerned with individuality. 
3. Aquinas, living in a static society, has nothing to say 
about the dynamics of social progress: 'we need to develop a 
type of responsible ci tizenship for which his world made no 
opportuni ty. ,6 
4. Aquinas gives insufficient weight to sin, treating 
individual sins as individual problems, rather than considering 
evil in all its manifestations: 'whatever may be true of St. 
Thomas himself, the Thomist 
does not adequately convey 
tradi tion as commonly presented 
the awful pervasiveness and 
penetrating potency of sin in all departments of human life, 
including in its sphere of poisonous influence even our worship 
and our generosity. ,7 
5. St. Thomas is too concerned with knowledge, not enough with 
'affective knowledge': 'the inadequate appreciation of 
individuality in Thomism leads to an insufficient emphasis upon 
actual personal relations - what some moderns call "meeting" -
alike in morals and in religion.'S 
6. Thomism has a too conceptual interpretation of revelation: 
'Thomism proceeds upon the widely accepted view that Revelation 
is given in propositions. I should contend that the primary 
medium of Revelation is events ••• in all Revelation what is 
revealed is not a truth concerning God but God Himself in 
action. ,9 
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For these reasons, it is, I think, possible to understand why 
Temple prefers the term 'Na tural Order' to 'Na tural Law': he 
wishes to distance himself from too close an identification 
with a purely Thomist interpretation of Natural Law. I suggest 
that for Temple, the roots of his approach lie elsewhere than 
in Thomism, though his conclusions are similar. It is also true 
that there was an emphasis in his time on a particular concept 
of 'order': Bishop Bell produced a Penguin Special, 
Christianity and World Order; another Penguin was A.C.F.Beales' 
The Catholic Church and International Order (1941): and in 
1942, Father Philip Hughes published The Pope's New Order. In 
1943, R.A.L.Smith wrote 'Dictators and democrats, bureaucrats 
and business men, one and all acclaim a New Order that is to 
come into being at the end of the war. ,10 'Order' was a 
fashionable and charged word of the years surrounding 
Christianity and Social Order: Temple is trying to relate it to 
deep moral principle. 
The Concept of Natural Order 
Temple does not produce a clear definition of natural order: 
rather he attempts to show its significance ostensively, by 
demonstration. Its roots lie in a realisation that one needs 
some means of applying the Christian virtues of love and 
justice: to say that the solution of a problem is to love, or 
to be just, is not a particularly helpful answer to practical 
difficulties: 
It is axiomatic that Love should be the predominant 
Christian impulse, and that the primary form of Love 
in Social organisation is Justice. No doubt this 
latter truth is sometimes ignored by those who wish 
to apply Love, so to speak, wholesale and direct. But 
it is hard to see how this works out. Imagine a Trade 
Union Committee negotiating with an Employer's 
Federation in an industrial crisis on the verge of a 
3 1 6 
strike or lock-out. This Committee is to be activated 
by love. Oh, yes, by all means - but towards whom? 
Are they to love the workers or the employers? Of 
course - both. But then that will not help them much 
to determine what terms ought to be either proposed 
or accepted. The fact is that these problems arise 
only so far as perfect love is not operative. That is 
a reason why both sides should confess their sin, but 
still the problem is unresolved. ll 
What is needed is some practical guidance on how to apply love 
and justice; and the bes t way to achieve this, as in the 
resolution of any problem, is to have a series of priorities: 
to ask what is most important. The concept of natural order, in 
Temple's formulation, provides an answer to the problem of 
producing agreed priorities. 
Natural order is discovered 'partly by observing the generally 
accepted standards of judgement and partly by consideration of 
the proper functions of whatever is the subject of enquiry.,12 
The second is particularly important. What is meant may perhaps 
be best understood from Temple's own example: 
• • • 
in the economic field, the reason why goods are 
produced is that men may satisfy their needs by 
consuming these goods. Production by its own natural 
law exists for consumption. If, then, a system comes 
into being in which production is regulated more by 
the profit obtainable for the producer, that system 
is defying the Natural Law or Natural Order. 
There is nothing wrong about profits as such. It has 
always been recognised that both the producer and the 
trader are entitled to a profit as their own means of 
livelihood, which they have earned by their service 
to the communi ty. Further, there can be no profi t 
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except so far as the needs f o customers are being 
met. But it is possible none the less for those two 
to get into the wrong order, so that the consumer is 
treated, not as a person whose interest is the true 
end of the whole process, but only as an 
indispensable condition of success in an essentially 
profit-seeking enterprise. 13 
Wha t is demanded is an analysis of purpose: to examine a 
particular activity to discover its end. In relation to its end 
a given course of action may be judged and rightly ordered. 
Temple comments in his article on Thomism, 'Many of the 
troubles of the modern world come from the confusion of means 
and ends. St. Thomas vindicates the saying of St. Augustine 
that omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis et frui utendis 
by pointing out that lex aeterna primo et principaliter ordinat 
hominem ad finem (Sum. Theol. Pt.I, Q.II, A.7l),14 
In his analysis of modern problems, Temple articulates a 
feeling shared by many - that disorder (Aquinas refers to sin 
as inordinatio) enters society when the true purpose of an 
organisation is subordinated to other ends. A company initially 
exis ts to supply a perceived gap in the market, and 
incidentally, to profit by supplying that gap. Sometimes, as 
the company grows, this appears to be forgotten - companies 
will deliberately manipulate the market, or restrict supplies 
for the sake of profits, either their own or those of financial 
backers. The problem of contradictory ends arises, perhaps with 
particular clarity in the case of nationalised industries. In 
Britain, industries have been nationalised, but there has been 
no consistent reasoning for their public ownership. The rail 
system provides a particular example: nationalised to ensure a 
means of travel for all, they have at various times been 
measured not in terms of their efficiency in providing a 
service but of profitability. (It might be argued that this is 
inevitable given that they do weigh on the public purse: I am 
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not concerned with a political point, but with the problems of 
inconsistency of purpose). Rail links have been cut, not 
because they do not serve a need but because they do not make a 
profi t. In other fields, there is often a half-spoken 
suggestion that a health service or educational establishment 
exists not for health or education but for other purposes, or 
that the service is subordinate to administrative convenience. 
Temple expressed these views for a broad English audience. He 
was not the first to do so - as an example, Cardinal Manning, 
commenting in 1891 on Rerum Novarum, presented a graphic 
picture of disorder: 
It is clear that the normal state of man in the 
natural order is that every man should have and 
should dwell in his own home, surrounded by the 
duties and charities of life. If the civil population 
of the country were debarred from marriage, like the 
standing army, the face of the country would be 
visited with all the evils of a garrison town. 
Homeless men are reckless. 1S 
The signal importance of Temple lies not in his originality but 
in the influence of his views: Denys Mumby refers to 
Christianity and Social Order as 'one of the foundation piers 
of the Welfare State,16, and Hannen Swaffer of the Daily Herald 
said that the Labour Party owed its sweeping victory of 1945 
17 Ch· . . t more to William Temple than to any other man. r1st1an1 y 
and Social Order was easily Temple's most popular book: over 
130,000 copies were sold on publication in 1942. 18 Temple 
himself tells us in his preface that 'the principles which I 
lay down are not an expression of a purely personal point of 
view but represent the main trend of Christian social 
teaching. ,19 
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It is not surprising that we should find hints of natural order 
thought in earlier works. In Mens Creatrix, there is reference 
to order: 'The true aim alike of State and individual is tha t 
condi tion which may be called ei ther free order or ordered 
d ,20 H . i free om. e lns sts upon a right ordering of the functions 
of the state: if this is ignored, disorder and tyranny follow: 
'Inasmuch as man is social, the State and the Church must be 
maintained even at great cost; but it must not be forgotten 
that the happiness or character they aim at producing can only 
be actualised by their individual members, and the 
individuality of the State is subservient to that of the 
citizens, because its function is subservient.,21 Perhaps most 
interestingly, he stresses the dehumanisation of industrial 
society, 
and not 
'the sense tha t the employees are trea ted as "hands" 
as "persons", so far as the industry is concerned. 
Their personali ty apparently is for their leisure time; only 
their productive utility counts in industry itself. ,22 
Precisely the same point had been made by Pope Leo XIII in 
Rerum Novarum: 'i t is shameful and inhuman to trea t men like 
chattels to make money by, or to look upon them as merely so 
much muscle or physical strength,23, and depersonalisation by 
industry is the major theme of Pope John Paul II's Laborens 
Exercens (1981). The question of means and ends is raised in 
Christus Veri tas, almost as an aside: 'i t is enough to make 
clear the danger of separating means and ends in our estimate 
of the value of ends. The means may have no value in itself, 
and yet may increase the value of the end which is reached 
through it. ,24 
The talk of means and ends enables us to understand the origin 
of Temple's conception of natural order. It is derived, I 
think, not from his study of Aquinas, but from his knowledge of 
Kant: it is an attempt to work through the implications of the 
second form of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Temple is 
explicit about this: 'in his second version of the Categorical 
Imperative _ "Treat humanity always as an end withal and never 
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only as a means" - he found the true moral principle; but ••• 
he never perceived or elaborated its full significance. ,25 
This Kantian formulation is entirely consistent with the 
metaphysical bases of Temple's thought: it values personality 
most highly, and is connected with purpose. 'Right order' 
involves the prioritising of people and their needs above any 
other ••• 'because it is of persons, the highest interest of the 
community and of its members is a personal interest, the 
fulfilment of their being as Persons; and this is Righteousness 
. •• For whatever is a truly personal good a good which 
resides in a person - takes priori ty over all non-personal 
goods, because morali ty is the discovery or recogni tion by 
persons of personality in others, to whom by the common 
attribute of personality they are bound in the ties of 
community membership. ,26 
We find here the characteristic stress on the personal: the 
basis of natural order is the value, the centrali ty, of the 
person. This, I think, is a difference of emphasis from Aquinas 
(as we saw, Temple considered tha t Aquinas gave too small a 
place to the individual): Aquinas emphasises rather the 
juridical aspects of natural law - its basis is not the primacy 
of the personality, but divine law: 'since all things subject 
to divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law 
.•• it is evident that all things partake somewhat of eternal 
law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, 
they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts 
and ends.,27 Natural law is seen, in Gilson's words as 
'universal legislation,28, placing beings 'in a position 
similar to that of rational persons, governed by a law.,29 (We 
should be careful, however, to recognise some ambigui ty in 
Aquinas about the use of the term 'law': scholars have been 
careful to distinguish two senses - 'ius' and 'lex': these have 
been explored in outline by A.P.D'Entreves 30 , and in detail by 
Oscar J.Brown3l • The significant point is that it is something 
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to which human beings naturally conform, rather than developed 
out of our being.) 
If natural order is concerned with the individual person and 
his needs, then it may indeed be possible to use it as a basis 
of ethical judgment. Temple believes the conception provides 
practical guidance: 
It is wholesome to go back to this conception of 
Natural Law because it holds together two aspects of 
truth which it is not easy to hold in combination -
the ideal and the practical. We tend to follow one or 
other of two lines: either we start from a purely 
ideal conception, and then bleat fatuously about 
love; or else we start from the world as it is with 
the hope of remedying an abuse here or there, and 
then we have no general direction or cri terion of 
progress. The conception of Natural Law will help us 
to frame a conception of the right or ideal relation 
between the various activities of men and of the men 
engaged in them. For consideration of the status of 
an activity in the light of its social function keeps 
both the ideal and the practical full in view. 32 
It is apparent tha t the guidance is not the 
answers to every problem, but rather of how 
provision of 
to determine 
ethical priorities. In ethics, a traditional and fundamental 
problem is that of conflict between priorities, as when the 
demands of honesty and charity pull in different directions. 
Natural order provides criteria for making the necessary 
judgment: in brief, one asks what is best for the persons 
involved. Morality is served when one asks not what is the 
right rule to follow, but rather, what is the good (what 
benefits personality) for this person/these persons. The 
clarification of problems comes if one is able to say 'for this 
person, charity is more important than honesty': but that 
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judgment is based on analysis of circumstance. The criterion of 
judgment becomes not rule-based, but circumstance-based. 
Situation Ethics 
In the encyclical Summi Pontificatus (1939), Pope Pius XII 
enunciated a doctrine of the natural law with which Temple's 
thought is in accord: 'God's law, imposed in the moral order, 
bids us carefully distinguish, in the interests of the common 
good, what is the right and what is the wrong way of meeting 
the needs of the moment, what necessity does and what it does 
not demand of us.,33 The extension of natural law into such a 
situationa1ism seems common among its practitioners. A recent 
Catholic writer emphasises the point: 'In the final accounting, 
there is no authoritative guidebook by which Christians can 
determine what is consistent with the Gospel and what is not. 
The Christian lives in a world of pre-moral and moral values 
and of rna teria1 and formal norms which express those values. 
But those norms have to be applied in each case, and no case is 
exactly like another. ,34 Aquinas himself draws attention to the 
situationa1ism inherent in each instance of moral judgment: 
'whatever is received is received according to the mode 
[situation] of the receiver. ,35 
This aspect of situationalism may properly be traced to 
Aristotle. In the Nichomachean Ethics, he constantly emphasises 
that right ethical action depends upon the situation, the 
agent, and the activities involved. This demands the practical 
virtue of prudence, which he likens to art. Likewise, Aquinas 
distinguishes the intellectual virtues as 'five in number: the 
understanding of principles, the science of conclusions, the 
wisdom of judging by the highest causes involved in in a given 
situation, the prudence of right doing, and the art of right 
making. ,36 The distinction between prudence and art is 
clarified in the Summa Theo1ogica: 'The value of art consists, 
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not in the artist, but in the work of art, for making, which is 
an action going out into external material, is a perfection, 
not of the maker, but of the thing made. But the value of 
prudence is in the doer, who is perfected by his activity, for 
prudence is the right idea of things to be done 37 ••• Prudence 
concerns the whole of human life and its last end; art deals 
with a local end.,38 This activity is essential to the 
application of moral virtue: and is only rightly applied when 
prudence leads to appropriate action: 
• •• moral virtue is a habi t making a good choice. 
Here two conditions are called for, a good intention 
of the end, which moral virtue provides by giving us 
a bias to what is reasonable, and a right taking of 
means, which implies that the reason takes good 
counsel, makes the right selection, and commends the 
correct course, all of which functions attach to 
prudence and its associate virtues. Moral virtue in 
consequence requires understanding of principles. As 
theory works from true premises so prudence 
presupposes a true sense of background, for it is the 
right idea of dealing with a human situation. 39 
We note that there is here a realisation that moral conduct 
involves the application of virtues: natural order, for Temple, 
provides the prudential criterion necessary for that 
application to specific situations. 
While, since Aristotle, moral philosophers have been concerned 
with questions of application of principles, it is in the 
present century tha t there has been particular emphasis on 
situational ethics. In simple terms, this approach is based on 
the idea that there is no one right way of conducting any part 
of human life - the 'right' way of behaving is not determined 
by reference to a particular rule which always holds, but 
according to the exigencies of a given situation. What is 
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'right' or 'wrong' in a given set of circumstances is 
determined by that situation: any rules one may follow are at 
best guidelines or rules of thumb - only the needs of the 
situation can tell us whether we should apply particular rules. 
A situationalist does not usually dispense with all rules, 
because experience tells us that it is generally wise to follow 
certain patterns of behaviour: what he does do is to say that 
no rule is universally applicable - in certain circumstances, 
it is positively the right thing to do to disobey the rule and 
wrong to obey. Thus, a situationalist would say that in most 
circumstances, experience has shown that it is best to tell the 
truth, (and so he can formula te the general rule 'tell the 
truth'), but it does not follow that it is right always to tell 
the truth. If we suppose that we have information vital to the 
country's interest and an enemy agent is questioning us, it is 
not merely permissible to tell a lie - in these circumstances 
it is positively the right thing to do: the situationalist 
would say that in these circumstances it would be wrong not to 
lie. This approach might seem fairly obvious in the case of 
lying, but fewer people are prepared to go all the way with the 
situationalist's belief that nothing is exempt from the 
possibility of exception - a true situationalist would not, for 
instance, be a pacifis t, because he could not rule out the 
possibility that in certain circumstances it would be right to 
go to war. If challenged by the example of burning babies, he 
would say simply that he could not think of any circumstances 
where this would be right, but he accepts the theoretical 
possibility that such a circumstance might arise. If a 
situational approach is adopted it is argued it is 
essential that one has in mind not general rules but general 
goals: in ethical matters it might be that one should always so 
act that the welfare of the individual person is paramount. 
According to Joseph Fletcher, there is nothing in this account 
of situationalism with which Temple would disagree. Perhaps we 
would be wise to remember that Fletcher is one of the leading 
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exponents of what Peschke has called 'agapist situationism,40. , 
he has published a number of significant books on the 
subject. 4l The maxim of this view of ethics is that the rule is 
to love: but only circumstances can enable us to determine what 
is the loving action. 
Temple's clearest exposition of situationalism may be found in 
a relatively late essay: the passage requires full quotation: 
••• our whole case is that it can [be], and often is, 
right to do things which in isolation are bad. What 
things it is right to do may be very much affected by 
circumstances. Murder is always wrong; because murder 
is the taking of another man's life for personal and 
selfish ends. To kill a man, if tha t is the only 
alternative to being killed by him, is not murder; it 
is usually classed as justified homicide. Even if it 
is arguable that a perfect Christian would allow 
himself to be killed rather than kill his would-be 
murderer in self-defence, it is not arguable that he 
should allow a human brute to kill a child rather 
than to kill that brute himself. Of course he should 
stop him without taking his life if that is possible; 
but if it is not possible, he is not only at liberty, 
he is under obligation to kill; and that obligation 
is rooted in love. 
People sometimes become confused by the recognition 
that the rightness of most acts is relative and not 
absolute' but this does not mean that the rightness ,
is in any way doubtful ... The general principle is 
that relative terms are absolute in the appropriate 
relations. To kill is right, if at all, relatively 
and not absolutely; that is, it can only be right in 
special circumstances. But in those circumstances it 
is absolutely right. 
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It is doubtful if any act is right "in itself". Every 
act is a link in a chain of causes d ff an e ects ••• 
The rightness of an act ••• nearly always, and 
perhaps always, depends on the way in which that act 
is related to circumstances; that is what is meant by 
calling it relatively right; but this does not in the 
least imply that it is only doubtfully right. It may 
be, in those circumstances, certainly and absolutely 
right. 
Sometimes it looks as if an act were right apart from 
all relativity - as when a father gives a present to 
a child, or a man lays down his life for his friends. 
But it is possible to "spoil" children! And while the 
giving of oneself for others is always a sign of 
noble unselfishness, it only becomes right if the 
interest of the friends which is served in this way 
is the highest. A man ought not to put his life in 
serious danger in order to provide for his friends 
some momentary amusement, though this might be 
accurately described as laying down life for those 
friends. 42 
I think that other examples might be brought to show that some 
acts are never right: but it would be more helpful to see how 
Temple attempts to justify his approach in two particular moral 
questions; these may enable us to judge his consistency. 
Two Cases: War and Gambling 
(i) War 
The passage just quoted is taken from Temple's writing during 
the Second World War. I t is significant because war tends to 
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demand a large number of compromises in moral conduct - on one 
occasion, Winston Churchill remarked that in wartime truth is 
so precious that it must be surrounded by a bodyguard of lies. 
His remark was concerned wi th deception; and in the Second 
World War, the British effort required deception, adul tery, 
theft, and many other activities in pursuit of what appeared 
just ends - the evil of Nazism seemed to make many of these 
activities not simply permissible but necessary. In Germany, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer felt morally bound to those who plotted the 
assassination of Hitler, believing this to be morally right. 
Temple himself was no pacifis t, and in 1940 he published a 
pamphlet, A Condi tional Jus tifica tion of War, in which he 
accepted - in essence - the just war doctrine, and the concept 
of the lesser evil. Each of these is an essentially 
situationalist position. He argues that the specific 
circumstances of the Second World War make it necessary: 
The whole question, then, comes down to this: Is the 
Nazi threat to civilisation so serious that the evil 
of allowing it to develop is grea ter even than the 
monstrous evil of war? 
About the answer to that question I have no doubt. 
Most of the elements in life which we reckon as of 
highest value are incompatible with Nazi rule. What 
is happening in Bohemia and Poland illustrates the 
principles and temper of tha t rule; and its 
characteristic institutions are the Gestapo and the 
concentration camps. Far better some years of "total 
war", wi th all its misery and waste and increasing 
bitterness of spirit, than the riveting of that 
diabolic system upon more and more peoples. 43 
The consideration of the example of the Second World War points 
to a specific difficul ty wi th the 'lesser evil' doctrine. It 
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seems to me that that war provided, from the point of view of 
the Allied cause, as near an example of the just war as history 
affords. The difficulty is of determining the lesser evil: in 
declaring war, any nation is involved in imponderables. For 
this reason, a traditional view that to wage a just war, 
'victory must be assured,44 seems to ask thee impossible; 
certainly in 1939 Britain had no such assurance. But to embark 
on war is to unleash evils which cannot be foreseen - in 1939, 
the sufferings of Dresden, the extent of Soviet suffering, and 
the cruel carnage of the Soviet advance on Berlin, could not be 
foreseen. In saying that war is the lesser evil, there are two 
problems: the impossibility of knowing whether the actual evils 
of war truly are less than the hypothetical evils of not 
fighting; and the impossibility of judging whether war is truly 
the las t resort. Even wi th these provisos, si tua tions crea te 
their own difficulties. If we are to say war is only just if it 
is truly the last resort, we may be at odds with a 'lesser 
evil' doctrine. In these circumstances, we may say that a 
nation may legitimately defend itself if attacked. This would 
seem to require tha t a country should wai t while its enemy 
masses at its borders. It is difficult to say this is wholly 
moral or the lesser evil: a successful preemptive strike may, 
in the end, create less carnage than awaiting attack - for 
Britain to have waited until France had fallen and its 
territorial boundaries invaded does not seem significantly more 
moral than taking arms in 1939. 
If there are significant problems with war - and we have only 
touched on these45 pacifism raises, starkly, situational 
problems. One problem is that pacifism seems effective only in 
certain circumstances. Mahatma Gandhi - frequently cited as a 
paradigm case of effective pacifism - was successful because of 
cultural circumstances: British India was not a totalitarian 
state, his acti vi ties touched a chord of public opinion in 
, S . t U 1·0 or Hitler's Britain, and so on. In Stalin s OVle n n 
Germany or Hoxha's Albania, he would have been ineffective, his 
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disappearance unmarked. It was circumstance that made him 
effective, and his political genius was in the manipulation of 
situations. 
These difficulties remain: many of these points recur in 
current debate about nuclear weapons. Part of the problem is 
muddy thinking. Temple's clear personalism is useful here. It 
is evidently helpful to thought not to assert that 'nuclear 
weapons are immoral': they are inanimate, and thus morally 
neutral. If we ask whether the making, ownership or use of such 
weapons is moral, if we thus personalise the debate, then we 
are closer to the issues. A further thought demonstrates this. 
If we knew - which is impossible that the possession of 
nuclear weapons would guarantee no more war, or no significant 
war, I doubt that there would be any debate about keeping them. 
Our dilemma is that we do not cannot know this. A 
situational judgment has to be made in a case in which it is 
not possible to know all relevant circumstances. And this is a 
weakness, if an inevitable one, of situationalism. Nor is it 
true of war alone: almost any situation is likewise to a degree 
uncertain. 
This is compounded by human weakness. I judge the cause of the 
Second World War Allies to be generally jus t; but I am aware 
that the Axis powers considered their cause just. A pacifist 
may wish to consider the 'slippery slope' argument, similar to 
that sometimes used against abortion or euthanasia. This would 
hold that if one admits any war as just, as moral boundaries 
are blurred it is inevitable that people will argue that this 
or that other war is just because it is like the first in some 
t l.°t lOS better to morally relevant respects. On this argumen , 
hold the line against all wars because of the corrupting effect 
- the permissive effect - of admitting anyone as just. Such an 
argument takes us to the heart of discussion about 
situationalism, and the argument about about a situational or a 
more absolute ethical system/ I would suggest, against such a 
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pacifist view, that its consequence is itself a form of 'lesser 
evil' argument, which puts it On a par with, and, I think, as 
identical to the just war argument it purports to refute. For 
such an argument claims that we must accept the lesser evil (of 
suffering the consequences of non-resistance) for the sake of 
the greater good (the avoidance of war). Thus it is itself a 
'lesser evil' argument: and one may not legitimately use a 
lesser evil argument to deny the validity of a lesser evil 
argument. This leaves us with the argument between pacifist and 
non-pacifist no further forward: each appears to rely on a 
'lesser evil' argument; and only circumstance would appear to 
be a guide - uncertain though it necessarily is - as to which 
is right. Perhaps, in the case of war, only situationalism is 
possible as a judgment though it is a circumstance of 
judgment as uncertain and as dangerous as war itself. In this 
Temple is consistent. He is conscious that to attempt to take a 
particular position on a particular war creates special moral 
demands: 
• • • one thing is certain. I f we are to use such 
justification of joining in war as has been offered 
wi thout becoming involved in horrible hypocrisy, we 
must be in deadly earnest. Only if we are determined 
to see that our victory really does serve justice and 
freedom; only if we are determined in our own 
national life to promote justice and freedom where 
now they are imperfectly attained; only on these 
conditions dare we come forward as their champions in 
war. 
Especially must we remember that it is very hard to 
extract justice from strife. The passions evoked by 
war blind the vision and distort the judgment. We 
dare not hope to make our victory resul t in pure 
justice. We can, indeed, make it result in something 
far nearer justice than a Nazi domination; that alone 
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would justify our fighting. But we must not ignore 
the perils inseparable from our enterprise; and we 
must steadfastly determine that we will resist, so 
far as by God's help we can, these corrupting 
. fl 46 1n uences ••• 
It is clear that situationalism is not an easy form of ethics: 
it requires constant intellectual effort, clear-mindedness, and 
acute judgment; and the ability to avoid self-deception. For it 
is easy to believe that one is rightly judging circumstances 
when simply interpreting them to suit oneself: the history of 
war demonstrates this phenomenon with special force. 
(ii) Gambling 
In 1927, Temple republished an essay which had appeared in The 
Pilgrim, on gambling. It is interesting because he uses a 
natural order argument in an attempt to demonstrate that 
gambling is always wrong - a view that seems at odds with his 
situationalism, and which, I think, points to a significant 
weakness in Temple's position. 
Temple condemns even moderate gambling on the grounds of 
example, in remarkably fierce language: 
The advocate of gambling in moderation usually 
appeals in fact to a profoundly anti-social 
principle, which is conspicuously dominant today. The 
moderate gambler is very liable to say that he does 
no harm with his gambling, and if others do harm with 
theirs, that is no affair of his. But that is, in the 
strict and theological sense of the term, damnable; 
and to that form of damnation we are 
prone ••• This reversion to ethical 
it cuts too fatally at 
jus t now very 
individualism 
the roots of cannot 
social 
last; 
life; but it is now prevalent and widely 
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pernicious. To take your pleasure in a way which 
encourages your neighbour in a course so noxious for 
him is wicked. To repudiate responsibility for one's 
influence is as profoundly wicked as anything can be 
- far wickeder than most crimes of passion - for it 
denies one of the springs of all obligation. 47 
Temple is here raising a significant point for any 
situationalism, which is the effect of example. Among the 
consequences of an action is the example it sets for the 
conduct of others, and any complete theory of situation ethics 
must put this into the balance of judgment. It is rare that 
consequences of action are entirely unknown; and it is a 
profound truth of human frailty that we are influenced by the 
activity of others 'If he can do it, why can't I?' is 
frequently heard: arguments tha t circumstances are different 
tend to fallon deaf ears. The weight of example is one 
particularly difficult to calculate in reaching a moral 
assessment; but it is something which calls in the First Form 
of Kant's Categorical Imperative, the principle of 
universalisation. Of course, one may consistently believe that 
in any circumstances one may consistently ask 'what if everyone 
acted like this?' and consistently will that everyone should; 
yet it is this type of thought which unusual conduct has to 
contend wi th. The problem is a familiar one. I may say, ' I 
would wish anyone in similar circumstances to act as I do'; but 
it does not follow that circumstances are truly repeatable. In 
a certain situation I behave in a particular way; and that is 
visible. What is not visible is my reasoning. If I say 'I would 
wish anyone in similar circumstances to act as I do', I 
actually mean something like 'I would wish anyone in similar 
circumstances to consider these particular points/ to develop 
his logic/ to think about human needs of the people involved/ 
to be a caring human being/ to behave physically as I do'; and 
much of that process is invisible. Only outward signs are 
visible - actions, and any words I may use - but my inner 
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processes are not, nor are any small but significant pOints 
which make these circumstances special. When I say I would wish 
people to act as I do, I do not (or should not) mean that they 
simply ape my actions: I would hope I meant that in so far as I 
acted as a thoughtful, independent moral agent, that others 
would so act. I might further say that it is situationalism 
that I wish to universalise the conduct of examining 
circumstances in a certain kind of way. 
Temple's argument against gambling is based on the idea that it 
is a distortion of the natural order, because it involves the 
distribution of money by chance: 
••• the excitement •.• resides in the hope and fear of 
winning or losing money, according to some unknown 
contingency largely determined by luck or chance 
(that is, by forces not rationally controlled). 
Now the distribution of money by chance is a socially 
wrong principle ••• gambling is, in mere fact, a 
source of immense moral and social evil; so that, if 
its principle is false, it ought to be altogether 
repudiated. And its principle certainly is false ••. 
we see it when someone wins a big sum for no service 
rendered. It is bad for the winner, who is encouraged 
to live idly; it is bad for society, within which 
wealth, with its labour-directing potency, is so 
distributed. Wealth ought to be distributed in 
accordance wi th <:~) need, (b) service rendered, C.S) 
service expected; the last is the justification for 
inherited wealth. No one proposes that wealth should 
be distributed in accordance with chance. That is a 
false principle ••• 48 
The objection which springs to mind is that life is indeed 
deeply influenced by chance, in a host of ways: whether I come 
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from this or that land, have inherited such and such 
characteristics, have been brought up in particular 
circumstances, are all strictly matters of chance. So far as I 
am concerned, these forces are not rationally controllable. To 
an extent, all my activities may be touched by chance: and it 
has been a force in my life in all sorts of unexpected ways. 
If other matters are affected by chance, one wonders what is 
special about money. It could be argued that it is man-made, 
and hence ought to be more strictly controllable than natural 
circumstances. Money is socially affected: the social value of 
money changes. In the middle ages, money had Ii t tIe social 
value: it bought little, for most needs (and these were 
different) were met by other 
through the development of 
service-based economy; and 
means. Money achieved its status 
a money-based, as opposed to a 
that with difficulty (Simon de 
Montfort's struggle with Henry III can be seen as in large part 
a consequence of a need by the monarchy for cash in a society 
not geared to provide it). But money is a social means to 
particular ends, and those ends change. I use money for a host 
of purposes unknown in the reign of Henry III; not least, I use 
it to provide recreation. Now. Temple nowhere suggests that the 
use of money for recreational purposes is wrong. It would be 
wrong to use it for recreation at the expense of my 
commitments; but it is almost inevitable that if I indulge my 
human need for leisure that today it will involve expenditure. 
It is also true that the question of chance enters recreation: 
it is, for instance, fundamental to sport. I may achieve 
success as a batsman because of the random effects of wind and 
rain on the state of the pitch, or because the sun was in the 
fielder's eyes when he dropped a catch before I had scored. 
My recreation involves expense and chance. Whether I choose to 
spend a sum of money on watching a day's cricket or on football 
pools seems a matter of indifference: in either case, chance 
enters - it might rain, or I might lose my few pounds. If it 
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rains, I lose money to no purpose as surely as I do on the 
football pools; either way, I help to provide employment, 
though it does me no service. If I play cricket, I gamble not a 
few pounds, but greater things: the risks may be low, but I 
hazard myself; I could be injured or killed, or by chance kill 
or maim another. If it is true that chance enters here, so too 
with money; and if gambling were abolished, chance would still 
affect wealth, as when a natural disaster gravely affects a 
company. Chance seems part of the natural order, and part of 
recreation: if recreation almost necessarily involves money, I 
cannot see that moderate gambling is any more offensive than 
other recreational activity, why money has a moral value denied 
to the other things I use as the counters of recreation. 
Other thinkers wi thin the na tural law tradi tion do no t share 
Temple's severity about gambling. Even Peschke, whose tendency 
is to be more rigid than Temple on morali ty, is content to 
limit himself to 'husbands have the serious responsibility not 
to waste their money through gambling, drinking, exorbitant 
smoking, etc. ,49 He does not condemn gambling in moderation, 
provided that more important commitments are met. J.Messner, in 
perhaps the most Significant twentieth century work of applied 
natural law, comments: 
Precisely because certain ends are essential for the 
integration of the human person, in the process of 
this integration they all hold their own against ends 
of higher rank as long as the latter are not thereby 
frustrated. Thus an existential end of lower rank 
prevails in conflict with one of higher rank if the 
former would be otherwise frus tra ted, provided tha t 
by giving way to the former the latter is not ruled 
out altogether. therefore gambling for the sake of 
recreation is good if other existential ends are not 
frustrated. 50 
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This touches on the most significant weakness in Temple's 
conception of natural order. Messner rightly - as I think _ 
holds that the human person is not a creature of . 1 d a slng e en , 
but a variety of ends, each of which has its own rights, and, 
as it were, its own logic. Fulfilment of the self has a variety 
of needs - intellectual, physical, spiritual, recreational, and 
so on. Any integration, any 'right ordering', requires balance 
of the needs. Messner gives an important example: 'A mother 
must nurse her child whose health is in serious danger and give 
up attending divine service, although the end of devotion to 
the child ranks in itself lower than that of devotion to the 
Creator; in the process of realisation, however, in the 
particular circumstances described, the end of devotion to the 
child's well-being prevails, since the end of its preservation 
is in danger of being frustrated, whereas the end of devotion 
to the Creator can still be attained. ,51 
The implication here is tha t there are different 'Orders' in 
human life, the needs of each of which have to be balanced, 
though the orders are, within themselves, self-contained. 
Temple briefly mentions the concept of orders - 'The Germans, 
with their fruitful doctrine of various "orders" (Ordnungen), 
have contributed much, and among English writers the American 
Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, has broken new ground wi th dis turbing 
but, as I am convinced, most salutary effect' 52 but he 
nowhere develops it. 
The concept of orders is, I think, clearest in the work of 
Niebuhr's friend, Bonhoeffer, who develops his ideas in his 
EthicsS3, though the corruption of the word 'order' by the 
Nazis led him to prefer the term 'divine mandates'. Bonhoeffer 
contends that there are five of these marriage, labour, 
culture, state and church. Each retains its legitimacy - by 
it serves God's purpose for divine commission - so long as 
man; but each is constrained by the other mandates - the state 
should not interfere in the church, nor culture in the state: 
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each has its own logic. There 
difficulties in this view, not least 
are, I think, certain 
the question of what would 
the idea is helpful in 
different and parallel ends, 
constitute 'interference' ; but 
suggesting that human activity has 
each with their own requirements. 
ideas Perhaps more frui tful for present discussion are the 
recently developed by John Finnis. He holds that there are a 
number of 'basic forms of good', and lists as necessary for 
human well-being: Life, Knowledge, Play, Aesthetic Experience, 
Sociabili ty, Practical Reasonableness, and 'Religion' 54, each 
of which is fundamental and a natural fact of human nature. The 
logic of these is, Finnis believes, beyond argument: we are so 
constituted that to be human is to wish to fulfil, in our 
individual ways, each of these forms of good. And because each 
is required, one may not suppress one (indeed, it would be 
unnatural to do so), for the sake of another. 
Finnis' suggestions are valuable to our present discussion in a 
particular way: adopting them enables us to see a way out of 
the posi tion which Temple's undifferentia ted 'na tural order' 
seemed to require. If we say that gambling belongs to the form 
of Play, it would - if nothing else intervened - be legitimate 
so long as it did not interfere wi th any other basic good: 
precisely the point made by Messner. Excessive gambling clearly 
would interfere with other goods; but so would any other form 
of excess (that, after all, is what we mean by 'excess'); and 
if it could be shown that a man's gambling did not interfere 
with his basic forms of good, nor those of anyone else, I would 
argue that it is not wrong. This is not at all the same as 
saying that all gambling is acceptable, or that anyone form of 
gambling is - only circumstance can determine that - but it is 
to say that I am unable to accept gambling as an exception to 
the situationalism for which Temple has argued. It is only 
necessary to find one example of gambling being acceptable to 
deny the universal condemnation; and I confess that I am quite 
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unable to see that the pleasure of an elderly pensioner backing 
a Grand National horse, or buying a ticket in a church raffle, 
is a source of damage to the natural order or the basis of 
economics. If the question of example is raised, it could be 
argued that the modest gamble is an example of moderation as 
much as of gambling - it is a matter of judgment which has the 
greater effect. The same problem arises with any act; those who 
wish to take it as an example tend to select those features of 
the act which appeal, rather than as a whole. 
Perhaps Temple's comments on gambling should be seen as an 
aberration within a generally consistent situationalism, but I 
suspect that they reflect conviction. Of course, few of us are 
ever wholly consistent, and his view has value in acting as a 
focus of discussion, not least because it is uncommon. 
* * * 
In later writings, Temple applies the concept of natural order 
to many issues, each of which demands deep study outside the 
scope of this thesis. Much of his writing concerns economic and 
financial matters - he was fascinated, for instance, by banking 
- yet no-one has attempted a detailed study of his views. 
Likewise, there is scope for an analysis of his views on 
education, the nature of the communi ty, and particularly his 
view of the effects of Calvinism on the economic order: each 
would properly require a thesis as long as this. All that has 
been possible in the present chapter is an outline of the 
natural order concept, with an attempt to draw out some 
examples of explicit situationalism. 
The Justification of Natural Order 
Natural law theory has, in the twentieth century, been the 
subject of considerable criticism. One of its fiercest critics 
has been Hans Kelsen, who has deeply influenced the development 
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of positive law theory. His remarks are particularly pertinent 
to any study of Temple's comments: 
The natural-law doctrine presupposes that value is 
immanent in reality and that this value is absolute, 
or, what amounts to the same thing, that a divine 
will is inherent in nature. Only under this 
presupposition is it possible to maintain the 
doctrine that the law can be deduced from nature and 
that this law is absolute justice. Since the 
metaphysical assumption of the immanence of value in 
natural reality is not acceptable from the point of 
view of sCience, the natural-law doctrine is based on 
the logical fallacy of an inference from the "is" to 
the "ought". The norms allegedly deduced from nature 
are - in truth - tacitly presupposed, and are based 
on subjective values, which are presented as the 
intentions of nature as a legislator. By identifying 
the laws of nature with rules of law, pretending that 
the order of nature is or contains a just social 
order, the natural-law doctrine, like primitive 
animism, conceives of nature as a part of socie ty. 
But it can be easily proved that modern science is 
the result of a process characterised by the tendency 
of emancipating the interpretation of nature from 
social categories. Before the tribunal of science, 
the natural-law doctrine has no chance. But it may 
deny the jurisdiction of this tribunal by referring 
to its religious character. 55 
Kelsen's confusion - and I think it is a confusion - is to 
assume that natural law is necessarily a religious perception. 
If, as I shall suggest, it is possible to deduce a form of 
natural law from human activity without reference to religious 
belief, much of the thrust of Kelsen's objection would fall. 
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Natural law theory has, as a matter of history, been closely 
tied to belief in God. Cicero, in his famous formulation of 
natural law theory, sees God as its source: 
True law is right reason in accordance with Nature; 
it is of universal application, unchanging and 
everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and 
averts from wrong-doing by its prohibitions ••• It is 
a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable 
to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is 
impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed 
from its obligations by Senate or People, and we need 
not look outside ourselves for an expounder or 
interpreter of it. And there will not be different 
laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and 
in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law 
will be valid for all nations and for all times, and 
there will be one master and one ruler, that is, God, 
over us all, for He is the author of this law, its 
promulgator, and its enforcing judge. S6 
It is also true that the classical theory of St. Thomas is based 
on the idea that 'Natural law ••• [is] ••• nothing else than 
the impression of the divine light in us ••• the Natural law 
is nothing else than the participation of the Eternal law in 
rational creatures. ,57 Even so, Aquinas is clear that the law 
is not an arbitrary divine command (he rejects the Divine 
Command theory of ethics) but is discernible by reason. This is 
absolutely clear in a central passage: 
St. Augustine says: 'There is no law unless it be 
just'. So the validity of law depends upon its 
justice. But in human affairs a thing is said to be 
just when it accords aright with the rule of reason: 
and ••• the first rule of reason is the Natural Law. 
Thus all humanly enac ted laws are in accord wi th 
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reason to the extent that they derive from the 
Natural Law. 58 
Thus, na tural law is discernible by and in accordance wi th 
reason: one may assume that for Aquinas, as for others, it is a 
natural perception of those who use reason. However, the point 
is not always clear in modern proponents of natural law theory 
- Jacques Maritain, for instance, constantly stresses the ties 
of natural law with theological virtue: 'it is thus that 
Christianity has suspended the moral from the supra-moral in 
the moral life of man,59, and d'Entreves has drawn attention to 
modern Thomists who develop natural law 'into a codified system 
of human rights based on the Christian view of the supreme 
value of the individual soul, the goal of Redemption. ,60 
It may be that it is this type of religious basis for natural 
law theory which is at the heart of Ke1sen's objection, though 
there is another area of difficulty. Ke1sen maintains that it 
is scientifically impossible to deduce an 'ought' from an 'is'; 
therefore no system of morality may be derived from a natural 
fact. A legal or moral norm may be deduced only from another, 
higher and more basic, norm; a grundnorm: this leads Rommen to 
say that 'but for his agnosticism ••• [his] ••• thought 
structure would have led straight to the conclusion that this 
basic norm must be the law of God, in whom being and oughtness 
are identical and who has revealed His law in the order of 
being, in the ordo rerum, from which through intui tion or by 
discursive thinking we derive the precepts of a natural 1aw.,61 
This seems a faintly ludicrous suggestion; even apart from the 
curious statement 
God, it is an odd 
would change his 
that 'being' and 'oughtness' are identical in 
procedure to assume that if only an opponent 
views about religion he would necessarily 
opposite of that which he currently holds. It 
sharp relief the question that d'Entreves 
mentions: Rommen appears to require a particular religious 
belief as a prerequisite of the perception of natural law. Only 
accept a code the 
also raises in 
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if certain metaphysical assumptions are made is it possible to 
perceive the reasonableness of natural law. 
D' Entreves believes tha t a number of classical natural law 
theorists present an alternative basis. Grotius held that 
natural law theory 'would have a degree of validity even if it 
should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost 
wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men 
are of no concern to Him.' 62 Natural law has, according to 
Grotius, the same kind of authority as that two and two make 
four. 63 According to d'Entreves, the 'doctrine of natural law 
which is set forth in the great treatises of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries - from Pufendorf's De lure Naturae et 
Gentium (1672) to Bur1amaqui's Principes du Droit Naturel 
(1747), and Vattel' s Droit des Gens ou Principes de 1a Loi 
Naturel1e (1758) - has nothing to do with theology. ,64 There is 
thus a tradition of non-religious approaches to natural law, 
which is especially important in any attempt to justify a 
similar position. Interestingly, Temple once remarked that 'in 
its nature ••• the moral judgment is quite absolutely 
independent of religion. ,65 We should note also that any 
adherence to natural order is essentially, for Temple, a 
rational process: 
We • • • avoid the grea t blunder of supposing tha t 
being true to nature means being true to the 
primitive and the elementary; it means truth to the 
general course and tendency which we find in the 
process of nature where such progress can be traced, 
, 66 
and whatever the cause of such progress may be. 
To examine cause, to trace progress, course and tendency, 
requires the exercise of critical reason. 
In an earlier chapter, I considered whether an examination of 
psychological and anthropological evidence would indicate an 
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innate capacity for morality. It is not here possible to 
present a complete natural law system, but it is possible to 
outline the basis of such a system, built upon the idea that it 
is natural to behave in a certain kind of way. The position to 
be argued is consistent with Brentano's belief that 'the word 
"natural" may refer to those rules which can be known to be 
correct and binding, in and for themselves, and in virtue of 
their own nature. ,67 I have already suggested that the basis of 
human morality may be the consequence of preference leading to 
particular activity: and it is activity, and the analysis of 
activity, which seems to provide the true basis of natural 
order. 
To do this requires the rejection of the Cartesian tradition of 
stressing the cognitive aspect of man, and to look instead to 
the concept of the acting person. This notion demands, in 
various ways, a return to Aristotle's belief that ethics is an 
activity; his Nicomachean Ethics is meant, in essence, to be a 
handbook on self-fulfilment, by living well as a human being. 
In recent times, this approach has been exemplified in the work 
of Wojtyla. Working from the premise that man is a 
psychosomatic unity, Wojtyla considers the phenomenon of 
conscience: it is a datum that the intellect renders the self 
capable of, reflection on his own actions, and it is - as 
Brentano insists the case that we observe no phenomena 
neutrally: in Brentano's terminology, we feel 'love' or 'hate' 
towards the phenomena presented to the mind. (We would be more 
likely to say that we have 'preferences'.) This sense of 
preference is the beginning of conscience: we move organically 
from believing something is preferable to questioning about why 
it is preferable; and thence, critically, to whether it is 
justified to consider it preferable. It is a matter of 
experience that preferences change; by reflection and by 
intercourse with others, we do change our opinions. But, it is 
also true that preferences change unconsciously: my childhood 
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passion for cream horns has entirely disappeared, for reasons I 
cannot discern. This change in tastes is thus only partly 
rational. I use the term 'organic' to distinguish the 
transition from a 'logical' or 'mechanical' one: it is partly 
mysterious, it certainly does not demonstrate a formal logic: 
but it is real. Likewise, it is a datum that human beings 
actually are in action: by being born into a community we are 
in a network of activities. It is worth remembering that 
activity actually precedes thought: a baby is active and 
inter-active (it moves, acts and responds) long before 
developing the capacity to reflect on that activity. The 
beginning of reflection is reflection on activity of self and 
others already in process. To this extent, the tendency of some 
philosophers to write as if there were first meditation and 
only then thoughtful action is a misleading one: the model 
presented for theoretical purposes is only a model. In the 
process of life, ethical activity is, as it were, partly 
reactive: social processes are ongoing, through the activity of 
myself and others, and my contemplation and criticism of right 
action occurs within that context, rather than as a passive 
onlooker. Indeed, even as a 'contemplative onlooker' I am not 
inactive: each new phenomenon is an alteration of my pattern of 
preference, and I change wi th the new inter-action brought 
about by each change of circumstance. Thus, the alteration of 
circumstances triggers the 'organic' change from 'is' to 
'ought'. By a slightly different path of reasoning from the one 
just outlined, Wojtyla concludes: 'In each of his actions the 
human person is eyewitness of the transition from the "is" to 
the "should" - the transition from "X is truly good" to "I 
should do X",~ 68 To put it another way, we are necessarily in 
activity, and, as it is human activity, it is the subject of a 
degree of reflection we do not, as a matter of fact, 
habitually act entirely without thought - and that reflection 
includes imaginative foresight: we can envision possible 
futures. Because we think in terms of preferences, we find some 
possible futures preferable to others, for whatever reasons, 
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and tend, because we are in action, to guide our activity. To 
think of what is, before the mind, because of the kind of 
organism we are, leads us to prefer; and the transi tion to 
should be, from preference, is a natural one. It is natural 
because we are in activity: and activity presents us with 
choices. To act is itself to choose, even though we may not 
have realised it: by acting I have chosen to act. Because the 
human organism is active, it becomes committed to choice: 
theoretically it can at any point act in a variety of ways - it 
has the capacity to do so - but circumstance means that it 
cannot act in all ways that it is capable of doing. I have the 
capacity to eat or not to eat: but I can only do one of these 
at one time. I can do either: I must do, now, only one. Thus, 
from being a creature capable of choice, and as an active 
being, I am necessarily choosing. The choice may be this or 
that; but I am bound to make it, and, because to be human is to 
be reflective, I naturally say, 'what should I do?' It is the 
inescapable fact of choice that creates the possibility of 
obligation; and the fact of choice flows from the nature of my 
being as active. 
The nature of the choice, with the concept of duty, flows from 
the inevitably communal face of activity: as Wojtyla says: 'The 
person's duties with regard to other people ••• occur in virtue 
of an interpersonal nexus of "participation" that manifests 
itself in the personal intertwinings of the coexistence and 
collaboration of people. ,69 He believes that the root of moral 
judgment lies in consideration of activity: 
••• any moral value, whether good or bad, presupposes 
the performance of the action, indeed full-fledged 
performance. If action fails to be actually performed 
or if it betrays in some respects the authenticity of 
self-determination, then its moral value loses its 
foundations or at any rate partly loses them. Hence 
any judgment about moral values, about any merits or 
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demerits attributed to man, have to begin by 
determining efficacy, self-determination , and 
responsibility; in other words, we have first to 
establish whether this particular man-person did or 
did not perform the action. 70 
The basis of judgment is hence the action, and it is natural to 
ask of an action whether it worked whether the action 
achieved the results intended; and to ask that is to assume the 
reali ty of intentionali ty. Where we can infer intention, we 
apply the concept of responsibility; but none of this removes 
the central point that it is the fact of the action from which 
the judgments flow. 
Wojtyla believes that in the attribution of a judgment there is 
necessarily a moral dimension: 
••• the performance of the action by the person 
should not be seen as having a purely ontological 
significance, since ••• the performance itself of the 
action by the person is a value. If we call this 
value "personalistic" it is because the person 
performing the action also fulfils himself in it, 
that is, acquires a personal feature. 71 
The implication is that the moment we speak of responsibility 
or efficacy of an action, we are making a judgment about a 
person. Further, it is a personal judgment because a person who 
has performed an action is a different kind of person from one 
who has not. A saint is a man who has acted in a saintly way (I 
am speaking of a psychosoma tic uni ty - he has acted in a 
saintly way in answer to saintly thoughts): I am not a saint if 
I have not. The fulfilment of saintliness happens only in 
action, and it is only action which is fully capable of being 
judged. (This is consistent with Aristotle's view that one is 
not really moral while asleep: morality is an activity). 
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We are now speaking the language of 'persons', 'actions' 
'responsibility', 'judgment', 'intention'; and this is the 
language of ethics. Each, as I think, Flows from the fact of 
human activity, from the reality of activity as in part 
intellectual. From the fact of activity we may find a 
productive basis for an ethical system, based on the natural 
basis of man as i) acting, ii) reflecting, iii) judging, and 
iv) being in community. 
The American philosopher, Alan Gewirth, may serve as an example 
of one way of developing the consequences of an action-centred 
path towards a concept of natural order. He believes tha t 
activity in the individual creates a demand for certain kinds 
of rights; to be active requires the making of choices, which 
need a degree of freedom of movement and imply responsibility. 
Activity takes place in a sphere in which there are others: and 
one must interact with others. This involves what Gewirth calls 
'transactions' 72; as a centre of consciousness who acts and 
needs to act, I meet and deal wi th others who have the same 
needs. If I wish to act, I must permit that ability to others: 
a transaction is something that happens between people 
adjusting their choices and actions to each other, and, as I 
suggested, to act implies choice. Thus a transaction presumes a 
certain degree of rights to each participant. From this fact, 
Gewirth deduces his 'Principle of Generic Consistency' [PGC]: 
'Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as 
well ~ of yourself,.73 Gewirth continues: 
The PGC is a necessary principle in two ways. It is 
formally or logically necessary in that for any agent 
to deny or violate it 
he would then be in 
rights he claims for 
is to contradict himself, since 
the position of holding that 
himself by virtue of having 
certain qualities are not possessed by other persons 
who have those qualities. The principle is also 
materially necessary, or categorical, in that .•• the 
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obligations of the PGC cannot be escaped b 
--- y any agent 
by shifting his inclinations interests . d 1 
, , or 1 ea s, 
or by appealing to institutional rules whose contents 
are determined by convention. Since the generic 
fea tures of action are involved in the necessary 
structure of agency, and since the agent must hold 
that he has rights to these features simply insofar 
as he is a prospective purposive agent, he rationally 
must accept that his recipients also have these 
rights insofar as they too are prospective purposive 
agents. 74 
If he is correct, Gewirth has deduced a moral principle from 
the fact of activity. This could provide the basis of a natural 
order system: he notices some important parallels 75 between the 
two ideas, and he attempts to deduce both personal and communal 
ethical principles from his original perception. 
In the present context, we should note that an understanding of 
the principle requires the kind of perception of the other 
agent demanded by Temple and Josiah Royce: only wi th such 
imaginative insight would it be possible to recognise the 
nature of the activity of another. In reality, of course, it 
seems not implausible that he is as much a centre of 
consciousness as I am; certainly it seems less implausible than 
any alternative view. But this requires thought the 
discernment of the nature of things. Once the matter has been 
recognised, we seem to be tracing the general course of nature, 
and the particular kind of organism which is the acting person. 
We have also, by implication, granted value to the person, as 
at least equal to the value I claim to myself by acting - the 
point made by Wojtyla. Each of these things is a natural fact, 
and appears naturally valuable. Any thought, any choice, 
concerning activity should therefore take account of them -
action is about a person or a person's acting - and any system 
of guidelines for conduct should not violate them, and should 
349 
respect their priority. And that, I suggest, provides a basis 
for natural order: as a fact of nature, certain things are 
valuable, on the basis of the nature of activity. 
Further analysis may suggest other features of activity which 
need to be taken into account. Aristotle and others believe 
that the pursuit of happiness (or what is perceived as 
happiness) is an inevitable feature of human activity: Max 
Scheler 76 speaks of love as an aspect. It is not possible in 
the present limited space to develop these points: my concern 
has been simply to try to demonstrate the possibility of a 
natural order conception, based on the nature of the person. If 
the case is reasonably made, it may provide some theoretical 
credibili ty to Temple's posi tion and conclusions, especially 
if, as I believe, that justification can be made independently 
of particular religious belief. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE PHILOSOPHER 
Any final assessment of the value of Temple's contribution to 
philosophy remains difficult. He is indubitably a transitional 
figure, and at times seems caught between the Idealism of his 
upbringing and the developing currents of twentieth century 
thought, both theological and philosophical. If, as I have 
suggested, there is apparent throughout his work a deeply non-
propositional approach to questions of revelation, he is 
clearly at one with the main trends of modern theology, and yet 
there is also something of the nineteenth 
apparent optimism about the progress of 
continuing Platonism in his philosophy. 
century in 
mankind and 
his 
the 
Part of this difficulty in any judgment of Temple lies in the 
problem noted by W.R.Matthews: 
To speak candidly, I think the defects of Temple's 
method of philosophising come to the surface ..• We 
are persuaded, while we read, that in principle the 
problem is solved, but subsequent reflection awakens 
doubt whether the solution may not be partly verbal. 
I remember, after a meeting of the Doctrinal 
Commission at which he had produced an amazing 
formula which appeared to satisfy everyone, saying to 
him, "If you had been at the Council of Nicea we need 
never have lost the Arians." I meant to express 
admiration, though I fear he did not take it so, and 
since then I have wondered if it was not also an 
unconscious criticism. l 
There is, as any careful reader quickly realises, a remarkable 
verbal felicity in Temple; and it is certainly true that after 
prolonged reflection one is often aware of gaps in argument -
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it is easy to be swept along by the confidence of exposition. 
One of the dangers of this is tha t there is a temptation to 
feel the victim of deception, and hence subsequently to be 
harsh in criticism. David L. Edwards has perceptively described 
him as 'a philosopher, or rather a philosophically minded 
preacher,2, and there is truth in this description. Many of his 
books, not least Nature, Man~d God, are the texts of courses 
of lectures, and there is an evident rhetorical and apologetic 
tone throughout his work. In all his writing there is a sense 
that his philosophical training is being deployed in defence of 
previously accepted religious dogma. Matthews comments that: 
. . . I bel ieve tha t Temple's reverence for the 
tradition of the Church prevented him from 
criticising drastically any doctrine which had become 
a part of the tradition. At least he had an almost 
insuperable reluctance to abandon it. In the case 
before us a considerable part of the difficulty 
arises from the conception of God as self-sufficient. 
Why not try the hypothesis, suggested by the Gospels, 
that God is not self-sufficient?3 
I have devoted part of this thesis to the question of the 
difficulties posed by the problem of evil if we adhere - as 
Temple appears to do - to a strictly Platonic, timeless and 
self-sufficient God. 
This creates a particular tension 
unreservedly a process theologian, 
endorsement of Whi tehead in Na ture, 
in seeing 
despi te his 
Man and God. 
Temple as 
apparent 
Whitehead 
conceives the world in dynamic terms, and we are to think in 
terms of 'process' and 'organism'. He believes the world to be 
made up from 'actual entities,4, which range from the tiniest 
fragment of existence to God at the top of the scale. The world 
process consists of the 'becoming' of these actual entities. It 
is important to notice that the entities are alone wholly real 
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(we may compare this with Kotarbinski' s notion that the sole 
constituents of the universe are material objects): mentality 
is not a separate substance, but a pole of a bipolar actual 
entity. For Whitehead, every entity has a mental (though not 
necessarily conscious) and a physical pole. 
God, as 
mental 
himself an actual entity, is 
or conceptual pole, which 
himself bipolar. 
Whitehead calls 
The 
his 
'Primordial nature', is unchanging, complete, and the source of 
all ideals and possibilities. In the primordial sense, he is 
not dependent on the universe, indeed has no reference to any 
particular creation. But, his ideas are conceptual only: they 
lack actuality, which can only be supplied by physical 
experience in a temporal world. This side, the 'consequent 
nature', 'is determined, incomplete, consequent, everlasting, 
fully actual, and conscious' 5. It depends entirely upon the 
evolving universe for its reali ty: 'The "consequen t na ture" of 
God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the 
evolving universe,6. By 'prehension' he means the involvement 
of actual entities with each other in a nexus of relationships. 
This involves a kind of panpsychism: Whi tehead speaks 
constantly in the images of an interweaving of material and 
mental: 'The primordial nature is conceptual, the consequent 
nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon His 
primordial concepts. 7 • thus, the whole is organically 
connected; each of our partial, limited experiences is taken up 
into a uni ty in the consequent wisdom: 'God's na ture is bes t 
conceived ••• [as] ••• a tender care tha t nothing be los t ,8. In 
this sense, what is emphasised is not God as immutable creator, 
but God as the patient and wise guide of the universe: 'He does 
not create the world, He saves it: or, more accurately, He is 
the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by His 
vision of truth, beauty and goodness,9. The emphasis is on the 
personal aspect of God: 'What is done in the world is 
transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven 
passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal 
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relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven , 
and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the 
great companion - the fellow-sufferer who understands ,10. 
In some respects, Whitehead's metaphysics are difficult to 
comprehend; and certain aspects of his conception of God are 
incoherent. For instance, he sees the primordial nature of God 
as envisaging all eternal objects. But this envisaging, we are 
told, lacks consciousness. Does God then have, under this 
aspect, only a kind of blind feeling? If so, it is hard to see 
how all possibilities, all conceptions are to be represented to 
this blind feeling. It is also difficult to see how the 
realisation of particular concepts can make no difference to 
the primordial nature if it is seen as yearning for 
actualisation. It is hard to see that such actualisation would 
not create change in that which seeks actualisation, unless the 
primordial nature is itself simply a kind of blind longing, 
separate from the consequent nature of God in every way. And if 
that is the case, we seem to have a divide between two natures 
in God, an uncrossable chasm between one part and the other, 
quite as great as the traditional bifurcation between mental 
and physical, which, by means of his concept of bipolari ty, 
Whitehead endeavours to avoid. He has created a division as 
incomprehensible as that which Temple uses to differentiate 
between the side of God which knows the future and that which 
does not. 
A further difficulty with Whitehead's conception of the 
primordial nature of God has been indicated by Rasvihary Das: 
This nature lacks fulness of actuality as well as 
consciousness. These defects are supposed to be 
remedied by His consequent nature. the consequent 
nature of God consists in the physical prehensions of 
the temporal actualities of the world. But how or 
where are these actualities to be had? They have no 
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being prior to the being of God. Since they can arise 
only by initially feeling physically other 
actualities, it is apparent that God must already be 
actual, if there are to be any actualities at all. 
thus we find that the temporal actualities cannot 
realise themselves unless God is already actual, and 
God cannot actualise Himself unless the temporal 
actualities are there. We do not know how we can get 
over this difficulty.ll 
This objection perhaps takes us to the heart of a particular 
difficulty encountered in both Whitehead and Temple, the 
question already raised about the merely verbal solution of 
a problem. What is meant by a 'actual' or actuality'? Is it 
precisely the same as 'physical' or 'material' realisation? In 
a continually evolving universe, it is difficult to say that a 
thing is wholly realised. The actual child is the potential 
adult; but the actualised adult has no potential to be a child, 
yet it is hard to see the adult as somehow less than the child, 
or the ashes of the man at the end of his life as somehow a 
fuller being than he was when alive. Which actuality is 
harmonised wi th God? Or is it, as I am inclined to think, 
simply erroneous to assume that we should consider 'actuality' 
as something in itself instead of seeing it as a purely verbal 
device to indicate, for convenience' sake, a particular stage 
which, for the sake of argument, we so designate. in different 
guises, for the sake of particular purposes, we may call the 
same thing 'actual' or 'potential', 'realised' or 'unrealised'; 
and the given word is defined not by the object itself but by 
the perspective from which it is examined. 
The problem of the apparent verbal solution appears in 
Whitehead's notion that all things are harmonised in the 
consequent nature of God. this comes close to a quasi-mystical 
notion of 'Oneness'. It is one thing to speak of a harmony, 
created by God, but quite another to see how, in practice, 
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quite incompatible things are to be harmonised and yet in any 
significant sense retain their identity. If the lion lies down 
with the lamb, it seems to lose something of itself. At what 
time, and in wha t way, can the victim be harmonised wi th the 
aggressor? Whitehead's God does not forcibly harmonise things: 
we are told that things are harmonised in the rightness of his 
feeling. It is difficult to see how a subjective feeling can 
right an objective wrong. I may feel that a wrong 'out there' 
in the world may not feel so wrong, much as a Christian 
Scientist may experience pain as purely imaginary: but that 
seems to devalue the reality of evil which, I believe, is an 
essential element in a truly Christian understanding of the 
world. 
In Whi tehead, there is a sense in which the unders tanding of 
God is frankly mystical: 'The concept of God is the way in 
which we understand the incredible fact that what cannot be, 
yet is.,lZ I am not convinced that it is possible to say that 
we can ever say that we can ever 'understand' that 'what cannot 
be, yet is', for it is surely impossible to understand a 
contradiction: we can be aware of it, but we remain baffled, 
just as I am aware that a bee flies, though its flight defies 
all known laws of aerodynamics, but I cannot pretend that my 
awareness constitutes understanding. 
If Whitehead's words are to be taken seriously, we must see his 
explanations as inevitably incomplete, a verbal attempt to 
mediate, to picture a universe which is sacramental, and which 
itself is vividly shot through with the presence of God. In 
this we find a po in t of uni ty wi th Temple. For Temple, as we 
have repeatedly seen, the universe is itself the source of 
revelation, 
through the 
sacramental 
whether through truth, beauty and goodness, or 
collective religious experience of mankind. The 
nature of the universe, in which the object of 
salvation is not simply men's souls, but the whole of creation, 
is an idea emphasised in many twentieth philosophers and 
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theologians, including, as well as Temple and Whitehead, 
Teilhard de Chardin, Hartshorne and Alexander. 
Temple does not accept so dynamic a view of God, with 
consequences we have seen when considering the problem of evil. 
Mcquarrie has noted the dilemma posed by different strands 
within the movement usually called Process Theology: 
The more thoroughgoing and consistent realists 
Alexander, Whi tehead, Hartshorne bring God into 
time so that he becomes to some extent a God who is 
'on his way', so to speak, a God who in one way or 
another is not yet complete in his perfection, a 
natural God rather than a supernatural God. Others -
Morgan and Joad among the philosophers, Temple and 
Thornton among the theologians - definitely put God 
beyond the spatiotemporal world, making him the 
eternally perfect supernatural god of traditional 
theism. And this difference of opinion about God 
seems to lead us to a dilemma; for there is no doubt 
that the first of these two conceptions of God is the 
most satisfying intellectually, and the one that is 
most consistent with the realist approach to 
metaphysics; but at first glance the second is more 
satisfying religiously, though by placing God beyond 
space and time in some superempirical realm it throws 
away those virtues of realist metaphysics ... and 
reverts to the 
supernatural. 13 
old-style metaphysics of the 
The question that Mcquarrie poses is whether the God of 
Whitehead and Hartshorne, the God who suffers with mankind, can 
be the object of the deep awe and reverence which is a t the 
heart of religion. He concludes: 
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We must remember tha t Whi tehead recognises a 
primordial as well as a consequent nature in God; 
that his disciple, Hartshorne, has argued that the 
idea of God who completes himself is more consonant 
with the 'living' God of biblical revelation than the 
idea of a static perfection; that the notion of a God 
who is in some manner still 'on his way' goes far 
towards easing the problem of evil, so intractable 
for traditional theism; and that such a notion also 
gives fuller meaning to the moral life of men by 
taking seriously their responsibility as 'co-workers' 
with God. >At least, it cannot be lightly said that 
such an idea of God is not religiously satisfying, or 
that it does not accord with the Christian idea of 
God, freed, perhaps, from some of its patristic and 
medieval accretions. 14 
By a different route, based not on the bipolar actual entities 
of Whitehead, but on Kotarbinski's understanding of space and 
time, and more agnostic than Whitehead on the nature of God, I 
have reached a not dissimilar view. My intention has been, by 
avoiding the kind of argument employed by Whitehead, to avert 
the dangers of an incoherent type of metaphysical speculation. 
* * * 
In Whitehead is an intense Platonism - in this he is apparently 
at one with Temple. But, despite his enthusiasm (he once 
famously remarked that the history of philosophy consists of 
footnotes to Plato), he is aware of the limits of Platonism, 
more acutely than Temple. Bluntly he states ' ... Plato is the 
originator of the heresies and of the feeblest side of 
Christian Theology' 15. His criticism requires full quotation, 
for it points to a crucial weakness in Temple's position: 
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· . . When PIa to is faced with the problem of 
expressing the relationship of God to the World, and 
of the relation to the World of those ideas which it 
is in God's nature to contemplate, Plato's answer is 
invariably framed in terms of mere dramatic 
imitation. When Plato turns to the World, after 
considering God as giving life and motion to the 
ideas by the inclusion of them in the divine nature, 
he can find only second-rate substitutes and never 
the originals. For Plato there is a derivative 
second-rate God of the World, who is a mere Icon, 
that is to sayan image. Also, when he looks for the 
ideas, he can only find, in the World, imitations. 
Thus the World, for Plato, includes only the image of 
God, and imitations of his ideas, and never God and 
his ideas. 
Plato has definite reasons for this gap between the 
transient world and the eternal nature of God. He is 
avoiding difficul ties, al though he only achieves the 
feeblest of solutions. What metaphysics requires is a 
solution exhibiting the plurality of individuals as 
consistent with the unity of the Universe, and a 
solution which exhibits the world as requiring its 
union with God, and God as requiring his union with 
the World. Sound doctrine also requires an 
understanding how the Ideals in God's nature, by 
reason of their status in his nature, are thereby 
persuasive elements in the creative advance. Plato 
grounded these derivations from God upon his will [my 
italics]; whereas metaphysics requires that the 
relationships of God to the World should lie beyond 
the accidents of will, and that they be founded upon 
the necessities of the nature of God and the nature 
of the world. 16 
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He goes on to say that Christian theologians have found a 
metaphysical answer in a 'doctrine of mutual immanence in the 
divine nature' 17. It is true that Temple, in Nature, Man and 
God, writes at some length, in particular in the final 
lectures, on the 'immanence of the transcendent' and the 
'transcendence of the immanent'; but there remains a tendency 
towards a dichotomy between spirit and material things. Three 
quotations (italicised in the original) give the flavour of 
Temple's argument: 
The mind of a human being increasingly organises 
itself and its own world apart from the processes 
which, for the most part, control the body within 
which, and (at first) as a function of which, the 
mind has come into being. As mind increasingly takes 
control of the organism, so it becomes increasingly 
independent of the organism as physiologically 
conceived. 18 
For as it is true that matter is the necessary 
condition for the actuality of life and this also of 
spirit, so also is it true that, in our experience at 
least, spirit arises within and as part of an 
organism which is also material, and expresses its 
spirituality, not by ignoring matter but by 
controlling it. 19 
We reach a convic tion of the independence and the 
f 'd r sp1'r1't,' we do not reach a supremacy 0 m1n 0 
conviction of the non-existence of matter. On the 
1't 1'S from an assertion of the reality of contrary, 
matter that we reach our conviction of the supremacy 
of spirit.20 
In the last extract, Temple is - he believes - turning his back 
'wh1'ch we regard as an error due to the effort to on Idealism, 
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construct philosophy as a theory of cognition rather than as a 
h f l·· ·,21 t eory 0 lvlng experlence • He believes that Idealism arose 
as a consequence of 'the elaborate intellectual constructions 
of modern science, which it is impossible to verify by direct 
experience.,22 But the habits of mind inculcated by prolonged 
exposure to Idealism remain in Temple: he sees the spirit as 
something able to be quite wholly independent of the matter out 
of which it arose the idea of psychosomatic unity so 
characteristic of modern psychology, and stressed by Wojtyla, 
appears foreign to his way of thought. That Temple does not 
deny the reality of matter is a long step from Teilhard's view 
of the essential holiness of matter, and the idea that 'God so 
loved the world that He sent His only Son', or the 
interconnectedness that causes Whitehead so specifically to 
emphasise what he sees as the bipolarity of things. 
In Teilhard, there is a profound sense of interpenetration of 
spirit and matter; the noosphere may be a kind of giant cosmic 
envelope" but the geosphere and biosphere (matter, inorganic 
and organic) are contained within it, and are integral to it. 
Temple's stress on mind has led him to conceive of it in terms 
of independence, as controlling, and, most tellingly, as 
supreme over matter. 
There are two dangers in this; and each has profound religious 
consequences. 
the doctrine 
Firstly, 
of the 
there is a danger of misunderstanding 
incarna tion. Secondly, there is a 
temptation to understate the significance of evil. 
The doctrine of the incarna tion has to be seen, I think, in 
terms of scandal. In Christian thought, the idea has led to 
considerable difficulty, chiefly for historical reasons. In the 
early church, controversy surrounded the question of how it was 
possible for the man Jesus also to be God, and how he could be 
related to the doctrine of the Trinity. Important though these 
questions are, the problem of how a man could also be God 
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should not deflect attention from the question of how God could 
also be man; and what that means - or could mean to us. Because 
we think we know the man Jesus, we tend to argue from him to 
God; but the crucial question for us is the taking on of human 
form by God, and what that means for us. 
Part of this problem is rooted in the original sources of 
Christianity, in the Gospels. Rudolf Bultmann has pointed to 
some of the literary weaknesses of the evangelists: they could 
not, for instance, handle crowd scenes - crowds of people speak 
always and only with a single voice. But, more significantly, 
the Jesus of the Gospels is the public Jesus. Most attention is 
paid to his ut terances, some to his miracles, much to his 
public humiliation and suffering. The private Jesus remains as 
it were unknown: the temptations are clothed in the language of 
myth and allegory, and the agony in the garden could not be 
known to disciples who were asleep. Wha tit meant to be the 
human Jesus remains closed to us, private pains only hinted at. 
St. John, in the sublime opening chapter of his Gospel, tells 
us that 'the Word became Flesh and dwelt amongst us', but the 
full weight of the meaning of the phrase is closed. None of the 
gospels, each of which is very short, gives more than even a 
brief sketch of even the public elements of a short, but busy, 
ministry; and of the largest part of Jesus' life, there is no 
record at all. 
An account of the public life is partial, and itself 
misleading. We know how difficult it is for people to recognise 
the private world, with its needs and fears, pains and sorrows, 
of people wi th a public face. (A nun once told me that the 
worst part of her vocation was that no-one imagined she might 
need to use a lavatory). If it is hard to visualise the 
suffering humanity of celebrities and royalty, so more 
difficult is it to visualise (paradoxically) not the Godhead of 
Christ, but his humanity, especially with so little documentary 
evidence. But it is in the humanity of Christ that the extent 
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of the scandal of incarnation lies. In recent years theological 
attention has been fixed on the question of Christ's sexuality, 
and it is revealing tha t to many Christians it seems more 
scandalous that Jesus might have had sexual feelings than 
claims that he was not God. But the Jesus of the pious 
imagination is a curious creature, etiolated and living in a 
kind of haze. The metaphysical assertion that he was without 
sin leads, if we are not careful, to the assumption that, until 
the passion, he was without pain. But to be wholly human is to 
live with, and in, suffering, from infantile indigestion and 
teething pains to the graver sorrows of adolescence and 
adulthood, from bullying to insect bites. Only so does the 
human mind learn endurance and courage; only so does the 
heroism of the passion become possible reality. 
The failure to recognise the extent of the significance of the 
meaning of the incarnation, and the extent of - if the doctrine 
be true - the voluntary self-humbling of God, may be partly 
attributed to the influence of Platonism. If attention is 
devoted solely to the ineluctable, timeless, unchanging, 
infinite God of Platonists, the suffering incarnated God slips 
into the background. It becomes hard to see how Christ fits 
into the scheme of things if God is so self-sufficient and 
immutable. But if we see God not so much in terms of a God of 
goodness, but a God of love, who is moved, and does love, then 
God becomes 'the grea t companion - the 
understands'. This is to stress the 
perspective changes. 
fellow-sufferer who 
humanity of God, rather than the remoteness of Plato's 
disembodied Form. It is also to see an interpenetration with 
the world, which is more than a disembodied 'will' or 'Purpose' 
controlling matter. 
On such a view, suffering becomes more than simply a problem of 
evil' to be explained or even, for some, explained away. There 
is an ancient tradition of associating evil with the material; 
the spiritual seems somehow free of its taint. To concentrate 
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on the spiritual side of Christ is, perhaps, a kind of mental 
defence against too close an involvement with the pain of his 
world and perhaps of ours. Idealism seems also a kind of 
escape; we have seen how rudely shattered was Royce's world by 
the Lusitania sinking. Even in Plato himself, who was so much 
more acute in his psychology than many of his acolytes, human 
evil is reduced to human ignorance. [Temple insisted that much 
evil flowed from man seeking the good, but confusing the 
apparent with the actual good.] 
Hans Kung has recognised the centrality of suffering to a 
redemptive scheme: 
••. suffering ... is encompassed by God; suffering 
too, even though it seems like being forsaken by God, 
can become the point of encounter with God. The 
believer ... looks to the One sufferer in believing 
trust in him 
particularly in 
and maintains 
who is also secretly present 
suffering and who himself sustains 
man in the utmost peril, 
meaninglessness, nothingness, abandonment, loneliness 
suffering particularly 
be the· One whom Jesus 
and emptiness . . . It is in 
that God can be shown to 
proclaimed: • • • the Father of the lost. This God is 
himself the answer to the question of theodicy, to 
life's enigmas, to suffering, injustice, death in the 
world. As Father of the lost, he is no longer a God 
transcendent and remote, but a God close to man in 
incomprehensible goodness, generously and 
magnanimously pursuing him through history, in 
darkness, futility and meaninglessness, inviting him 
to dare to hope, mercifully sustaining him even in 
his remoteness from God. 23 
In Kung's vision, suffering is faced with directness one feels 
missing in Temple. That is not to say that he is unaware of 
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human misery: the range of his writing on social problems, from 
venereal disease to unemployment, is testimony to that, as is 
the evidence of his considerable public activity. 
But there is a difference between awareness of the ills of 
society, especially if they are seen - as they are by some -
simply as social problems to be resolved, and a searing 
existential sense of suffering at the root of things, as 
evidenced in the writings of Kierkegaard and others. Temple has 
too much wisdom to assume that social problems are, as it were, 
external: through all his social wri ting there is profoundly 
present the sense that resolution of social suffering requires 
the reorientation - the right ordering - of men's hearts and 
minds in Christian fellowship. But there remains, as one reads 
him, the sense that he is 
confidence that he has 
serenity, even placidity, 
too readily content, that he has such 
found the truth, that his inner 
has too deeply penetrated his work. 
In personal relationships, such inner strength shines like a 
beacon through English life in the first half of a troubled 
century. To the power of his personality and the depth of his 
faith, many have paid eloquent tribute; and to the roles of 
bishop and archbishop, ecumenist and social activist, he 
brought abilities perhaps unparalleled. But that which made 
him, in his way, so splendid a churchman, is perhaps out of 
character with the philosopher's world of doubt. 
And so we have come full circle, to Temple's idea of truth as 
that which satisfies the mind. In my introduction, I contrasted 
Temple's vision of truth as that which satisfies the mind. In 
my introduction, I contrasted Temple's vision of truth with the 
critical approach of Popper. Perhaps, in seeing Temple as a 
kind of late flower of Idealism, we may discern weaknesses not 
only in that school, but also in others. Temple himself noted, 
as we have seen, that British philosophers had been too much 
concerned with epistemology, too little with metaphysics. To 
h t clear ly illustrates a weakness in any say this per aps mos 
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notion of truth as satisfactoriness. If we make truth dependent 
upon the self, we are interpreting the world in terms of self 
(a view held by a number of empiricists), rather than self in 
terms of the world. The process of growing is one of learning 
how the self belongs in the world in which it finds itself, and 
rarely the other way about; and that, I suggest, is the natural 
inclination of mind. 
* * * 
William Temple, then, cannot unreservedly be deemed a 
philosopher so much as a churchman who deployed considerable 
philosophical gifts in the defence of his fai th and 
evangelisation of his nation. His contribution to events was 
profound: as Walter James has commented: 'The leading British 
figure after 1918 .•. to re-state Christian responsibility for 
politics and economics was William Temple. The movement reached 
a peak during his short tenure of the see of Canterbury, and 
one would have to go back to the Middle Ages to find an 
Archbishop as convinced as Temple was of the relevance of 
Christianity to everyday political affairs.' 24 Robert Craig 
believes that, 
action there 
'In contemporary Protestant social thought and 
are happily significant signs of the permanent 
value of Temple's social teaching, and that these signs appear 
not only in theological formulations but also in the day-to-day 
activities of local and national churches is particularly 
noteworthy.,25 To this we should add his ecumenical efforts -
the significant contribution to the World Council of Churches, 
his efforts at dialogue with the pre-Vatican Council Catholic 
Church, and the example of the Church of South India, whose 
d d · d h t f t Whatever doubts one may evelopment he 1 so muc 0 os ere 
have of him as a philosopher, his achievement is secure, and 
his influence lasting. 
That, perhaps, is enough. 
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